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Intelligent Design & the Design Question

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I don’t have much of a lead-in for this post, so I’ll get right to the point: I think it’s important to draw a distinction between two concepts when it comes to ID. Namely, the distinction between the Design Question, and Intelligent Design itself.

When I say ‘the Design Question’, I mean more or less this: The question of whether X is designed, where X is some particular artifact, some particular part of nature, or nature as a whole.

And by Intelligent Design, I think a good, concise view was given here by Jonathan Wells: Intelligent design maintains that it is possible to infer from empirical evidence that some features of the natural world are best explained by an intelligent cause rather than unguided natural processes.

The purpose of this post is to point out that while ID and the Design Question are related (not to mention very important) they are nevertheless distinct: It’s possible to answer “yes” to the Design Question, and still reject ID as stated. Likewise, it’s possible to affirm an ID inference in many cases, yet still answer in the negative on the Design Question (say, affirming that organism X was designed, while still believing that nature as a whole was not designed.)

More below.

First, Wells’ statement has to be augmented: The mere reference to some empirical observation in coming to a conclusion is not sufficient to define ID. It’s the claim that intelligent design and ID inferences themselves qualifies as science. I consider this identification of ID with science as, in the eyes of its most prominent proponents, non-negotiable. As with everything, maybe ID will change someday, or maybe not – ideas can be fluid – but for now, you can’t really be an ID advocate while at the same time denying that ID is science.

So what does this mean? It means that you can accept that the bacterial flagellum (for example) is designed, you can accept empirical evidence in nature points to design, you can affirm that the entire universe is the product of design – but if you don’t consider your views or your inferences to be strictly scientific, you’re not an ID proponent. You may have a lot in common with some ID proponents, but in the end you have to stand outside of the big tent.

And I consider this important to highlight, because it illustrates this much: A person who rejects ID (and remember, simply thinking ID is not science is sufficient for rejecting it) may still come to a positive design conclusion about nature or natural things. Really, they may come to a conclusion more strong than ID itself can provide, and with powerful arguments of their own.

This is probably nothing new to most of the regulars here, but I bring it up because I think it’s a point that’s easily obscured when the subject of “Christian Darwinists” comes up. I could go on about this (and someday soon I probably will), but the problem is that you have “Christian Darwinists” who decry ID, and who seem downright reluctant to affirm design even outside the context of ID – or who affirm it in dodgy, non-committal terms. (Let’s not beat around the bush: I’m talking about Biologos here, or at least a number of their contributors.) When that’s the most common face of theistic ID-critics you come across, it’s easy to start assuming that if someone is not on board with ID, then they can’t possibly believe in design at all (at least, not in the relevant sense.)

Likewise, I think many ID critics come to the conclusion that ID proponents pin all of their views on design on ID itself, such that if ID doesn’t turn up a design inference, then they don’t believe in design or don’t believe it’s rational to believe in design. Not only do I think this is obviously false (though a complicated subject) in the cases of most prominent ID proponents, I think ID critics routinely underestimate the intellectual value ID provides regardless of whether or not they believe ID is science. To put it another way: ID encourages an interest in science, and an interest in asking important questions (like how it’s possible to determine this or that is designed, what factors into such an inference, etc.) Whether or not one believes it’s a scientific question, I’d think any theist would agree “Is this or that natural thing designed?” is a *good* question, an important question. And like it or not, ID encourages people to ask questions about the design question and to investigate the subject, rather than just accept what they’re told.

Anyway, hopefully this post will serve as a reminder about the core commitments of ID, how ID differs from the Design Question itself, and that it’s possible to still strongly affirm design even while disagreeing with ID. (I think one response to this may be that whether or not ID is science may not of the utmost importance, as opposed to agreeing that design inferences themselves are well-supported and rational. I could see that, but I’d also note that highlights the importance of understanding the distinction between ID and the Design Question once again.)

Comments
Elizabeth Liddle:
As for the rest of your post: I’m not sure you understand what “equivocate” means. Either that, or you are seriously misreading my posts.
