Uncommon Descent Contest 19: Spot the mistakes in the following baffflegab explanation of intelligent design theory

_{Denyse O'Leary

December 26, 2009

Contests}

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In a review in First Things by David B. Hart, of Richard Dawkins’s The Greatest Show on Earth, we are informed – on the mag’s cover – that Dawkins “gets a gold star” for his book of that name (January 2010 Number 199).

Indeed, he does get the gold star from reviewer Hart. Hart is full of praise for Dawkins, though daintily demurs at his hardline atheism. But he is a total, unwavering convert to the greatest scam ever conceived in the history of biology, that Darwinism – a conservative aspect of wild nature that trims out life forms unsuited to an ecology – actually has vast creative powers.

I can’t yet seem to find the review on line, but that was not for lack of trying.

Now the contest: Here’s what Hart has to say about design in nature:

The best argument against ID theory, when all is said and done, is that it rests on a premise – irreducible complexity” – that may seem compelling at the purely intuitive level but that can never logically be demonstrated. At the end of the day, it is – as Francis Collins rightly remarks – an argument from personal incredulity. While it is true that very suggestive metaphysical arguments can be drawn from the reality of form, the intelligibility of the universe, consciousness, the laws of physics, or (most importantly) ontological contingency, the mere biological complexity of this or that organism can never amount to an irrefutable proof of anything other than the incalculable complexity of that organism’s phylogenic antecedents.

Commenters, for a free copy of Expelled, can you spot the mistakes in the quoted passage above? I mean, actual mistakes, as opposed to “He isn’t making any sense.” There is enough of the former, but you will find plenty of the latter too, I am afraid.

Here are the contest rules. Most important: No more than 400 words.

Also: If you won a previous contest quite recently and your prize is late, it is most likely because our post office here has four days off at this time of year, and I can’t do a thing about that. If you won a long time ago and never got your prize, write me at oleary@sympatico.ca

Note: This contest has been judged. Go here for more.

