Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

ID Foundations, 21: MF — “as a materialist I believe intelligence to be a blend of the determined and random so for me that is not a third type of explanation” . . . a root worldview assumption based cause for rejecting the design inference emerges into plain view

Share
Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Flipboard
Print
Email

In the OK thread, in comment 50, ID objector Mark Frank has finally laid out the root of ever so many of the objections to the design inference filter. Unsurprisingly, it is a worldview based controlling a priori of materialism:

[re EA] #38

[MF, in 50:] I see “chance” as usually meaning to “unpredictable” or “no known explanation”. The unknown explanations may be deterministic elements or genuinely random uncaused events which we just don’t know about.

It can also includes things that happen as the result of intelligence – but as a materialist I believe intelligence to be a blend of the determined and random so for me that is not a third type of explanation.

But, just what what is the explanatory filter that is being objected to so strenuously?

Let me present it first, in the per aspect flowchart form that I have often used here at UD, that shows it to be a more specific and detailed understanding of a lot of empirically grounded scientific methods of investigation.

Galileo's leaning tower exercise, showing mechanical necessity: F = m*g, of course less air resistance. NB: He did a thought expt of imagining the light and heavy ball tied together, so on the "heavier must fall faster" concept, the objects now should fall even faster. But, shouldn't the lighter one instead have retarded the heavier? As in, oopsie. The expt may have been done and the heavier may have hit just ahead, as air resistance is as cross section but weight is as volume. (HT: Lannyland & Wiki.)
Galileo’s leaning tower exercise, showing mechanical necessity: F = m*g, of course less air resistance. NB: He did a thought expt of imagining the light and heavy ball tied together, so on the “heavier must fall faster” concept, the objects now should fall even faster. But, shouldn’t the lighter one instead have retarded the heavier? As in, oopsie. The expt may have been done and the heavier may have hit just ahead, as air resistance is as cross section but weight is as volume. (HT: Lannyland & Wiki.)

One that explicitly invokes mechanical necessity as first default, then on high contingency rejects it — if a lawlike necessity is at work, it will produce reliably similar outcomes on similar initial circumstances, just as a dropped heavy object near earth’s surface has initial acceleration 9.8 N/kg due to the gravity field of the earth.

However, this does not cover all phenomena, e.g. if the dropped object is a fair common die that then falls to a table, it will tumble and settle to read a value from the set {1, 2, . . . 6} in a way that is close to the mathematical behaviour of an ideal flat random variable.

But also, chance and necessity cannot cover all outcomes. Not only do we routinely experience being intelligent designers — e.g. by my composing this post — but we often see a class of phenomena which is highly contingent but not plausibly accounted for on chance. For, if we see 500 – 1,000 bits or more of functionally specific complex organisation and/or information [FSCO/I], the needle in haystack challenge faced by the atomic resources of our solar system or cosmos will be overwhelmed by the space of possible configurations and the challenge of finding cases E from narrow and isolated target or hot zones T in such spaces, W.

 

 

 

Citing Dembski’s definition of CSI in No Free Lunch:

p. 148: “The great myth of contemporary evolutionary biology is that the information needed to explain complex biological structures can be purchased without intelligence. My aim throughout this book is to dispel that myth . . . . Eigen and his colleagues must have something else in mind besides information simpliciter when they describe the origin of information as the central problem of biology.

I submit that what they have in mind is specified complexity [[cf. here below], or what equivalently we have been calling in this Chapter Complex Specified information or CSI . . . .

Biological specification always refers to function . . . In virtue of their function [[a living organism’s subsystems] embody patterns that are objectively given and can be identified independently of the systems that embody them. Hence these systems are specified in the sense required by the complexity-specificity criterion . . . the specification can be cashed out in any number of ways [[through observing the requisites of functional organisation within the cell, or in organs and tissues or at the level of the organism as a whole] . . .”

p. 144: [[Specified complexity can be defined:] “. . . since a universal probability bound of 1 [[chance] in 10^150 corresponds to a universal complexity bound of 500 bits of information, [[the cluster] (T, E) constitutes CSI because T [[ effectively the target hot zone in the field of possibilities] subsumes E [[ effectively the observed event from that field], T is detachable from E, and and T measures at least 500 bits of information . . . ”

So, design thinkers reject the default explanation for high contingency– chance — if we see FSCO/I or the like. That is, we infer on FSCO/I and related patterns best explained on (and as known reliable signs of) design, to just that, intelligent design:

Explanatory Filter

Accordingly, I replied to MF at 59 in the OK thread, as follows:

____________

>>> the pivot of the issue is now plain from MF at 50 above:

[re EA] #38

[MF:] I see “chance” as usually meaning to “unpredictable” or “no known explanation”. The unknown explanations may be deterministic elements or genuinely random uncaused events which we just don’t know about.

It can also includes things that happen as the result of intelligence – but as a materialist I believe intelligence to be a blend of the determined and random so for me that is not a third type of explanation.

Here we have the root problem, that for MF, design reduces to chance and necessity.

Also, I would not go along fully with MF’s definition of chance {“uncaused events” is a very troublesome concept for instance but my focus here is,} having identified that chance processes come about by two major known physical processes:

Chance:

tumbling_dice
Tumbling dice — a chaotic phenomenon thanks to eight corners and twelve edges interacting with uncontrollable surface roughness etc. (HT:Rosendahl, Flicker)

TYPE I: the clash of uncorrelated trains of events such as is seen when a dropped fair die hits a table etc and tumbles, settling to readings in the set {1, 2, . . . 6} in a pattern that is effectively flat random. In this sort of event, we often see manifestations of sensitive dependence on initial conditions, aka chaos, intersecting with uncontrolled or uncontrollable small variations yielding a result predictable in most cases only up to a statistical distribution which needs not be flat random.

TYPE II: processes — especially quantum ones — that are evidently random, such as quantum tunnelling as is the explanation for phenomena of alpha decay. This is used in for instance zener noise sources that drive special counter circuits to give a random number source. Such are sometimes used in lotteries or the like, or presumably in making one time message pads used in decoding.

In reply to MF’s attempt to reduce design by intelligence to the other two sources of cause, I suggest that this approach radically undermines the credibility of mind as a thinking and knowing function of being intelligent humans, in a reductio ad absurdum. (Cf my remarks here yesterday in reply to Dan Barker’s FFRF and my longstanding observations — in the end they go back to the mid 1980′s in answer to Marxist materialism as well as evolutionary materialism — here on.)

Haldane sums up one of the major problems aptly, in a turn of the 1930′s remark that has often been cited here at UD:

“It seems to me immensely unlikely that mind is a mere by-product of matter. For if my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically. And hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms. In order to escape from this necessity of sawing away the branch on which I am sitting, so to speak, I am compelled to believe that mind is not wholly conditioned by matter.” [[“When I am dead,” in Possible Worlds: And Other Essays [1927], Chatto and Windus: London, 1932, reprint, p.209.]