I know full well what it means to equivocate. I've pointed out numerous cases in my posts. Where have you done likewise? Where have you pointed out an instance of equivocation on my part? So that leaves the second possibility. That I seriously misunderstand your posts. The evidence indicates otherwise. You have consistently had to modify or rephrase or amend or retract your remarks. I can think of one of mine which I've retracted, which was when I characterized something you said as a lie. I think we communicate with each other just fine. I assume you're posting in good faith. I just find myself needing to modify that assumption when faced with repeated gaffes. Take, for example, your repeated mis-characterizations of ID. But let's get back on topic. You said:
The effects however are very similar, and indeed, I would argue that the first is a special case of the second – in the first case, human agents are part of the fitness landscape – part of the environment that determines which phenotypic features affect the probability of replication.
How did I misread that? You said:
I have also taken pains to distinguish between intentional selection and un-intentional selection (which I think is a more useful distinction).
Do you believe that "intentional selection" can bring about results which "unintentional selection" cannot? If your answer is no, then why go to great pains to distinguish between the two? But you've already told us what you think:
The effects however are very similar, and indeed, I would argue that the first is a special case of the second...
So the question remains: How do you propose to demonstrate that natural selection can mimic the intentional choice of intelligent agents who can set goals and plan to bring about an end? You cannot. You will not. I read and understand you just fine.Mung
June 24, 2011
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Mung:
How do you propose to demonstrate that natural selection can mimic the intentional choice of intelligent agents who can set goals and plan to bring about an end?
That's easy enough. The selection processes are very similar. The additional process that an attentional agent has at his/her disposal is the capacity to simulate future actions and feedback simulated outcomes into the selection process. This gives intentional agents the ability to make bigger leaps, and also to apply solutions from one "lineage" to another. Evolutionary processes obviously can't do this, and indeed, one marked difference between human design lineages and the lineages of living things is that human design lineages do evidence such transfers, and living lineages don't. As for the rest of your post: I'm not sure you understand what "equivocate" means. Either that, or you are seriously misreading my posts. Actually, the latter seems more likely as several times now you have attempted to paraphrase what you think I have said, and what you have written has completely missed my point. If we are to communicate successfully it is going to take effort on both our parts. I've been doing my best - at the very least, as I have said to ba77 as well, please do me the returning courtesy of assuming that I am posting in good faith. Because I am.Elizabeth Liddle
June 24, 2011
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Elizabeth Liddle:
I have also taken pains to distinguish between intentional selection and un-intentional selection (which I think is a more useful distinction).
If you had taken such pains I would have not had a point to make in my post @47. If you had not been counting on that equivocation you would have nothing to complain about wrt the emendation I made to what you wrote. The fact is, you personally believe that nature can mimic the same sort of selection that human agents engage in, even going so far as to calling one a subset of the other. So it's plain that you don't really see a difference and that you therefore don't see any equivocation. But for those of us who do see a difference, there is indeed an equivocation that takes place. The problem you have is that you cannot demonstrate that natural selection can bring about the sorts of things that intentional selection brings about. So you have to rely on the equivocation. That's why your objection rings so hollow. How do you propose to demonstrate that natural selection can mimic the intentional choice of intelligent agents who can set goals and plan to bring about an end? Good luck.Mung
June 24, 2011
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Mung, I am not "equivocating" over selection. I have taken great pains to make it clear when I am talking about "artificial selection" choices made by an intelligent farmer with a specific goal, and "natural selection", which is simply what happens when self-replicating things replicate with variance that affects their ability to self-replicate. The effects however are very similar, and indeed, I would argue that the first is a special case of the second - in the first case, human agents are part of the fitness landscape - part of the environment that determines which phenotypic features affect the probability of replication. I have also taken pains to distinguish between intentional selection and un-intentional selection (which I think is a more useful distinction). So I apologise for being unclear; however, your charge of equivocation is unfounded.Elizabeth Liddle
June 24, 2011
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Umm it doesn't have to ne a mechanical process to be a mechanism. A mechanism can be a way or means of getting something done. As I said Lizzie needs to buy a dictionary, or a vowel...Joseph
June 20, 2011
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I guess you can see where I’m going with this
Actually no, I'm sorry. I don't see where you're going with it. Unless you mean where you're going in equivocating (once again) over selection.
