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I found this chilling:

Abstract:
This paper questions criminal law’s strong presumption of free will. Part I assesses the ways in which environment, nurture, and society influence human action. Part II briefly surveys studies from the fields of genetics and neuroscience which call into question strong assumptions of free will and suggest explanations for propensities toward criminal activity. Part III discusses other “causes” of criminal activity including addiction, economic deprivation, gender, and culture. In light of Parts I through III, Part IV assesses criminal responsibility and the legitimacy of punishment. Part V considers the the possibility of determining propensity from criminal activity based on assessing causal factors and their effects on certain people. In this context, the concept of dangerous individuals and possible justifications for preventative detention of such individuals in order to protect society is assessed. The concluding section suggests that the law should take a broader view of factors that could have determinant effects on agents’ actions.

The part that bugs me is “possible justifications for preventative detention”.

That’s what always happens when free will is denied. Somehow or other, the idea gets started that we can detect in advance who will commit a crime. Then you needn’t do anything to get arrested and put away. Someone just needs to have a theory about you.

But no one can truly predict the future in any kind of detail.

What about the Fort Hood massacre, you ask? Well, according to a number of reports, that guy had been advertising his grievances for some months. You sure wouldn’t need a brain scan or materialist theories about free will to figure out that he wasn’t happy in the Army and should just have been discharged – which is what he wanted. You’d just need to listen to what he actually said.

Also just up at my neuroscience blog, The Mindful Hack:

Neuroskepticism: A breath of fresh air, and maybe more legal safety too

Materialism and popular culture: The human brain as a machine?

Spiritual Brain: Polish translation rights bought

Curiosity and the dead cat

Comments
PaulN, "So what’s your solution to this in terms of a teenager being given responsibilities from the parent? Or do you just avoid that altogether?" Paul, I don't have an opinion on freewill or not. I'm just saying if something is proposed and it's agreed we'll all stay on a logical track in discussing this, then in that case I have a good point. Don't I? I was talking about the answer being found outside of our definition of time and cause and effect. The answer has to be there and not in some other research path.lamarck
November 22, 2009
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Clive Hayden @122
Do you admit that nature is a mystery? that things that appear to us as truthful one way, today, could appear differently tomorrow in nature? Do you admit the possibility that whatever scientific theories we may have today, we hold provisionally, given that at any time new information can arise that will change the picture? Did you read the thirteen pages of that link I sent you in Chesterton’s book? He does a masterful job of explaining it. I have no idea what it means to say that nature is a mystery, so I can hardly assent to that assertion. There is an inconceivable amount of "nature" which we have neither explored not have an "explanation" for. Nature is a mystery.
...things that appear to us as truthful one way, today, could appear differently tomorrow in nature?
Again, I find this statement nearly incomprehensible. Do I agree that things that appear to us one day in nature may appear to us another day differently in nature? Absolutely! Nature, by it's very nature, changes. It should not be surprising, therefore, that an observer might observe that "things chznge." Aristotle observed this (as did others before him). Are we left with but two conclusions? Everything changes, nothing is permanent. Change is but an illusion. Is it the case that one or the other must be true?