Comments

Upright Biped: It is not a physical property of tree rubber to mix with sulpher, heat itself, and then mould and mill itself into a sphere and dye itself red.
No, the Upright Biped, a natural being, does the mixing.
Upright Biped: So you plainly failed to explain the existence of a red plastic ball in terms of its physical properties.
The question was "What characteristics of a red plastic ball exist outside the realm of physical laws?" The answer is none, and you were provided the means to verify this for yourself. Your new question requires reference to the properties of other entities, such as a few common chemicals and an Upright Biped.Zachriel_{January 4, 2010
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Middle Ages, though Middle Sages does have a ring to it.Zachriel_{January 4, 2010
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StephenB: Methodological naturalism is an arbitrary rule imposed by one group of scientists on another group of scientists.
We agree then that Methodological Naturalism dates to the Middle Sages.
StephenB: No such rule existed before Darwin, nor did one group of scientists ever presume to lecture another group of scientists on methods.
Your concern, then, is that there is some sort of "rule" being imposed. Your claim is that the concept may be old, but the rule is new. Is that correct?
StephenB: What is it about the word “rule” that you do not understand.
Is this a law? In every nation or just some? What prevents you from practicing your preferred investigations? It surely can't be because someone wrote a book. Can you be specific? Exactly what observations, or whatever it is you think is being denied you, can be done to confirm your hypothesis, or whatever it is you call it?Zachriel_{January 4, 2010
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Collin at 115, My apologies for the delay in replying. I hope you had a good New Year celebration. The following link explains what I’m talking about. It is David Chalmer’s “hard problem of consciousness.” . . . Here are some quotes that get at the problem. . . . T.H. Huxley remarked: how it is that any thing so remarkable as a state of consciousness comes about as the result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable as the appearance of the Djin when Aladdin rubbed his lamp” Huxley seems to be arguing solely from personal incredulity, not on the basis of any evidence. So far as we are aware, all of our experience, however rich, is the result of electrochemical patterns in our physical brains, all of which obey the laws of chemistry and physics (with, no doubt, some emergent phenomena due to the complexity of those brains). Unless and until there is evidence otherwise, Occam's razor applies. We have no necessity to multiply entities.Mustela Nivalis_{January 4, 2010
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vjtorley at 107, Thank you for your post, and sorry for my delay in responding to you. I'm afraid I've taken even longer to reply to you. My apologies and I hope you had a good holiday. "The essence of the scientific method is testability. To the extent that critiques of anything are testable, either against logic or objective, empirical evidence, they are subject to the scientific method." Three points in reply: 1. Testability alone does not and cannot define the scientific method. It’s too vague. At any given point in history, the scientific method is defined in terms of a particular set of recognized procedures that are considered appropriate for testing hypotheses. Over the course of time, scientists (and philosophers of science) may need to subject these procedures to further criticism and refinement. When they do so, they are stepping outside the scientific method as it is defined at that point in time. That's an interesting point. I'm not sure I agree that testability is vague, though. Certain testing procedures may work better or worse than others, but the ultimate arbiter is how well a prediction corresponds to objective, empirical evidence. Similarly, the value of a testing procedure is measured against how well it allows such predictions to be measured. 2. Insofar as one can speak of appropriate procedures for critiquing a method for testing hypotheses, it should be clear that what counts as an appropriate procedure for critiquing a method for testing hypotheses is not the same as what counts as an appropriate procedure for testing a hypothesis. The former is one level “up” from the latter. That’s what I meant when I wrote that meta-science could not be explained within the framework of science. I see your point, but both are subject to comparison against objective, empirical evidence of their efficacy. In that sense, both are testable. 3. If I read you aright, you seem to be suggesting that the notion of a test is an “uber-concept” that serves as a yardstick for judging the validity of all other concepts. However, I do not think that this approach to science could possibly work. For in order to answer the question of what constitutes a good test, you would first need to know something about the world in which you were performing your tests – i.e. the framework of reality, or structure of the world. In other words, questions about what makes a good test presuppose at least a rudimentary grasp of metaphysics. That has to come first. Scientists need to explore the world and try to understand it before they can think of a good way of testing hypotheses about events occurring in it. Another excellent point. My view is that mechanisms that allow our predictions to iterate to more closely approximate what we see in reality are more useful. They are tested, in fact, against the real world. That being said, there is an assumption there that the real world is understandable. As long as it is recognized as an assumption that may lead to a contradiction if the real world is not actually understandable, I don't think it interferes with using testability as a criteria. You also wrote: "Humans can certainly come up with all kinds of wild ideas that have nothing to do with reality. The process by which they come up with them, though, is (as far as anyone has been able to tell) constrained by chemistry and physics in a physical brain." I agree with you that the process whereby we come up with ideas (or concepts) is constrained by our brains. “Constrain” is not the same thing as “determine,” however. A necessary condition is not a sufficient one. While I found the rest of your comment interesting, I'll stop my response here because the remainder follows from this point of disagreement (or confusion on my part). Do you have any objective, empirical evidence to suggest that there is anything other than a physical brain, operating according to laws of chemistry and physics, responsible for our thought processes? Without such evidence, speculating on possible other mechanisms is premature.Mustela Nivalis_{January 4, 2010
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Wow, Zachriel blathers on and on about "the scientific method" (which really does not exist) when all the while his position cannot even muster a testable hypothesis based on the proposed mechanisms. There is no such thing as “THE Scientific Method.”:
If you go to science fairs or read scientific journals, you may get the impression that science is nothing more than “question-hypothesis-procedure-data-conclusions.” But this is seldom the way scientists actually do their work. Most scientific thinking, whether done while jogging, in the shower, in a lab, or while excavating a fossil, involves continuous observations, questions, multiple hypotheses, and more observations. It seldom “concludes” and never “proves.” Putting all of science in the “Scientific Method” box, with its implication of a white-coated scientist and bubbling flasks, misrepresents much of what scientists spend their time doing. In particular, those who are involved in historical sciences work in a very different way—one in which questioning, investigating, and hypothesizing can occur in any order.
Joseph_{January 4, 2010
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Jerry, your post caused me to take the time to read the Hart article. Its a complete head-shaker, starting with the term "special evolution". I assume Mr Hart is a TE, one who will invent phrases in order to swallow.Upright BiPed_{January 3, 2010
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----Zackriel: "That’s a reasonable statement of Methodological Naturalism. This shows that the basic principle was established long before Darwin." {I don't cite the quote because it is irrelevant} Methodological naturalism is an arbitrary rule imposed by one group of scientists on another group of scientists. No such rule existed before Darwin, nor did one group of scientists ever presume to lecture another group of scientists on methods. What is it about the word "rule" that you do not understand.StephenB_{January 3, 2010
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Zach, "Assuming you are really interested in making a plastic ball, you can start with naturally occurring rubber (from trees), vulcanize it by heating it with sulpher, then mould or mill the final product. Quite servicable. You can dye it your favorite colour too!" So you plainly failed to explain the existence of a red plastic ball in terms of its physical properties. It is not a physical property of tree rubber to mix with sulpher, heat itself, and then mould and mill itself into a sphere and dye itself red. Your smugness in that face of what is obvious is noted. It no doubt comes from an assumption on your part. One which suggests you know more than you can prove through science.Upright BiPed_{January 3, 2010