Let me clip my more extended discussion:

___________

>> 15 –> In short, it is at least arguable that self-referential absurdity is the dagger pointing to the heart of evolutionary materialistic models of mind and its origin . . . . [It can be presented at a much more sophisticated way, cf. Hasker p. 64 on here as an example, also Reppert, Plantinga and others] but without losing its general force, it can also be drawn out a bit in a fairly simple way:

a: Evolutionary materialism argues that the cosmos is the product of chance interactions of matter and energy, within the constraint of the laws of nature; from hydrogen to humans by undirected chance and necessity.

b: Therefore, all phenomena in the universe, without residue, are determined by the working of purposeless laws of chance and/or mechanical necessity acting on material objects, under the direct or indirect control of happenstance initial circumstances.

(This is physicalism. This view covers both the forms where (a) the mind and the brain are seen as one and the same thing, and those where (b) somehow mind emerges from and/or “supervenes” on brain, perhaps as a result of sophisticated and complex software looping. The key point, though is as already noted: physical causal closure — the phenomena that play out across time, without residue, are in principle deducible or at least explainable up to various random statistical distributions and/or mechanical laws, from prior physical states. Such physical causal closure, clearly, implicitly discounts or even dismisses the causal effect of concept formation and reasoning then responsibly deciding, in favour of specifically physical interactions in the brain-body control loop; indeed, some mock the idea of — in their view — an “obviously” imaginary “ghost” in the meat-machine. [[There is also some evidence from simulation exercises, that accuracy of even sensory perceptions may lose out to utilitarian but inaccurate ones in an evolutionary competition. “It works” does not warrant the inference to “it is true.”] )

c: But human thought, clearly a phenomenon in the universe, must now fit into this meat-machine picture. So, we rapidly arrive at Crick’s claim in his The Astonishing Hypothesis (1994): what we subjectively experience as “thoughts,” “reasoning” and “conclusions” can only be understood materialistically as the unintended by-products of the blind natural forces which cause and control the electro-chemical events going on in neural networks in our brains that (as the Smith Model illustrates) serve as cybernetic controllers for our bodies.

d: These underlying driving forces are viewed as being ultimately physical, but are taken to be partly mediated through a complex pattern of genetic inheritance shaped by forces of selection [[“nature”] and psycho-social conditioning [[“nurture”], within the framework of human culture [[i.e. socio-cultural conditioning and resulting/associated relativism]. And, remember, the focal issue to such minds — notice, this is a conceptual analysis made and believed by the materialists! — is the physical causal chains in a control loop, not the internalised “mouth-noises” that may somehow sit on them and come along for the ride.

(Save, insofar as such “mouth noises” somehow associate with or become embedded as physically instantiated signals or maybe codes in such a loop. [[How signals, languages and codes originate and function in systems in our observation of such origin — i.e by design — tends to be pushed to the back-burner and conveniently forgotten. So does the point that a signal or code takes its significance precisely from being an intelligently focused on, observed or chosen and significant alternative from a range of possibilities that then can guide decisive action.])

e: For instance, Marxists commonly derided opponents for their “bourgeois class conditioning” — but what of the effect of their own class origins? Freudians frequently dismissed qualms about their loosening of moral restraints by alluding to the impact of strict potty training on their “up-tight” critics — but doesn’t this cut both ways? Should we not ask a Behaviourist whether s/he is little more than yet another operantly conditioned rat trapped in the cosmic maze? And — as we saw above — would the writings of a Crick be any more than the firing of neurons in networks in his own brain?

f: For further instance, we may take the favourite whipping-boy of materialists: religion. Notoriously, they often hold that belief in God is not merely cognitive, conceptual error, but delusion. Borderline lunacy, in short. But, if such a patent “delusion” is so utterly widespread, even among the highly educated, then it “must” — by the principles of evolution — somehow be adaptive to survival, whether in nature or in society. And so, this would be a major illustration of the unreliability of our conceptual reasoning ability, on the assumption of evolutionary materialism.

g: Turning the materialist dismissal of theism around, evolutionary materialism itself would be in the same leaky boat. For, the sauce for the goose is notoriously just as good a sauce for the gander, too.

h: That is, on its own premises [[and following Dawkins in A Devil’s Chaplain, 2004, p. 46], the cause of the belief system of evolutionary materialism, “must” also be reducible to forces of blind chance and mechanical necessity that are sufficiently adaptive to spread this “meme” in populations of jumped- up apes from the savannahs of East Africa scrambling for survival in a Malthusian world of struggle for existence. Reppert brings the underlying point sharply home, in commenting on the “internalised mouth-noise signals riding on the physical cause-effect chain in a cybernetic loop” view:

. . . let us suppose that brain state A, which is token identical to the thought that all men are mortal, and brain state B, which is token identical to the thought that Socrates is a man, together cause the belief that Socrates is mortal. It isn’t enough for rational inference that these events be those beliefs, it is also necessary that the causal transaction be in virtue of the content of those thoughts . . . [[But] if naturalism is true, then the propositional content is irrelevant to the causal transaction that produces the conclusion, and [[so] we do not have a case of rational inference. In rational inference, as Lewis puts it, one thought causes another thought not by being, but by being seen to be, the ground for it. But causal transactions in the brain occur in virtue of the brain’s being in a particular type of state that is relevant to physical causal transactions. [[Emphases added . . . ]

i: The famous geneticist and evolutionary biologist (as well as Socialist) J. B. S. Haldane made much the same point in a famous 1932 remark:

“It seems to me immensely unlikely that mind is a mere by-product of matter. For if my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically. And hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms. In order to escape from this necessity of sawing away the branch on which I am sitting, so to speak, I am compelled to believe that mind is not wholly conditioned by matter.” [[“When I am dead,” in Possible Worlds: And Other Essays [1927], Chatto and Windus: London, 1932, reprint, p.209.]

j: Therefore, though materialists will often try to pointedly ignore or angrily brush aside the issue, we may freely argue: if such evolutionary materialism is true, then (i) our consciousness, (ii) the “thoughts” we have, (iii) the conceptualised beliefs we hold, (iv) the reasonings we attempt based on such and (v) the “conclusions” and “choices” (a.k.a. “decisions”) we reach — without residue — must be produced and controlled by blind forces of chance happenstance and mechanical necessity that are irrelevant to “mere” ill-defined abstractions such as: purpose or truth, or even logical validity.

(NB: The conclusions of such “arguments” may still happen to be true, by astonishingly lucky coincidence — but we have no rational grounds for relying on the “reasoning” that has led us to feel that we have “proved” or “warranted” them. It seems that rationality itself has thus been undermined fatally on evolutionary materialistic premises. Including that of Crick et al. Through, self-reference leading to incoherence and utter inability to provide a cogent explanation of our commonplace, first-person experience of reasoning and rational warrant for beliefs, conclusions and chosen paths of action. Reduction to absurdity and explanatory failure in short.)

k: And, if materialists then object: “But, we can always apply scientific tests, through observation, experiment and measurement,” then we must immediately note that — as the fate of Newtonian Dynamics between 1880 and 1930 shows — empirical support is not equivalent to establishing the truth of a scientific theory. For, at any time, one newly discovered countering fact can in principle overturn the hitherto most reliable of theories. (And as well, we must not lose sight of this: in science, one is relying on the legitimacy of the reasoning process to make the case that scientific evidence provides reasonable albeit provisional warrant for one’s beliefs etc. Scientific reasoning is not independent of reasoning.) >>
___________

In short, there is a major issue that materialism is inherently and inescapably self referentially incoherent, undermining its whole scheme of reasoning.

