Questions in evolution: How do jellyfish, crustaceans and beetles just suddenly appear?

_{Denyse O'Leary

January 3, 2008

The Design of Life}

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Animals suddenly appear … and after that nothing much happens. Why? How?

Read the latest post, linked above, at The Design of Life blog and help me think about this. (Currently, I am learning to cope with the fact that Alley Oop has been lying to me for, like, tens of thousands of years, so I can use the help wth thinking.)

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Comments

vividblue, I very much appreciate your postings on this blog things must have gotten a bit boring for you over at ARN. I also think you bring forth some valid objections to ID and hope you stick around. Thank you very much! I do think though that there are some instances where you seem to ignore what certain writers are actually saying and thus at times it makes one wonder if you really are desirous of interacting with the arguments being put forth in an honest way. As you (and everyone else) can see by tracing the thread, KF has become increasingly insulting, demeaning, pedantic, and supercilious as our debate progressed, while I maintained focus on the issues rather than on his personal failings. This probably made me a bit hasty and less objective in my last response. In any event, I'm open to correction - let's see where I've gone wrong... I think a fair reading of KF’s post would have shown you why dealing with you as if you were an Evo Mat is not odd at all. I had already told KF quite explicitly that I was neither an evolutionist nor a materialist. Each of my points about ID stands no matter what is true about either evolutionary theory or metaphysical ontologies. He continued to call me an "Evo Mat" simply because I too believe ID is vacuous, which is an error on his part. AIGUY: “To my charge that ID doesn’t actually say anything about what is supposed to account for living things, Kairosfocus repeats that living things are really complex and then ends up saying..." VIVIDBLUE: NO this is not what Kf said and trying to represent this as the case is IMO disingenuous. You're quite right, I plead guilty to skimming his response and not taking it seriously. OK, then, here goes... To summarize KF's points: a) minds create CSI b) again - minds create CSI (I think that's what he means here) c) therefore CSI implies minds at work Aside from the problem in defining "mind" this argument is fallacious because it affirms the consequent: a) minds create CSI b) X contains CSI c) therefore X was created by a mind only minds create CSI Here is a real-world example of this mistake in science: Chemical reactions such as oxidation (burning) create light and heat, and for much of the history of science was the only thing known to create light and heat. So everyone thought the sun's radiation arose from chemical reactions, and was mystified that the sun did not quickly run out of chemical fuel (it's a miracle!). Now we know that nuclear fusion is not a chemical reaction, but gives off light and heat just the same. In the same way, other properties or laws of nature of which we have no understanding may result in CSI. KF continues... d) ID predicts purposeful structures, clever integration..., creativity that surprises and informs us... Put this way, it is the ancient theological argument from design (these adjectives are not operationalized scientific definitions). Dembski went to all that trouble to (ostensibly) operationalize CSI - why not go with that? e) Forensics, archeology, pharmacology, reverse engineering... And here we have KF ignoring what I've written in this thread: Each of these disciplines is fully predicated upon our knowledge of human beings, and none of these disciplines has any notion whatsoever of "intelligent agency" that is divorced from human beings. f) aiguy is willfully obtuse This is what I mean about KF's uncivil discourse. g) Humans did not exist prior to humans existing h) So ID must be true and we did not create ourselves Help me out here, Vividblue - I have no response to this. i) Thermodynamic argument against abiogenesis I have no idea how life started, and neither does KF. But that doesn't mean ID is a non-vacuous explanation. j) Therefore ID must be true k) The universe is fine-tuned, so ID must be true KF wants to believe that "a highly intelligent, powerful, creative" being just happened to somehow come into existence, or has existed forever, or exists outside of space and time, or is "necessary", or something. Further, he wants to believe that this being had the means to create the universe. I find this hard to swallow, which is why I am not religious. It is no more implausible to imagine that the universe just happened to necessarily pop into existence just as it is, all "front-loaded" with the complexity we observe. We truly have no understanding of either of these scenarios. l, m, n) I'm willfully obtuse because I point out that nobody understands what "intelligent agency" is supposed to mean Uh huh. o) evolutionary materialists are impotent Uh huh. OK, those were KF's points. Now back to you... AIGUY: “Unfortunately, nobody can say what “mind-related characteristics” is supposed to mean.” VIVIDBLUE: Aiguy well KF did this very thing... Now you may not like his answer but to represent that nobody can say what mind characteristics is supposed to mean is blatantly false, Kf “did say” and you just ignored it. I would suggest you deal with Kf’s position not try to rewrite history. Sorry, but you're wrong on this one. All he has said is that CSI is created by mind/intelligence - he never said what the characteristics of mind are supposed to be. If these characteristics are merely "can create CSI", then we have a fine summary of ID theory: ID Theory says that CSI is created by that which can produce CSI" So what might "characteristics of mind" be? Perhaps consciousness, or contra-causal free will? Surely these are characteristics of mind, no? Well, fine - let ID claim that these very things are what their scientific theory entails, and then we can talk about how we might ascertain if these characteristics can be shown to exist by looking at the evidence! What about the ability to learn, something that all intelligent creatures can do (even evolutionary processes learn!) Can ID provide any support whatsoever that the Designer is capable of learning? No, of course not. Instead of actually talking about what their theoretical explanation is supposed to mean, ID proponents simply cover their beliefs with the opaque blanket of "intelligent agency" and hope nobody will ask to peek underneath to see what it is actually supposed to mean. I'm not talking about the "identity" of the designer here - I'm talking about the meaning that these magic words are intended to convey. You go on to say. “Sorry, but there is no scientific theory of mind” Did KF state that there was? No. My point was that one cannot provide a scientific explanation for some phenomenon by saying words which have no scientific meaning. The words "intelligent agency" is something that philosophers write about, and they all disagree about what these words mean, and what they are supposed to entail. I think it is KF’s position that we empirically know that mind exists is by its effects. I agree, but this is just wrong. There is not one single instance where we have ever inferred the existence of a mind in the abstract and confirmed our inferrence. Never, in any area of scientific inquiry, period. We have only inferred the activity of human beings, or other animals, who may be more or less "intelligent" depending on how you choose to define the term. I only point out these things because i want you to stick around. Vivid I thank you for your corrections and input, and again for your warm welcome!aiguy_{January 8, 2008
