Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

WJM Sums it up Nicely

Share
Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Flipboard
Print
Email

We’re telling you [i.e., materialists] what the logical ramifications of your premises are, not what your beliefs are. In other words, if you hold premise A, then you must rationally also commit to B. That doesn’t mean you actually believe B; it just means that if you do not, you’re being logically inconsistent with regards to your stated premise. We’re actually, for the most part, assuming you do not believe B, even though it is logically implied by your premise.

It’s our hope that once you realize that B is logically [implied by] your premise, you’ll question your premise.

Comments
PHV: Pardon, but the subjectivity of the self-aware, thinking subject does not entail the ideology of subjectivism. This is vital, in light of the need to ground rationality and knowledge, in general and in the domain you wish to consign to irretrievable subjectivism, morality. (BTW, I take it that despite your silence you have duly noted the response to the guilty persons issue, and I trust you are a bit better.) In this, the issue of self-evident truth is crucial. For specific instance, consider a rock. It has no dreams and cannot be deluded that it is conscious. Likewise, suppose that you are in reality a brain in a vat on planet xzcvbn, deluded to think you are walking around here on Earth. Your subjectivity would be infected by error, but there is something else you could not be mistaken on. The fact that you are self-conscious, aware, not just a mindless computing object like those peculiarly designed rocks made of doped silicon we call microprocessors. Like unto this, you are obviously very aware of the abstract possibility of error; to the point that it is a major subtext of your focus on subjectivity. However, as Josiah Royce and Elton Trueblood remind us, the consciousness on the reality of error has much to teach us. Take the Royce proposition, Error exists -- E. Try to deny it, NOT_E or ~E. Now, let's use a sledgehammer on the nut: push the two together E AND ~E. This must be false, so one is false. And given the meaning, the false part is ~E. That error exists is undeniable, not just a matter of subjectively experienced perceptions labelled as "fact." We have now seen the reality of self-evident, incorrigibly true assertions that move beyond subjectivity to objective and indeed certain truth. That is they accurately describe reality and we as knowing subjects can be sure of them to certainty beyond correction. Indeed, to try to deny is to descend into immediate absurdity. (Think about who is imagining that his self awareness is a delusion, he is like a rock.) Likewise, consider a red ball on a table, say A. From this we see a world partition: W = A | ~A) Immediately, the law of identity drops out as A is A, and non-contradiction is there as it is impossible for the ball to be both A and ~A in the same sense and circumstances. Where by the brute fact of dichotomy, exclude3d middle also is there (the best expression for that law is the X-OR of logic, i.e. one stands on one or the other side of the dichotomy.) We can go further, to a self-evident weak form of the principle of sufficient reason: For a given A, we may ask why it is there, and seek and hope for a reasonable answer. This opens the door to the principle of causality, e.g. if A begins, and may cease, it has one or more necessary enabling on/off factors that must be present and enabled if A is to be or to continue to be. Such are causes. So, we have grounds for understanding that there are objective truths that we subjects can access and know, even to undeniable certainty. The question behind this thread is whether this extends to the domain of OUGHT. And, a specific (and unfortunately, real world) candidate has been put: that it is self evident that it is wrong to kidnap, torture, sexually violate [i.e. rape] and murder a child. The peculiar thing is that for all the skeptical arguments that have been raised, we find very little evidence of open denial. Instinctively, objectors realise that to deny this truth plainly is to admit to moral deficiency, to be morally defective in an absurd way. So, the challenged raised have been indirect intended to undermine and redefine morality in ways that -- while such is not usually openly admitted -- it can be shown amount to might and manipulation make 'right.' Where of course the child is a proverbial example of one who is not able to appeal to strength especially in the face of a kidnapper. So, we see indirect inadvertent evidence that even those who deny objectivity to morality recognise it. Thus testifying against interests that hey are aware of an inner sense -- usually termed conscience -- that senses morality even as eyes sense light and ears sound thence minds manifest an awareness of the world based on sight and sound. That brings up the root, conscience is invisible, as conscious mind is invisible, and in a materialism-influenced age, seeing is believing. Oops, seeing depends on that invisible consciousness, and rocks -- whether fancy bits of silicon or peculiar cells that pass ion currents and thus signals in networks similar to logic gates in that bit of silicon, have no dreams. Yet another sign of the irretrievable incoherence and factual inadequacy of materialism and its fellow travellers. So, we have no good reason to reject the objectivity of being bound by OUGHT. And, just by observing the pattern of human quarrels, we find that the sense of ought is near universal and forms a core consensus that we ought to be treated fairly in light of simply being human, the exceptions being accountable for on much the same grounds as that some people have become blind. (I will never forget the videotaped last words cry of a man in a gas chamber as the gases were released: I am a human being! [How this was allowed out on news, I don't know.]) We recognise that we have quasi-infinite worth, which should not be violated. Thus, our sense of justice and of the difference between luring and catching a fish to become lunch and luring and despoiling then destroying a child. (Where, that some take pity on the fish and will go out of their way to eat only vegetables is itself further eloquent testimony on the point. [Notice, there is no "people for the ethical treatment of fruit, root starches, grains and vegetables" movement.]) There is no better reason to imagine that we live in a moral Plato's Cave, than that we live in a physical Plato's Cave. So, we see the absurdities implied by attempted denial of moral reality through reducing it to mere delusional perceptions. For, if our minds are that delusional on so important a matter, we have decisively undercut the mind, period. Which should be patent, once we give it a moment's thought in light of our experience and understanding of the world we live in. OUGHT is credibly real; which then points to a foundational IS that properly bears the weight of OUGHT. Notoriously (post Hume's guillotine and post the Euthyphro dilemma argument), there is but one level of reality where that can enter, the foundation. Namely, the inherently good creator God who has endowed us with minds, hearts, consciences and rights thus also duties. Thus, the force of Locke's point in his second essay in civil govt where he sets out to ground what would become modern liberty and democracy by citing "The judicious [Anglican Canon Richard] Hooker [in his 1594+ Ecclesiastical Polity]":
. . . if I cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man's hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire which is undoubtedly in other men . . . my desire, therefore, to be loved of my equals in Nature, as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to themward fully the like affection. From which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn for direction of life no man is ignorant . . . [[Hooker then continues, citing Aristotle in The Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 8:] as namely, That because we would take no harm, we must therefore do none; That since we would not be in any thing extremely dealt with, we must ourselves avoid all extremity in our dealings; That from all violence and wrong we are utterly to abstain, with such-like . . . ] [[Eccl. Polity,preface, Bk I, "ch." 8, p.80]
Where of course the latter part plays a pivotal role in Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis, in its built in didactic component. KFkairosfocus
November 23, 2013
November
11
Nov
23
23
2013
01:04 AM
1
01
04
AM
PDT
When you claim that you believe X is universally applicable and actionable to all humans whether they agree with you are not, you are describing a subjective belief that morality is an objective commodity, because that’s how we define “objective morality”- universally applicable and actionable.