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Hart 3 - "While it is true that very suggestive metaphysical arguments can be drawn from the reality of form, the intelligibility of the universe, consciousness, the laws of physics, or (most importantly) ontological contingency, the mere biological complexity of this or that organism can never amount to an irrefutable proof of anything other than the incalculable complexity of that organism’s phylogenic antecedents" There are some non sequiturs in this long sentence. Essentially, it is ok that certain subjective things (reality of form, the intelligibility of the universe, consciousness or (most importantly) ontological contingency) can be considered as evidence of something which is not stated here but which we assume is an intelligent creator but that somehow biological complexity is not. How is this logical? While these subjective arguments and the laws of physics (which are very objective ) are solid arguments, to classify the fact that biological organizational complexity is so absurdly unlikely by natural processes as not a good argument is how can I say illogical. A major argument that is based on science and data is suspect to Hart. Why? No reason is given by Hart other than his objection. The extremely high likelihood that natural processes could not produce this organized complexity but is routinely produced by intelligent intervention seems to be meaningless to Hart. The production of information and the use of this information to control highly complex functions is at the essence of ID. The fact that this information has never been produced by naturalistic processes and then Hart criticizes ID, astonishes (and I should be careful how I use the term) credulity. My guess is that Hart has an agenda and it is not seeking the truth or wishes to have a conversation about it. An aside. In his full review, Hart uses the term special evolution more than once and I was curious if Dawkins actually used the term since Denton uses it in his book, Evolution, a Theory in Crisis. So I downloaded Dawkins book onto my wife's Kindle and searched for the term special. Dawkins does not use the term special evolution in his book.jerry_{January 3, 2010
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Hart 2 - "At the end of the day, it is – as Francis Collins rightly remarks – an argument from personal incredulity." Another illogical statement. This is not an argument against anything. There is nothing in the term "personal incredulity" or the term "God of the Gaps" that falsifies a proposition. It is a rhetorical argument using a particular philosophical point of view that has no basis in logic. More on that later. Basically, what the argument from personal incredulity says is that if someone says he cannot fathom how something was done by naturalistic processes, then that means it could not have been done in a naturalistic way. It goes back a couple hundred years to when LaPlace said "I have no need of that hypothesis" in answer to Napoleon question about the place of God in his treatise of the universe. LaPlace had explained how the variations in orbits of the planets were natural oscillations and that no intervention by God was necessary for the orbits to be stable as hypothesized by Newton. Thus, was born the God of Gaps or its alternative expression, the arugment from incredulity. It has petrified scientists ever since from pointing to an intelligent intervention but as I will point out immediately not always. This illogical argument is applied against ID but not in the way most understand it. To illustrate this, take Stonehenge or Easter Island. Both have large stone formations that appear to be the result of some intelligence. Does the scientist say their origin is due to natural forces playing out over time. No, they say they were intelligently designed. They are certainly less complex than the organized complexity found in life but why then are these stones intelligently designed. It is because they cannot fathom how these relatively un-complex entities could have formed through natural causes and thus they attribute them to intelligence. The difference is that at the time of the origin of the stones, specific intelligences were known to exist, humans, even if no specific human population can be identified with the stones. No scientist thinks that apes did it or that some form of bird did it. They only think that humans did it. The interesting phenomena is that these scientists are attributing some special quality to human intelligence? But what about life and specifically the organized complexity in life. It is certainly magnitudes greater in complexity than the stones at Stonehenge and Easter Island and these stones at these two places could have had millions of years to form. The difference is there is no known intelligence around at the time of the formation of organized complexity in cells and multi-cellular organisms. But wait a minute. Is Hart denying that God exists. In Hart's world, wasn't God available. So why couldn't his God be the intelligence? For Hart, He obviously exists at the time of the formation of life and its associated complexity. Why cannot God be the source of complexity. After all we automatically assume and I bet Hart does too, that the stones of Easter Island were designed by humans. Why is God eliminated from the design of organized complexity in life? ID does not say the intelligence was God but it certainly does not deny that it could have been. Obviously, some want to make that leap and it is not illogical but because it is not illogical it does not mean that is what ID says. If an intelligence was known positively to exist at the time the Earth formed then no one would be questioning the origin of the life on Earth. They would be saying that because life is so complicated that it must have had an intelligent origin. Even Richard Dawkins admits that. So Hart is again seemingly very illogical.jerry_{January 3, 2010
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I have broken up Hart's review into three separate parts and after each have placed my comments. My analysis certainly can be improved and any constructive criticism would be welcome. They were mostly written while at a one year old's birthday party. Each part will be in a separate comment. Hart 1 - "The best argument against ID theory, when all is said and done, is that it rests on a premise – irreducible complexity” – that may seem compelling at the purely intuitive level but that can never logically be demonstrated." This response is quite long. But first. Is irreducible complexity as defined and modified by Behe at the heart of the ID argument or is irreducible complexity just a proxy for all the arguments at the heart of ID. For now I will assume that irreducible complexity just means functional complexity in a cell or organism, that is complex entities within the cell or organism that have function. The issue is the origin of this functional complexity. ID in general has examined some specific phenomena in the history of matter and has concluded that there is no known naturalistic processes that can explain these phenomena. The phenomena can loosely be grouped into origin phenomena. What are the causes of certain origins that appear to be singular in nature. For example, the origin of the universe, the origin of an extremely rare planet we call Earth, the origin of life, the origin of species with novel complex capabilities and the origin of consciousness. These are five seemingly singular events with one origin having numerous singular origins, namely the origin of novel complex capabilities of life forms. Once organisms have these complex capabilities it not hard to understand how they are passed on to subsequent generations but their initial appearance go so far seems beyond the capabilities of naturalistic processes just as the comments on this and similar forums are beyond the capabilities of naturalistic processes. When Hart says that irreducible complexity can never logically be demonstrated he is guilty of making a very misleading statement. His statement implies that most things in science are logically demonstrated. And they are not. Very few things in science are logically proved as would be with a theorem in Mathematics. Thus, this criticism is illogical in the sense that nearly all science is based on induction and not deduction which is the traditional use of the statement "logically demonstrated." The author uses the term logically as if ID should follow from a deductive sequence. Actually some science follows a deductive sequence but if this the process of establishment that Hart expects ID to follow, he is being extremely disingenuous. (It should be noted that some philosophers consider inductive reasoning a form of logical demonstration. The fly in the ointment for such a stance is always the black swan.) Now after saying all this, the establishment of ID is going to be logical or deductive. And to do this it is necessary to develop a