Mung
November 20, 2009
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Mark Frank You're welcome.vjtorley
November 20, 2009
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Vjtorley Incidentally I am copying our dialogue and storing it here. I thought it might be useful next time I have to explain compatabilism so to someone.Mark Frank
November 19, 2009
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#119 Vjtorley On morality of rats and young children I think there are several reasons why they are not morally responsible. 1) The rats don't have and the children have not yet developed any moral desires. They don't want to help others and do not have any empathy for that desire. 2) I think you are right that to be moral you have to some extent understand what it is like to be someone else. 3) They are incapable of predicting the consequences of what they do beyond the very short term. 4) Much of morality is cultural (although it relies on a base derived from human nature) and rats and young children have not learned the culture specific rules. There are probably other things as well. On desires causing mental processes You are right that it is desires plus stored information that cause me to undertake rational deliberation. In fact a lot of other things are necessary. It is one of the problems of discussing causality that we tend to talk about "the cause" of an event. But in fact there are always an infinity of different conditions that are necessary for an event to take place and which one you select as the cause depends on the context. For example, for me to work on a maths problem I must want to solve it, but also have a wide range of skills, a body, a way of writing down the answer, etc. Which of these is the cause? Any of them depending on the context. And even if we list them all they may be necessary but not sufficient - because there may be a random element - perhaps some quantum factor - who knows. I don't see it as a problem that the desires and stored knowledge work through chemistry and physics. I am a materialist so I believe the rational deliberation is also a chemical/physical process. Describing it in terms of the rational deliberation is another way of describing the same thing - as check mate is a way of describing a particular type of configuration of wooden items on a board. But the discussion has moved away from free will to materialism/immaterialism. On Calvinism I didn't say that I would not be perturbed if the decision making process was immaterial. I just said compatabilism does not entail materialism. I am a died-in-the-wool materialist. I have several objections to Calvinism, but as you point out, I do not think it removes free will. 1) My primary objection is I am a materialist and an atheist! 2) Second - remember my definition of determinism. It includes the possibility of random, uncaused events. I believe there are such events and so no God can totally control or predict what will happen. 3) However, if there were a person who acted like the Calvinist God then I would see them as a bit like the manager who creates a sales environment which encourages sales people to behave unethically. He is responsible for what happens and so are his staff. So such a God would be responsible for all the wicked things he got people to do. And so would the people doing the wicked things. We blamed the high up Nazis for giving the orders (because they they knew they would be obeyed) and the concentration camp staff for carrying them out.Mark Frank
November 19, 2009
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Mung,
But scientific theories are supposed to be constructed in such a way as to be truthful, are they not? Not only are they expected to be truthful, they are supposed to be susceptible to tests of truth. And we certainly employ our reasoning in science, and things in science are discerned through reason. It makes no sense to say that this reasoning that we use in science is not concerned with truthfulness.
Do you admit that nature is a mystery? that things that appear to us as truthful one way, today, could appear differently tomorrow in nature? Do you admit the possibility that whatever scientific theories we may have today, we hold provisionally, given that at any time new information can arise that will change the picture? Did you read the thirteen pages of that link I sent you in Chesterton's book? He does a masterful job of explaining it.Clive Hayden
November 19, 2009
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Science has to accord with truth. It must be factual and facts must be true. There are realms of science where it becomes speculative and synthetic- and it is here that we cannot "know" whether the theories, speculations or hypothesis are truthful or not- but in the case of these instances the strength of the science is weaker. There are also realms of truth that go beyond science- like for example beliefs and issues of faith for example religious claims like the resurrection which for many people these are truths and ultimate truths that are even worth dieing for. SO science must accord with truth- but it cannot discern all truth- that is, it cannot reveal everything- and while it is permitted at times to go beyond what we can know- to make inferences of relative strengths (weak to strong)- those too must accord with what we know to be true.Frost122585
November 19, 2009
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Clive:
I’m sure you see my point and would agree.
Of course I see your point. It think it's quite similar to mine, though stated differently. Saying that science is not about truth is very misleading. Think of some ways in which that statement could be reframed. "Science is unconcerned about truth." "What is true (or not) is irrelevant to science." If science is not about truth, what is it's purpose? If science is not about truth, why does it employ the tools of truth, such as the law of non-contradiction?
If I may interject, scientific theories are not truths like the laws of logic and reason and all things discerned by virtue of our reason, including mathematics, and I would add morality.