This is just nonsense. The claim is that X is applicable in my subjective opinion, not objectively outside my own perspective, rendering that belief obviously subjective. Once again you assume an objective framework, and refuse to attempt to think outside it--this makes you particularly inept at following a subjectivist train of thought. If someone believes that all cats everywhere are pretty and should be petted, universally, it is still a subjective belief. Similarly, if I acknowledge my moral beliefs arise from my own head and have no objective, external reality, they are subjective beliefs--even if those beliefs are about the set of all people. The distinction between "subjective" and "objective," as those terms have been used throughout this conversation, arises from the perceived source of the belief rather than the the size of the set of subjects to which the belief applies. If you would like to go back to having a serious conversation, please go back and rephrase your original argument without omitting the various "to whoms," as I explained above. I think that would be interesting, as I doubt it can be done coherently. That is a consequence of the incoherent and circular nature of your argument.Pro Hac Vice
November 22, 2013
November
11
Nov
22
22
2013
01:21 PM
1
01
21
PM
PDT
This is just silliness. It’s like saying the belief that all food is tasty is an objective belief, since it’s “universally applicable.” (“Actionable” doesn’t make any difference one way or another to the distinction between subjective and objective.)
Nope. You are conflating the inescapable nature of believing anything (always subjective) with a claim about the nature of the thing you have the belief about. You can subjectively believe that X is an objective commodity, or you can subjectively believe that X is a subjective commodity. You cannot "objectively believe" anything. When you claim that you believe X is universally applicable and actionable to all humans whether they agree with you are not, you are describing a subjective belief that morality is an objective commodity, because that's how we define "objective morality"- universally applicable and actionable. While you say that morality is subjective in nature, what you describe is the very definition of morality that is objective in nature. You can say you are pointing at an apple, but if it's an orange, you saying it's an apple doesn't make it an apple. You saying that you are pointing at "subjective morality" doesn't change the fact that what you are pointing at (describing) is actually objective morality. This really is much like having an argument with a materialist who claims to have free will via compatibalism. He points at something that is not free will, calls it free will and then says "see, I have free will".William J Murray
November 22, 2013
November
11
Nov
22
22
2013
08:42 AM
8
08
42
AM
PDT
However, I submit it doesn’t matter because in the Real World people don’t operate on the basis of necessary logical ramifications of their feelings. The British and Americans went to war against the Nazis because the average person was persuaded in their feelings, objectivist and subjectivist alike, that what the Nazis were doing was “bad” and should be opposed.
Of course, I admit I have no rational argument against anyone who doesn't care if their belief system and behavior is irrational.
It’s a relativistic world. People generally act on feeling and emotion (based on whatever nature and nurture has endowed them with) without regard to the logical ramifications of their worldview.
I agree. I strive, however, to keep my worldview logically consistent and my behavior rational and in accordance with my premises, and I both enjoy and learn via debates like this.William J Murray
November 22, 2013
November
11
Nov
22
22
2013
08:32 AM
8
08
32
AM
PDT
WJM: The problem here is that PHV is using deceptive (probably self-deceptively, as well) phrasings and terms in order to avoid the necessary logical ramifications of his/her position – something many materialists and atheists do, consciously or subconsciously.
Whether PHV is doing what you say is one thing and I'll leave that up to you guys to hash out. However, I submit it doesn't matter because in the Real World people don't operate on the basis of necessary logical ramifications of their feelings. The British and Americans went to war against the Nazis because the average person was persuaded in their feelings, objectivist and subjectivist alike, that what the Nazis were doing was "bad" and should be opposed. And then acted accordingly. I didn't take nuanced philosophy to get people to feel and act against the Nazis. Nor did many subjectivists fail to oppose the Nazis on the basis that the subjectivist's failure to see the logical ramifications of their core philosophy. It's a relativistic world. People generally act on feeling and emotion (based on whatever nature and nurture has endowed them with) without regard to the logical ramifications of their worldview.CentralScrutinizer
November 22, 2013
November
11
Nov
22
22
2013
05:40 AM
5
05
40
AM
PDT
PHV, Foregoing a direct response to your points @63, I want in this post to just explore something that struck me upon reading that response. I have many more things to say, but will reply in a separate post. You keep saying that since we only have feelings to go on, there is no reason to think there is an objective standard to refer to behind those feelings. For instance:
I think it’s the same standard! I absolutely accept that objectivists are operating based on their feelings, just as I am. What I don’t accept is that those feelings are proof of a transcendent objective standard. Their feelings are only proof of their feelings. The same analysis applies to them and to me.
What strikes me is this, that all of our feelings, no matter the magnitude, are, actually, traced to objectively existing causes. Perhaps anecdotally, the feeling of pain associated with burning one's finger, for instance. But, even feelings of remorse, for example, are traced to an act that caused the feelings. Sadness may be attributed to the death of a loved one, happiness to the birth of a child. Even, I could say, my preference for vanilla ice cream can be traced to the physical sensations associated with its taste. So, upon some further thought, it occurs to me that our feelings, all of them, are grounded in an objective IS, as it were. If that is the case, then why would you, or anyone, conclude that our feelings on morality, our moral intuitions, are not grounded in an objective reality? And please don't miss this point. The moral argument for the existence of God itself exists as proof pointing to God, not that we reasoned from God to them. Therefore, every time you say an objectivist must point to the objective standards he is referring to, you are missing the point. No; objectivists don't claim they found these objective standards in the woods somewhere, but rather that, finding the same moral intuitions that the subjectivist has recognized, he sees that they must, also, like all other feelings, be rooted in some objectively existing reality.Brent
November 22, 2013
November
11
Nov
22
22
2013
04:13 AM
4
04
13
AM
PDT
Saying that you “subjectively believe” in something doesn’t change what follows. What follows at B is a description of moral standards you hold to be universally applicable and actionable. That’s the very definition of “objective morality”.
This is just silliness. It's like saying the belief that all food is tasty is an objective belief, since it’s “universally applicable.” (“Actionable” doesn’t make any difference one way or another to the distinction between subjective and objective.) I’m defining subjectivism, for our purposes, as the belief that moral principles have no determinable objective reality. That definition is perfectly consistent with the belief that all people have rights. The subjectivist assumes that those rights are human creations, whereas an objectivist would say they come from an objective, perhaps transcendent source. Your definition collapses that distinction, which is quite convenient but makes no sense whatsoever. A person can, obviously and trivially, have beliefs that they subjectively believe are universally applicable. What makes them a subjectivist is the belief that those principles lack any determinable objective reality. I.e., I believe all people have rights, but I acknowledge that’s a subjective belief because I can’t prove it with any objective standard. It's the source of the principle that matters, not the size of the set to which the belief applies.Pro Hac Vice
November 21, 2013
November
11
Nov
21
21
2013
09:03 PM
9
09
03
PM
PDT
Unless you admit that you hold your morality as binding on the behavior of the Nazis, there is no reason to consider your views, much less enforce them on the Nazis.