critical dichotomy. In order to understand the logic behind ID it is necessary to consider causes for any phenomena. If A and B are exhaustive of all the possible causes of a phenomena and mutually exclusive and if A is not true then B must be true. This is the critical dichotomy. Thus, under such a situation, to establish B all one has to do is falsify A and vice versa. For ID, the two domains under analysis are A - the causes of a phenomena are due to natural laws only and B - the causes of some phenomena are somehow due to the intervention of an intelligence with the processes of the natural laws so that phenomena under examination that could not occur normally, has occurred. This does not mean that Domain B excludes natural causes but only that the normal result of these natural causes are altered by intelligent interventions. Natural causes due to the initial conditions of the Big Bang have produced a multitude of phenomena that is the result of just the interactions of the material and energy available at the Big Bang and the four laws of physics. These are in Domain A. However, there are certain phenomena that these initial conditions could not have produced except for the intervention of an intelligence. These are in Domain B. For the phenomena in Domain B the natural forces that were contravened might be quite insignificant but some parts of a phenomena are due to the intervention of an intelligence with what normally would have happened. Domain B would include any phenomena that was even modified minutely by an intelligence. It is obviously possible that some phenomena in Domain B might appear that they could have happened in Domain A. So certain phenomena in Domain B are hard to identify as belonging there while other phenomena are obviously in Domain B. For example, the building of an automobile could never have resulted from just the natural laws operating on the material and energy of the universe no matter how long it was allowed. But when someone plants wild flowers on a hillside it may be hard to know if it was due to intelligent intervention. Except if the wild flowers appear to be in a pattern. To give an example of A: cosmologist believe the initial pattern of matter just after the Big Bang was minutely un-uniform so that over time, this incredibly small differences in the distribution of matter and energy was enough to give rise to all the disparity in the universe as the four laws of nature played out over time. That is stars, galaxies, planets, inter stellar dust, energy distributions, the formation of all the elements and the myriad distributions of dark matter and dark energy were the result of incredibly small differences in the initial distributions of matter and energy at the Big Bang. These were the initial and boundary conditions at the beginning of the universe that explain all the distribution of matter and energy in the universe today. Domain B would be any deviation from this expected pattern that was due to an intelligence intervening in the interaction of these four laws and the distribution of energy and matter at any time in the history of the cosmos. It can be a slight intervention with the operation of natural laws or a major one but the thing in common is that there have been interventions. For example, if an intelligence could have modified the non uniform distribution of matter and energy at the Big Bang by just a small amount an entirely different universe would have arisen in terms of the distribution of galaxies, stars etc. In later times on Earth, a small intervention might be for an intelligence to dam or divert a small tributary of a river to create a new flow of water to prevent flooding or increase water availability in a certain area. After the diverting or damming nothing further may be done and essentially the river flows as before but with a slight adjustment. Using the four basic forces of nature, this diverting would never have happened. In Domain B are also major interventions with the operation of natural laws to produce a phenomena that would be so obviously impossible within the scope of the four basic laws, maybe not even possible if there was even an infinite amount of time. For example, the phenomena of producing written comments on this site involves so many interventions that there does not seem numbers large enough to describe the possibilityx of it happening due to natural processes alone. This has so far been long winded in order to set up the dichotomy between A and B and how logic applies. So getting back to domains A and B and science, science frequently works such that it tries to prove either A or not A where in our case A is natural laws only and B is not natural law only. For the time being I am eliminating what has often been referred to as chance and including it under natural law as phenomena due to the four basic laws only but not understood well enough to describe. If one wants to consider chance as something different then it can be included in domain A. Either way chance is part of Domain A. Few conclusions in science since the days of Descartes are based solely on deduction. Rather, case after case of a phenomena are investigated and if the same phenomena is seen to operate in each case or nearly every case, then a law may develop. Over time the litany of individual cases may become a law but not till the number of cases is very large and there is a theoretical basis for the appearance of the cases. Seldom are the laws developed on a deductive basis. But seldom is a law developed that is based on the failure to show anything but in this case ID is supported more and more by the failure to establish something. If as Hart claims, irreducible complexity is at the heart of ID, then there is one way to show it to be invalid. Use induction to show that Domain B is improbable by establishing Domain A. That is show that organized complexity arises from natural causes. That is, point to numerous occasions where irreducible complexity arose naturally. Then using the inductive model, establish Domain A as likely and thus, Domain B as unlikely. To establish Domain B as the likely source for some organized complexity, then one would have to find the equivalent of the black swan for Domain B. As of this moment I am not aware of even one such example in Domain A for organized complexity arising through natural causes and as each new attempt fails, it adds credence to Domain B. So, Domain A has not one factual example let alone the numerous cases that would be required for inductive reasoning to logically apply. Then using logic, Domain B becomes not only possible but probable. Much of science has proceeded by first showing that a certain process is unlikely or impossible and then one looked for another process that would explain the phenomena. That is exactly how ID proceeds. ID posits as a basic premise that most things investigated by science should assume a naturalistic explanation. But some things are obviously not part of the laws of nature such as writings, tools of a certain sophistication, orderly forms of inanimate objects etc and are investigated almost immediately as having an intelligence origin. So to deny that certain phenomena can not have intelligent origin is obviously an absurd argument. So logically, to deny that so called "irreducible phenomena" can not have an intelligent origin is a non sequitur. To say it must have an intelligent origin is also a non sequitur but ID does not claim that. ID just says let's apply a frequent scientific process and investigate organized complexity uing the methods of science. What ID claims is that the origin of many of these phenomena is possibly due to intelligent intervention. It then evaluates this possibility using the tools of science, mathematics and logic by looking at this. All the tools of science are brought to bear on establishing a natural origin for organized complexity and when none are found, logic points to its negation or ID. Thus, the logic of the science is that ID or irreducible complexity is logical and is just the opposite of what Hart claims.jerry_{January 3, 2010
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Upright BiPed: So by all means, please explain the existence of red plastic balls solely by virtue of the physical laws that govern the hydrogen, nitrogen, carbon, and sulfur that constitutes their material make-up.
Assuming you are really interested in making a plastic ball, you can start with naturally occurring rubber (from trees), vulcanize it by heating it with sulpher, then mould or mill the final product. Quite servicable. You can dye it your favorite colour too! If you prefer, you can use synthetic rubber, which can be made by heating sodium polysulfide and stirring in sulpher. Then agitate that with ethelene disulphide and a dispersing agent such as magnesium hydroxide. Add a bit of hydrochloric acid to aid coagulation. Finally, you can vulcanize it with zinc oxide. Don't forget to shake the magic rattle or it won't work. A peculiar species of Hominoidea make them in a variety of colors.Zachriel_{January 2, 2010