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Aiguy I very much appreciate your postings on this blog things must have gotten a bit boring for you over at ARN. I also think you bring forth some valid objections to ID and hope you stick around. I do think though that there are some instances where you seem to ignore what certain writers are actually saying and thus at times it makes one wonder if you really are desirous of interacting with the arguments being put forth in an honest way. You say: "This is odd, as I’ve already told Kairosfocus, I advocate neither Darwinism nor materialism. To my charge that ID doesn’t actually say anything about what is supposed to account for living things," I thought Kf was very clear on why he is treating you as an Evo Mat even though you deny that you are either a Darwinist or materialist, it is because "AIG of course refuses to elaborate his own view, but in so doing has consistently used arguments raised by Evo Mat advocates. It is proper for me to respond to the underlying theme of those arguments." I think a fair reading of KF’s post would have shown you why dealing with you as if you were an Evo Mat is not odd at all. You go on to write "To my charge that ID doesn’t actually say anything about what is supposed to account for living things, Kairosfocus repeats that living things are really complex" NO this is not what Kf said and trying to represent this as the case is IMO disingenuous. And "Unfortunately, nobody can say what “mind-related characteristics” is supposed to mean." Aiguy well KF did this very thing. a –> First, as I have elaborated in my always linked [cf my handle left column], organised, complex, functionally specified [and often fine-tuned in so being functional — i.e perturbations beyond a fairly narrow limit destroy functionality] information is a reliably known characteristic of mind — i.e. intelligence — at work. Now you may not like his answer but to represent that nobody can say what mind characteristics is supposed to mean is blatantly false, Kf “did say” and you just ignored it. I would suggest you deal with Kf’s position not try to rewrite history. You go on to say. "Sorry, but there is no scientific theory of mind" Did KF state that there was? I think it is KF’s position that we empirically know that mind exists is by its effects. Rather than deal with his position you make a pronouncement regarding something that as far as I can tell KF never said. Now maybe he thinks there is a scientific theory of mind , I do not know but I don’t recall reading in his latest post that he advocated such a position. I could go on but I wont since the above examples I think make my point that you sometimes do not interact with the arguments and positions put forth by your counterparts and worse substitute things that were never presented. I would suggest that you not regurgitate what you want Kf’s positions to be rather read and interact with what is actually being said. I only point out these things because i want you to stick around. Vividvividblue_{January 8, 2008
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kairosfocus, in 95, said "... with implications for the now common “quantum indeterminacy makes room for mind” type issue raised by Q in the previous thread, and answered there." I didn't mean that quantum indeterminacy makes room for mind. I meant that quantum indeterminacy makes chance and regularity fundamentally inseparable. No argument about the real world ever can accurately claim that there is 100% regularity with 0% chance. Instead, it requires arguments to actually address the probability that chance or regularity is being observed. If you think that makes room for mind, it is your interpretation.Q_{January 8, 2008
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Onlookers, ...the refusal of evo mat advocates to engage... This is odd, as I've already told Kairosfocus, I advocate neither Darwinism nor materialism. To my charge that ID doesn't actually say anything about what is supposed to account for living things, Kairosfocus repeats that living things are really complex... and then ends up saying: In short, we know a lot. And we have serious scientific grounds to infer to mind-related characteristics of the agent[s] directly or indirectly responsible for life. Unfortunately, nobody can say what "mind-related characteristics" is supposed to mean. What is responsible for creating flagella? Mind-related characteristics, that's what! This is not an explanation of anything. K was unable to engage the illustration regarding animals that build artifacts out of instinct, apparently confused by the fact that I happened to pick "termite mounds" rather than "spider webs" as my example, as though that made any difference. Then, he argued the precise point I had already countered: Even if the termites (or the spider) were not intelligent, whatever created them must have been. Apparently K didn't understand that the very same problem faces him at every step in the causal regress (perhaps the creator of the spider was just as instinctive as the spider itself, and so on...) From there, K descended into theology, explaining that he has personally met some unnamed "intelligent being" (who is presumably capable of creating life). I'm happy for K, but doubtful this has anything to do with the biological sciences. K then listed five "theses": THESIS I] we empirically know the FACT of mind. Sorry, but there is no scientific theory of mind, K. Perhaps you give cognitive scientists such as myself too much credit, but in fact we do not have an understanding of consciousness, intelligence, will, or any other fundamental aspect of what we call "mind". You believe that mind is some mysterious power that transcends the physical universe, but that is your metaphysical/religious belief, and not an "empirical fact". THESIS II] We empirically know some of the capabilities of mind. This is also wrong, obviously. We empirically know some capabilities of human beings, and we know some capabilities of other animals too. Nobody knows the capabilities of "mind", however, since we don't even know what "mind" is. THESIS IV] We have an invitation to explore the possibilities of mind. By all means - I have been doing exactly that for my long career in AI. Perhaps you ID folks can help answer the question of what minds are and how they work - that would be great, and then you might begin to be able to put together some sort of theory of ID. Until then, though, your "theory" is completely vacuous. AIG of course refuses to elaborate his own view, but in so doing has consistently used arguments raised by Evo Mat advocates. Since K can only argue against "Evo Mat", he is confounded by the fact that I am not an Evo Mat advocate. Too bad. And by the way, I have already stated my stance: In 21 I explained that I did not believe evolution accounted for biological complexity, and in 75 I explained I was a neutral monist rather than a materialist. In point of fact, what he refused to address cogently is that “Error exists” is undeniably true, as to deny iot is to instantiate it I refused nothing, obviously - I simply asked K to relate Royce to the present discussion! He failed to do so; instead, he simply reiterated that CSI is supposed to indicate "mind" (his metaphysical res cogitans) and that we have no proof that minds require physical bodies (true, but our experience indicates otherwise). In summary, everything that K has said has been wrong, irrelevant, or both.aiguy_{January 8, 2008
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Onlookers: Observing the onward interaction has only underscored the force of my earlier point on the essential futility of this thread occasioned by the refusal of evo mat advocates to engage on the merits responsively, but instead to simply multiply objections [while never acknowledging cogent responses]. I will comment on a few illustrative points, as I said yesterday. (Unless I see reason to infer that this thread will become productive, I see little or no reason for further substantive comments here): 1] Re AIG, 87: Until ID says something about the nature of whatever is supposed to account for life, it says nothing at all. The explanation of “intelligent agency” is utterly vacuous. Nothing follows from it, and no information is gained by labeling the unknown cause of life as “intelligent”. NONSENSE!
a --> First, as I have elaborated in my always linked [cf my handle left column], organised, complex, functionally specified [and often fine-tuned in so being functional -- i.e perturbations beyond a fairly narrow limit destroy functionality] information is a reliably known characteristic of mind -- i.e. intelligence -- at work. b --> Indeed, this is the empirical basis for much of how we operate in the real world. c --> So, now, when we detect FSCI, we -- on reliable, empirically anchored grounds -- know that mind has been at work. d --> So, we can expect to find: purposeful structures, clever integration of aspects of the entity or process being observed, creativity that surprises and informs us, etc etc. e --> That holds for the world of arson investigations. it holds for archaeology. It holds for pharmacology [including whodunit on poisoning . . .]. And much more. Indeed, it is a premise of reverse engineering in hardware and software. f --> So straight out the starting gate, we know the above objection is willfully obtuse. The issue is why . . .