You still aren’t asking, “for whom”? No reason for whom to consider my views? The Nazis? No, they probably don’t feel that they have a moral obligation to consider my views. For me? Yes, I have plenty of reasons to consider my own opinions. Even third parties like the UN would have reasons to consider my opinions, although they'd evaluate it through their own subjective lens. You are assuming some kind of objective, neutral perspective under which you can say, “there’s no reason for this,” or “that is justified,” or “this is good,” without specifying for whom. It’s not just a question of leaving it understood but unwritten—you aren’t thinking about this at all, and operating as if there’s an objective framework that makes “for whom?” unnecessary. That’s assuming your conclusion, at best, and just screamingly incoherent at worst. You are making pronouncements about the logical results of subjectivism, remember? Subjectivism doesn’t admit to any such outside perspective in which there is a moral principal without an actor to hold it. You failed to analyze subjectivism according to its own premises, which kept you from performing any real logical analysis of where it leads under its own assumptions.
Under moral relativism, you do not get to decree or judge what is moral for others to do.
This is your starting assumption, not the conclusion of some logical process. If you start with this conclusion, then your subsequent pronouncements make sense. You aren’t analyzing any real person’s philosophy, but it’s an internally consistent straw man. Actual subjectivists, unlike the scarecrows you’ve outlined, are logically quite free to judge what is moral for others. They simply do so with a subjective standard. In other words, you assumed your conclusion. All you’ve done is driven in a circle, shouting about Nazis.
If you do that, then you are treating your personal standard as if it was objective and that the Nazis **should** behave according to your standard.
There’s that assumption of objectivity again. Should according to whom? To the Nazis, or to me? According to me, and as a subjectivist that’s the total framework of my analysis, the Nazis should behave according to my standards. Why? Because my standards are better than theirs. The fact that they would disagree is irrelevant to me.
All you are doing here is trying to intellectually dodge what is blatantly obvious. You cannot actually live as if morality is nothing more than a personal preference based on feelings.
“Blatantly obvious” is not an argument. It’s a way of escaping the need to make one. But at some point you have to actually put some rigorous argument down on paper. “Blatantly obvious,” “it’s so!”, and “Nazi!” only cut it with people who already agree with your preconceived notions and won’t ask hard questions. Your statement here is trivially false. Real people live as subjectivists every single day. I outlined a simple version of how this works above; repeating your conclusions over again is a poor rebuttal. Let’s revisit your hasty initial post. Talking with Brent, Box and StephenB has sharpened my thinking on the subject; I particularly appreciate the way they’ve put some thought into their responses.
The way that moral relativists attempt to wiggle out of this is by saying that in their opinion, Hitler was behaving immorally. Unfortunately, they have no rational basis for making this statement. It is a category error, a non-sequitur under moral subjectivism, offered as if there was some means by which to pass judgement [sic] on what others consider to be right.
I think it’s clear now, at least to onlookers, that you simply assumed that subjectivists need an objective standard by which to pass judgment on others. I’m sure you believe that, so it’s understandable that it snuck into your thinking here. But you’re trying to model a subjectivist analysis, remember? And subjectivists don’t think they need an external framework. You introduced an outside a priori assumption that has no place in the mindset you’re trying to analyze, and tried to draw a logical conclusion from it. Logic doesn’t work that way—if you’re going to determine the logical outcome of applying a particular framework, you have to stay within that framework. In other words, the subjectivist doesn’t need some external “means by which to pass judgment on what others consider to be right.” The subjectivist makes his own internal assessment of what’s right and acts accordingly; nothing logically requires him to stop and take into account the fact that the other person disagrees with him.
Their principle necessarily endorses the actions of the Nazis as morally good as long as they (the Nazis) believed what they were doing was right; what anyone else thought or thinks is entirely irrelevant.
Here’s where the missing “to whom” tripped you up—you’re looking at “morally good” as if it’s an objective quality, and assuming subjectivists would do the same. But of course they wouldn’t, that’s what makes them subjectivists. Morally good to whom? The Nazis? Congratulations, you’ve proved that subjectivists believe that the Nazis think that the Nazis were doing a great job. A rather trivial result. Morally good to anyone else? Not hardly. Everyone else judges the “moral good” of the Nazis through their own subjective lenses, and, not being Nazis, finds no good at all. And to a subjectivist, those are the only perspectives that matter—there’s no external, objective framework to say, “Well, as long as it's good to someone then it’s just plain good because every perspective is equal.” You always have to understand, “to whom?” I think you’re in a tough spot, logically speaking. You tried to analyze the end results of the subjectivist approach without actually following that approach, and although the results probably made you feel good they aren’t valid or logical. Your argument is either incoherent or circular. If you disagree, I’d ask you to go back and fill in those missing “to whoms” and restate your case. I don’t think you can do it coherently.Pro Hac Vice
November 21, 2013
November
11
Nov
21
21
2013
08:41 PM
8
08
41
PM
PDT
The second quote shouldn't be quoted, it should be bold. Sorry.William J Murray
November 21, 2013
November
11
Nov
21
21
2013
07:28 PM
7
07
28
PM
PDT
A. I deny the existence of objective moral standards. B. I subjectively believe that all people have rights, including the rights to life and some self-determination.
Every belief anyone has is a subjectively held belief, even if it is a belief that an objective commodity exists. Saying that you "subjectively believe" in something doesn't change what follows. What follows at B is a description of moral standards you hold to be universally applicable and actionable.
That's the very definition of "objective morality".
Moral standards one believes to be universally applicable and actionable. Saying that you subjectively believe in objective morality is the same as saying you believe in objective morality. Your A and B directly contradict each other. Cognitive dissonance, anyone?William J Murray
November 21, 2013
November
11
Nov
21
21
2013
07:28 PM
7
07
28
PM
PDT
I think this is the core of your confusion. You are incorrect. What I believe is relevant to my assessment of whether the Nazis were moral by my standards. Their beliefs are not logically required for or relevant to that assessment.
Your standards are irrelevant to the question of if the Nazis are behaving morally. All that matters under moral relativism is the Nazi standard when it comes to Nazi behavior. Unless you admit that you hold your morality as binding on the behavior of the Nazis, there is no reason to consider your views, much less enforce them on the Nazis. Under moral relativism, you do not get to decree or judge what is moral for others to do. If you do that, then you are treating your personal standard as if it was objective and that the Nazis **should** behave according to your standard. All you are doing here is trying to intellectually dodge what is blatantly obvious. You cannot actually live as if morality is nothing more than a personal preference based on feelings.William J Murray
November 21, 2013
November
11
Nov
21
21
2013
07:09 PM
7
07
09
PM
PDT
It is not my subjective feelings that justify my moral beliefs.