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Zachriel, Concerning the red plastic balls, I asked: "Clearly, something “else” has been instantiated into the matter of its existence, which itself follows the physical laws that govern it. Something determined it beyond the laws that describe the materials it is made of. What characteristics of a red plastic ball exist outside the realm of physical laws?" You answered: "clearly none" So by all means, please explain the existence of red plastic balls solely by virtue of the physical laws that govern the hydrogen, nitrogen, carbon, and sulfur that constitutes their material make-up.Upright BiPed_{January 2, 2010
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There is no reason to take recourse to the heavens, the last refuge of the weak, or demons, or to our glorious God as if He would produce these effects directly, more so than those effects whose causes we believe are well known to us.
That's a reasonable statement of Methodological Naturalism. This shows that the basic principle was established long before Darwin.Zachriel_{January 2, 2010
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Seversky (#124) If you're going to quote from Buridan and Oresme, then I suggest you cite them in the appropriate context. You got your quotes from the Wikipedia article, "Science in Medieval Western Europe" at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Science_in_Medieval_Western_Europe . For the most part, it's a very good article. Sometimes, however, it pays to consult the sources. For instance, you assert that the cleric Jean Buridan (ca. 1295-ca. 1358), "contrasted the philosopher’s search for 'appropriate natural causes' with the common folk’s erroneous habit of attributing unusual astronomical phenomena to the supernatural." Here's what Buridan actually said in his Questions on Aristotle's Meteorology:
There are several ways of understanding the word natural. The first [is] when we oppose it to supernatural (and the supernatural effect is what we call a miracle). And it is clear that the meteorological effects are natural effects, insofar as they are produced naturally, and not miraculously... The philosophers, consequently, explain them by the appropriate natural causes; but common folk, not knowing of causes, believe that these phenomena are produced by a miracle of God, which is usually not true... [Emphasis mine - VJT.] Source: Nicole Oresme and the Marvels of Nature: A Study of his "De causis mirabilium" with Critical Edition, Translation and Commentary by Bert Hansen (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1985), p. 59.
Note the qualification: "which is usually not true." And note also that Buridan is talking about meteorology, not biology. You also write:
In the fourteenth century the natural philosopher Nicole Oresme (ca. 1320-82), who went on to become a Roman Catholic bishop, admonished that, in discussing various marvels of nature, “there is no reason to take recourse to the heavens, the last refuge of the weak, or demons, or to our glorious God as if He would produce these effects directly, more so than those effects whose causes we believe are well known to us.”
Here's what Oresme actually said in the Prologue to his treatise, On the Causes of Marvels (De causis mirabilium), also known as the Quodlibeta, composed around 1370:
In order to set people's minds at rest to some extent I propose here, although it goes beyond what was intended, to show the causes of some effects which seem to be marvels and to show that these effects occur naturally, as do the others at which we commonly do not marvel. There is no reason to take recourse to the heavens, the last refuge of the weak, or demons, or to our glorious God as if He would produce these effects directly, more so than those effects whose causes we believe are well known to us. (Emphases mine - VJT.) (Source: Oresme, ibid., p. 137.)
Note the heavily qualified language used in the above passage. Oresme is simply invoking what we now know as Occam's razor. Now, it is certainly true that while Buridan, as a devout Christian, allowed that God could intervene in the natural order of events, he also insisted that "in natural philosophy, we ought to accept actions and dependencies as if they always proceed in a natural way" (Questions on De caelo, book2, question 9, p. 164 (Moody edition). In saying this, he was typical of many late medieval natural philosophers, according to Edward Grant, author of God and reason in the Middle Ages (Cambridge University Press, 2001), some of which can be viewed online at http://books.google.com/books?id=UB0Tao4oikEC&pg=PA199&lpg=PA199&dq=Oresme+there+is+no+reason+to+take+recourse+to+the+heavens,+the+last+refuge+of+the+weak,+or+demons&source=bl&ots=u7xSpb74F2&sig=H5hiz5_f15q1N_D7argXcedHep0&hl=en&ei=zlI_S4CGOYHo7AOs3KzIBQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CAgQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Oresme%20there%20is%20no%20reason%20to%20take%20recourse%20to%20the%20heavens%2C%20the%20last%20refuge%20of%20the%20weak%2C%20or%20demons&f=false . What relevance does this have for intelligent design? Very little, in my opinion. Does it make Buridan a methodological naturalist? Not as the term is understood today. Here's why. As I see it, the aim of ID is to make a persuasive scientific case that certain patterns in Nature can be reliably identified as manifestations of intelligence. Accepting that claim does not commit one to a belief in the supernatural. Even for ID proponents who believe that God is the author of the intelligently designed patterns we observe in the biological realm, it does not follow that the creation of these designs was a supernatural act. As far as ID is concerned, scientists are welcome to search for pathways leading from simple forms to specified complexity. An ID proponent could, for instance, believe (if he/she wished) that the initial conditions of the primordial Earth were very finely tuned by God, in such a way as to make the emergence of life by natural processes inevitable. Ditto for irreducibly complex systems. So much for the notion that ID is supernaturalistic. Nevertheless, you might still ask: what would Buridan and Oresme have made of ID? That's a fair question. Four points need to be borne in mind here. 1. At the time when they lived, Aristotle was the dominant intellectual influence. Aristotle held that the world was eternal, and that each species had always existed. Within his intellectual framework, the problem of how specified complexity arose - let alone how life originally arose - simply did not exist. Nothing arose, except individuals. 2. During the Middle Ages, abiogenesis (more accurately spontaneous generation) was widely believed to be a commonplace and everyday occurrence, as this Wikipedia article illustrates. Indeed, it was even believed that whole animals (e.g. crocodiles) could be generated from inanimate matter such as mud. 3. Describing actions as if they "always proceed in a natural way" does not imply that they always proceed in an unintelligent way. "Natural" does not equate to "blind." 4. As Grant points out (op. cit., p. 198), Buridan, as a natural philosopher, was concerned with what he called the "common course of nature" - i.e. regular events and not singular events. Scientists now consider the origin of life on Earth to have been a singular event, yet they continue to investigate this occurrence, as they should. In so doing, they have already moved beyond Buridan's characterization of science as dealing only with regular occurrences. I would argue that it is intellectually stultifying to limit science to the search for unintelligent explanations of natural phenomena. The world is a more interesting place than it was thought to be in the fourteenth century - or the nineteenth, for that matter. In the twenty-first century, scientists should not be shackled by invocations of dead philosophers. Rather, they should be free to boldly search for the best explanation of natural phenomena, and follow that search wherever it takes them - even if the best explanation turns out to be some kind of intelligent agency.vjtorley_{January 2, 2010
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Zachriel:
If the balls had characteristics outside the realm of physical laws, then the ape creatures (Hominoidea) wouldn’t be able to make them.
What ape creatures make balls? Please be specific. And if you think that humans = ape creatures then you need to provide the scientific data which demonstrates the tyransformations required are even possible. Otherwise you are just talking out of your arse, as usual. Also there is evidence for entity intervention. That you refuse to understand it doesn't mean anything to those who do. Also if you could just step up and support your position then ID would go away. So what are you waiting for?Joseph_{January 2, 2010
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StephenB: You have made another logical error. Methodological naturalism forbids the scientist to make the aforementioned link.
You really need to learn to read more carefully.
Zachriel: Methodological Naturalism is just that, a methodology. vividbleau: Why does the scientific method need a qualifier? Zachriel: It doesn’t.
We consider Methodological Naturalism as a mere heuristic (albeit a very useful one), and reject its application as a hard-and-fast rule because of the empirical ambiguity between natural and supernatural. A clearer methodological demarcation can be constructed without reference to naturalism. The Scientific MethodZachriel_{January 2, 2010