But scientific theories are supposed to be constructed in such a way as to be truthful, are they not? Not only are they expected to be truthful, they are supposed to be susceptible to tests of truth. And we certainly employ our reasoning in science, and things in science are discerned through reason. It makes no sense to say that this reasoning that we use in science is not concerned with truthfulness.Mung
November 19, 2009
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Mark Frank (#106) Thank you for your post. If I understand you rightly, your model of free choice is as follows: (i) external forces (past and present) mold my desires. It does not matter if these external forces are personal (like my hypothetical Martian) or impersonal (e.g. blind natural processes, such as chance and necessity); (ii) My desires determine my rational decision-making processes, but these decision-making processes have to take place inside me. They cannot be micro-managed from outside; if they are, then my decision is not properly mine and hence not free; (iii) The decision-making processes in turn determine my actions, which are (for the most part) bodily movements. I have a few comments I'd like to make. 1. In #98 you wrote that on your view, "blame is morally appropriate for healthy adult human beings because they have free will and responsibility," whereas two-year-old children, chimpanzees and rats have free will, but are not responsible for their actions. I have to ask: why not? In #100, I suggested that infants, although rational, lack "a fully fledged theory of mind, in which they understand that there are other people, who have their own beliefs and desires." In my opinion, this is a sensible reason for denying moral responsibility to infants - and to any non-human animals who are incapable of having a "theory of mind." (Having duties and responsibilities to others presupposes an ability to empathize with them, and see things from their perspective. Infants can't do this; neither can rats, and I doubt whether chimps can, either.) Would you concur with this view? 2. In #106, you wrote: "My mental processes are caused by my desires." This sounds odd. For the life of me I cannot see how a desire can determine a rational deliberation. After all, the object of one's rational deliberation (e.g. food for dinner) can hardly be said to generate syllogisms in one's head, so why should a desire for that object be able to do so? A desire is merely an appetite which moves someone towards an object. Well, what about a combination of desire and stored information? Could that generate a rational deliberation? Certainly not, if you envisage reasoning as a formal process. My desires might push me to manipulate the information in my brain to obtain some end, but that would be by virtue of their chemical properties rather than their formal properties, such as logical validity and soundness. 3. You also noted in #106 that you would not be perturbed, as a compatibilist, even if the (decision-making) process were (in some way) an immaterial one. Since you don't particularly care whether the forces determining your desires are personal or impersonal, and you don't care whether your decision-making processes are material or immaterial, then I can only assume you have no objection to theological compatibilism. On your own account of freedom, there is no objection which you could level at Calvin's absolute double predestination: the notion (held by a small minority of Christians) that God decreed from all eternity that a few people will be saved, and that the remainder (who are said to constitute the vast majority of humankind) will be damned. Calvin held that God was perfectly just in punishing the damned, since they had freely chosen to perform the actions which brought about their damnation: after all, they did exactly what they wanted to do, and their rational deliberations were their own - they were not micro-managed by God, so your condition (ii) would be satisfied by Calvin's God. (A Calvinistic God would be perfectly capable of determining people's deliberations through either remote or proximate causes, so we can assume that no micro-management occurs.) You might object to the eternity of the punishment of the damned, but a Calvinistic God might reply: "Well, if they continue to hate me and my laws, then why shouldn't I continue to punish them for it? It's a self-perpetuating cycle, and they freely perpetuate it." You might also ask why God does not annihilate the damned; but why, on your account, is He obliged to? The doctrine of hell is without a doubt the number one objection to Christianity, put forward by skeptics. Since most skeptics are also compatibilists, then I would argue that they are being inconsistent when they object to Christianity in this manner. Would you agree? For my part, I hasten to add, I am not a Calvinist: if I were one, I'm sure I'd go crazy, as it would destroy my capacity to "live in the present moment," and in any case, it seems unacceptably counter-intuitive to say that I am free even if my actions are controlled. Calvinism, like reductionist materialism, is one of those ideas that you cannot accept without destroying your sanity. For me, that's a good reason to give it a wide berth.vjtorley
November 19, 2009
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Victor Tussle,
I’m not denying logic.
That's all I need, and all I was asking for from you. If logic goes, so does science. If you do not perceive the reasonableness to something like the law of non-contradiction, no argument can bring you to it which doesn't rely on that law. Clive Hayden
November 19, 2009
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Clive,
I don’t see how this argument could follow, but if you’re not interested in logic, to you it could.
Could you restate that argument in formal logic? Then perhaps we can start to make progress, rather then veiled insults and arrogance.
And it is, of course, quite possible that you see nothing wrong with contradictions, you might maintain at once that you know logically that you’re not in a state of solipsism while denying logic.
I'm not denying logic. I'm asking you what your "definition" of logic is as it's apparently very different from what I understand as logic. You seem to be using some home-spun version of logic to mean "what appears obvious and true to me" rather then "logic" as defined by some of the greatest minds to ever live, another tool in the systematic attempt to better understand the universe. Perhaps if you could define exactly what you mean when you say "logic" we could start over?Victor Tussle
November 19, 2009
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Victor Tussle, You have to just have faith that you're not in a state of solipsism. There is nothing poor about this. And any argument you bring that you're not in a state of solipsism, will only, and indeed can only be brought on the basis that logic and reason are real things, in other words, you'll use what you're maintaining doesn't exist. But that would lead you into a contradiction. And it is, of course, quite possible that you see nothing wrong with contradictions, you might maintain at once that you know logically that you're not in a state of solipsism while denying logic. I don't see how this argument could follow, but if you're not interested in logic, to you it could. Clive Hayden
November 19, 2009
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So Clive, when I asked you for the explanation you claimed to have
But we can give an explanation for the laws of logic and reason, and why they are true.