And I’ve always been fascinated by the fact (I think it is a fact) that it seems to be a combination of both INTELLIGENT/INTENTIONAL selection (what to put in; what to leave out; what to remove; what to add) and stochastic processes ...
The sort of selection that actually involves real choice. Unlike "natural selection" where there is no choice involved (it's a law of nature, don't you know).Mung
June 20, 2011
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Shall I leave you two to get a room?
Joe's not my type, but if you're paying ...Mung
June 20, 2011
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I’ve always loved working with materials, even though I’ve tended to work in fairly abstract media, because so often, the materials themselves suggest things that you can use (or problems that you have to solve).
(just dipping in whilst on my hols) I understand entirely. I trained and worked as s sculptor before transferring to science. Physical interactions and those 'happy accidents' drive creative inspiration. Just out of curiosity, are you familiar with Maggie Bodens work on philosophy of cognitive science and creativity?DrBot
June 20, 2011
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@Elizabeth Liddle - Quantum physics doesn't seem to have much of a "mechanism" either, so therefore...Jeffrey Helix
June 20, 2011
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Mung wrote:
Elizabeth Liddle:
What are the mechanisms of that process? Perhaps design is not a mechanical process. It could be a creative process.
What are the mechanisms of creativity?
Joseph wrote:
Elizabeth Liddle:
what do we know about how things get designed? What are the mechanisms of that process?
Design is a mechanism- buy a dictionary and look it up.
Shall I leave you two to get a room? :D Anyway: Mung, as a psychologist/neuroscientist, of course I'm interested in what I tend to call the "mechanisms" of cognitive processes - what they involve, how they are disrupted, what modulates them. And I've always been interested in design and creativity in particular (having trained earlier in both music and architectural design :)) Poincaré is very interesting on the subject of creativity in mathematical thinking. And I've always been fascinated by the fact (I think it is a fact) that it seems to be a combination of both selection (what to put in; what to leave out; what to remove; what to add) and stochastic processes (the bit of dribbled paint that balances the composition; a pot that grew too tall accidentally on the wheel, and suggested a giraffe instead of a cow; the things that turn out to have been in frame that you didn't notice, at least consciously, when you took the shot; the accidental wrong note that sounded better than the one you'd meant). I've always loved working with materials, even though I've tended to work in fairly abstract media, because so often, the materials themselves suggest things that you can use (or problems that you have to solve). I guess you can see where I'm going with this :)Elizabeth Liddle
June 20, 2011
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RE- philospohy and science- Isn't somewhat strange that, if Neil R is right, that Courtrooms would be the place that philosphers get to tell judges what is and isn't science. Dover had Babs Forrest. An earlier trial had Mikey Ruse (McLean v Arkansas). Just weird...Joseph
June 20, 2011
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Elizabeth Liddle:
what do we know about how things get designed? What are the mechanisms of that process?
Design is a mechanism- buy a dictionary and look it up.Joseph
June 20, 2011
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NR: The proper field of study on the subject of what is known, why, is philosophy; explicitly subsuming phil of sci as a subset. Specifically, epistemology:
Epistemology or theory of knowledge is the branch of philosophy that studies the nature, origin, and scope of knowledge and belief. The term "epistemology" is based on the Greek words, [epistemon] or episteme" (knowledge or science) and [logos] or logos" (account/explanation); it was introduced into English by the Scottish philosopher, James Frederick Ferrier. Much of the debate in this field has focused on analyzing the nature of knowledge and how it relates to similar notions, such as truth, belief, and justification. It also deals with the means of production of knowledge, as well as skepticism about different knowledge claims. In other words, epistemology primarily addresses the following questions: "What is knowledge," "How is knowledge acquired," and "What do people know?" The two central questions of epistemology could be summed up as: What do humans know and how do they know it? Some of the numerous subsidiary questions include: What is knowledge? Are there different types or kinds of knowledge? Does the process of knowing differ in different domains of human knowledge and activity? Does what is knowable differ in different domains? Does genuine knowledge require justification or evidence? Must one believe something in order to know it? Is there a difference between knowledge and true belief, and if so what is it? Can one know a statement or proposition S if S is false? . . .