Now, further to that onward search, we observe that on the cellular level, biological life forms are seen to be sophisticated information-bearing and using self-maintaining, self-replicating autonomous systems, with all sorts of clever algorithms and surprising tricks of the trade that we are only now beginning to reverse-engineer. We know that the information storage capacity involved is well beyond 500 - 1,000 bits. That raises several interesting implications and issues:
g --> We were not there at the time of [1] OOL, or of [2] origin of body plan level bio diversity [OOBPLBD], and we are the products of whatever process led to [3] the origin of embodied beings with sufficiently reliable minds [OOEBWSRM] for intellectual inquiry and its products in a high-tech sci-tech civilisation to exist. h --> Thus, on issues 1 - 3, we can reasonably infer and reliably though provisionally know [as is true of all significant sci-tech thought] that intelligent agents were at work, and that on grounds of temporal sequence of causes and effects in a dynamic situation, "we did not create ourselves." i --> Moreover, we know on good thermodynamics principles grounds, that the chemistry, thermodynamics and physics generally of plausible prebiotic conditions could not credibly have given rise to the required organised complexity on the gamut of the observed cosmos; cf. always linked, app 1 esp point 6. [Resort to unobserved quasi-infinite arrays of sub-cosmi is a resort to metaphysical speculation, not science, and is addressed in the always linked.] j --> Therefore we credibly know that we are not the only intelligent agents that exist, nor the most capable such agents. Indeed, such agency was credibly active long before our own existence. k --> Factoring in [iv] the origin of a fine-tuned, life-facilitating cosmos with sophisticated underlying physics [OOFTLFCWSP], we have arguably got good reason to infer onward that a cosmogenetic agent exists. So, we know that the concept that a highly intelligent, powerful creative agent who set up a cosmos as a stage in which life could then originate and be elaborated up to and including OOEBWSRMs, is a scientifically possible explanation of origins. l --> We also know from much experience and observation -- cf here in my always linked -- that causal dynamics as a matter of general observation trace to chance and/or necessity and/or agency. m --> Further to this, on the statistical thermodynamics and observation grounds mentioned and linked above, we know that chance and/or necessity only are dynamically and/or probabilistically impotent on the gamut of our observed universe [the focus of scientific explanation] to account for FSCI. But intelligent agency, on much observation, is. n --> So, we know that the statement that inference to intelligence above is vacuous, is a manifestation of willful obtuseness in the teeth of much experience, and that it is likely to be in service to worldviews and agendas hostile to the idea of intelligent agency involved in origins i to iv supra. o --> So, we finally know too that the statement on "the unknown cause of life" is a confession of the dynamical and probabilistic impotence of the evolutionary materialist views commonly met in the academy, but insistence that such views must prevail.
In short, we know a lot. And we have serious scientific grounds to infer to mind-related characteristics of the agent[s] directly or indirectly responsible for life. 2] Just as your hunch (that the immediate cause of the mound was intelligent) was wrong, your hunch that the cause of the cause of the mound might be wrong as well. And while you may continue to evaluate this causal regress as long as you’d like, you will never be able to show that some unseen designer was not just another instance of a “CSI conduit”. For all ID can show, it is turtles all the way down. Further willful obtuseness. First, I never proposed that termites were intelligent agents, not that termite mounds were direct products of intelligent agents. Indeed, I never brought up termite mounds at all, but responded on a contrast between arrow heads and spider webs, by pointing out that the sophisticated programmes involved in the latter point to agency as their source. So this is all about a strawman in whose mouth has been put hopefully convenient words. But, mind how you set up and ignite strawmen, they can fall on you. In this case, has AIG ever seen a case of a sophisticated program that wrote itself based on lucky noise etc? Or, is it not the case that all observed cases trace to intelligent agents, and not to infinite chains of them either, very directly so. So, on what empirically anchored grounds can AIG infer to such an infinite regress, that he wishes to put in my mouth? That brings us to . . . 3] You can pretend to know that the universe started with an uncaused cause, and you can pretend to know that this uncaused cause was intelligent rather than pre-programmed, but you do not know these things. It is no more plausible (and certainly no more empirically verifiable!) to imagine an uncaused intelligent being than an uncaused pre-programmed universe. How did it get programmed? I don’t know - how did the Designer get intelligent? HW: AIG, kindly first read here, on basics of phil analysis across comparative difficulties and inferences to best explanation [BTW, the basis for scientific inference], then here on basic worldviews options on origins. Then you wil be able to speak based on some foundation of knowledge not ill-informed, triumphalistic, sophomoric rhetoric that falls into selective hyperskepticism thus self-refutation. FYI, first, I can confidently know that if the world in which we live shows itself to be full of contingent creatures, and to itself be contingent, then it necessitates a necessary being as its sufficient explanation. Such a necessary being will be uncaused, and so will not need to learn or acquire key characteristics as you raise above -- on any major worldviews option. The live options issue is whether that necessary being is some sort of quasi-infinite, unobserved [and probably unobservable] quantum foam of bubble universes or the like, or an agent. On grounds partly discussed supra and as elucidated and onward linked in my always linked, section D and E, I infer to intelligent agent as my own worldview. This is a phil option in light of empirically anchored comparative difficulties analysis that emphasises coherence and elegant explanatory power, not question begging. Along with a great many millions of others over many centuries, including many of the greatest minds of all time, I do also claim to know that intelligent being on a personal basis, through interpersonal encounter. That, too, is not question-begging, it is an empirically -- experientially -- anchored claim, one that I can observe the positive effects of across my life and that of many others. You are free to reject this, but not to escape the worldview level intellectual [and entailed moral] consequences of how you come to reject it, as can be seen above. 4] My main point is that “intelligence” is a label covering our ignorance about what minds are and how they work. To offer this as an explanation of natural phenomena is vacuous. Let's put it another way:
THESIS I] we empirically know the FACT of mind. THESIS II] We empirically know some of the capabilities of mind. We feign no poorly anchored hypotheses to explain beyond further investigation and exploration, the structure and mechanism and ontology of mind. So, THESIS IV] We have an invitation to explore the possibilities of mind. For that, THESIS V] Computer systems [in the broadest sense of ICT based machines and similar entities in living systems] offer us a very useful tool, for we can see in it how information, a known major artifact of mind, can interact with material systems through the use of symbolic codes.