You said
You just have to perceive their reasonableness, their truth.
Or in other words, you just have to believe! Have faith! Very poor!Victor Tussle
November 19, 2009
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Clive,
You just have to perceive their reasonableness, their truth.
I'm afraid I don't understand what you mean. What particular part of the universe that is logic are you talking about? It's a big subject http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outline_of_logic And there are plenty of controversial topics.
If you don’t, then you have no basis of rationality to begin with to discern the reasonableness of any explanation that anyone could give you.
So, if I don't perceive some thing you see as true I am not rational? Could you state that in formal logic so I can be sure I understand you?
If you do not “see” it from the outset, no argument could bring you to it, because any and all argument relies on it.
I suspect some of these people would disagree with you. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outline_of_logic#Famous_logicians And Clive, what do you make of this? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%27s_theorem And as you presumably "see" it from the outset, what do you make of the role of paradox in logic? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_paradoxesVictor Tussle
November 19, 2009
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Victor Tussle, You just have to perceive their reasonableness, their truth. If you don't, then you have no basis of rationality to begin with to discern the reasonableness of any explanation that anyone could give you. If you do not "see" it from the outset, no argument could bring you to it, because any and all argument relies on it. Clive Hayden
November 19, 2009
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Clive
But we can give an explanation for the laws of logic and reason, and why they are true.
Can you? Could you then? As just as there is disagreement over what logic is about, there is also disagreement about what logical truths there are. More here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logic What is your explanation for the laws of logic and reason, and why they are true? I'm very interested to hear.Victor Tussle
November 19, 2009
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Mung,
How can “the data of science” provide to Allen a rational basis upon which to reject materialism if science is not about truth?
It cannot. It is a metaphysical assertion that can be based on anything it likes, such as the data of science or the lack of the data of science, but the point is that it is discerned with something more than the data of science, such as our powers of reasoning, and then the reasonable conclusion follows. The data of science is only one part of his deliberation. Maybe this will illustrate how science isn't about truth, I think that you will grant that there are truths that cannot be got through any science, such as the law of non-contradiction, mathematics, etc. Science relies on logic, otherwise, if you don't start with logic, you cannot even begin to do science. If you get rid of logic, all science goes with it. I'm sure you see my point and would agree. But the problem with calling scientific theories as truth, is that they are a different sort of inference, one which can in principle be changed, and has been changed, when more data is studied. The laws of logic and reason, in principle, will not be changed, regardless of how much data is collected. It doesn't matter how far you go in mathematics, differential equations, etc., if the multiplication table changes, all is in ruins, and the same goes for our reason, and I would add even morality. But the outside world is the mystery, which constantly alludes us, and never explains itself. We do not discern it as we discern logic. All science can ever do is provide descriptions of things, and then we call those descriptions "natural". What can never come is an explanation from those descriptions. But we can give an explanation for the laws of logic and reason, and why they are true. We have "inside knowledge" to the laws of reason and logic, and do not have the equivalent insight into what we call the "natural" world, because we do not perceive it, as it were, as a truth, like the law of non-contradiction. There is no equivalent insight that we possess in regards to logic that we have in regards to nature. Logic we understand as true, nature, we don't.Clive Hayden
November 19, 2009
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Mung, If I may interject, scientific theories are not truths like the laws of logic and reason and all things discerned by virtue of our reason, including mathematics, and I would add morality. This chapter in G. K. Chesterton's book Orthodoxy may give you some answers. http://www.pagebypagebooks.com/Gilbert_K_Chesterton/Orthodoxy/The_Ethics_of_Elfland_p1.html "No; the vision is always solid and reliable. The vision is always a fact. It is the reality that is often a fraud." ~ChestertonClive Hayden
November 19, 2009
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Re: Truth in Science Over at Telic Thoughts Allen tells a somewhat different story about science and truth.