That is a big topic itself.

But, when it comes to the issue of debates over the meaning of chance and inferences to design which implicate intelligence, it is an underlying assumption that plainly leads to endless debates.

In this context, however, the case of 500 coins in a row on a table reading all H or alternating H and T or the first 72 characters of this post in ASCII code, strongly shows the difference in capacity of chance and design as sources of configurations that come from independently and simply describable clusters that are deeply isolated in a space of configs that are such that the atomic resources of our solar system cannot credibly search a big enough fraction to make it reasonable to believe one will stumble upon such configs blindly.

In short, there is a major and directly experienced phenomenon to be accounted for, self aware conscious intellect and related capacities we subsume under the term mind. And this phenomenon is manifest in capacity to design, which is as familiar as composing posts in this thread.

Such designs are well beyond the capacity of blind chance and mechanical necessity, so we have good reason to see that intelligence capable of design is as fundamental in understanding our empirical world as chance and as necessity.

Whatever the worldview consequences — and I think they are huge.>>>

____________

In short, it seems that one key root of objections to the design inference is the notion that intelligence needed for design in the end reduces to cumulative effects of blind chance and mechanical necessity.

Only, that runs into significant self referential incoherence challenges.

A safer approach would be to recognise that intelligence indisputably exists and indisputably exerts capacities not credibly observed to emerge from blind chance and mechanical necessity. Indeed, on inductive and analytic — needle in haystack — grounds, it is arguable and compelling that certain phenomena such as FSCO/I are reliable signs of design as cause.

Then, we run into the challenge that from its very roots, cell based life is chock full of such signs of design, starting with the genetic code and the size of genomes, from 100 – 1,000 kbits on up.

Then, the observed cosmos itself shows strong and multiple signs of being fine tuned in ways that enable the existence of cell based life on terrestrial planets such as our own — where fine tuning is another empirically grounded sign of being designed.

So, there are good reasons to extend the force of the design inference to the origin of cell based life and of major body plans for such life, and to the origins of the observed cosmos that hosts such life. END

__________

F/N: I must update by posting this all too aptly accurate debate summary by no less than UD’s inimitable WJM, done here on Christmas day as a gift to the blog and world. WJM, I CANNOT let this one just wash away in the stream of comments! (You ought to separately headline it under your monicker.) Here goes:

Typical debate with an anti-ID advocate:

ID advocate: There are certain things that exist that are best explained by intelligent designed.

Anti-ID advocate: Whoa! Hold up there, fella. “Explained”, in science, means “caused by”. Intelligent design doesn’t by itself “cause” anything.

ID advocate: What I meant is that teleology is required to generate certain things, like a functioning battleship. It can’t come about by chance.

Anti-ID advocate: What do you mean “by chance”? “By” means to cause. Are you claiming that chance causes things to happen?

ID advocate: Of course not. Chance, design and necessity are the three fundamental categories of causation used to characterize the outcomes of various processes and mechanisms. You’re taking objection with colloquialisms that are commonly used in mainstream science and debate. Here are some examples of peer-reviewed, published papers that use these same colloquialisms.

Anti-ID advocate: Those aren’t real scientists!

ID advocate: Those are scientists you yourself have quoted in the past – they are mainstream Darwinists.

Anti-ID advocate: Oh. Quote mining! You’re quote mining!

ID advocate: I’m using the quotes the same way the authors used them.

Anti-ID advocate: Can you prove it?

ID Advocate: It’s not my job to prove my own innocence, but whatever. Look, it has been accepted for thousands of years that there are only three categories of causation – necessity, or law, chance and artifice, or design. Each category is distinct.

Anti ID advocate: I have no reason to accept that design is a distinct category.

ID advocate: So, you’re saying that battleship or a computer can be generated by a combination of necessity (physical laws) and chance?

Anti-ID advocate: Can you prove otherwise? Are you saying it’s impossible?

ID advocate: No, I’m saying that chance and necessity are not plausible explanations.

Anti-ID advocate: “Explanation” means to “cause” a thing. Chance and necessity don’t “cause” anything.

ID advocate: We’ve already been over this. Those are shorthand ways of talking about processes and mechanisms that produce effects categorized as lawful or chance.

Anti-ID advocate: Shorthand isn’t good enough – we must have specific uses of terms using explicitly laid-out definitions or else debate cannot go forward.

ID advocate: (insert several pages lay out specifics and definitions with citations and historical references).

ID advocate: In summary, this demonstrates that mainstream scientists have long accepted that there are qualitative difference between CSI, or organized, complimentary complexity/functionality, and what can in principle be generated via the causal categories of chance and necessity. Only intelligent or intentional agency is known to be in principle capable of generating such phenomena.

Anti-ID advocate: OMG, you can’t really expect me to read and understand all of that! I don’t understand the way you word things. Is English your first language? It makes my head hurt.