The argument I'm making is against what PHV is advocating, which is that subjective feelings justify moral acts and beliefs. Not all moral subjectivists attempt to overtly make that case.
Rather my subjective feelings are justified by all sorts of considerations such as suffering and fairness which result in my subjective judgement that the Nazis were deeply wrong.Possibly they may have had their own justifications for their subjective judgement – I would almost certainly subjectively reject those justifications.
The problem is that, under subjectivism, so what? Everyone's moral actions and views are justified by whatever they feel justifies them. That you accept or reject them by your personal preference is irrelevant with whether or not they are behaving moarlly.
But I have an idea. Rather than rehash old arguments over and over again. Show me how you can rationally argue that the Nazi’s were objectively wrong. I will role play a Nazi you are trying to convince. My opening line is: “Inferior races should be eliminated to allow superior races to fulfil their manifest destiny.”
How do you prove me wrong?
I never claimed I could prove anyone "wrong" about their morality, including moral subjectivists.William J Murray
November 21, 2013
November
11
Nov
21
21
2013
06:51 PM
6
06
51
PM
PDT
One thing that might prevent further miscommunication: the next time you try to set out the logical result of my beliefs in terms of "PHV think this is good," or "PHV thinks this is justified," please don't elide the "to whom". Good to whom?Pro Hac Vice
November 21, 2013
November
11
Nov
21
21
2013
03:07 PM
3
03
07
PM
PDT
Once again you are misstating my position, perhaps in hopes that I won’t respond. But I find your constant invention of convenient “logical” requirements with no actual logical support worth of correcting. I particularly dislike being continually slimed with the word "Nazi," when the justification for doing so is so tawdry and paper-thin.
[W]hat PHV believes is entirely irrelevant and inadmissable when determining if what the Nazis are doing is moral; all that matters is the feelings of the actor.
I think this is the core of your confusion. You are incorrect. What I believe is relevant to my assessment of whether the Nazis were moral by my standards. Their beliefs are not logically required for or relevant to that assessment.
Either an act is morally justified by the feelings of the actor, or it is not. That one dislikes what the actor is doing doesn’t make it immoral for the actor to do it. It may be immoral for PHV to gas Jews, but PHV cannot pass judgement on what the Nazis are doing because he is not them, and is not feeling what they are feeling.
A subjectivist need not logically stop to consider whether an actor believes himself justified in order to pass judgment on that actor. There's just no logical connection there. A subjectivist, Alfred, can logically condemn another person, Betty, whether or not Betty believes herself to be justified. Betty’s opinion simply isn’t necessary for, or even necessarily relevant to, Alfred’s analysis. You have failed to construct any logical argument to the contrary, much less a convincing one.
Looking over the scenario, PHV must logically admit that what the Nazis are doing is moral by the the principle of “it’s their opinion”. We can agree that it would be immoral for PHV to gas the jews (he doesn’t like it), but it is not immoral for the Nazis to gas the Jews (they like it).
You should take more care with your phrasing; whether intentionally or not, you are equivocating between subjective and objective standards. You say “it is not immoral for the Nazis to gas the Jews,” but immoral to whom? To the Nazis? It’s trivially true that it’s not immoral in their own opinion. But that’s irrelevant to my subjective analysis. I logically need admit only that the Nazis believe that the Nazis were justified. I do not logically need to admit that their actions were moral in any larger sense; it would be incoherent for me to do so, since my position assumes no larger sense exists. Since the Nazis’ beliefs about their own actions are irrelevant to me, they do not factor into my assessment of the morality of their actions.
What then, under PHV’s moral subjectivism, could logically support PHV’s intervention in the admittedly moral activities of the Nazis? PHV says that he doesn’t like what they are doing – doesn’t like it so much, in fact, that he/she must intervene, meaning it would be immoral for PHV to not intervene. But, why would PHV feel morally compelled to intervene in what PHV must admit is an entirely justified, moral act – justified in the only sense and by the only criteria admissible, the opinion of those committing the act?
Because I need not, and do not, admit the Nazis actions are either justified or moral. The Nazis believe that, not me. I do not need to and do not consider their beliefs as a predicate for putting my own into practice. Here’s a summary of the logical process: A. I deny the existence of objective moral standards. B. I subjectively believe that all people have rights, including the rights to life and some self-determination. C. The Nazis are committing genocide on Jews, homosexuals and others. D. In my estimation, those victims’ right to life far outweighs the Nazis’ right to self-determination. E. I therefore think I am entitled to act to stop the genocide. F. My sense of the significance of the moral issue far outweighs my own personal well-being. G. I therefore think I am obligated to act to stop the genocide. There is no link in the chain that stops to consider whether the Nazis consider themselves to be justified, because it's irrelevant to my evaluation. Nor is there a link that stops to ask whether the Nazis’ beliefs are equivalent to my own, because it would be logically incoherent. I don’t acknowledge a greater context in which they would be equivalent, so the only question would be whether I consider them equal to my own, and of course—tautologically—I do not.Pro Hac Vice
November 21, 2013
November
11
Nov
21
21
2013
02:55 PM
2
02
55
PM
PDT
It’s important to me to clarify what WJM has been eliding: the subjectivist need only acknowledge that the Nazi is justified in the Nazi’s own mind. There is no logical requirement for the subjectivist to say that a Nazi is justified in any other way.
Unfortunately, that is the only justification that matters or is at all relevant, because under your own argument, it is only the opinion of the actor that validates any act as moral. It may be immoral for you to gas Jews (you don't like it), and it may be moral for you to intervene and stop the Nazis from gassing the Jews (you feel like doing it), but you are logically obliged to admit that it is moral for the Nazis to gas the Jews. There's no way around it. Your opinion on their behavior is entirely irrelevant to the morality of their behavior, which can only be determined by how they feel about it. But then you're faced with the problem of accounting for why you are morally compelled to stop what you must admit is a morally good action by the Nazis.William J Murray
November 21, 2013
November
11
Nov
21
21
2013
02:19 PM
2
02
19
PM
PDT
PHV admits that the Nazis were justified in the sense that they believed what they were doing was right, that "in their opinion" they were "justfied", but they were not justified "in other senses",or in PHV's opinion. The problem here is that PHV is using deceptive (probably self-deceptively, as well) phrasings and terms in order to avoid the necessary logical ramifications of his/her position - something many materialists and atheists do, consciously or subconsciously. PHV tries to create some space between "determining principle" and "in their opinion" by substituting one for the other and saying one is entirely different from the other. The problem is that there is no difference in the meaning between those two phrases under PHV's argument, because the determining principle (of whether or not an act is moral) **is** the personal opinion of the actor. PHV says that the acts of the Nazis may not be justified "in every sense", even if they are justified in the "it's their opinion sense", but once again, PHV fails to see the obvious problem. The only sense that matters is the personal opinion of the actor. There is no other "sense" that can justifyan act as moral. PHV has even said that the views and beliefs of others are irrelevant when determining what is moral, so what PHV believes is entirely irrelevant and inadmissable when determining if what the Nazis are doing is moral; all that matters is the feelings of the actor. The problem for PHV is that, under his/her subjective morality position, there isn't any other sense that matters besides "in their opinion" when it comes to justifying an act as morally good. PHV tries a failed analogy to gain some ground:
It’s like saying that we can’t hold that a light is both bright and dim.