I doubt that these five theses amount to vacuity that can be dismissed. 5] I do not happen to adhere to “materialistic determinism”, and that my arguments here do not depend on defending this particular stance. Onlookers, I have in 66 above and following, raised the issue as a relevant consideration on the known prevalent view of many on mind. AIG of course refuses to elaborate his own view, but in so doing has consistently used arguments raised by Evo Mat advocates. It is proper for me to respond to the underlying theme of those arguments. Next, if AIG would follow the link I already made, he would see that the argument I make is to the incoherence of both deterministic and stochastically/ indeterminacy/ chance driven evo mat, with implications for the now common "quantum indeterminacy makes room for mind" type issue raised by Q in the previous thread, and answered there. Further to this, 6] I recall Royce’s point about the proposition “Error exists” as being a critique of epistemological relativism. Yet again, you bring up these references as though they have a profound relevance to our discussion, but you seem incapable of showing how. H'mm. Let's see: I asked AIG to address this in the context of Adler's paper on Little Errors at the beginning and their deleterious consequences, especially on Kantian phenomenalist thought, with a link to the part of my own always linked note, where I remarked briefly on this. So, this is yet another strawman, and here one for which AIG is culpable of at least gross neglect of duty to fairness before making adverse comments on another person's capacity. Sadly telling. In point of fact, what he refused to address cogently is that "Error exists" is undeniably true, as to deny iot is to instantiate it. It is thus self-evidently true and it entails that there is knowable truth about the real, external world of things in themselves, however fallibly we may come at such knowledge. Thus also, we as knowing subjects, are well-warranted to hold that mind is capable of interacting with the world of things in themselves, and of acting causatively on it, as we must do that to learn and know. Further, that in so doing, FSCI is a key tool we use, and one that leaves empirical traces that other knowing subjects may observe and make inferences from to the presence of intelligent mind in action in other bodies or upon other bodies. By contrast, we have no good warrant for inferring, asserting, assuming, arguing or demanding that mind is bound to or necessarily emerges from body materialistically, or that it comprises parts in the same sense that complex systems expressed in the forces and materials of physical nature do. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{January 8, 2008
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Q, aiguy mentioned, in 92, “If you knew that some animal made something, then calling it “designed” would not add anything to your knowledge.” That would be true if “designed” only means “made by an animal”. But, doesn’t “designed” include some level of intent, and not simply construction? Good point, Q. Without a set of agreed-upon operationalized definitions of these terms, nobody knows the answers to any of these questions. One might think that a "theory" that offers "intelligent design" as its sole explanatory principle might provide some canonical meaning so that people could actually evaluate its claims. If I ask the ID proponents here for definitions of these words ("intelligence" or "design (verb)"), I predict that I will get a number of fundamentally different definitions.aiguy_{January 7, 2008
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aiguy mentioned, in 92, "If you knew that some animal made something, then calling it “designed” would not add anything to your knowledge." That would be true if "designed" only means "made by an animal". But, doesn't "designed" include some level of intent, and not simply construction? Take a footprint that was made by an animal, and trapped for eons in the hardened dirt. Was the footprint designed or not? If it was called "designed", it would connote a work of art or some form of intent. If the footrpint was the result of no more than the physical interaction of the properties of mud on against the properties of the foot, would it be proper to even consider the petrified footprint as "designed"? Would the of "designed" matter if the footprint was of a person - i.e. made by what would be called intelligent agent?Q_{January 7, 2008
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Joseph, It tells us there was purpose and intent and it also tells us how our investigatioin should proceed- meaning it makes a great deal of difference to any investigation whether or not that which is being investigated arose via agency or nature, operating freely. No, saying the cause of life was intelligent says nothing about this. For example, can you scientifically demonstrate that the Creator had the conscious intent to create life? No, of course you can't. And what sort of "intent" is unconscious? And so on. AIGUY: Archeologists and forensic investigators look for signs of human activity, rather than that of non-human activity. JOSEPH: False- just how do they know the alleged activity they are investigating is human or not? LOL. American Heritage Dictionary archeology n. The systematic study of past human life and culture by the recovery and examination of remaining material evidence, such as graves, buildings, tools, and pottery. Uh, they know that the activity was human because we happen to live on planet Earth, and the only things we know of on planet Earth that do such things are human beings. What they do is look for things that nature, operating freely could not have done and go from there. You are mistaken; archeology has no theory about whether or not human activity represents "nature operating freely". They simply look for things that humans are likely to make. Are you retarded? Good argument, Joseph. I provided the definition of “transcend” which proves our ability to design a car trascends nature, operating freely. You are confusing synthetic and analytic statements. Definitions of words can not provide proof of factual propositions. OK say one finds evidence of design. By your illogic no one can follow the design inference unless we know the designer was an animal. No, you've got this wrong. I say the only way we recognize "design" is by recognizing something as being the sort of thing that some animal in our experience might make. There is no other criterion. However if we knew the designer was an animal then we wouldn’t have a design inference, design would be a given. If you knew that some animal made something, then calling it "designed" would not add anything to your knowledge. That is correct. So, when an archaeologist finds a clay pot, they know it is remaining material evidence of past human life and culture. To then say it is "designed" does not add anything to this knowledge.aiguy_{January 7, 2008
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2) Calling the cause of life “intelligent” doesn’t tell us anything.
Yes it does. It tells us there was purpose and intent and it also tells us how our investigatioin should proceed- meaning it makes a great deal of difference to any investigation whether or not that which is being investigated arose via agency or nature, operating freely.
Archeologists and forensic investigators look for signs of human activity, rather than that of non-human activity.
False- just how do they know the alleged activity they are investigating is human or not? What they do is look for things that nature, operating freely could not have done and go from there.
No, you are mistaken. You can review every journal of archeology and every training manual for fire investigators, and not one of them will talk about “intelligent agency” nor “counterflow”.
Archaeologists call it work. And guess what? The arsonist would be an "intelligent agency".
When a human being designs a car, in your view, she is doing something that “nature operating freely” cannot do. It doesn’t matter where this human being came from; the act of designing a car is an example of counterflow, right? So the problem is that you have no way to show that this act of designing a car is in any way outside of, or transcends, nature operating freely. For all you can show, pure physical causality is responsible for this human’s ability to design the car.
Are you retarded? I provided the definition of "transcend" which proves our ability to design a car trascends nature, operating freely. You don't get to change the definitions of words to suit your twisted and misguided position. OK say one finds evidence of design. By your illogic no one can follow the design inference unless we know the designer was an animal. However if we knew the designer was an animal then we wouldn't have a design inference, design would be a given. And as for organisms on Earth- they very well could have been designed by a biological agent. We have to focus on what we have. BTW I see you quote Dembski when you cherry-pick something that might agree with you but you ignore everything else he writes that refutes your nonsense. Why is that?Joseph_{January 7, 2008
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kairosfocus, I'm afraid you have not been more clear (at least to me) but rather you have repeated the same cryptic point. It would be helpful if you could simply say why you find physicalist mental theory to be implausible. You should also note I do not happen to adhere to "materialistic determinism", and that my arguments here do not depend on defending this particular stance. However, IF my philosophy entailed materialistic determinism, your complaint that my mind could not operate by "lucky noise reducible to chance + necessity" would certainly not challenge my views. P.S. when we see a computer or an assembly line robot we do not conclude that these machines and their products are the product of chance and necessity but rater we infer to agency acting through design as evidenced by the FSCI and related algorithmic behaviour we observe. You are confusing two issues. The first issue is how computers or humans can behave intelligently while still operating within the realm of chance and necessity. The second issue is how computers or humans come to exist. As for the first issue, you claim that human beings are truly, creatively, intelligent, and that this means we must somehow transcend chance + necessity. I disagree and say this does not follow. Currently, there is no experiment we can perform to decide the matter. So then you bring up the second issue - the issue of the origins of computers and humans. But we need not understand the origin of something to decide if it is intelligent or not, right? If human beings are designed by an intelligent designer, does this mean that human beings are also not intelligent in their own right, but instead merely conduits for the CSI imbued in us by our creator, like a computer is a conduit of the programmer? No, of course not. So if human beings (who you think are designed) can be considered intelligent agents, why can't computers (who are obviously designed) be bona-fide intelligent agents themselves? P.P.S. Sorry, but I recall Royce's point about the proposition "Error exists" as being a critique of epistemological relativism. Yet again, you bring up these references as though they have a profound relevance to our discussion, but you seem incapable of showing how.aiguy_{January 7, 2008
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kairosfocus, in 88, points out "You may try the undeniable, self-evident truth: ERROR EXISTS,..." Very important observation, KF. If there is too much error, random is inseparable from intelligent. If there is too much error, random is inseparable from all other explanations of causality. Since error exists in reality, as you just pointed out, and does not always reside in all philosophies, we find philosophies which do not accomodate the limitations of error are inadequate to sufficiently explain reality. Essentially, claims of the different types of agency are presupposed upon probability as part of the explanatory filter. At the same time, those probabilities are only valid of the error - or standard deviation - is low enough.Q_{January 7, 2008
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AI Guy: Maybe I need to be more clear: Before you can SAY anything that we do not have a right to hold is just lucky noise triggered by the neurones firing off in your CNS, you have to deal with some little errors at the beginning. Or, adapting Phil Johnson, this is the implicit preface we see to all you have to post:
“I, [AI Guy], my opinions and my science, and even the thoughts expressed in this [blog thread], consist of nothing more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules.” . . .