Similarly, the proper field of study on logic and its underlying first principles of right reason, is again philosophy. We cannot avoid doing philosophy, we can just avoid doing it in an instructed and prudent manner. And while philosophers and mathematicians do not normally sit on a thesis advisory panel in physics or Chemistry, you had better believe that underlying issues in these fields lie under the findings and analyses involved in such theses. And, when bodies like the US NAS or in sci edu the NSTA make rulings on how science may only explain by "natural causes," meaning thereby to (i) set up and knock over a strawman of "supernatural explanations" [where at least since Plato the proper alternative is to study nature vs art on empirical signs, i.e chance + necessity vs intelligent action on choice -- cf Newton below on this] and to (ii) establish a priori materialism as a censoring constraint [cf Newton, below, on this blunder!] on scientific explanations by the back door implicit route of so-called methodological naturalism, they are making moves in philosophy, not science. Indefensible, a priori question-begging moves. If you doubt me on the freighting loaded on to such moves, let me cite Wikipedia which here in its enthusiasm for naturalism and for citing Judge Jones channelling NCSE et al, makes a telling slip or two:
Naturalism is the philosophical belief that only natural laws and forces (as opposed to supernatural ones) operate in the world and that nothing exists beyond the natural world.[1] Natural laws are the rules that govern the structure and behavior of the natural world. The goal of science is to discover and publish these laws. The strict naturalist believes that there are no supernatural agents or events, that there are only natural objects and events. However, for many individuals, a belief in natural laws coexists with a belief in supernatural laws. In Christian theology, natural laws describe the effects of so-called secondary causes (see #History) [--> I cannot but comment right away: how neatly this side-steps the whole established historical fact that it is Christians who across the era form about 1200 - 1700 created modern science and that on a specifically theistic foundaiton, but that admission would not fit the natrualism narrative now would it -- willfully false and deceptive] . But Christians also believe there is a primary (supernatural) cause: God. Philosopher Paul Kurtz notes two senses to naturalism. First, nature is best accounted for by reference to material principles, that is, by mass and energy; physical and chemical properties. Second, all scientific endeavors—all hypotheses and events—are to be explained and tested within methodological naturalism's reference of natural causes and events.[2] Naturalism in Kurtz's first sense, insisting that nature is all there is, is called metaphysical naturalism or philosophical naturalism. In the second sense, methodological naturalism provides assumptions within which to conduct science. Methodological naturalism is a way of acquiring knowledge. It is a distinct system of thought concerned with a cognitive approach to reality, and thus a philosophy of knowledge or epistemology.
Expert testimony reveals that since the scientific revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries, science has been limited to the search for natural causes to explain natural phenomena.... While supernatural explanations may be important and have merit, they are not part of science. This self-imposed convention of science, which limits inquiry to testable, natural explanations about the natural world, is referred to by philosophers as "methodological naturalism" and is sometimes known as the scientific method. Methodological naturalism is a "ground rule" of science today which requires scientists to seek explanations in the world around us based upon what we can observe, test, replicate, and verify.[3] [i.e. Jones, channelling the NCSE]
See the blatant dismissal of alternatives, the twisting of the plain facts of history including those of the founding of science, and the outright establishment of ideologically motivated censorship that begs the question of proper warrant relative to truthfulness in science? Let me cite Newton in Opticks, Query 31, 1704 (and thus well within the NCSE/Jones window where science was supposedly atheistical in its methods, and of course I am citing the leading single scientist of the past 400 years, maybe all time]: ______________ >> Isaac Newton (1642-1727) from Query 31 of Opticks (London, 1704) All these things being consider'd, it seems probable to me, that God in the Beginning form'd Matter in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable Particles, of such Sizes and Figures, and with such other Properties, and in such Proportion to Space, as most conduced to the End for which he form'd them; and that these primitive Particles being Solids, are incomparably harder than any porous Bodies compounded of them; even so very hard, as never to wear or break in pieces; no ordinary Power being able to divide what God himself made one in the first Creation. While the Particles continue entire, they may compose Bodies of