Since the empirical sciences ... are all ultimately founded on induction, all of the concepts in the empirical (i.e. "natural") sciences are closer to nominalism than to Platonic realism. This is why I tell my students that the empirical sciences aren't about "Truth", if by that term one means generalizations that are absolutely and necessarily "true". here
Sort of reminds me about the different stories for his rejection of materalism:
My statement that I am not a materialist and that I believe that there is a logical inconsistency between materialism and the data of science is a metaphysical assertion, and therefore not a scientific conclusion.
As for materialism, I am not a materialist and believe that purely materialistic arguments are fatally logically flawed, and would therefore not ever try to support them.
If science isn't about "truth," then why should ID be excluded on the basis that it cannot be falsified? Something is just not adding up here. I can't quite put my finget on it. How can "the data of science" provide to Allen a rational basis upon which to reject materialism if science is not about truth?Mung
November 19, 2009
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Mark Frank, You might find this quote from Dostoevsky interesting in the discussion on free will: http://afterall.net/papers/491347 Here is an excerpt: "Oh, tell me, who was it first announced, who was it first proclaimed, that man only does nasty things because he does not know his own interests; and that if he were enlightened, if his eyes were opened to his real normal interests, man would at once cease to do nasty things, would at once become good and noble because, being enlightened and understanding his real advantage, he would see his own advantage in the good and nothing else, and we all know that not one man can, consciously, act against his own interests, consequently, so to say, through necessity, he would begin doing good? Oh, the babe! Oh, the pure, innocent child! Why, in the first place, when in all these thousands of years has there been a time when man has acted only from his own interest? What is to be done with the millions of facts that bear witness that men, CONSCIOUSLY, that is fully understanding their real interests, have left them in the background and have rushed headlong on another path, to meet peril and danger, compelled to this course by nobody and by nothing, but, as it were, simply disliking the beaten track, and have obstinately, wilfully, struck out another difficult, absurd way, seeking it almost in the darkness. So, I suppose, this obstinacy and perversity were pleasanter to them than any advantage.... Advantage! What is advantage? And will you take it upon yourself to define with perfect accuracy in what the advantage of man consists? And what if it so happens that a man's advantage, SOMETIMES, not only may, but even must, consist in his desiring in certain cases what is harmful to himself and not advantageous. And if so, if there can be such a case, the whole principle falls into dust. What do you think — are there such cases? You laugh; laugh away, gentlemen, but only answer me: have man's advantages been reckoned up with perfect certainty? Are there not some which not only have not been included but cannot possibly be included under any classification? You see, you gentlemen have, to the best of my knowledge, taken your whole register of human advantages from the averages of statistical figures and politico-economical formulas. Your advantages are prosperity, wealth, freedom, peace — and so on, and so on. So that the man who should, for instance, go openly and knowingly in opposition to all that list would to your thinking, and indeed mine, too, of course, be an obscurantist or an absolute madman: would not he? But, you know, this is what is surprising: why does it so happen that all these statisticians, sages and lovers of humanity, when they reckon up human advantages invariably leave out one? They don't even take it into their reckoning in the form in which it should be taken, and the whole reckoning depends upon that. It would be no greater matter, they would simply have to take it, this advantage, and add it to the list. But the trouble is, that this strange advantage does not fall under any classification and is not in place in any list..." Fyodor Dostoevsky, Notes from Underground (1864), Part I, Sect. VII, VIII.Clive Hayden
November 19, 2009
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Do you deny this is true?? Do you want me to cite the studies again?? Do you want to go through them with a fine tooth comb? Surprising No,,, you want to completely ignore this foundational test and to argue about something that has no direct bearing on concretely falsifying Genetic Entropy and concretely establishing evolution as possible in biology,,, This is concrete science NAK,, that presents a clear, fairly solid, boundary condition for the falsification of ID, as well as confirmation of evolution to boot,,,
I think he just wants to model it in a simulation so that it can be studied.Mung
November 19, 2009
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#104 vj There was a phrase in your description of the Martian case which escaped my notice the first time which I think is rather important. the Martian has been controlling all of your desires, and all of your rational deliberations</b<, This rather implies that the Martian is micromanaging my deliberations - intervening in the decision making process. My model of free will does not include that. My mental processes are caused by my desires. If determinism is true, then in theory given my desires (and a zillion other things such as my memories and the current environment) it would be possible to predict how those processes will operate and the decision they will come up with (with the standard reservation about a possible random element). But the processes operate standalone as it were in my brain. It is my brain that is balancing alternatives, weighing outcomes, imagining how I would feel if ... To me this is free will. As you point out it no difference if a Martian specified all my desires and environment or whether they just happened - the mental process is the same. Here we meet an impasse. You feel that something important is missing from this rather bizarre scenario. A mysterious element called "free will". I feel this bizarre scenario captures what we call free will. I am making decisions based on what I want. I am responsible for those decisions and culpable or laudable accordingly. As I say I only want to explain what compatabilism is. I know I will not convince anyone - at least not immediately - but sometimes it gradually takes root as an idea. A reflection which you may find obvious. Materialism more or less entails compatabilism or the denial of free will. However, compatabilism does not entail materialism. It may be that the this process, caused by my desires, is in some sense immaterial.Mark Frank