See why we hold, with Johnson, that: “[t]he plausibility of materialistic determinism [or in general of reduction to reality including mind to chance + necessity] requires that an implicit exception be made for the theorist”? CHECK. Your move, AI Guy . . . or is that just the neurons firing off with more lucky noise reducible to chance + necessity across time, space and matter-energy in our bubble in the quasi-infinite quantum foam or whatever it was . . . ? GEM of TKI PS: I will respond later on, for the sake of onlookers, on points of merit; e.g. when we see a computer or an assembly line robot we do not conclude that these machines and their products are the product of chance and necessity but rater we infer to agency acting through design as evidenced by the FSCI and related algorithmic behaviour we observe. But you have a little worldview level self-examination to do, first and foremost. PPS: You may try the undeniable, self-evident truth: ERROR EXISTS, following Royce and Trueblood, as a good place to begin. Having sorted that one out, then we can see our way to a better place to begin serious discussion.kairosfocus_{January 7, 2008
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kairofocus, ...we are EPISTEMOLOGICALLY inferring from observed characteristics of design to known alternative causal patterns and their characteristics and limitations [i.e chance and/or necessity and/or agency], You cannot characterize the "causal patterns" of agency in any way whatsoever that would allow you to infer mental characteristics of an unseen entity of completely unknown properties. ...thence infer to the EXISTENCE of design from FSCI. After that empirical datum is established, we can then speculate to our heart’s content on the identity and nature of the relevant agents, as well as their intent. Until ID says something about the nature of whatever is supposed to account for life, it says nothing at all. The explanation of "intelligent agency" is utterly vacuous. Nothing follows from it, and no information is gained by labeling the unknown cause of life as "intelligent". BTW, on instincts: I find these to actually be STRONG evidence of agency at work: enormously complex and adaptive programmes hard wired into the genes... if I see a complex plainly algorithmic and highly adaptive program working on an information-processing system [living or non-living], I infer to programmer not lucky noise. Your attempted challenge on accounting for arrowheads and spider webs, simply fails. An artifact like a termite mound could not arise by wind, rain, erosion, etc, and it is purposefully arranged. So if you did not know what created it, you would suspect an intelligent agent built the mound. Upon finding out that termites built it via fixed, instinctual behaviors, you would say aha! It is not the creator of the mound that was intelligent, but rather the creator of the creator of the mound! Oh yes, these termites must have been programmed very cleverly to build this termite mound! But what you fail to see is this: Just as your hunch (that the immediate cause of the mound was intelligent) was wrong, your hunch that the cause of the cause of the mound might be wrong as well. And while you may continue to evaluate this causal regress as long as you'd like, you will never be able to show that some unseen designer was not just another instance of a "CSI conduit". For all ID can show, it is turtles all the way down. You can pretend to know that the universe started with an uncaused cause, and you can pretend to know that this uncaused cause was intelligent rather than pre-programmed, but you do not know these things. It is no more plausible (and certainly no more empirically verifiable!) to imagine an uncaused intelligent being than an uncaused pre-programmed universe. How did it get programmed? I don't know - how did the Designer get intelligent? If our rationality is trustworthy but Evo Mat entails that it should not be, then it is dynamically thence logically incoherent – being forced to trust what it claims or implies is not trustworthy. [Cf my linked discussion supra in 66 for detils.] Sorry, was somebody here defending "Evo Mat"? It certainly wasn't me. Perhaps you've confused your threads. In short, I am distinctly unimpressed by the level of argument you as a person necessarily trained in logical reasoning, are bringing to the table. I will admit to being a little disappointed in you too, but I wasn't going to say anything (I'm trying to be polite). So, let’s just say on the main point you have tried to make that [a] I have seen no good – i.e. non-question-begging, logically and dynamically competent and coherent and factually adequate — reason to infer that intelligence must be embodied in a physical, material medium There are good reasons, but that would be another discussion, and this does not speak to my main point. My main point is that "intelligence" is a label covering our ignorance about what minds are and how they work. To offer this as an explanation of natural phenomena is vacuous.aiguy_{January 7, 2008
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nullasalus, And you may as well argue that if you can automate a process (manufacturing, programming, etc) that we ‘do not say it takes intelligence’, and that it’s all being done without intelligence. It even sounds nice, so long as no one minds missing the point. I don't have good luck with this argument, but it is because people have a hard time taking the point. The point you are missing is that you do not know that whatever created the factory (or designed human ontogeny) was intelligent either. Just as the factory makes cars without having intelligence, something could have made the factory without having intelligence. And where did that come from? We can keep this up as long as you'd like. Remember, ID denies this sort of regress is a problem: If you ask me what designed the factory-creation-factory, I will ask you "Who designed the Designer?" What’s wrong with taking the data and speculating about the viability of intelligence being at work within and behind it? Here are two things wrong with that: 1) We have no data which can tell you anything about the mental characteristics (or lack of mentality) of the cause of life 2) Calling the cause of life "intelligent" doesn't tell us anything. Nothing follows from the bare proposition that life was caused by something intelligent - not one single thing. Maybe it’s unscientific - I’d even be tempted to agree - but that didn’t stop many others when the only speculation was ‘maybe this means we’re here as a result of unintelligent, meaningless forces’. Suddenly the opposition wants to play with the same toys, and they go back in the toy chest? I object to Dawkins-like pontification about the supposed metaphysical implications of evolution as much as anybody. My stance is that we do not know, but also that neither eliminating evolutionary mechanisms as a viable theory nor trying to apply the design inference is capable of supporting any meaningful, positive assertions about the cause of life.aiguy_{January 7, 2008
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AI Guy: I looked at your response to my own comments in 66, as seen above in 73 and 76. Sorry to be direct: I am not impressed, especially since in recent weeks we have been over this same ground in other threads ad nauseum. Cf for instance here, on a thread that got side-tracked from dealing with the issue of the gaming of reviews over at Amazon by Darwinistas. The issues you raise will lead if pursued to the same situations as played out there with Q, and unless you engage the comparative difficulties phil issues seriously, will be just as fruitless and frustrating for participants. I have taken time to bring these out and speak to them in my always linked, here. Onlookers can see for themselves by following the links above, what he issues are and how they play out – the Kantians lose on the merits but a lot of people are unduly and largely unawares ruled by Kantian little errors at the beginning. You therefore need to go back to GIGO on your own thoughts. Then, once you can see that we reasonably can see the external world on a sufficiently reliable basis to operate and think in it and at least sometimes see things as they are, then we can talk seriously. Next, please observe as Joseph et al have pointed out: we are EPISTEMOLOGICALLY inferring from observed characteristics of design, to known alternative causal patterns and their characteristics and limitations [i.e chance and/or necessity and/or agency], thence infer to the EXISTENCE of design from FSCI. After that empirical datum is established, we can then speculate to our heart's content on the identity and nature of the relevant agents, as well as their intent. BTW, on instincts: I find these to actually be STRONG evidence of agency at work: enormously complex and adaptive programmes hard wired into the genes/operating systems of the various animals – e.g bird navigation [as came up in yet another recent thread]. In short, if I see a complex plainly algorithmic and highly adaptive program working on an information-processing system [living or non-living], I infer to programmer not lucky noise. Your attempted challenge on accounting for arrowheads and spider webs, simply fails. [So does the now commonly met argument on chaining designers. Caused designers can in turn be designed. But an observed cosmos full of contingent beings and that credibly had a beginning as a whole points to a necessary being as its source. Thus too Dawkins' attempted infinite regress of ever more complex designers fails; no to mention equivocating on the term complexity.] As to the way you try to respond on Crick, that alone tells me that you have a lot of homework on comparative difficulties to do. I have not got the time to handhold you step by step through it. See the discussion here, from 48 on for a recent case in UD. And while I do think Plantinga made one form of the case well too, pace your strawman attempted rebuttal, the issue is far more broad and deep and potent than you represent:
1) Either our rationality is trustworthy or it is not 2) If our rationality is trustworthy, then Plantinga’s argument is moot 3) If our rationality is not trustworthy, then we cannot evaluate Plantinga’s argument, and so the argument is moot 4) Therefore, Plantinga’s argument is moot.