... but this analogy is improper. Nobody is talking about degrees of morality, but rather if a thing is moral or not. The light cannot be off and on at the same time. Either an act is morally justified by the feelings of the actor, or it is not. That one dislikes what the actor is doing doesn't make it immoral for the actor to do it. It may be immoral for PHV to gas Jews, but PHV cannot pass judgement on what the Nazis are doing because he is not them, and is not feeling what they are feeling. And that is the key. Moral judgements only be made by the actor under moral subjectivism; only the actor knows they are feeling and can say if what their actions are moral or not; PHV doesn't know what the Nazis are feeling, so he/she cannot say if the act is moral or not, because that is the only way to judge if an act is moral or not. Looking over the scenario, PHV must logically admit that what the Nazis are doing is moral by the the principle of "it's their opinion". We can agree that it would be immoral for PHV to gas the jews (he doesn't like it), but it is not immoral for the Nazis to gas the Jews (they like it). What then, under PHV's moral subjectivism, could logically support PHV's intervention in the admittedly moral activities of the Nazis? PHV says that he doesn't like what they are doing - doesn't like it so much, in fact, that he/she must intervene, meaning it would be immoral for PHV to not intervene. But, why would PHV feel morally compelled to intervene in what PHV must admit is an entirely justified, moral act - justified in the only sense and by the only criteria admissible, the opinion of those committing the act?William J Murray
November 21, 2013
November
11
Nov
21
21
2013
02:14 PM
2
02
14
PM
PDT
What you’re saying is “philosophically true” (in my opinion). And makes for interesting discussion around academic firesides and Internet blogs.
Fortunately, that's where we are. It's important to me to clarify what WJM has been eliding: the subjectivist need only acknowledge that the Nazi is justified in the Nazi's own mind. There is no logical requirement for the subjectivist to say that a Nazi is justified in any other way. In fact, the subjectivist can't logically say that the Nazi is justified in any broader sense. A subjectivist doesn't believe in an objective state of justification; the Nazi can, logically, only be justified to himself or in the subjective opinion of observers. The Nazi is trivially justified in his own mind, and not at all justified in the minds of others applying their own moral standards.Pro Hac Vice
November 21, 2013
November
11
Nov
21
21
2013
01:39 PM
1
01
39
PM
PDT
To PHV, WJM said:It is also a trivial observation that humans often hold irrational and logically irreconcilable beliefs. Because one believes that morality is relative doesn’t necessarily mean they accept that what the Nazis did was good; it just means that if they restricted their beliefs to what was logically extractable from their premise, that is what they would have to accept. (bold added.)
What you're saying is "philosophically true" (in my opinion). And makes for interesting discussion around academic firesides and Internet blogs. But in the Real World, it doesn't matter. People generally don't give a hoot or even think about what logically follows from premises they hold. People generally act on emotion not from rigorous philosophical arguments. Whether or not God or some transcendent morality exists, PVH is essentially right when he says it's a relativistic world. It's hard to see how it could be any different, unless some Higher Power shows up and enforces the Transcendent Law, if such exists.CentralScrutinizer
November 21, 2013
November
11
Nov
21
21
2013
01:20 PM
1
01
20
PM
PDT
WJM - I am confused by which parts of the above comments you intended or not. However, I think I can throw light on #61. It is not my subjective feelings that justify my moral beliefs. Rather my subjective feelings are justified by all sorts of considerations such as suffering and fairness which result in my subjective judgement that the Nazis were deeply wrong.Possibly they may have had their own justifications for their subjective judgement - I would almost certainly subjectively reject those justifications. But I have an idea. Rather than rehash old arguments over and over again. Show me how you can rationally argue that the Nazi's were objectively wrong. I will role play a Nazi you are trying to convince. My opening line is: "Inferior races should be eliminated to allow superior races to fulfil their manifest destiny." How do you prove me wrong?Mark Frank
November 21, 2013
November
11
Nov
21
21
2013
01:10 PM
1
01
10
PM
PDT
Brent, Thanks for your response. This is kind of a disjointed point-by-point comment; we might want to abandon this format for future responses lest we get into ridiculous lengths. You had originally said,
If you say my measurement of twelve inches is wrong, it is because you can use a ruler to check. Why does this not apply in ethics? And if it doesn’t apply, how can you really say anything is wrong?
And answered as you thought I would:
It seems to me you’ve already answered it pretty clearly: You don’t think an objective standard is necessary, only your subjective one. I.E., you think it’s enough to say, only, that you think it is wrong. You believe that since something isn’t a physical object, but a value judgment, that there is no standard to appeal to, and therefore unnecessary.
I think this is pretty close. I’d focus on the impossibility of identifying an objective moral standard, rather than simply calling it unnecessary, but I think both are true. Thank you for putting in the work to understand my perspective.
Again, it’s baffling to me that you appeal to feelings while being perplexed that an objectivist might say “self-evident”. Very strange. So, the objectivist position, by your own admission it seems, has as much evidence for objective standards as you do for subjective standards. I get the difference, that you would say that because they are just feelings they shouldn’t be considered anything but subjective, while the objectivist says they are something more than subjective; but you want to apply your subjective standards as if they weren’t. The inconsistency seems to be on the subjectivist position.
I like this response, both because you’re identified an important issue and sharpened a point of our disagreement. First, you’re exactly right that the “feelings” I’m pointing to are functionally the same as the objectivists’ feelings of “self-evidency.” But where you say “the objectivist position . . . has as much evidence for objective standards as you do for subjective standards,” I strongly disagree. The objectivist has as much evidence for their subjective feelings regarding self-evident moral truths. What they don’t have is evidence that those feelings actually reflect any real objective moral standard. Of course, you accurately predicted that response. I don’t understand what you think is the inconsistency, though. That I want to apply my subjective standards as if they were objective? I don’t think that I do. I think that I’m applying subjective standards, period. I may apply them to govern my interactions with other people, but I don’t think that makes them objective or that they need to actually be objective to do so.
You have the world upside-down. Of course my preference that genocide doesn’t happen is of much greater importance and weight, or “feeling”, than my preference for vanilla ice cream. And for good reason, then, I don’t think I’m feeling the same thing. Why do you? Genocide may not directly affect me, or you, but not getting our favorite ice cream does. Why do we care what may happen to a group of people on the other side of the world?