Comments
Optimus: Thank you! :)gpuccio
January 29, 2014
January
01
Jan
29
29
2014
12:17 AM
12
12
17
AM
PDT
RDFish: Now you are more reasonable, so I will answer briefly. I don't think my statement was misrepresenting anything. The meaning was very clear, and it was that your position was extreme and not true. Many theists (and non theists) are theists because they have chosen to be, with all their mind and heart. That their families were theists or not is not relevant in that case. There are always exceptions, and the exceptions can even be numerous. Many theists (and non theists) are that way just because they have passively received those ideas from society, be it the family, or the university, or simply some Internet chat. But I will never offend a priori another thinking person by thinking that he has not chosen responsibly his own ideas. Each of us has his priors, as Mark would say, but for me each of us is free to shape his own destiny, and therefore his own cognitive scenario. And is responsible for that. So, I have not appreciate that argument of yours, and have tried to express, very clearly, why. You can go on trying fastidious tricks to change the discourse, but I believe that the essential meaning is very clear.
As for our substantive disagreements, I think it’s clear that while I am interested in delineating what can and cannot be scientifically established with regard to explanations of origins, you are happy to settle for a position that you’re drawn to, whether or not you can substantiate your claims empirically. That in and of itself is of course unproblematic, but you insist that your opinion constitutes a result that is scientific in the same sense as the huge body of scientific knowledge that real research has generated. To me that seems quite arrogant of you.
Well, as I see things, they are very different from how you represent them. I say: "As for our substantive disagreements, I think it’s clear that I am interested, like you, in delineating what can and cannot be scientifically established with regard to explanations of origins, but don't believe that there is some outer source of authority which can force anyone to accept my views or your views about that. As my conclusions about what can and cannot be scientifically established with regard to explanations of origins are completely different from yours, even after long attempts to clarify our reciprocal ideas, I am happy to settle for the position that I'm drawn to, and to let you settle for the position that you are drawn to. Moreover, I am happy that it is part of my position that no one can decide for us if my position or your position is right, and which of them can substantiate its claims empirically, while it is part of your position, apparently, that someone or something has that authority to do that (probably you). That in and of itself is of course unproblematic. I insist that my opinion constitutes a result that is scientific in the same sense as the huge body of scientific knowledge that real research has generated. You insist that the opposite is true. That in and of itself is of course unproblematic. Finally, to you that seems quite arrogant of me. To me, that seems quite arrogant, dogmatic and sometimes intellectually insincere of you. Again, that in and of itself is of course unproblematic." As you can see, you are certainly right in at least one thing: we have substantive disagreements.gpuccio
January 29, 2014
January
01
Jan
29
29
2014
12:16 AM
12
12
16
AM
PDT
@ Gpuccio Kudos for your diligence and patient exposition!Optimus
January 28, 2014
January
01
Jan
28
28
2014
06:02 PM
6
06
02
PM
PDT
gpuccio,
Rather silly. But you had to say something, I suppose.
You may not have noticed how I have worked to capture and respond directly to my opponents' arguments, only to be accused of constantly misrepresenting them. For example, in this most recent exchange:
StephenB: I do not disagree with GPuccio. Will RDF ever stop misrepresenting what I say?
But of course he did disagree with you, quite directly:
SB @275: “There is no conflict between Dembski’s definition of intelligence and Meyer’s definition.” GP @521: “Just to be clear, I definitely disagree with Dembski here. And I agree with you that the two positions are not compatible.”
So when you misrepresent my statements as well, after I took care to be clear and careful to qualify my generalization, I did feel it was worthwhile to point out that you had some disregard for the truth here. Your response was to call that silly, so I suppose my feeling was justified. As for our substantive disagreements, I think it's clear that while I am interested in delineating what can and cannot be scientifically established with regard to explanations of origins, you are happy to settle for a position that you're drawn to, whether or not you can substantiate your claims empirically. That in and of itself is of course unproblematic, but you insist that your opinion constitutes a result that is scientific in the same sense as the huge body of scientific knowledge that real research has generated. To me that seems quite arrogant of you. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
January 28, 2014
January
01
Jan
28
28
2014
02:42 PM
2
02
42
PM
PDT
Mark:
Definitions have many uses. To say one definition is “better” than another depends on the use.
That's really a good start. I absolutely agree.
Broadly definitions can be descriptive or prescriptive. If it is a purely descriptive definition then a better definition is one that describes more accurately and clearly how the word is commonly used. Even that is subtle. We have a concept of correct use which is not necessarily the most common use (e.g. “disinterested” and “alternate” both of which almost universally abused). But in the end what is correct has to change to recognise popular use – both of those words are on the cusp. Also the clearest description may depend on the audience and the context. In particular it may not make sense to define a word by simply substituting different words that are not clearer or suffer from the same lack of clarity. This happens again and again when discussing the meaning of moral words.
Well... OK, I am not really sure if I completely agree, but for the moment I see no big problems here.
The other broad category is prescriptive definitions. These try to slightly change or sharpen up common usage to make the word more useful in some way. Scientists often do this to make the concept measurable or more objective e.g. “Force” and “Work”. I suspect you did this for “conscious”. But you need to be clear about why this is more useful and recognise that you are changing the meaning and therefore some of things associated with the original meaning may not apply any more.
OK, I am fine with that. I would definitely say that my definition of "conscious" is prescriptive, in the sense you give. But I would also say that "conscious" is typically a word which is ambiguous, in the sense that in common language, and even more in scientific and philosophical language, it can have a lot of different meanings and interpretations. So, my prescriptive definition is meant not so much to give a new different meaning to the word, but rather to isolate a definite meaning that already exists in common language, separating it from the other possible meanings. So, I define being conscious essentially as having subjective representations. I call the subject "the I", or the "perceiving eye", to remind even more explicitly that it is defined by the simple, observable fact that it has subjective representations. What subjective representations are is not defined, but only described from our personal experience. As you can see, mine is a prescriptive definition whose main purpose is to avoid existing ambiguities of the word itself, and base however on empirical observations (our personal intuitive awareness of what subjective representations are) that are not defined, but only described. It seems complex, but in the end it is rather simple. My definition of design, instead, is more "descriptive": The process where a conscious agent outputs a form which is already represented in his consciousness to a material object, because he desires to do that. Why is that definition descriptive? Because I believe that it simply makes explicit the one and only meaning that the word "design" has in common language. In that sense, "design" is a much less ambiguous word than "conscious". If you have alternative definitions for "design", I will be happy to consider them, but I really think that all common uses of the word can be reconducted to the simple definition I have given. So, as you can see, I try to give definitions that, be they descriptive or prescriptive, may be explicit and clear. You will not agree, probably, that they are explicit and clear, but believe me, that is my sincere intention, and I am pretty satisfied of their explicitness and clarity. In any case, even if you don't agree about the clarity, I suppose that they are explicit enough for you to criticize them. :)