November 19, 2009
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Mark Frank (#103) The hypothetical cases involving addiction which you propose are very interesting, but they differ in two significant ways from my Martian case. The first difference relates to time, and the second relates to scope. 1. Time. An addict may have a craving that he/she needs to satisfy, but once it is satisfied (i.e once the addict has obtained his/her "fix"), the addict is free from his/her overpowering urge for a while. During that time, the addict is free to seek treatment for his/her addiction. For example, the addiction can call someone for help, or go and see a therapist, or take refuge in a church. Even if the criminal mastermind has cunningly locked all the doors of the building and cut the phone lines, the addict can still pray. That, at least, is a free act, even if the addict's prayers go unanswered and the addict never manages to escape. For at least some of the time, then, the addict is free. 2. Scope. The criminal mastermind doesn't control all of the addict's desires. In fact, the criminal mastermind doesn't even control all of the addict's ultimate goals. The drug is an ultimate goal for the addict, but so is the urge to sleep, eat, drink or relieve oneself. Any of these urges can be over-riding cravings too. What happens when these urges conflict? It is thus doubtful whether the criminal mastermind could control the entire gamut of the addict's behavior, simply by creating an addiction in his/her victim. But even supposing that there were no conflicts of urges, and that the criminal mastermind could infallibly make the addict take on complex, dangerous and unpleasant work to satisfy his/her need, the mastermind's control over the addict's behavior would not be complete: it would still be up to the addict to decide exactly how to go about performing these dangerous tasks, as the criminal mastermind has not attempted to control the addict's rational deliberations, but has merely ensured that the addict will do his/her utmost to achieve the goal intended by the mastermind. In any event, I would say that while the addict is experiencing an over-riding craving, he/she has lost his/her free will. That person's intellect may be still functioning, but it is the slave of the addict's compulsive desires. However, the Martian case which I described above (#100) is quite different from the addiction case you proposed. In the Martian case, the Martian has been controlling all of your desires, and all of your rational deliberations, all your life. Surely you would concede that you have no freedom left in this case - and yet, "the usual decision making processes," as you describe them, have been left intact, by supposition. What that suggests to me is that free will cannot be cashed out in purely procedural terms. Absence of determination is a necessary condition for freedom. Let's return to the other cases you propose. What about the employer who creates an addictive workplace? That's quite a different case from the criminal mastermind. The employees presumably go home at some time. At least while they are at home, they are free to reflect on the misery of their hectic lifestyles, come to their senses and seek help. I should add, however, that if I were the spouse of an employee who died from overwork in such an environment, I would sue the company for every last penny they had, and then some. Lastly, incentives and addictions are two very different things. The whole purpose of creating an addiction is to either destroy reason or make it the slave of the passions. An incentive works precisely by appealing to the subject's reason. Of course, it may appeal to the subject's appetites too. However, a human incentive is above all designed to secure the intellect's approval for the course of action which it is intended to elicit. I hope my analysis of the above cases has convinced you that incompatibilism (which I espouse) remains a strong, philosophically defensible position.vjtorley
November 19, 2009
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#100 I guess a little more discussion of "control" is needed. In one sense we are all under external control. Advertisers create "needs", good employers set up working environments so we get job satisfaction and work harder. But in doing so they are not changing us into creatures that lack free will. They are not, as it were, by-passing the usual decision making processes. An addictive drug may create an enormously strong desire that drives out all others. You could imagine a criminal master mind inflicting such a drug on a victim and this becomes very similar to the Martian case. The criminal master mind gives the drug because he knows that the victim will take on complex, dangerous and unpleasant work to satisfy the need. However, the work involves planning and decision making. So in one sense the master mind is controlling the victim. But the victim is still able to make decisions, to reflect on his addiction, quite possibly to wish that the desire was not so strong. Has the victim lost free will? Where is the difference in principle from the employer who designs the working environment so it becomes addictive?Mark Frank