ON THE DIRECT CONTRARY,
1 --> If our rationality is trustworthy but Evo Mat entails that it should not be, then it is dynamically thence logically incoherent – being forced to trust what it claims or implies is not trustworthy. [Cf my linked discussion supra in 66 for detils.] --> Thus, your counter fails in the very first term, thus the second one collapses. THE ISSUE IS THAT WE ALL ACKNOWLEDGE THE GENERAL RELIABILITY OF MIND AND MUST USE IT AS A MATTER OF PLAIN AND UNDENIABLY TRUE FACT, BUT ON EVO MAT GROUNDS, THAT IS NOT GROUNDED. --> Thirdly, the real point is that CSL, AP et al have brought out that evo mat as an account of the origin of all phenomena on the cosmos implies a key self-referentially incoherent, inescapable and so decisive counter-factual: the unreliability of mind. So, per reductio ad absurdum – a well-known technique in logical reasoning, it is falsified. --> AP, CSL, et al are not moot: they have credibly exposed a critical instability in the foundation of evo mat as an account of reality. One that too many are refusing to face or properly address on t he merits.
In short, I am distinctly unimpressed by the level of argument you as a person necessarily trained in logical reasoning, are bringing to the table. So, let's just say on the main point you have tried to make that [a] I have seen no good – i.e. non-question-begging, logically and dynamically competent and coherent and factually adequate -- reason to infer that intelligence must be embodied in a physical, material medium, and that [b] this ties back to the issue that the observed cosmos betrays agency in action in its fine-tuned organised complexity, and evidently had a beginning, so was caused. Thus, I find [c] the best explanation of the cosmos as we experience it, on such empirically anchored comparative difficulties, to be a personal, intelligent, powerful and non-material necessary being. You are free to disagree, but then you will have to face the implications and comparative difficulties challenges of your own views. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{January 7, 2008
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nullasalus, in 83, asks "I dunno. Do you know what counts as ‘inferrence’?" Any old extrapolation can count as an inference. You want a good inference? That's a matter of statistics. There will be some level of correlation of effects and alleged causes. A high correlation is a good (but not guaranteed) indicator that other similar causes will generate the previously observed effects. nullasalus also comments "But I have to have sympathy with people who look at natural mechanisms and structures, see purpose, and suddenly it’s an abuse of science to infer design. But inferring its lack was, and in some ways still is, A-OK." It's not an abuse of science to make an inference about design. It would be an abuse to suggest a stronger inference than the statitistics or prior observations would warrant.Q_{January 7, 2008
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aiguy, "1) Ontogeny is an example of the generation of CSI and IC 2) We do not say it takes intelligence to make a baby 3) Therefore we have a counter-example to ID: The generation of CSI without intelligence" And you may as well argue that if you can automate a process (manufacturing, programming, etc) that we 'do not say it takes intelligence', and that it's all being done without intelligence. It even sounds nice, so long as no one minds missing the point. You don't need intelligence to start a brewery either - hey, you don't need to pull up your sleeves, shrink yourself, and do the fermenting process manually. ID folks get furious at that? Maybe, but I suspect it's not because it's a fantastic argument with no flaws. "Until we figure out a way to experimentally determine the answer to some of these age-old questions from the philosophy of mind, the arguments of ID that rest on a duality of causes cannot be said to be inferences from empirical data." I dunno. Do you know what counts as 'inferrence'? I'm a believer in the hard problem too. But arguing 'we can't infer anything until what could be the hardest problem we'll ever face, and which may in principle not be solvable, is solved' is a bit much. What's wrong with taking the data and speculating about the viability of intelligence being at work within and behind it? Maybe it's unscientific - I'd even be tempted to agree - but that didn't stop many others when the only speculation was 'maybe this means we're here as a result of unintelligent, meaningless forces'. Suddenly the opposition wants to play with the same toys, and they go back in the toy chest? Mind you, I say this believing neither speculation is truly scientific. But I have to have sympathy with people who look at natural mechanisms and structures, see purpose, and suddenly it's an abuse of science to infer design. But inferring its lack was, and in some ways still is, A-OK.nullasalus_{January 7, 2008
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Q, The logical argument being made about physical mechanisms is that physical mechanisms can only produce physical results. So, if consciousness is not physical, it must not be the result of physical mechanisms. OK - except nothing tells us that physical mechanisms can only produce physical results, or conversely that mental activity can only produce mental results. Interaction is of course the central problem of dualism, but it didn't stop Decartes from offering his solution... The converse of junkyardTornado’s claim should be examined as well. If consciousness is physical, it may have been created with physical means. Do we know through observation that consciousness is outside of the results of physical means, or is it simply a semantic argument about what is “consciousness”? I happen to think consciousness is a hard problem, perhaps harder than our minds can deal with. But to tie this back to theories of origins, I'll just return to my main point: Until we figure out a way to experimentally determine the answer to some of these age-old questions from the philosophy of mind, the arguments of ID that rest on a duality of causes cannot be said to be inferences from empirical data.aiguy_{January 6, 2008
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aiguy, that last bit in 80 is simply arguing semantic similarities. The logical argument being made about physical mechanisms is that physical mechanisms can only produce physical results. So, if consciousness is not physical, it must not be the result of physical mechanisms. The converse of junkyardTornado's claim should be examined as well. If consciousness is physical, it may have been created with physical means. Do we know through observation that consciousness is outside of the results of physical means, or is it simply a semantic argument about what is "consciousness"?Q_{January 6, 2008
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JunkyardTornado, I guess DNA and cell replication is is example of a physical mechanism that creates humans without benefit of human consciousness. Yes, as a matter of fact it is (ontogeny in general at any rate). I've used this argument before, and I think it is perfectly valid, but people have a hard time understanding it. The argument is this: 1) Ontogeny is an example of the generation of CSI and IC 2) We do not say it takes intelligence to make a baby 3) Therefore we have a counter-example to ID: The generation of CSI without intelligence This argument seems to make ID folks furious. They respond that ontogeny does not create CSI/IC, it only reproduces it like a copying machine, and that I haven't explained how our ability to reproduce arose in the first place. These counter-arguments fail completely; if anyone would like to know why I'll spell it out. If consciousness is not physical, then physical mechanisms couldn’t have created it. I don't understand this one at all. If cars are not biological, then biological organisms couldn't have created them? If my parents were not tall, they could not have created a tall person like me?aiguy_{January 6, 2008
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If consciousness is not physical, then physical mechanisms couldn't have created it.JunkyardTornado_{January 6, 2008
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Maybe the above analysis bordered on the facetious. I guess DNA and cell replication is is example of a physical mechanism that creates humans without benefit of human consciousness.JunkyardTornado_{January 6, 2008