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Interestingly, although the term "methodological naturalism" is young, components of the debate have been pursued within the Catholic Church since the 12th century, and continue to the present day. See the article by Philip J. Jacobs: "An Argument Over 'Methodological Naturalism' at the Vatican Observatory" in The Heythrop Journal, XLIX (2008), pp 542-581. The abstract:
This paper is framed as a continuation of a 12th century debate over whether a ‘profane’ account of nature without reference to arbitrary divine acts in its workings (secundum phisicam) threatens the unity of scriptura et natura that was assumed in the natural philosophy which developed out of the Platonic/Augustinian tradition. Currently this issue takes the form of either a commitment to or circumvention of the protocol of ‘methodological naturalism’ in the explanation of natural history, most clearly with regard to evolutionary theory. The focus of the paper is on the latent disagreement over this issue between two poles of the steering committee which oversaw a series of conferences co-sponsored by the Vatican Observatory. One side was willing to make a sustained commitment to ‘methodological naturalism’, arguing that while nature was not self-explanatory, its inherent characteristics were sufficient for explaining the course of natural history. The other side was initially willing to concede the protocol, but ultimately saw the unity of scriptura et natura threatened. After the introduction, Section II analyzes specific disagreements between the two groups over theological epistemology, theological language, and God as a necessary factor in the explanans of natural history. That analysis becomes the basis in Section III for the assertion that the strategy of the second group involves returning to an older form of natural philosophy with a doxa-episteme progression that allows it to augment the ‘profane’ epistemology of ‘methodological naturalism’ with an esoteric insight in order to recognize what is ‘objectively’ the case. Natural philosophies of this sort permit a ‘semantic variability’ such that the designation of a claim as ‘theological’ can mean that it both is and is not a semantic alternative to claims that follow the protocol of ‘methodological naturalism’. The strength given the claim will depend on the discourse context. The paper concludes with a chart of the multiple and significant differences between the two groups.
Jacobs notes that this discussion has a history extending back to the 12th century.
It is not a new argument since an early version of it was debated in the 12th century. In that period, the cosmology offered in the Timaios provided the framework for a natural philosophy in a Platonic mode which permitted a seamless melding of religious, aesthetic, philosophical, and ‘scientific’ elements. Since this model did not distinguish between ‘natural’ and ‘religious’ knowledge, the ‘prejudice’ of faith was granted an essential position in its comprehensive epistemology. Eventually, however, an interest developed in a methodological program to produce an account in which nature could be known in itself, secundum phisicam, a view represented in the writings of William of Conches (d. 1154). He took the step of stipulating that the cosmos was from the very beginning guided by laws of nature such that its processes proceeded according to an immanent physical lawfulness that could be studied by rational research. In such an account, no reference need be made to arbitrary acts of God. William of Saint-Thierry (d. 1148/49) opposed this, criticizing the inherently ‘naturalistic’ tendency of such a position. His basically Augustinian criticism was taken up as well by Richard of St. Victor (d. 1173) for whom the program of secundum phisicam represented a step toward a ‘profane’ understanding of nature, which in his view was simply not possible. The debate showed how, in the view of some, the idea of ‘profane nature’ functioning independently of specific divine directions threatened to undermine the unity of scriptura et natura. It was suggestive of a disquieting alternative to the kind of integration of theology and ‘science’ that had allowed for theological explanations of natural processes. To demarcate ‘nature’ in this way implied accepting a limitation on the biblical meaning of the divine arbitrium (dominion and authority). The reaction of those opposing William of Conches, therefore, was to reaffirm the integrative natural philosophy of the Platonic/Augustinian tradition.
He further notes that two opposing schools of thought have continued to contest this issue within the Vatican Observatory to the present day:
My strategy for parsing out the differences between them involves creating two ‘constructs’ which will represent the consolidated views of the members in each group. The first position, generally aligned with Richard of St. Victor, includes Robert Russell, Nancey Murphy, and Thomas Tracy [RMT] and the members of the second are William Stoeger S.J., George Coyne S.J., and Ernan McMullin [SCM] who can be seen as sympathetic to William of Conches’ interests.
He describes their contemporary positions:
For [SCM], a central intention of the conferences was to nurture what it sees as a developing rapport between science and theology. It presupposes a version of a ‘consonance criterion’: there should be mutual respect between the two disciplines, with each remaining within the area of its competence and neither making competing claims that infringe on the type of reflection practiced by the other. This criterion, then, presumes a ‘methodological naturalism’, a procedural decision not to permit the admixture of theological claims into scientific inquiry, and specifically into the explanans of natural history. [RMT], in order to fulfill the ‘consonance criterion’, will passively concede at the outset that science must proceed according to ‘methodological naturalism’. Yet [RMT] shares the medieval concern that such a ‘profane’ explanation of nature threatens the unity of scriptura et natura since it would make it unclear how God superintends creation as the biblical accounts propose. Consequently, after its initial concession, it finds a way to have a ‘fluid’ semantic so that the designation of a claim as ‘theological’ allows it to mean that it both is and is not a semantic alternative to claims that follow the protocol of ‘methodological naturalism’. [RMT] can do this by returning to a Platonic mode of natural philosophy that allows it to meld its ‘theological epistemology’ with ‘profane epistemology’ in order to produce a model in which, while different explanations can be offered for the same natural event, there is ultimately just one integrated, comprehensive explanation. The theological claims can, when the context permits, supersede (by augmenting) those of natural science and require mention of the divine agent in order to establish what actually happened/happens. As a result, the original concession of ‘methodological naturalism’, granted possibly for diplomatic reasons, ends up being surpassed by a claim that theology can make ‘objective’ claims about the course of natural history.
With respect to the "semantic variability" suggested by the second [RMT] group Jacobs remarks:
What remains, then, of the commitment [of the LCD faction] to the protocol of ‘methodological naturalism’? I would argue that it can appear and disappear ‘pragmatically’ as a function of the current discourse context. But this pragmatic benefit has its weaknesses since it would seem that it only succeeds when the discourse contexts are kept isolated from one another, otherwise the inherent variability presents debilitating problems. For example, there is the following petard on which [RMT] hoists itself: if God in the details of evolution is to be used intramurally in a parochial discussion of apologetics, then it can be strengthened at will and be presented as a claim in natural history. But what strength should it be given if it were part of an open, intermural polemic against the opponents/atheists? In that context, were [RMT] to weaken the claim to avoid sounding like Intelligent Design, then it would find itself drifting back into a parallel language approach and given the agenda of the new Neo-Orthodoxy it cannot do that. So it would be forced to the Intelligent Design position (and the abandonment of ‘methodological naturalism’), all the while trying (unsuccessfully) to argue that it is not a version of Intelligent Design. The only way [RMT] can avoid this loss of coherence is by intentionally segregating the discourse contexts, even though it is using the same ‘constructive theology’ in both. At this point questions about coherence as well as candor arise once again.
It an interesting article that traces the implications of this debate through quantum physics, the question of randomness, and evolution. Unfortunately, it appears to be available only behind institutional/pay walls.Voice Coil_{January 2, 2010