one and the same Nature and Texture in all Ages: But should they wear away, or break in pieces, the Nature of Things depending on them, would be changed. Water and Earth, composed of old worn Particles and Fragments of Particles, would not be of the same Nature and Texture now, with Water and Earth composed of entire Particles in the Beginning. And therefore, that Nature may be lasting, the Changes of corporeal Things are to be placed only in the various Separations and new Associations and Motions of these permanent Particles; compound Bodies being apt to break, not in the midst of solid Particles, but where those Particles are laid together, and only touch in a few Points . . . . Now by the help of these Principles, all material Things seem to have been composed of the hard and solid Particles above-mention'd, variously associated in the first Creation by the Counsel of an intelligent Agent. For it became him who created them to set them in order. And if he did so, it's unphilosophical to seek for any other Origin of the World, or to pretend that it might arise out of a Chaos by the mere Laws of Nature [= chance + necessity without intelligence, i.e. he is pointing to inferior alternatives under comparative difficulties, which would be discussed in the General Scholium to Principia]; though being once form'd, it may continue by those Laws for many Ages. For while Comets move in very excentrick Orbs in all manner of Positions, blind Fate could never make all the Planets move one and the same way in Orbs concentrick, some inconsiderable Irregularities excepted, which may have risen from the mutual Actions of Comets and Planets upon one another, and which will be apt to increase, till this System wants a Reformation. Such a wonderful Uniformity in the Planetary System must be allowed the Effect of Choice. And so must the Uniformity in the Bodies of Animals . . . . As in Mathematicks, so in Natural Philosophy, the Investigation of difficult Things by the Method of Analysis, ought ever to precede the Method of Composition. This Analysis consists in making Experiments and Observations, and in drawing general Conclusions from them by Induction, and admitting of no Objections against the Conclusions, but such as are taken from Experiments, or other certain Truths. For Hypotheses [= a priori controlling/censoring speculations] are not to be regarded in experimental Philosophy. And although the arguing from Experiments and Observations by Induction be no Demonstration of general Conclusions; yet it is the best way of arguing which the Nature of Things admits of, and may be looked upon as so much the stronger, by how much the Induction is more general. And if no Exception occur from Phaenomena, the Conclusion may be pronounced generally. But if at any time afterwards any Exception shall occur from Experiments, it may then begin to be pronounced with such Exceptions as occur. By this way of Analysis we may proceed from Compounds to Ingredients, and from Motions to the Forces producing them; and in general, from Effects to their Causes, and from particular Causes to more general ones, till the Argument end in the most general. This is the Method of Analysis: And the Synthesis consists in assuming the Causes discover'd, and establish'd as Principles, and by them explaining the Phaenomena proceeding from them, and proving the Explanations [notice the definition of science and its methods]. . . . And if natural Philosophy in all its Parts, by pursuing this Method, shall at length be perfected, the Bounds of Moral Philosophy will be also enlarged. For so far as we can know by natural Philosophy what is the first Cause, what Power he has over us, and what Benefits we receive from him, so far our Duty towards him, as well as that towards one another, will appear to us by the Light of Nature [this is an allusion to Romans 1:19 - 32 etc]. And no doubt, if the Worship of false Gods had not blinded the Heathen, their moral Philosophy would have gone farther than to the four Cardinal Virtues; and instead of teaching the Transmigration of Souls, and to worship the Sun and Moon, and dead Heroes, they would have taught us to worship our true Author and Benefactor, as their Ancestors did under the Government of Noah and his Sons before they corrupted themselves. >> _______________ There is something to be said in favour of the older practice, of describing science as process as natural philosophy, reserving the claim "knowledge" [what the term in Latin -- then, the universal language of scholarship -- behind "Science" denoted] for well-warranted findings. At least, it would help keep our thinking straight on the subject of warrant and limitations of scientific findings, and keep us out of the sort of self-refuting logical nonsense -- I mean that quite literally -- involved in making claims like "science [is] the only begetter of truth," or that it is self-evident that science [understood as applied, a priori materialism] is the surest means of putting us in contact with reality. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
June 19, 2011
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Elizabeth Liddle:
What are the mechanisms of that process?