This is a good question that often confuses people. I think the clearest and best answer is that I value people who aren’t me. I care about the typhoon victims in the Philippines, even though I’ve never been there and don’t know anyone directly affected. Why? Because I value those people. I value them less than I value myself, or else I’d be on the next plane dedicating my life to helping them. I value them less than my immediate family, or else ditto. But I value them. So genocide, or natural disaster, or whatever, affects people I value even if it doesn’t affect me. An economist would say that therefore those things do affect me. This is sometimes a very difficult thing for people who aren’t atheists or subjectivists to understand. I have had people ask me why I’d value someone other than myself. I think, again, it’s largely down to my upbringing and socialization, although there may also be some biology to it.
And about feeling, will a judge sit idle while the prosecution says they feel the defendant is guilty? No; they had better bring some evidence. The point is, feelings are not robust enough to convict someone for. But you say they are. You only feelmurder is wrong; I say I know murder is wrong. But don’t get tripped up here just yet because I said I know. Hold on a minute. The main point is I believe murder IS wrong, and with that, I can have confidence to convict a guilty man.
I’m a little confused about your point here. You’re correct that the court will consider evidence in order to convict a defendant according to an objective standard—but not the kind of transcendent objective standard we’re discussing here. Rather, that’s a standard that people agreed upon using their own subjective moral beliefs as an input. The law is an agreed-upon standard, a created objective metric. The ruler we built for moral questions because the universe didn’t give us one. Using the law, we can say that something is objectively wrong. But only according to our human-built standard. Of course, and I say this as someone with (limited) experience practicing criminal law, you don’t need to be an objectivist to have the confidence to convict a guilty man. A subjectivist can feel just as strongly and passionately that the guilty deserve to be punished!
Now, if you want the standard, I’ll say it is God Himself, or if you want something more “concrete”, His Holy Bible. Assuming you won’t accept that (not that you have a good reason, of course), let’s just say for the sake of argument that I cannot define or identify the standards.
Catholic or Protestant Bible? Original languages or in translation? When two people disagree about how to interpret a verse, such as Romans 13, how do you tell who is right? How do you objectively prove your answer? The fact that all of the answers to these questions are subjective gives me, I think, quite good reason to reject the Bible as an objective standard of morality.
I actually don’t have to. To be rational, I only have to give good reasons for believing they exist, and more to the point and practical part of this, give good reasons for believing that the moral intuitions that we do have are probably a good indication of what those objective standards are. I say that there can be no objective standard in the absence of God. And, if God exists, objective moral standards exist automatically by virtue of whatever His nature is. In that case, every argument for the existence of God is also an argument for objective moral values. One of the arguments for God, of course, is the moral argument itself. This has as its premise that objective moral values do exist, however, which is what we’re talking about.
Thanks, I appreciate the explanation of your position. Even when I was a theist, though, I think I would have disagreed. You’ve outlined an argument for believing that objective moral standards exist. But that’s not even halfway there. What we need is some way of telling what they are that’s based on more than subjective feeling. How do we tell if any particular moral dilemma has an objective answer? How do we tell what that answer is if people disagree? Even if we agreed that God exists and imposes objective moral standards, if we can’t identify them we’re still living in a subjectivist world.
In like manner of thinking, it is funny that people say you cannot get an ought from an is…
I’m omitting a substantive response to your thoughts on this because I think they’re orthogonal to our discussion. They’re interesting, but not really something that’s germane to our dispute. Please let me know if you disagree or want me to respond, but otherwise I’ll refrain from commenting on them.
Of course, the mile and the inch might have been something else. They are arbitrary and subjective and perhaps will be changed some day. So, what is the problem with subjective moral standards? Nothing, if you don’t mind, for instance, condemning someone to death for subjective standards.
We only condemn people to death for subjective standards. There’s an objective law at issue, of course, but that’s the temporal human-built kind of objectivity, not the transcendent eternal kind of objectivity. And the law is built through subjective moral processes. At no point is there an objective standard employed that resolves the question. Humans, with disagreements about the underlying moral principles, argue with one another about the right rule to enact. Subjective process, subjective result.
So let me ask you: Is it moral in your opinion to unjustly convict a man? Let’s say there is a murder suspect but you have no evidence, just feeling. Should he be convicted? You’ll say no, of course. But let’s ask it in reverse: there is evidence for the act, but no evidence that murder is wrong, just feeling. Why is objective evidence necessary in your opinion on the one side, but not the other? If the feeling that a man committed an act of murder isn’t enough to convict him, it doesn’t bother you that feeling murder is wrong is enough to convict him?
Thanks again, I love hypos. No, I don’t think it’s moral to unjustly convict someone. And yes, you’d need evidence to justly convict them. But no, I don’t think we need evidence that murder is objectively wrong. First of all, no such evidence exists. Bear in mind the utter failure of objectivists to identify such evidence—“I feel it to be true” being neither objective nor, in any useful sense, evidence. I’m comfortable with living under laws based on our collective feelings because we live in a democracy, and our laws (more or less) represent our consensus view. I also feel protected from the tyranny of the majority, and overall feel that our justice system is highly ethical and moral. Not perfect, but I don’t expect (only wish for) a perfect system. Let’s take that hypo in a new direction. “Objective” morality breaks down even further when the questions get complicated. It’s easy to say that hedonistically torturing children is wrong, because everyone agrees, regardless of whether or not objective standards exist. But when the questions require actual thought and consideration, I think objectivity goes out the window. What’s the objective moral solution to the N Guilty Men problem? (I linked to this in the other thread—in other words, how many guilty men should be let free before convicting an innocent man?) The classical answer is 10. You could say 0 or 1 or -10 (that 10 innocent men should be jailed rather than letting a guilty one go free). What’s the objectively true answer? One response would be to say there’s no objective answer to that particular problem. But how do you know? Does your feeling for whether there’s an objective answer just happen to track your subjective evaluation of the problem?
So, if you think it is unjust to convict an innocent man, then you have nothing but injustice, for on your position not only don’t you know if a man is guilty of any objective moral transgression, but openly claim there isn’t even any way to know, or objective thing as, moral transgression.
No, here you’re making some unnecessary assumptions. I don’t need to know that he’s guilty of an objective transgression to feel, just as strongly as you do, that he’s guilty. I feel he’s guilty as I define guilt, which is true for all of us. I believe my standard is good and correct. Of course he may disagree, but (big surprise) criminal defendants always do, objective morality or no. (It’s even easier because here he’s transgressed our codified, human-built “objective” standards.)
You like hypos, you said: Your position convicts a man for trespassing only based on knowing that a man walked in such and such an area. My position needs to know not only that a man walked in such and such an area, but also that such and such an area really was prohibited to be walked in. You say you feel it was prohibited. I say Iknow it was prohibited. A judge would throw your case out, and not mine.
I'm not sure that I understand this hypo. Do you mean this as an actual court case, or a metaphysical process? If this is a court of law, I need to prove that the area was prohibited under the law and that he was in it. To feel comfortable prosecuting him, I need to feel that it’s right to do so. I can achieve that by believing either that this law is good or that the law overall is good, and this law is not so bad as to override my general preference for a codified justice system. I'd also need to believe that he actually violated that law.