November 18, 2009
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By the way, the late John Macmurray is a very interesting but much-neglected philosopher. Readers can find out more about him here at http://www.giffordlectures.org/Author.asp?AuthorID=116 , and also here and here .vjtorley
November 18, 2009
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Bornagain77 (again): Whats this 'Genetic Entropy' ? Could you cite some reference (other than Behe, Creation Ministries, Uncommon Descent etc) ? Thanks.Graham
November 18, 2009
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Nak , The whole point for me pressing you to find a gain in functional/information/complexity by passing the bacterial fitness test by a fairly trivial level is to make it as crystal clear to you as possible that the fitness test has never been passed!!!! Never Nak!!! NOT ONCE!!! THIS IS A CONCRETE FACT!!!! A fact that is especially driven home now that Nylonase and Lenski's e-coli are shown to rigorously conform to Genetic Entropy,,, Do you deny this is true?? Do you want me to cite the studies again?? Do you want to go through them with a fine tooth comb? Surprising No,,, you want to completely ignore this foundational test and to argue about something that has no direct bearing on concretely falsifying Genetic Entropy and concretely establishing evolution as possible in biology,,, This is concrete science NAK,, that presents a clear, fairly solid, boundary condition for the falsification of ID, as well as confirmation of evolution to boot,,, you should be absolutely giddy that here is a rigid test in that you could produce clear undeniable empirical evidence that Genetic Entropy is false, evolution is true, and flood me with a myriad of bacterial examples that have violated the fitness test,,, And do it in the most rigorous direct manner possible!!! The plain fact is Nak all examples put forth by evolutionists, when subjected to rigid scrutiny, fail to violate Genetic Entropy!!! Taken in conjunction with Abel's Null hypothesis this is absolutely shattering for evolution and is THE primary test that would falsify ID,,,If evolution were actually true this one simple and trivial test should have countless examples violating it all the time every day,, at any beck and whim of any competent scientists who chooses to do so,,, Thus Nak will you answer my question? Why do you believe in a theory that has no foundational proof? Once you realize how severe the cutoff is for information (if you ever admit it) then you realize the information has to come from somewhere i.e. A designer!! But if you refuse to even address this issue Nak how can I possibly show you just how deep the chasm is between material processes and functional information? So please be fair with the evidence Nak and quit trying to play games with what are in reality totally irrelevant issues when compared to the weight this one test carries.bornagain77
November 18, 2009
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Mark Frank (#98) Thank you for your thoughtful response, and for your clarification of what you mean by determinism. You write:
Acting according to my desires is not being under external control. It is doing what I want to do.
If some thing or set of things determine your desires, then they do control you. Let's make the illustration plainer. Suppose that instead of a thing, it was a person - let's say a Martian - that was determining your desires, by twiddling a meter. He sets it to 0 and you feel hungry, 10 and you feel thirsty, 20 and you feel angry, 30 and you feel like going for a walk, and so on. And now suppose that for the first time, the Martian decides to reveal himself to you. He knocks on your door and demonstrates how his meter works. How do you react? Do you feel blind, inchoate rage that all your life you have been mainpulated by this being from Mars? No, of course you don't - for he's prudently set the meter to 40, which makes you feel calm. Now he's smiling at you, and you're smiling back at him. Now, I put it to you: are you free? All yoyr life you've been doing what you want. What's more, you've been deliberating rationally - it's just that the Martian has controlled your deliberations. And yet I think the overwhelming intuition of the person-in-the-street is that in this case, you are not free. I think you would agree, yourself, in this case. Now, why should it be any different if the factors determining your desires are a combination of the people whom you have met in your life, and well as blind, impersonal natural forces? The argument you put forward for the plausibility of determinism, based on the cognitive development of the infant, appears difficult to refute at first. I would respond by characterizing infants as being rational from the very beginning. Their minds are at work from the start - it just takes them five years to make sense of this buzzing, blooming mess we call the world. In particular, it takes them about five years to develop a fully fledged theory of mind, in which they understand that there are other people, who have their own beliefs and desires. How do they do this? I think the philosopher who explored this subject best was John Macmurray. Her's a short summary of his thinking by Ryan Lamothe, at http://www.pep-web.org/document.php?id=CPS.044.0581A :
In brief, Macmurray defines community as mutual/personal forms of associations wherein persons recognize and treat each other as persons—unique, responsive, agentic, centers of subjectivity. From a developmental view, for Macmurray, it is the parent's intentional recognition and omnipotent construction of the baby as a person that shape and govern the infant's impulse to communicate. Initially, the infant's impulse to communicate involves omnipotent impersonal recognition of objects—whereby the objects are recognized primarily in terms of utility, benefit, and function. The parent's personalization enables the child, in time, to subordinate impersonal recognition to personal recognition.