Perhaps design is not a mechanical process. It could be a creative process. What are the mechanisms of creativity?Mung
June 19, 2011
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(However fine-tuning is clearly a specified complexity argument and therefore belongs with ID.)tragic mishap
June 19, 2011
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Above the fold: I have never seen a finer hair split. I'm not even sure what you said here makes any sense at all. For instance your example depends on comparing what the Design Question and Intelligent Design say about two completely different things. How is that a comparison? "X" is the thing about which the question is being asked. To compare the two you must use the same "X". It's not a real difference if ID says an organism is designed and the Design Questions says the universe is not designed. Below the fold: I see what you are saying. I would call them the "design argument" and the "design inference" maybe. Or just "intelligent design" in place of the latter as you have it. And I suppose you could say that the primary difference is whether one is considered "scientific" or not. I would define science as the "pursuit of truth about Nature" and define Nature as "that which can in principle be observed and upon which reproducible experiments can in principle be performed." On that basis I could differentiate between ID and Aquinas' Five Ways. Aquinas' arguments don't necessarily apply to only Nature.tragic mishap
June 19, 2011
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All humans philosophize, and scientists are no exception to that. Except many people don't know when they've stopped doing science and started philosophizing. Philosophers are not normally included in thesis defense panels for graduate students; philosophers are not ask to give their approval to the way that science departments conduct their affairs; most physical scientists do not study philosophy. And yet, science is still ultimately undergirded by philosophical assumptions and rules of reason. Who here has been suggesting that a scientist publishing a theory has to run it by a philosopher first? A scientist doesn't necessarily have to get approval of his theory from a mathematician either, but that doesn't mean the theory in question does not rely on math.nullasalus
June 19, 2011
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nullasalus (#30):
Science requires certain fundamental philosophical understandings and commitments to even get off the ground.
All humans philosophize, and scientists are no exception to that. My statement above referred to "the field of philosophy" in an attempt to be clear that I was not talking about this normal human practice. I am not trying to pick a fight with philosophy or philosophers. However, at least for the physical science, the idea that philosophy warrants science is clearly mistaken. Philosophers are not normally included in thesis defense panels for graduate students; philosophers are not ask to give their approval to the way that science departments conduct their affairs; most physical scientists do not study philosophy.Neil Rickert
June 19, 2011
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---Neil Rickert: "Most scientists and most mathematicians do not study philosophy. Thinking logically is ordinary common sense. Being able to use logic does not require any knowledge of the codification of logic within philosophy." In fact, science is dependent on the first rules of right reason and philosophy tells us what those rules are. The man in the street does not tell us about the law of non-contradiction, philosophy does. The man in the street does not tell us about the law of causality, philosophy does. More to the point, the man in the street does not provide a test for discerning when those rules have been followed or broken, philosophy does. Without that philosophical underpinning, science cannot function.StephenB
June 19, 2011
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THE GOD OF THE MATHEMATICIANS - DAVID P. GOLDMAN - August 2010 Excerpt: we cannot construct an ontology that makes God dispensable. Secularists can dismiss this as a mere exercise within predefined rules of the game of mathematical logic, but that is sour grapes, for it was the secular side that hoped to substitute logic for God in the first place. Gödel's critique of the continuum hypothesis has the same implication as his incompleteness theorems: Mathematics never will create the sort of closed system that sorts reality into neat boxes. http://www.faqs.org/periodicals/201008/2080027241.html This following site is a easy to use, and understand, interactive website that takes the user through what is termed 'Presuppositional apologetics'. The website clearly shows that our use of the laws of logic, mathematics, science and morality cannot be accounted for unless we believe in a God who guarantees our perceptions and reasoning are trustworthy in the first place. Proof That God Exists - easy to use interactive website http://www.proofthatgodexists.org/index.php Stephen Meyer - Morality Presupposes Theism (1 of 4) - video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uSpdh1b0X_M Nuclear Strength Apologetics – Presuppositional Apologetics – video http://www.answersingenesis.org/media/video/ondemand/nuclear-strength-apologetics/nuclear-strength-apologetics