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(aiguy:) ...saying that intelligence created us is not a synthetic proposition but an analytic one. For example, if it turned out that random mutation and natural selection did happen to account for speciation, then we would call that process intelligent too, even though it isn’t consciously aware of its actions, nor does it represent its goals, and so on. You didn't make consciousness and issue when you said, Computers can learn to perform complex behaviors (including design tasks), just like humans can. Why would we consider the human intelligent and not the computer? Before we start making consciousness an issue I think we should define what it means (along with agency). Does a chimp have consciousness? Isn't it reasonable to assume that a chimp is purely physical? What relevance is there to a chimp's subjective experience of the external stimuli that impinge on its sense organs? Do we say that whatever created us has to experience the world like a chimp in order to be considered intelligent? Furthermore, if we our conscious and part of the physical universe, and the physical universe created us, then the thing that created us is conscious. As far as goals, I guess a computer contains electrical impulses, not goals, but what it contains maps to what it does and that is all that matters. (Where do goals reside in brain tissue.) If its random mutation and natural selection, it still mapped to the output of living things. So it makes no difference what the internal workings were. Anyway the point was, a machine that output the biological world would be considered wildly, fantastically, unimaginably intelligent, however it accomplished the task. And we know such a machine exists. I am not a dualist (I am a neutral monist if you’d like to know.) I will look that one up.JunkyardTornado_{January 6, 2008
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kairosfocus, After reading through more of your links, I believe I have deciphered your issue with Crick's physicalist theory of mind; it is Plantinga's argument about the source of rationality, yes? Perhaps you can help me, then, for I have always found that particular argument as lame as can be, and wonder how someone of Plantinga's abilities could advance it in seriousness. Here is my quick rebuttal: 1) Either our rationality is trustworthy or it is not 2) If our rationality is trustworthy, then Plantinga's argument is moot 3) If our rationality is not trustworthy, then we cannot evaluate Plantinga's argument, and so the argument is moot 4) Therefore, Plantinga's argument is moot.aiguy_{January 6, 2008
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JunkyardTornado: So somewhat confusingly you say “intelligent agent” has no meaning with which I somewhat agree, but then you imply only biological organisms can be intelligent agents, a term which you just said has no meaning. First, I did not imply that only biological organisms can be intelligent, only that they are the only type of intelligent things we know of. Second, I put "intelligent agent" in scare quotes to show that for whatever meaning they are attributing to this, surely there are no known examples that are not animals. A computer and a human or both physical mechanisms, and we gauge their intelligence by the complexity of their behaviors. Whatever created us is a physical mechanism. Shouldn’t we gauge its intelligence by the same standard? I think that is a perfectly reasonable approach. In this case, saying that intelligence created us is not a synthetic proposition but an analytic one. For example, if it turned out that random mutation and natural selection did happen to account for speciation, then we would call that process intelligent too, even though it isn't consciously aware of its actions, nor does it represent its goals, and so on. The fact is, we have no other way to understand any aspect of the universe other than algorithmically. I understand what you mean (a la Chaitin, yes?) but this is not exactly a consensus position. Most (including me) believe there are other ways of knowing. You fault ID proponents for their dualism,... No, I don't. I only fault them for suggesting they have an empirically-grounded theory (ID) that actually depends critically on an implicit commitment to dualism. ...but having your cake as well. No, I am not a dualist (I am a neutral monist if you'd like to know) but my point was that the mind-body problem has not been solved by scientists (!) and this renders ID's arguments regarding intelligent causation as philosophical rather than scientific. That's fine - I rather like philosophy of course - but it's important to keep this straight. You say we might have to build a non-algorithmic machine (utterly contradictory) to capture intelligence, No, I didn't say "non-algorithmic machine" - I said "harness the same physics". I'm referring here to ideas such as those by Penrose and Hameroff. ...and then you assert that maybe thought has non-physical components which say are impossible to construct in any machine. To me this all seems to be utterly incoherent,... In that case, you ought to reject dualism like I do. I'm simply allowing for the multitude of positions in philosophy of mind - there are advocates of each of these positions and then some. These philosophical debates show no sign of converging on a consensus, which has been the case for thousands of years. My point here is that this is no basis for a set of empirical claims about biology. ... and it makes me wonder whether attributes of your discourse are in fact designed to confuse. You also repeatedly imply that only biology can think, To alleviate your confusion, you simply need to read my posts with a bit more care. Once again I remind you that I have never once implied that only biology can think, of course. That is John Searle's position, but it is not mine. ... for example by labelling any other type of intelligence “artificial”, even something that utilizes this so called non-algorithmic non-physical component. ??? To me, the term "artificial" in AI means only "created by human beings" and nothing else. Junkyard, I think we've talked past each other a bit; if my writing was unclear I apologize. My position is thus: - The mind-body problem has not been solved - Science can neither confirm nor disconfirm dualism - Most versions of ID do actually depend on substance dualism - Therefore these versions of ID cannot be empirically groundedaiguy_{January 6, 2008
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Joseph, A YES or NO question was asked to which aiguy responded with: Not all answers can be answered YES or NO without being misleading, Joseph. Have you stopped beating your wife? YES or NO, please! So it isn’t important to know if some non-human agency caused something to happen? Archeologists and forensic investigators look for signs of human activity, rather than that of non-human activity. Not only is that wrong but just how can one tell if the agency was human or not without direct observation or designer input? We know this because there are no other animals on Earth who do things like make clay pots or build large stone structures, or shoot people with guns, or cheat on lotteries... When we see these things we are safe to conclude that humans were responsible. I happen to know for a fact that forensic scientists require the knowledge of what nature, operating freely is capable of. The same goes for archaeologists and fire investigators. Atchaeologists look for counterflow- they call it “work”- to make their determination. The same goes for any design-centric venue. Ya see neither “counterflow”, “agency” nor “nature, operating freely” are metaphysical concepts. They are reality as they all exist and all can be accounted for during an investigation. No, you are mistaken. You can review every journal of archeology and every training manual for fire investigators, and not one of them will talk about "intelligent agency" nor "counterflow". If you can find a single reference to any such thing, please let us know. Otherwise, you should realize that these professions involve the detection of human activity, and not the abstract notion of whether or not human beings transcend physical reality with their special "counterflow" powers. They are not philosophers. AIGUY: When a human being generates CSI/IC, for all you can show, that is nature, operating freely, producing CSI/IC. JOSEPH: Only if it can be shown that humans arose via nature, operating freely. Which brings us back to refuting ID. No, we are not talking in this case about how human beings arose, but rather about what is happening when they use their intelligence to, say, design things. When a human being designs a car, in your view, she is doing something that "nature operating freely" cannot do. It doesn't matter where this human being came from; the act of designing a car is an example of counterflow, right? So the problem is that you have no way to show that this act of designing a car is in any way outside of, or transcends, nature operating freely. For all you can show, pure physical causality is responsible for this human's ability to design the car. AIGUY: There are no instances of anybody ever discovering “design” without having some knowledge or making some knowledge-based assumptions regarding what the “designer” was. JOSEPH: There are plenty of examples- Stonehenge- it took us years of