What I see a lot is muddling definitions with criteria and measurements. This comes up frequently in ethical discussions e.g. defining “good” as “according to natural moral law” or “acting to maximise happiness”. These may be good criteria for deciding whether some person or action is good but they are not definitions. If they were, the utilitarian and the natural law follower would not have anything to disagree about as they are talking about different things. Similar things happen in all sorts of fields.
I am happy to conclude by again agreeing with you! (By the way, I suppose that "maximise" is a true pearl of britishness!) :)gpuccio
January 28, 2014
January
01
Jan
28
28
2014
01:51 PM
1
01
51
PM
PDT
It's a bit of a hoot to see RDF chastise someone for reading something into another persons words. Mr Kettle meet Mr Pot. This also caught my eye:
It is not surprising that an AI researcher like RD Fish has strong interest in the notion that intelligence is mechanistic versus something mystical.
Sal, your AI guy apparently doesn't even care enough about his chosen course of research to study how chemosemiotic systems actually function. If he did, he wouldn't take the positions he has on this thread. It truly is as if he has no idea that such systems have actual material requirements, and that those requirements can be identified and integrated in coherent model. Then again, this is also the same guy that suggests that rivers "choose" their way to the sea, so I suppose actual rigor is not high on his list of priorities.Upright BiPed
January 28, 2014
January
01
Jan
28
28
2014
09:46 AM
9
09
46
AM
PDT
#578
What about the role of definitions? I would like the digression…
Well - here's a few thoughts. Definitions have many uses. To say one definition is "better" than another depends on the use. Broadly definitions can be descriptive or prescriptive. If it is a purely descriptive definition then a better definition is one that describes more accurately and clearly how the word is commonly used. Even that is subtle. We have a concept of correct use which is not necessarily the most common use (e.g. "disinterested" and "alternate" both of which almost universally abused). But in the end what is correct has to change to recognise popular use - both of those words are on the cusp. Also the clearest description may depend on the audience and the context. In particular it may not make sense to define a word by simply substituting different words that are not clearer or suffer from the same lack of clarity. This happens again and again when discussing the meaning of moral words. The other broad category is prescriptive definitions. These try to slightly change or sharpen up common usage to make the word more useful in some way. Scientists often do this to make the concept measurable or more objective e.g. "Force" and "Work". I suspect you did this for "conscious". But you need to be clear about why this is more useful and recognise that you are changing the meaning and therefore some of things associated with the original meaning may not apply any more. What I see a lot is muddling definitions with criteria and measurements. This comes up frequently in ethical discussions e.g. defining "good" as "according to natural moral law" or "acting to maximise happiness". These may be good criteria for deciding whether some person or action is good but they are not definitions. If they were, the utilitarian and the natural law follower would not have anything to disagree about as they are talking about different things. Similar things happen in all sorts of fields.Mark Frank
January 28, 2014
January
01
Jan
28
28
2014
09:43 AM
9
09
43
AM
PDT
Mark: I take a pride just the same. Everyone has his small satisfactions. After all, maybe my definitions are better, or simply that my interlocutors/antagonists are so good that they have guided me to the best definitions, just to be able to counter their objections. :) What about the role of definitions? I would like the digression...gpuccio
January 28, 2014
January
01
Jan
28
28
2014
08:30 AM
8
08
30
AM
PDT
RDFish: Rather silly. But you had to say something, I suppose.gpuccio
January 28, 2014
January
01
Jan
28
28
2014
08:27 AM
8
08
27
AM
PDT
Gpuccio
Mark: There is no problem with using my definitions, if I make clear what they are and what they mean. Ambiguity in definitions causes confusion. I believe that my definitions are clear, and that they can be used operationally in my reasoning.
This is a real digression but the role of definitions interests me. While it may be true that your definitions are clear I have to question taking a pride in being different in this case.Mark Frank
January 28, 2014
January
01
Jan
28
28
2014
08:18 AM
8
08
18
AM
PDT
Hi gpuccio,
You seem to think that everyone believes what one has been taught in his family. I must disappoint you, but that is not the case.
Again you have reading comphrension issues. Perhaps this is a language problem, but it seems to me that you just habitually assume things not in evidence. More careful readers realize that I actually said:
(emphasis added) Most people born to Christians are Christians, and so on for all other religions. There are the exceptions – the conversions – but they are in the minority.
Yet you translate that in your head into "everyone", and then proceed to tell me there are exceptions! Very curious. I suppose it is true for you that I said something other than what appears on this page. What is true for me is that you have a tenuous grasp on the meaning of what other people say.
I certainly appeal to our uniform and shared experience, bit not as an arbiter. You should have understood, by now, that I don’t like arbiters at all.
Yes, I know. You lack a scientific mind. That's fine - there's room all kinds, poets, philosophers, politicians and priests. Not everyone is cut out for understanding science. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
January 28, 2014
January
01
Jan
28
28
2014
07:47 AM
7
07
47
AM
PDT
RDFish: You seem to think that everyone believes what one has been taught in his family. I must disappoint you, but that is not the case. I think that many people (not all) who are theists have strong personal reasons, freely chosen, to be that way. I like to believe the same of you and your convictions. I am not denying the influence of environment, but you know, I do believe in libertarian fee will. For all, including you. I certainly appeal to our uniform and shared experience, bit not as an arbiter. You should have understood, by now, that I don't like arbiters at all. I appeal to those things only for one reason: to exchange opinions with you, to debate intellectually and humanly, to fight if necessary for what I and you believe to be true. There are no arbiters there, no authority. Only the enjoyment of intellectual confrontation in the search for truth. Maybe I like playing tennis without a net. Maybe you like nets, but only if it's your net. I will not comment on the rest, because it's only the same old trivial repetitions. No joy there.gpuccio
January 28, 2014
January
01
Jan
28
28
2014
07:00 AM
7
07
00
AM
PDT
Mark: There is no problem with using my definitions, if I make clear what they are and what they mean. Ambiguity in definitions causes confusion. I believe that my definitions are clear, and that they can be used operationally in my reasoning. If others do not understand exactly what I mean, I am ready to clarify it again. So, no confusion there.gpuccio
January 28, 2014
January
01
Jan
28
28
2014
06:51 AM
6
06
51
AM
PDT
Hi gpuccio,
But I think you are wrong if you believe that theism is what keeps ID people together. Indeed, I have found a lot of objections to ID, or more specifically to my scientific view of ID, attributable to religious reasons. I believe that what keeps us together, notwithstanding our big worldview differences, is the fundamental conviction that the design inference in biological beings is simply true.
Most people born to Christians are Christians, and so on for all other religions. It's unlikely, then, that most religious people objectively evaluate the evidence and pick the religion that they feel is simply true. There are the exceptions - the conversions - but they are in the minority. Likewise, the vast majority of ID folks really are theists of course: Of all of the ID supporters I've debated on this board and others (probably on the order of a hundred different folks over the years), I do not recall debating anyone who was not a theist. So it's similarly unlikely that these people dispassionately evaluated the biological evidence and came up with "intelligent designer" as the best explanation. Rather, their prior belief in God made ID a natural mental fit. And again, the same is true for me I suppose. My prior beliefs about theism certainly primed me for my position on ID: Without a great deal of definitional work that is missing from ID, the claims of ID are meaningless. But once you force an IDist to actually say what exactly is being claimed, the specific claims are highly conjectural and without any empirical evidence.
3) You say: “Your definition of “conscious”, for example, is different from anyone else I’ve ever spoken to.”. Being a proud minority guy, I take that as a big compliment :)