John Lennox - Science Is Impossible Without God - Quotes - video remix http://www.metacafe.com/watch/6287271/ Materialism simply dissolves into absurdity when pushed to extremes and certainly offers no guarantee to us for believing our perceptions and reasoning within science are trustworthy in the first place: Dr. Bruce Gordon - The Absurdity Of The Multiverse & Materialism in General - video http://www.metacafe.com/watch/5318486/ What is the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism? ('inconsistent identity' of cause leads to failure of absolute truth claims for materialists) (Alvin Plantinga) - video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5yNg4MJgTFw Can atheists trust their own minds? - William Lane Craig On Alvin Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism - video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=byN38dyZb-k "But then with me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?" - Charles Darwin - Letter To William Graham - July 3, 1881 It is also interesting to point out that this ‘inconsistent identity’, pointed out by Plantinga, which leads to the failure of neo-Darwinists to make absolute truth claims for their beliefs, is what also leads to the failure of neo-Darwinists to be able to account for objective morality, in that neo-Darwinists cannot maintain a consistent identity towards a cause for objective morality; The Knock-Down Argument Against Atheist Sam Harris – William Lane Craig – video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tvDyLs_cReE "Atheists may do science, but they cannot justify what they do. When they assume the world is rational, approachable, and understandable, they plagiarize Judeo-Christian presuppositions about the nature of reality and the moral need to seek the truth. As an exercise, try generating a philosophy of science from hydrogen coming out of the big bang. It cannot be done. It’s impossible even in principle, because philosophy and science presuppose concepts that are not composed of particles and forces. They refer to ideas that must be true, universal, necessary and certain." Creation-Evolution Headlinesbornagain77
June 19, 2011
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Here's the proof against your main contention Neil, THE GOD OF THE MATHEMATICIANS - DAVID P. GOLDMAN - August 2010 Excerpt: we cannot construct an ontology that makes God dispensable. Secularists can dismiss this as a mere exercise within predefined rules of the game of mathematical logic, but that is sour grapes, for it was the secular side that hoped to substitute logic for God in the first place. Gödel's critique of the continuum hypothesis has the same implication as his incompleteness theorems: Mathematics never will create the sort of closed system that sorts reality into neat boxes. http://www.faqs.org/periodicals/201008/2080027241.html This following site is a easy to use, and understand, interactive website that takes the user through what is termed 'Presuppositional apologetics'. The website clearly shows that our use of the laws of logic, mathematics, science and morality cannot be accounted for unless we believe in a God who guarantees our perceptions and reasoning are trustworthy in the first place. Proof That God Exists - easy to use interactive website http://www.proofthatgodexists.org/index.php Stephen Meyer - Morality Presupposes Theism (1 of 4) - video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uSpdh1b0X_M Nuclear Strength Apologetics – Presuppositional Apologetics – video http://www.answersingenesis.org/media/video/ondemand/nuclear-strength-apologetics/nuclear-strength-apologetics John Lennox - Science Is Impossible Without God - Quotes - video remix http://www.metacafe.com/watch/6287271/ Materialism simply dissolves into absurdity when pushed to extremes and certainly offers no guarantee to us for believing our perceptions and reasoning within science are trustworthy in the first place: Dr. Bruce Gordon - The Absurdity Of The Multiverse & Materialism in General - video http://www.metacafe.com/watch/5318486/ What is the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism? ('inconsistent identity' of cause leads to failure of absolute truth claims for materialists) (Alvin Plantinga) - video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5yNg4MJgTFw Can atheists trust their own minds? - William Lane Craig On Alvin Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism - video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=byN38dyZb-k "But then with me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?" - Charles Darwin - Letter To William Graham - July 3, 1881 It is also interesting to point out that this ‘inconsistent identity’, pointed out by Plantinga, which leads to the failure of neo-Darwinists to make absolute truth claims for their beliefs, is what also leads to the failure of neo-Darwinists to be able to account for objective morality, in that neo-Darwinists cannot maintain a consistent identity towards a cause for objective morality; The Knock-Down Argument Against Atheist Sam Harris – William Lane Craig – video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tvDyLs_cReE "Atheists may do science, but they cannot justify what they do. When they assume the world is rational, approachable, and understandable, they plagiarize Judeo-Christian presuppositions about the nature of reality and the moral need to seek the truth. As an exercise, try generating a philosophy of science from hydrogen coming out of the big bang. It cannot be done. It’s impossible even in principle, because philosophy and science presuppose concepts that are not composed of particles and forces. They refer to ideas that must be true, universal, necessary and certain." Creation-Evolution Headlines http://creationsafaris.com/crev201102.htm#20110227abornagain77