The problem is as I was getting at above: how can someone trained in law be at peace with himself if he believes that the moral values undergirding the law are only subjective?
Quite easily. Again, I think my moral beliefs are good. I have no problem taking action based on them so long as the need to so, in my opinion, outweighs by belief in the right of others to do as they please. (Whether or not that’s true depends of course on the circumstances.) But of course as a subjectivist, I think we need to come together as a community and set rules that bind us so that we don’t have to hash out every moral problem every time it arises. That’s what the law is for. It’s designed by and for subjective human beings, but creates a temporal “objectivity” we can use to resolve these sorts of questions. Unlike the phantom objectivity that lots of people here believe in but can’t demonstrate, I can point to the law and say, “Yes, it’s definitely illegal to double park here. It may or may not be transcendently wrong—there’s no way to tell—but it’s definitely illegal.”
Again, your world is upside-down. You need an objective standard for unimportant things, but for the most important things feelings will do.
It’s not a question of what we need, it’ a question of what we have. We don’t have a metaphysical ruler to point to, regardless of how much we feel we need one.
But you are only interested in “seeing the ruler” when confronting objectivists. When you are confronted, feelings are enough. You’ll forgive me for saying that’s a double standard?
I think it’s the same standard! I absolutely accept that objectivists are operating based on their feelings, just as I am. What I don’t accept is that those feelings are proof of a transcendent objective standard. Their feelings are only proof of their feelings. The same analysis applies to them and to me.
Absolutely agree and disagree with the emboldened. Of course the slaves were not freed by telling the south they were objectively wrong. But it WAS because people BELIEVED that they were objectively wrong that they put their own lives on the line! The Holocaust was stopped because principled men and women believed there was a Principal behind their principles that gave them ought!
Yes, they believed it. First, the fact that they believed it is not evidence that they were right. Second, the fact that they believed it does not dispose of the fact that the South believed otherwise, deflating the idea of an objective principle. Third, there were atheists fighting for the good guys in both of those wars—you don’t have to believe in an objective standard to risk yourself for an abstract value. And fourth, this just illustrates that objective principles seem to get worked out by subjective disputes—it took a war to get us to the point where everyone agrees that slavery is wrong. No objective voice clarified that for us.
Again, missing the point. They disagree over who has the correct understanding, but not whether there is a correct understanding to be had.
I think this is an important point—even if there is an objectively correct understanding, if there’s no objective way to determine what it is, then we live in a subjectivist world.Pro Hac Vice
November 21, 2013
November
11
Nov
21
21
2013
11:51 AM
11
11
51
AM
PDT
WJM, I indicated earlier that our conversation was done, as you were being both silly and rude. Your restatement in #61 is such a simple explanation of your position, though, that I think it’s worthwhile to point out the failure in your logic. If your view is that behavior is justified as moral ultimately by the subjective feelings of the actor, then you are logically obliged (not mentally forced) to agree that the behavior of the Nazis was justified in the Nazis’ own opinion, as long as they believed it was the right thing to do. I have altered what you wrote to add the critical thing you omitted, in bold. As a subjectivist, I do acknowledge that the Nazis believed they were justified. Objectivists would typically agree with that. (Except perhaps those that believe that everyone secretly shares their own moral beliefs.) A subjectivist need not, and would not, say that the Nazis were justified in any other sense—it would contravene the meaning of subjectivism. To a subjectivist, the Nazis’ behavior was justifiable only to other Nazis—it’s an internal, subjective justification. Their behavior is wrong to everyone else. Your statement that we “cannot hold that behavior is both justifiable and wrong” conflates these two perspectives. It’s like saying that we can’t hold that a light is both bright and dim. Of course we can—to a person who has been staring at a floodlight, it’s dim. To someone who’s been blindfolded for an hour, it’s bright. Those positions are only contradictory if you ascribe objective meaning to those subjective evaluations.Pro Hac Vice
November 21, 2013
November
11
Nov
21
21
2013
11:44 AM
11
11
44
AM
PDT
To make this more simple: If your view is that behavior is justified as moral ultimately by the subjective feelings of the actor, then you are logically obliged (not mentally forced) to agree that the behavior of the Nazis was justified by your fundamental moral principle, as long as they believed it was the right thing to do. You cannot hold that behavior is both justifiable and wrong. Either the Nazis' behavior is justified by the principle (even if subjective), OR it is wrong by the moral principle (even if subjective). You cannot have it both ways.William J Murray
November 21, 2013
November
11
Nov
21
21
2013
10:05 AM
10
10
05
AM
PDT
Also, I put quotes on the second paragraph instead of the first in #57. GAH!William J Murray
November 21, 2013
November
11
Nov
21
21
2013
09:41 AM
9
09
41
AM
PDT
Eh, I thought I had edited that last line out.William J Murray
November 21, 2013
November
11
Nov
21
21
2013
09:37 AM
9
09
37
AM
PDT
Mark Frank said:
No. Subjectivity does not exclude reasoned debate.
I didn't say it did. What I said was that the assumption that a commodity is entirely subjective excludes rational (logical) debate.
You can have a reasoned debate about whether Mozart is a better composer than Beethoven – but I think that in the end we all recognise it is a subjective judgement.
Go ahead, MF. Put up or shut up. Provide a rational argument why one is better than the other. Put up or shut up, MF. Make a reasoned argument that one is better than the other.William J Murray
November 21, 2013
November
11
Nov
21
21
2013
09:36 AM
9
09
36
AM
PDT
The extreme committed Nazi’s were so alien and perverted that it might have turned out that there was no way to present a convincing argument (how does your “objective” view help you present one if they don’t share it?).
Under PHV's argument, the terms "alien and perverted" only mean "strongly differ from your own". You and PHV keep using phrasings that imply an objective standard when the argument at hand is that there is no such thing.
The existence of some assumed objective standard, even if not your own, gives a foothold to make a rational case using the assumed objective standard and logic extending from it to convince them that they are wrong - according to their own standard. If "the standard" is "however they happen to feel", there is no rational basis for argument.
However, in this ethical dispute, like all others, there is plenty of reason to look for shared premises (I don’t know whether they would turn out to be fundamental but I don’t see that matters.
PHV has stated that the fundamental premise for moral rights and wrongs is how one feels about a thing. That premise dictates there is no common ground when feelings are in direct conflict; you feel gassing Jews is wrong; they feel it is right. That is all the justification either of you need under PHV's argument.
Although morality is in essence subjective we have a core of common subjective opinions with almost everyone. If you can find that common ground then you can argue from it.