And I meant it as a big compliment. (But when I say "compliment" I mean a "facetious slight"). :-)
Again, you seem not to understand that science is not a privileged source of truth, form me.
Well, I do now. Unless you agree that appeal to our uniform and shared experience is the arbiter of our shared truths, there is no point to debate - it is like playing tennis without a net.
What can be cognized scientifically, for example the design inference, should be cognized scientifically.
Since different people mean different things by "design inference", it doesn't mean anything at all unless you accompany the term with your particular definition.
So, not only libertarian free will is not a scientifically established fact, but IMO it will never be.
And in that case the EF can never actually reach the "design" node by means of scientific evaluation, which means that ID cannot be a scientifically supported fact. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
January 27, 2014
January
01
Jan
27
27
2014
11:45 PM
11
11
45
PM
PDT
Gpuccio
You say: “Your definition of “conscious”, for example, is different from anyone else I’ve ever spoken to.”. Being a proud minority guy, I take that as a big compliment
While it often makes sense to be proud of being able to think independently I don't think that applies to definitions. If you start to use your own definitions of words that differ from what is commonly accepted you are just causing confusion.Mark Frank
January 27, 2014
January
01
Jan
27
27
2014
10:51 PM
10
10
51
PM
PDT
RDFish: 1) I said "mainly based on empirical facts. Emphasis added. And yes, I believe that "each person finds their own scientific truth". Science is shareable, but not completely shareable. Empirical facts need not be different for different people (although what can be considered an empirical fact can certainly differ from person to person). But certainly, the inferences that we can make from empirical facts are not equally accepted by all (as this blog repeatedly demonstrates). 2)
By and large, and for obvious reasons, people who believe in God believe in ID, and people who don’t, don’t (although of course you’ll find the odd IDist/nontheist or theist/non-IDst).
. It's not true, but I can accept that there is a tendency towards that. With a lot of exceptions. Especially in the sense that a lot of people who believe in God do not believe in ID theory. Again, non believers seem to be more conformists, and usually reject ID with dogmatic fervor. But there are some exceptions. But I think you are wrong if you believe that theism is what keeps ID people together. Indeed, I have found a lot of objections to ID, or more specifically to my scientific view of ID, attributable to religious reasons. I believe that what keeps us together, notwithstanding our big worldview differences, is the fundamental conviction that the design inference in biological beings is simply true. 3) You say: "Your definition of “conscious”, for example, is different from anyone else I’ve ever spoken to.". Being a proud minority guy, I take that as a big compliment :) 4)
On top of these semantic issues, there are the two primary metaphysical questions that are central to ID (despite some folks’ insistence of their irrelevance): The mind/body problem and the problem of free will. One of the most annoying ploys of ID in general is that it is based on what psychologists call our “intuitive dualism”, but neglects to acknowledge that libertarian dualism is not actually a scientifically established fact. But you’ll likely disagree and tell me that libertarian dualism is indeed a scientifically established fact… at least for you :-)
No. Strangely, I have to disappoint you. I don't believe that libertarian dualism is a scientifically established fact. I simply believe that it is true. Many times I have expressed here my conviction that free will cannot be proved scientifically, only philosophically. But it is true just the same. Again, you seem not to understand that science is not a privileged source of truth, form me. What can be cognized scientifically, for example the design inference, should be cognized scientifically. What should be cognized philosophically, or religiously, should be cognized philosophically or religiously. But truth is always the purpose. So, not only libertarian free will is not a scientifically established fact, but IMO it will never be. And yes, no human truth is absolute. In the end, each one of us must decide in his own consciousness what he believes is true. And be responsible for that.gpuccio
January 27, 2014
January
01
Jan
27
27
2014
10:18 PM
10
10
18
PM
PDT
Sal, looks like we cross posted. You have done a good job of laying out your position @566. Well said.Eric Anderson
January 27, 2014
January
01
Jan
27
27
2014
09:51 PM
9
09
51
PM
PDT
Actually, Sal, allow me to clarify in follow up to #565. There are two separate issues going on: 1. The ultimate source of consciousness or intelligence. This is not germane to the design inference. Unfortunately, some are confused and mistakenly think this must be resolved (by proving a negative) in order for ID to be science. 2. Whether consciousness is required for intelligence. In every case in which some non-conscious "intelligence" arguably exists (such as the artificial intelligence or super-computing you refer to), in all cases in which we can trace back the source of that non-conscious entity we always arrive at a mind, at a consciousness. That is what Meyer is pointing out. But again #2 is separate from #1. Dembski seems to be (as are you) stopping part way in the analysis of #2 in a public relations effort to accommodate those who argue for naturally-occurring intelligence (or "teleology"). That may be fine as a pragmatic debating approach, but it does not take away the fact that Meyer is also quite correct in his observation. Personally, I'm not sure what the point is of taking Dembski's or your approach and arguing for naturally-occurring intelligence/teleology, because we still have to ask whether the artifact in question is best explained as a result of intelligence or purely natural causes. So we are left to come up with with a new term to refer to the naturally-occurring intelligence in contrast to intelligence more general. My hunch is that this is what caused Dembski had to fall back on words like "'real' teleology." In any event, while we can perhaps accommodate the idea of 'natural teleology' or an intermediate 'natural intelligence' and still make the design inference, it remains the case that Meyer is quite correct in his observation that in all known cases we still end up back at the more traditional understanding of intelligence/mind/consciousness.Eric Anderson
January 27, 2014
January
01
Jan
27
27
2014
09:48 PM
9
09
48
PM
PDT
Hi gpuccio,
I use the word science, because it well characterizes a field of cognition which is mainly based on empirical facts, and so can be partially separated from philosophy and religion.
And yet in your view each person finds their own scientific truth, and different things may be scientifically true for different people. This makes me wonder what it is you mean by "empirical facts". Are different empirical facts true for different people as well in your opinion?
The tent of ID is nothing if not large and heterogeneous. There must be something really strong that keeps such different people together. Just ask yourself what it is.
Oh I don't think there's any doubt that theism is the primary commonality for most everyone in the ID Tent. By and large, and for obvious reasons, people who believe in God believe in ID, and people who don't, don't (although of course you'll find the odd IDist/nontheist or theist/non-IDst). And sure enough, my view on ID mirrors my own beliefs regarding gods: As a theological non-cognitivist, I note that different people mean substantially different things by the word "God", and many of these definitions are vague, if not meaningless and even incoherent. As we've seen here, different people mean substantially different things by all of the terms used in discussions of ID. "Intelligence", "consciousness", "designer", "agent", "mind", "choice" - all of these terms are continually used in these debates, but rarely defined, and much of what is written in these posts are merely people talking past each other because they are using these words in different ways. Your definition of "conscious", for example, is different from anyone else I've ever spoken to. On top of these semantic issues, there are the two primary metaphysical questions that are central to ID (despite some folks' insistence of their irrelevance): The mind/body problem and the problem of free will. One of the most annoying ploys of ID in general is that it is based on what psychologists call our "intuitive dualism", but neglects to acknowledge that libertarian dualism is not actually a scientifically established fact. But you'll likely disagree and tell me that libertarian dualism is indeed a scientifically established fact... at least for you :-) Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
January 27, 2014
January
01
Jan
27
27
2014
09:47 PM
9
09
47
PM
PDT