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Neil Rickert you state: 'science does not depend on or require any warrant from the field of philosophy.' Actually, Neil, science is critically dependent on Theism being true, and furthermore science cannot be sustained by atheism or any other philosophy. Indeed a very strong argument can be made that Christian Theism, in particular, was, and is, necessary for the sustained development of modern science. This is not a matter of my personal taste but is of historical fact! Notes: Little known by most people is the fact that almost every, if not every, major branch of modern science has been founded by a scientist who believed in Christ: Christianity and The Birth of Science - Michael Bumbulis, Ph.D Excerpt: Furthermore, many of these founders of science lived at a time when others publicly expressed views quite contrary to Christianity - Hume, Hobbes, Darwin, etc. When Boyle argues against Hobbe's materialism or Kelvin argues against Darwin's assumptions, you don't have a case of "closet atheists." http://ldolphin.org/bumbulis/ Christianity Gave Birth To Each Scientific Discipline - Dr. Henry Fritz Schaefer - video http://vimeo.com/16523153 In this short video, Dr. Stephen Meyer notes that the early scientists were Christians whose faith motivated them to learn more about their Creator… Dr. Meyer on the Christian History of Science - video http://www.thetruthproject.org/about/culturefocus/A000000287.cfm A Short List Of The Christian Founders Of Modern Science http://www.creationsafaris.com/wgcs_toc.htm Founders of Modern Science Who Believe in GOD - Tihomir Dimitrov http://www.scigod.com/index.php/sgj/article/viewFile/18/18 The Origin of Science Excerpt: Modern science is not only compatible with Christianity, it in fact finds its origins in Christianity. http://www.columbia.edu/cu/augustine/a/science_origin.html The 'Person Of Christ' was, and is, necessary for science to start and persist! https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/she-said-it-nancey-pearceys-thoughtful-article-on-how-%E2%80%9Cchristianity-is-a-science-starter-not-a-science-stopper%E2%80%9D/#comment-385265bornagain77
June 19, 2011
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Sorry, kairosfocus, but science does not depend on or require any warrant from the field of philosophy. I think that's flatly untrue. Science requires certain fundamental philosophical understandings and commitments to even get off the ground. You can get away without various deeper philosophical/metaphysical commitments, but it does not fly solo. Science is probably not fully definable, as was already pointed out by nullasalus (#5). I didn't say it wasn't fully describable. I just know what sort of fight that sort of talk engenders, and I'm not interested in going down a rabbit hole this time around. Yes, a scientist doesn't need to master metaphysics to do research - and a chef doesn't need to know chemistry to cook a good steak. But that also means that when I want to know chemistry I don't talk to a chef, and when I want to know metaphysics/philosophy/theology I don't talk to a scientist.nullasalus
June 19, 2011
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StephenB (#28):
Can science claim independence from the philosophical rules of sound logic?
Yes, of course they can. Most scientists and most mathematicians do not study philosophy. Thinking logically is ordinary common sense. Being able to use logic does not require any knowledge of the codification of logic within philosophy.Neil Rickert
June 19, 2011
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--Neil Rickert: "Sorry, kairosfocus, but science does not depend on or require any warrant from the field of philosophy." Can science claim independence from the philosophical rules of sound logic?StephenB
June 19, 2011
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Sorry, kairosfocus, but science does not depend on or require any warrant from the field of philosophy.Neil Rickert
June 19, 2011
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Perhaps the best reason to believe in design: It’s there, every day, staring us in the face, crying out for an explanation.
Absolutely. So: what do we know about how things get designed? What are the mechanisms of that process?Elizabeth Liddle
June 19, 2011
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PS: Rorty is a bit of a late development, I am thinking going back to the 1870's and coming forward.kairosfocus
June 19, 2011
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Sigh: The act of attempting a definition of science is not an action within science but in the meta discipline that warrants science, i.e. philosophy.kairosfocus
June 19, 2011
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OUCH, typos . . .kairosfocus
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