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----Zackriel: "If a student says a demon turned the solution blue; perhaps it’s true, but unless he can link a demon to the result of the experiment, then the student had best read the sign on the door before turning in the assignment." You have made another logical error. Methodological naturalism forbids the scientist to make the aforementioned link. Indeed, if Moses came back to earth and parted the waters in real time, methodological naturalists would forbid scientists to investigate the matter even while it was happening. In keeping with that same point, methodological naturalism even forbids the admission of evidence for a cosmological big bang since some attribute it to the work of a Divine Creator. Of course, most methodological naturalists are not stupid enough to press the point.StephenB_{January 2, 2010
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---seversky: "The Italian Catholic Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), one of the foremost promoters of the new philosophy, insisted that nature “never violates the terms of the laws imposed upon her.” (Numbers 2003, p. 267)" Galileo was not an advocate of what we call “methodological naturalism,” and that quote Numbers offers is both meaningless and misleading. Indeed, Galileo thought of his system as an alternate interpretation of the biblical texts. That is what got him in trouble, for crying out loud. If he hadn’t allowed religion to leak into his methods, he would have remained free of controversy. However, we can forget about Galileo, if you like. I could fill several pages with examples of scientists who transcended anything similar to what we now know as “methodological naturalism.” Kepler’s works on astronomy contain writings about how space and the heavenly bodies represent the Trinity. Both Descartes and Bacon had systems in which God was important. Newton, in the Principia stated, “The most beautiful system of the sun, planets, and comets, could only proceed from the counsel and dominion on an intelligent and powerful Being.” He also believed that numbers were necessary for understanding God’s plan for history in the Bible. Boyle, in the Christian Virtuoso, wrote that the study of nature was a central religious duty. Some scientists even titled their scientific works as evidence for God’s existence. I could easily provide fifty more examples. With their meager two misplaced examples, Panda’s Thumb and Ronald Numbers have already played out their hand to the max. I have tracked down their methods and they have nothing.StephenB_{January 1, 2010
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----seversky: "It is argued that the concept of methodological naturalism predates both the invention of the term and Darwin’s theory of evolution by centuries, as evidenced by this excerpt from this post at The Panda’s Thumb”: I have already refuted Panda's Thumb and Ronald Numbers many times on this site. That science has often been "primarily" about natural causes is not being questioned. On the other hand, there is no record at all that science has been "exclusively" about natural causes. Panda's Thumb didn't do their homework and neither did Ronald Numbers. I have provided dozens of examples of scientists from Newton to Boyle who allowed design thinking to influence and inform their research. There was no rule to forbid it. That is simply a fact.StephenB_{January 1, 2010
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#123 "It doesn’t." So a scientist need not limit him or herself to hypothesese that can only be explained or by referenced to natural causes and events? Vividvividbleau_{January 1, 2010
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#122 From Wiki: "It is an epistemological view that is specifically concerned with practical methods for acquiring knowledge, irrespective of one's metaphysical or religious views.It requires that hypotheses be explained and tested only by reference to natural causes and events" In other words when doing science one must assume the truth of philosophical naturalism since naturalism asserts that nature is all there is. If nature is all there is then all causes must be natural causes. If it is not assumed when doing science that naturalism is true why the requirement that explanations can only be explanations that invoke natural causes? Seversky: "The term “methodological naturalism” was coined, apparently, to distinguish the investigative methodology of science, which is held to be neutral on the question of supernatural causation," This from Wiki "It is an epistemological view that is specifically concerned with practical methods for acquiring knowledge, irrespective of one's metaphysical or religious views." One can hold to any metaphysical or religious view they desire but WHEN doing scince they have to assume that PN is true. To assume that PN is true when doing science they are also assuming that any metaphysical view that contradicts naturalism is untrue. So when you say "which is held to be neutral on the question of supernatural causation," This is flat out contradictory. If when doing science one is only permitted to put forth "natural" explanations how can science be neutral on the question of supernatural causation? In fact to point to the supernatural as a scientific explanation is verbotten. It is by definition non science! I stand by what I said in #121 "MN is not about method rather it is a metaphysical presupposition that requires that WHEN doing science one must assume that naturalism is true." Vividvividbleau_{January 1, 2010
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StephenB @ 119
Methodological naturalism is an arbitrary rule established by Darwinists to rule out intelligent design apriori. Everyone studies natural causes, but not everyone defines science exclusively on those terms. Only Darwinists do that.
vividbleau @ 121</b
MN is not about method rather it is a metaphysical presupposition that requires that when doing science one must assume that naturalism is true.
The term "methodological naturalism" was coined, apparently, to distinguish the investigative methodology of science, which is held to be neutral on the question of supernatural causation, from ontological or philosophical naturalism, which asserts the metaphysical claim that nature is all there is. It is argued that the concept of methodological naturalism predates both the invention of the term and Darwin's theory of evolution by centuries, as evidenced by this excerpt from this post at The Panda's Thumb":
Ronald Numbers, one of the leading experts on the history of creationism, writes,
The phrase “methodological naturalism” seems to have been coined by the philosopher Paul de Vries, then at Wheaton College, who introduced it at a conference in 1983 in a paper subsequently published as “Naturalism in the Natural Sciences,” Christian Scholar’s Review, 15(1986), 388-396. De Vries distinguished between what he called “methodological naturalism,” a disciplinary method that says nothing about God’s existence, and “metaphysical naturalism,” which “denies the existence of a transcendent God.” (p. 320 of: Ronald L. Numbers, 2003. “Science without God: Natural Laws and Christian Beliefs.” In: When Science and Christianity Meet, edited by David C. Lindberg, Ronald L. Numbers. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, pp. 265-285.)
A few additional points worth noting here: 1. In case you didn’t know, Wheaton is a conservative evangelical school where the faculty and staff must agree with a detailed statement of faith. 2. The idea of methodological naturalism is of course much older than the term, stretching back centuries to the distinction between primary and secondary causes. (Glenn Branch dug around and found some evidence that the term may be older, but perhaps like the term “intelligent design” the words are associated occasionally over the decades, but without really being codified as an Official Term.) 3. But perhaps it was Darwin and those other dogmatic Darwinists that came up with methodological naturalism in the 1800’s in order to ram evolution down everyone’s throats. Not according to Numbers:
By the late Middle Ages the search for natural causes had come to typify the work of Christian natural philosophers. Although characteristically leaving the door open for the possibility of direct divine intervention, they frequently expressed contempt for soft-minded contemporaries who invoked miracles rather than searching for natural explanations. The University of Paris cleric Jean Buridan (a. 1295-ca. 1358), described as “perhaps the most brilliant arts master of the Middle Ages,” contrasted the philosopher’s search for “appropriate natural causes” with the common folk’s erroneous habit of attributing unusual astronomical phenomena to the supernatural. In the fourteenth century the natural philosopher Nicole Oresme (ca. 1320-82), who went on to become a Roman Catholic bishop, admonished that, in discussing various marvels of nature, “there is no reason to take recourse to the heavens, the last refuge of the weak, or demons, or to our glorious God as if He would produce these effects directly, more so than those effects whose causes we belive are well known to us.” Enthusiasm for the naturalistic study of nature picked up in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as more and more Christians turned their attention to discovering the so-called secondary causes that God employed in operating the world. The Italian Catholic Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), one of the foremost promoters of the new philosophy, insisted that nature “never violates the terms of the laws imposed upon her.” (Numbers 2003, p. 267)