I wrote: I’m merely saying, discussions of non-material intelligence don’t necessarily further the ID case.
I should clarify and say that doesn't mean we can critique material causes. What do I mean? In the case of homochirality or 500 fair coins heads, we can argue material causes that maximize uncertainty (disorganize, scramble, whatever) will yield disorganized symbols. Therefore such material causes can't account for the design. It would seem then, from such arguments some will be tempted to immediately jump and say, "if chance and law can't make this design, a non-material cause must be at the root." However, the complication with this line of reasoning is the problem of machine intelligence. Cells are machines and they make homochiral molecules. And a robot can conceivably make 500 fair coins heads. A materialist ID proponent (they are rare, but they do exist like Fred Hoyle) might argue intelligence is fundamentally mechanistic. Thus, perhaps someone like atheist Fred Hoyle, might agree the Explantory Filter works to identify a subset of designs, but it doesn't mean that the EF has identified the products of a non-material intelligence. I believe in non-material, conscious intelligence, but I will not argue that artifacts that pass the EF are necessarily the products of a proximal non-material intelligence even if they are the products of an ultimate non-material intelligence. For example, if we assume a cell is non sentient, we are arguing it can make other cells which will pass the EF. In such case a material mechanism without a non-material conscious mind created an artifact that passes the EF. I believe the origin of life is through a non-material intelligence, but the EF has nothing to say about the ultimate source of design, it can only say it is not the product of law or simple chance distributions. There could be a long trail of machines that make artifacts that pass the EF, and it's probably bordering on metaphysical questions if the end of the regress in this long chain of machines is a non-material intelligence versus a machine. I didn't make many friends when I pointed out the cells a sentient human comes from (from mom and dad) are probably not conscious sentient cellular entities. So it seems rather mystical that consciousness then infuses the machines of human life somewhere along the way after or during conception. All this to point out that I think questions of whether intelligence is ultimately non-material are hard to settle. But even supposing intelligence is purely mechanistic (machine like), it doesn't preclude the validity of the EF which tests for the simplest law and chance paths, not every conceivable law and chance path. Therefore machines can be proximally considered as mechanisms that create designs that pass the EF. That's probably why I had to side somewhat with RD Fish because the jump to "non material causes" seemed to add confusion to the basic design inference of the Explanatory Filter. ID can reject some materialistic mechanisms (simple law and chance), but it doesn't necessarily have to reject all materialistic mechanisms (machines) to assert that something passes the EF. It is not surprising that an AI researcher like RD Fish has strong interest in the notion that intelligence is mechanistic versus something mystical. PS Bill Dembski alluded to such machines in his NFL book by calling them "surrogates" of intelligent agencies.scordova
January 27, 2014
January
01
Jan
27
27
2014
09:42 PM
9
09
42
PM
PDT
Sal:
I’m merely saying, discussions of non-material intelligence don’t necessarily further the ID case.
That is because the question of the source of the intelligence is separate from the observation of the intelligence's existence. The former is not what the design inference addresses. Which is also why complaints against ID (like those made by RDFish on this thread) that focus on the source of intelligence and consciousness and demand that ID take a position on it (even demand that ID prove a negative), do not constitute a valid critique of ID per se. Because they don't even address the relevant question. They are interesting in their own right, to be sure. Just not germane to the design inference.Eric Anderson
January 27, 2014
January
01
Jan
27
27
2014
08:56 PM
8
08
56
PM
PDT
UB: Thank you! :)gpuccio
January 27, 2014
January
01
Jan
27
27
2014
07:09 PM
7
07
09
PM
PDT
RDFish: I use the word science, because it well characterizes a field of cognition which is mainly based on empirical facts, and so can be partially separated from philosophy and religion. It is a partial separation, based on certain features of cognition, not certainly based on the degree or absolute quality of scientific "truth" or "authority". Does that make of me "an epistemological relativist"? I don't know, but in a sense I like the definition! :) And yes, you suppose well. The tent of ID is nothing if not large and heterogeneous. There must be something really strong that keeps such different people together. Just ask yourself what it is.gpuccio
January 27, 2014
January
01
Jan
27
27
2014
07:08 PM
7
07
08
PM
PDT
Stephen: And I fully agree with your post. With your blessing, I hope :)gpuccio
January 27, 2014
January
01
Jan
27
27
2014
07:02 PM
7
07
02
PM
PDT
RDF
SB @275: “There is no conflict between Dembski’s definition of intelligence and Meyer’s definition.” GP @521: “Just to be clear, I definitely disagree with Dembski here. And I agree with you that the two positions are not compatible.
” For the record, I agree completely with GPuccio's belief that intelligence cannot reasonably be separated from consciousness. It is Sal and his belief that one must rely on faith to establish conscious agency that I disagree with. With respect to the compatibility of the definitions, I would say that it depends on the context: The context I had in mind (when I said there is no conflict) is the fact that both definitions are consistent with the way ID defines itself (some features in nature can best be explained by an Intelligent Cause than by undirected Naturalistic forces.) I doubt that GPuccio would disagree with that assessment in that context, though he is certainly free to do so with my blessing. Are the definitions incompatible with each other? They are not mutually incompatible, but only in a one way sense. Meyer would agree with Dembski's definition as far as it goes (intelligence is a function of a choice between alternatives [the weaker claim) but Dembski would not fully agree with Meyers' definition since it makes a stronger claim (the choice between alternatives is made by a "conscious agent" [the stronger claim.] I doubt that GPuccio would find much in that assessment to disagree with, but again, he is free to do so with my blessing. As he rightly points out, disagreement is the life blood of intellectual life.
Yum yum, how are those words tasting now that you have to eat them again?
My words taste fine. I understand context. Apparently, you do not. Perhaps that is why you continually misrepresent what people say. A good way to correct that habit is to read paragraphs as a whole unit and analyze the individual sentences they contain in that larger context. Most importantly, remember that the remarks that people make are reactions to comments that immediately preceded them. If the original comment deviates from the truth then the reaction will focus on that deviation and will not necessarily represent the full measure of the reactor's views and should not be characterized in that way.StephenB
January 27, 2014
January
01
Jan
27
27
2014
06:05 PM
6
06
05
PM
PDT
Hi gpuccio,
Because science is relative. Like any other human cognition.
You didn't answer my question: If scientific knowledge is relative and no different from conclusions from any other manner of inquiry, why even use the word "science" with reference to ID (or anything else)? Why not be happy to call ID philosophy, or religion, if it makes no difference? I myself am not an epistemological relativist, and neither is StephenB nor KF nor WJM nor anyone else here who have accosted me with extreme views regarding the objective truth of their beliefs (including objective moral truths)! The tent of ID is nothing if not large and heterogeneous I suppose :-) Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
January 27, 2014
January
01
Jan
27
27
2014
05:21 PM
5
05
21
PM
PDT
Scordova: however I must admit Tipler and Barrow’s super computer many-world’s description of God was unnerving.
I'm surprised you would. Where did consciousness come from? Algorithms? :)CentralScrutinizer
January 27, 2014
January
01
Jan
27
27
2014
03:11 PM
3
03
11
PM
PDT
RDFish I’m not talking about the origin of intelligence either. I’m talking about the operation of intelligence. I’m not talking about how intelligent organisms came to exist, I’m talking about how they manage to learn, remember, solve problems, and so on.
How the putative intelligent agent designed the DNA replicator is beyond the scope of my hypothesis except to say that it's operation is beyond the ability of chance and necessity as we understand it.
You have just contradicted your stated position by making a specific claim about what it means to be “intelligent”. You say it is “contra chance and necessity as we understand it”.(Emph mine)