investigation to come up with what little we have. Murders- there are many unsolved murders- meaning we don’t know who did it. Nasca, Peru- again it took us years to make determinations about the designers. Easter Island- same thing- years of investigation before we figured out who did it. Ah, I see the miscommunication here. When I talk about investigators having knowledge about these designers, what I mean is that we have knowledge about human beings in general, and not that we happen to know the name, address, birth date, or other information about one particular individual human being who was responsible. We have lots of knowledge of human beings in general, and we have lots of knowledge of other animals too. We have no knowledge of any sort of "intelligent agent" that is not an animal, however. It is true that IDists say the CSI in and generated by computers can be traced back to the programmer, but I have never read any IDists deny that computers will ever gain real intelligence. So perhaps you have a reference. Here's a couple of screeds from Dembski on the topic, where he famously suggests that "I fully grant that my theology would crumble with the advent of intelligent machines": http://www.arn.org/docs/dembski/wd_convmtr.htm http://www.designinference.com/documents/1999.10.spiritual_machines.htm AIGUY: The point was that the Design Inference does not just imply an “intelligent agent”, it implies “biological agent” just as strongly. JOSEPH: That may be what YOU infer, but ID makes no such implication (about a biological agent). That may be what you wish to think, but the logic is evident: The inference to a biological agent is exactly as strong as the inference to an "intelligent agent", based upon the exact same evidence.aiguy_{January 6, 2008
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kairofocus, So, if we see evident active, intentional, creative, innovative and adaptive [as opposed to merely fixed instinctual] problem-solving behaviour similar to that of known intelligent agents, we are justified in attaching the label: intelligence Agreed. As you say, fixed instinctual behavior does not indicate intelligence, only creative, innovative and adaptive behavior does. Now, all you have to do is tell us how we might ascertain that this is the case for the Designer of Life hypothesized to exist by ID theory. But also, in so solving their problems, intelligent agents may leave behind empirically evident signs of their activity; and — as say archaeologists and detectives know — functionally specific, complex information [FSCI] that would otherwise be improbable, is one of these signs. No, archaeologists and detectives think not at all about "specific, complex information" to do their jobs. When an archeologist finds a piece of a clay pot, it is not CSI nor IC that indicates intelligent design; it is our knowledge of the sorts of things that human beings build. Consider an arrowhead and a spider web. If "ID Scientists" from another planet found these on Earth, they could not tell which was made by an intelligent agent and which by fixed, instinctual behavior. Termites build complex structures; gorillas and dolphins can't build much of anything. Would this indicate termites are more intelligent? There is nothing that precludes the idea that entities could build fabulously complex artifacts by instinct, the way bees and termites and spiders build their respectably complex artifacts out of pure fixed instinct. So, without the ability to interact with some entity, we have no way to decide if something exhibits the sort of adaptive problem-solving you are talking about. Simply finding complex things in nature shows that nature produces complex things. The process by which these things arise might be analagous to fixed instinctual behavior rather than the adaptive behavior of human beings. And as for your oblique critique of Crick - his only mistake is his strident over-confidence; there is nothing logically contradictory in his physicalist theory of mind. You seem confused about this, but perhaps if you'd made your point more explicitly I could see where you've gone wrong.aiguy_{January 6, 2008
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aiguy, in 63, posted "First, I don’t understand what it means for intelligence to have “a relationship to cause and effect”. I thought “intelligent causation” was a type of cause." Sure. Other types of causation are also claimed to exist - like random events, which would count as non-intelligent causation. Causation isn't the interesting question, I'm suggesting. The nature of intelligence, and how it fits within the principles of ID is much more interesting. My comment above was meant to suggest an investigation into how intelligence affects the outcome of an event in a way which would yield distinctly different results than would other forms of causation. Also, aiguy asked "In any event, I’m also not sure what you mean by studying intelligence without studying actual intelligent agents. Can you give me an example of what you mean?" I, at least, didn't say not to study actual intelligent agents. I said that in ID a specific agent could not be investigated. That is, any properties of the intelligent designer must be extrapolated by observation of properties of observable agents. This is simply because the intelligence of the intelligent designer of ID cannot be directly observed. It is pretty clear that any intelligence attributed to the designer in ID comes from correlating results from known to unknown sources. That is, people correlate results that are observed from intelligent people to results from "unknown" sources, and infer that those results are from intelligence. This claim, I am suggesting, is simply a restating of Dr. Demski's explanatory filter, in which intelligence is inferred if the probability of chance and regularity is too low to have caused the result. --------------- Joseph, in 67, commented "The ONLY way to make ANY determination about the designer(s) or the specific process used, in the absence of direct observation or designer input, is by studying the deesign in question." and "IOW reality again demonstrates that one does not have to know anything about the designer(s) in order to first determine design and then study it." That sounds like a reversed argument. It is improper to assume design before studying the properties of the item. The study is needed first, before design can be inferred. But, to make that inference, we need to extrapolate some knowledge about other designers. Otherwise, we wouldn't know enough to filter the results of random action from the results of intentional actions.Q_{January 6, 2008
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(aiguy) If functionalism is true, cognition is algorithmic. In that case, “strong AI” could be achieved in digital computers. But maybe thought requires some special non-algorithmic quantum effects, so we would have to harness that same physics in order to build an artificial thinking machine. Or, maybe there is a non-physical component that isn’t even part of the physical universe at all, and we can never capture that property in anything we build. Nobody knows the answer. The fact is, we have no other way to understand any aspect of the universe other than algorithmically. You fault ID proponents for their dualism, but having your cake as well. You say we might have to build a non-algorithmic machine (utterly contradictory) to capture intelligence, and then you assert that maybe thought has non-physical components which say are impossible to construct in any machine. To me this all seems to be utterly incoherent, and it makes me wonder whether attributes of your discourse are in fact designed to confuse. You also repeatedly imply that only biology can think, for example by labelling any other type of intelligence "artificial", even something that utilizes this so called non-algorithmic non-physical component.JunkyardTornado_{January 6, 2008
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(Me:) A computer and a human or both physical mechanisms, and we gauge their intelligence by the complexity of their behaviors. Whatever created us is a physical mechanism. Shouldn’t we gauge its intelligence by the same standard? I think I could restate this more effectively: If a computer had created the biological world, how intelligent would we say it is? What difference would it make what method it used? And is not a computer actually an extremely simple mechanism? Just something that iterates through rudimentary instructions, and if possible lots and lots and lots of memory. And what determines its output - some program resident in memory, a series of 0's and 1's. And if a program output the biological world, how complex woud that program be? There is a program out there in the universe that output us. This is utterly self-evident bt the mere fact that we exist.JunkyardTornado_{January 6, 2008
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