Seversky_{January 1, 2010
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Zachriel: Methodological Naturalism is just that, a methodology vividbleau: Why does the scientific method need a qualifier?
It doesn't. That's why we deem it a heuristic, a useful rule of thumb. It uses a folk definition of supernatural, which can be construed for our purpose as a vaguely defined, unevidenced and extraneous entity, to eliminate most common, historical errors. If a student says a demon turned the solution blue; perhaps it's true, but unless he can link a demon to the result of the experiment, then the student had best read the sign on the door before turning in the assignment. Absolutely No Demons Allowed in Lab.Zachriel_{January 1, 2010
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StephenB: Methodological naturalism is an arbitrary rule established by Darwinists to rule out intelligent design apriori.
Methodological Naturalism dates to the Middle Ages (Buridan, Galileo, LaPlace, to mention a few natural philosophers who predate Darwin). Only the term is new.
StephenB: Science can study any subject it pleases any way that it pleases as long as its methods are reasonable and rigorous.
As long as they are grounded in repeatable empirical observations. As mentioned above, the term supernatural is not well-defined. It's more of a folk term used as a heuristic.
StephenB: No one, prior to the 1980’s, has ever dared to tell the scientist which methods he may use or what subjects he may investigate.
Natural philosophy, including methods and limits of scientific investigation, also date to the Middle Ages.
Zachriel: Science rules out vaguely defined, unevidenced and extraneous entities.” StephenB: Science rules out nothing.
Science certainly can and does rule things out when they are contrary to the evidence. Science also ignores extraneous entities.
StephenB: Darwinists fight me tooth and nail to avoid the obvious truth that the law of causality is absolutely necessary for scientific rigor.
As we've seen, your idea of causality is contrary to normal scientific usage (though whether you defined your usage or not isn't clear).Zachriel_{January 1, 2010
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"Zackriel: “Methodological Naturalism is just that, a methodology" If its just a methodology why the qualifier? Why does the scientific method need a qualifier? MN is not about method rather it is a metaphysical presupposition that requires that when doing science one must assume that naturalism is true. Vividvividbleau_{January 1, 2010
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---Upright Biped: "What characteristics of a red plastic ball exist outside the realm of physical laws?" ---Zackriel: "A lot of red balls are made by a peculiar species of terrestrial ape creatures for their juveniles. They do so by harnessing physical laws, including work and energy. If the balls had characteristics outside the realm of physical laws, then the ape creatures wouldn’t be able to make them." I don't think that is what UB had in mind. He appears to be referring to what Aristotle called, "substance," which is characterized as something real and distinct from a thing's collection of parts---expressed as the thing's "being" or its nature,"---a permanent property of an object without which it cannot be what it is as opposed to something else.StephenB_{January 1, 2010
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----Zackriel: "Methodological Naturalism is just that, a methodology." Incorrect. Methodological naturalism is an arbitrary rule established by Darwinists to rule out intelligent design apriori. Everyone studies natural causes, but not everyone defines science exclusively on those terms. Only Darwinists do that. Please read the FAQ. ----"Science has historically been defined in terms of casting off vaguely defined, unevidenced and extraneous entities." Science can study any subject it pleases any way that it pleases as long as its methods are reasonable and rigorous. Only materialist atheists feel otherwise. No one, prior to the 1980's, has ever dared to tell the scientist which methods he may use or what subjects he may investigate. The reason for that should be obvious: Only the scientist knows which questions he is trying to answer and is, therefore, the only one who knows which methods are the best means for obtaining the answers to those questions. ----"Science rules out vaguely defined, unevidenced and extraneous entities." Science rules out nothing. It sits at the feet of nature and waits to be instructed. Any other approach is ideology. What an irony. Darwinists fight me tooth and nail to avoid the obvious truth that the law of causality is absolutely necessary for scientific rigor. At the same time, they lecture me on the need to rule out demons in the name of scientific integrity. What a laugh.StephenB_{January 1, 2010
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