I said that. And I also said: this can be falisified by showing that necessity and chance without the aforementioned traits of intelligence as defined above can account for the DNA replicator. In other words, "contra chance and necessity as we understand it." Chance and necessity as we understand it does not have understanding of the physical world, goals, foresight, power to act.
But you can’t even demonstrate that human intelligence meets this criteria
There's no reason to. It's not part of my hypothesis.
how could you support the conclusion that the Designer of Life meets this criteria?
I don't know if it's possible to ever support it with direct empirical evidence. Negative evidence may be the best we can do, that is, a reasonable ruling out of chance and necessity without the attributes of intelligence, although it may never be possible to totally rule it out. Scientific theories are always tentative. What's left is the inference that something with the attributes of intelligence as I've defined is a good candidate, and hence the hypothesis, which is subject to empirical support and falsifiable.
So you say, but you have no way of supporting your opinion with any evidence. You may be right, of course, but you certainly may be wrong, and there is no science to help us decide the matter.
I disagree. I think OOL and protein domains are very reasonable positive empirical pointers to intelligent agency on the design of earth life given their unlikelihood based on chance and necessity without the attributes of intelligence. The only reason why one would reject that, IMO, is because of some prior philosophical commitment. However, we're getting beyond the scope of my post, which is that my hypothesis is scientific. It is subject to empirical support and is falsifiable.
For all we know, things that reason, learn, solve problems, use language, and design complex machinery (i.e. human beings) operate strictly according to deterministic “unguided” physical law.
For all we know they don't. But if they do, they operate such in ways that go beyond cause and necessity as we understand it, as my hypothesis specifies.
You can’t prove an hypothesis by defining yourself to be correct. You’re claiming that nothing that operates according to necessity could possibly exhibit these attributes, but you provide no reason to believe you are correct.
Again, my hypothesis:
“Intelligent agent” is defined as something that possesses an understanding of physical reality such as human physicists currently possesses, has foresight such that it can extensively run scenarios and probe for certain desired outcomes, has goals, and has the power and facility to put matter/energy together in such a way that physical reality otherwise have not been shown to accomplish. (Rabbit trails about whether consciousness is required of such an agent is tangential and irrelevant.) Now, I conjecture “the DNA replication system required an intelligent agent” as defined above. In other words it required an agent that has human-like grasp of physical reality, has goals, can run scenarios probing for desired outcomes, and the power to combine matter and energy to accomplish the goal. This can be falsified by showing that necessity and chance without the aforementioned traits of intelligence as defined about can account for the DNA replicator. Therefore it is a scientific hypothesis.
My hypothesis is not merely a negative hypothesis against chance and necessity, but rather against chance and necessity without those attributes of intelligence as I have defined it. For some reason this is getting lost on you. I will be happy to clarify. Now, if you like you may assume all day long that my putative designer is existing firmly within a "materialistic" universe, operating under all the laws and regulations of chance and necessity, with one difference: this designer has the following attributes: the understanding of the physical reality, goals, foresight and power to effects its desires. Point is, it stands that my hypothesis is entirely within the scientific domain. It is subject to empirical support and falsification. Free will and consciousness and transcendence have nothing to do with it.
If materialism is true, then you are wrong, no matter how much you play with your definitions.
See above.
Nonsense – there is no method to determine if ANYTHING is “other than” chance and necessity.
Irrelevant since my hypothesis is not a conjecture chance and necessity to an absolute degree. Only against the origin of the DNA replicator from chance and necessity without the attributes intelligence as I have defined it. That is, it requires "something" with those attributes, and that "something" may well be operating within chance and necessity, or not, it's not relevant to my hypothesis.
Undefined hypotheses are not scientific. Moreover, it is ridiculous to imagine that “falsification of ‘X explains Y’” merely refers to “proving that ‘not-X explains Y’”.
So I guess you're the arbiter of what is scientific? The form is logical. Fill in the words with meaning. At any rate, I agree that your little hypothesis is worthless by itself. And it is worthless as an argument against my hypothesis since my hypothesis is not vacuous and yours is.
You left one of your critical assumptions out of your definition, which is that intelligence is “other than chance and necessity”. There is no evidence that anything by that definition exists at all.
Read my hypothesis again. I didn't define intelligence that way. Bottom line, my hypothesis is well within the domains of science. Cheers!CentralScrutinizer
January 27, 2014
January
01
Jan
27
27
2014
03:00 PM
3
03
00
PM
PDT
GP, you are a joy to ID.Upright BiPed
January 27, 2014
January
01
Jan
27
27
2014
02:56 PM
2
02
56
PM
PDT
FWIW, I've never found Dawkins ideas the least bit threatening to my metaphysical beliefs because he was so obviously wrong, however I must admit Tipler and Barrow's super computer many-world's description of God was unnerving. Here was an ID proponent who had a conception of God that was highly impersonal and mindless and heartless and pretty much materialistic by the standards of humans. It could make designed objects that will pass the EF at least in theory. The question was whether he was right. Someone commented, "Tipler has found a god even an atheist could love." Tipler is a respected physicist, and that's why his ideas were a bit unnerving to me. I should also mention that I was among the first to announce Albert Voie peer-reviewed paper promoting ID based on Turing Machines. https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/another-pro-id-paper-passes-peer-review/ Although Voie rejects the notion of a super computer God, he did list is as a possible (at least in principle) source of intelligence to create life. I refer to ID to support certain metaphysical claims (especially since I'm a creationist), but using ID to support metaphysical claims is not the same as conflating metaphysical claims with ID. I may use ID arguments to support belief in the Christian God, but I certainly don't conflate the two notions. That is why I separate design from doctrines of intelligent or intelligent agency. It is a sufficient but not necessary condition for an artifact or event to pass the EF for me to regard it as resembling a design. Whether it is designed or regresses to some conscious intelligent agency is a separate issue, but when an artifact passes the EF, it is undeniable that it evidences certain empirical qualities. This is the part of ID theory that is defensible -- demonstrating that something is not the product of a given law or chance distribution (or set of distributions). That part of ID theory I consider science just as I would say 500 fair coins heads is in violation of expectation of a random process. I have no problem calling that part of ID science, and variations of such arguments can be used as a scientific criticism of evolutionism. As far as whether an intelligence made life, I'll say, "life resembles designs of a very great intelligent being, you may believe what you chose, but I find it hard to believe otherwise." So parts of the ID claim are based clearly on science (in fact ID would not exist without science), but other parts are not as clear cut whether they are science or not. Eric had a point, if we call Darwinism and Multiversism science, then ID deserves to be called science. I've argued that if we put all known science on the table, we could still make a case based on science because science strongly admits the possibility that there is indeed an ultimate intelligence: https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/the-quantum-enigma-of-consciousness-and-the-identity-of-the-designer/ So is ID science? My answer remains, "it doesn't matter, what matters more is whether it is true, and if God is the Intelligent Designer, it's a relatively unimportant question in the scheme of things whether we want to classify ID as science or not."scordova
January 27, 2014
January
01
Jan
27
27
2014
02:25 PM
2
02
25
PM
PDT
1 2 3 20

Leave a Reply