That's how I envisage it. I hope that helps.vjtorley
November 18, 2009
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Mr BA^77, Nak, I really should not have to explain this to you, but your philosophical basis directly effects your science. Umm, no. That is sort of like saying you won't let a bank teller count your money if they are believer in constructivist mathematics. I pointed out that you said one thing at one point in your message, and a different thing in another part. My belief/commitment philosophically to materialism or not doesn't change the apparent contradiction in your message. STOP THE PRESSES!!!1!ELEVEN I, Nakashima, have just been convinced of the non-material reality of FSM. You are going to Hull. I will pray for you, but without much hope for your immaterial portion of the divine sauce. Now will you answer my question?Nakashima
November 18, 2009
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Vj #93 I must say I envy you for having had the privilege of listening to philosophers like G.E.M. Anscombe and Bernard Williams. Clearly I was lucky but there is no correlation between being a major philosopher and being a good or inspirational teacher. The best teacher in the faculty was Timothy Smiley - and who has heard of him. I know I am not going to convince you that compatibilism is true but maybe I might just be able to explain how it works (at least in my version). I found that understanding it required a sort of Gestalt shift - seeing the duck as a rabbit. Just to clear up a point which you may well regard as trivial. By "determinism" I don't necessarily mean that everything is in theory predictable. There may be a genuine random element in the universe - uncaused outcomes. I just think there is nothing other than determined or random. To briefly answer your points. 1) Acting according to my desires is not being under external control. It is doing what I want to do. 2)Actually I think chimpanzees and rats do have free will. They don't have responsibility - but then neither does a 2 year old child - but would you deny it has free will. 3)Yes blame is morally appropriate for healthy adult human beings because they have free will and responsibility. 4) By desires I include the desire to do good, make penance etc. We do these things because we want to do them. And yes a stronger desire is simply the one that we decide to satisfy. That is part of what it means for one desire to be stronger than another. 5) I don't dispute the difference between desires and decisions. Desires cause decisions - but they are not the same kind of thing. My desire that England will win the cup may cause me to decide to donate to the sports fund. One way of thinking of compatibilism is following the progress of a human from foetus to baby to toddler to child to adult. At each point genetic inheritance and past and present external stimuli causes actions. But gradually the ways in which they lead to action become more sophisticated. As a foetus the stimuli lead to action in a simple, predictable way (although there may be a random element) e.g. kicking in the womb. You would not call this a decision to kick. In the toddler the action given the stimuli is harder to predict because the processing is more complicated - but there is a whole class of stimulus actions which we would definitely call decisions e.g. to throw perfectly good food on the floor. In the adult the stimuli may undergo the most complex processing including feedback loops where the processing may itself be part of the stimuli (a conscious decision). It becomes much harder to predict the outcome given the stimuli (but is still often possible). But being able to predict the outcome does not prevent higher order decision being free. Of course, even as adults there are still actions which we would not call decisions - breathing, pulse racing. And I would say there are some actions which are somewhere between decisions or not - the choice of a word in a sentence spoken instinctively for example. In this analysis free will is a matter of degree. It is about one of the ways we come to act based on the environment. And that is what free will means. It just hard to take this on board when you are, as it were, inside the decision process.Mark Frank
November 18, 2009
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