You're addressing something other than the question at hand. The question is not about things people that might agree upon, but rather about that which they disagree on. While one can always "argue" via rhetoric, emotional pleading, etc., if the premise is that feeling justifies behavior, then behavior doesn't have to be explained further than feeling. Even asking "why do you feel that way" refers to a justification that PHV has said isn't necessary. You don't have to justify why you feel that way; you only have to feel that way.William J Murray
November 21, 2013
November
11
Nov
21
21
2013
09:28 AM
9
09
28
AM
PDT
PHV, With apologies up front because I'm sure the formatting is messed up somewhere and there must be some mistakes I've missed as well. I said:
If you say my measurement of twelve inches is wrong, it is because you can use a ruler to check. Why does this not apply in ethics? And if it doesn’t apply, how can you really say anything is wrong?
And you asked me to give the response that I think you would give. It seems to me you've already answered it pretty clearly: You don't think an objective standard is necessary, only your subjective one. I.E., you think it's enough to say, only, that you think it is wrong. You believe that since something isn't a physical object, but a value judgment, that there is no standard to appeal to, and therefore unnecessary. Moving on . . .
First, I’d ask you to compare your “preference” for ice cream to your “preference” that genocide not happen. But do those things feel the same to you? At all? I assume that they don’t. They don’t to me, either. Subjectivists really, truly aren’t sociopathic monsters. Nor are we logically required to be by our premises. So the first difference is that they feel enormously different.
Again, it's baffling to me that you appeal to feelings while being perplexed that an objectivist might say "self-evident". Very strange. So, the objectivist position, by your own admission it seems, has as much evidence for objective standards as you do for subjective standards. I get the difference, that you would say that because they are just feelings they shouldn't be considered anything but subjective, while the objectivist says they are something more than subjective; but you want to apply your subjective standards as if they weren't. The inconsistency seems to be on the subjectivist position. Perhaps that is confusing, but it isn't the main thing I want to say. You have the world upside-down. Of course my preference that genocide doesn't happen is of much greater importance and weight, or "feeling", than my preference for vanilla ice cream. And for good reason, then, I don't think I'm feeling the same thing. Why do you? Genocide may not directly affect me, or you, but not getting our favorite ice cream does. Why do we care what may happen to a group of people on the other side of the world? And about feeling, will a judge sit idle while the prosecution says they feel the defendant is guilty? No; they had better bring some evidence. The point is, feelings are not robust enough to convict someone for. But you say they are. You only feel murder is wrong; I say I know murder is wrong. But don't get tripped up here just yet because I said I know. Hold on a minute. The main point is I believe murder IS wrong, and with that, I can have confidence to convict a guilty man.
Why do they feel different? I think an objectivist would say that it’s because they represent universal standards. But I can’t reconcile that with objectivists’ absolute, echoing failure to actually define those standards, propose a working tool with which to identify them, explain why they change over time, etc.
Exactly. They feel different because they are different. Now, if you want the standard, I'll say it is God Himself, or if you want something more "concrete", His Holy Bible. Assuming you won't accept that (not that you have a good reason, of course), let's just say for the sake of argument that I cannot define or identify the standards. I actually don't have to. To be rational, I only have to give good reasons for believing they exist, and more to the point and practical part of this, give good reasons for believing that the moral intuitions that we do have are probably a good indication of what those objective standards are. I say that there can be no objective standard in the absence of God. And, if God exists, objective moral standards exist automatically by virtue of whatever His nature is. In that case, every argument for the existence of God is also an argument for objective moral values. One of the arguments for God, of course, is the moral argument itself. This has as its premise that objective moral values do exist, however, which is what we're talking about. And so here we are, at the moral argument. You brought up some interesting and good observations, such as:
The ought still depends on what you could call “preferences” – freedom is good, suffering is bad, etc.
and
As a side note, I don’t see how objectivists escape that reduction. Even if there is an objective good, isn’t your decision to adhere to a matter of preferring good over bad? Isn’t that a “preference”?
In like manner of thinking, it is funny that people say you cannot get an ought from an is. Leave it to materialists to have it 100% wrong. In fact, the only place you can get an ought is from an is. If the ruler isn't the standard, how ought I decide what 12 inches is? If the mile isn't the standard, how ought manufacturers produce a meaningful speedometer? These can only be accomplished because there is an is; a law has been made that such and such a distance is an inch, and such and such a distance is a mile. Oughts can only be derived from iss. Of course, the mile and the inch might have been something else. They are arbitrary and subjective and perhaps will be changed some day. So, what is the problem with subjective moral standards? Nothing, if you don't mind, for instance, condemning someone to death for subjective standards. So let me ask you: Is it moral in your opinion to unjustly convict a man? Let's say there is a murder suspect but you have no evidence, just feeling. Should he be convicted? You'll say no, of course. But let's ask it in reverse: there is evidence for the act, but no evidence that murder is wrong, just feeling. Why is objective evidence necessary in your opinion on the one side, but not the other? If the feeling that a man committed an act of murder isn't enough to convict him, it doesn't bother you that feeling murder is wrong is enough to convict him? So, if you think it is unjust to convict an innocent man, then you have nothing but injustice, for on your position not only don't you know if a man is guilty of any objective moral transgression, but openly claim there isn't even any way to know, or objective thing as, moral transgression. Now, to you, it may appear that we could put each other over this same barrel. But you'd be wrong. You may feel I need evidence of these absolute ISs to prove my case, but it isn't the case. Why? Because I am consistent with my belief (actually knowledge, but for your sake . . . ) about the nature of morality, that it's objective ought based on IS. I can convict a man based on a solid Standard, while you convict him on a subjective standard. On the one hand you say you need to know if a man is really guilty, but on the other hand you don't. You say a man is guilty while only claiming to know half of what guilt really is. I claim to need to know not only what a man does in order to decide his guilt, but also that what he did do is worthy of actual guilt. You like hypos, you said: Your position convicts a man for trespassing only based on knowing that a man walked in such and such an area. My position needs to know not only that a man walked in such and such an area, but also that such and such an area really was prohibited to be walked in. You say you feel it was prohibited. I say I know it was prohibited. A judge would throw your case out, and not mine.
Even if there is an objective good, isn’t your decision to adhere to a matter of preferring good over bad? Isn’t that a “preference”?
To respond more directly to this, I think you've missed the point. If good isn't simply subjective as you believe, then although one may choose or prefer it, it is what they ought to choose and prefer. Choosing, per se, is neither here nor there. We choose either to act in accordance with our own moral standards or not, which speaks nothing towards their subjective or objective nature.
I’m sure I’ll think of some other reasons later; it’s such an odd question.
It seems like an odd question because you have an odd position.
What is the connection, in your mind, to my position and legal training? In my opinion, it runs quite the other way. In law school (and certainly in practice) you very quickly learn that you cannot simply appeal to “objective” standards to win a debate or establish a fair rule of law. Because people don’t agree on what those “objective” standards are. Even for dyed-in-the-wool objectivists, the practice of law is about operating in a relativist world: applying agreed-upon mortal rules, rather than some ethereal and objective moral standard.
This is just begging the question. The moral values are not different themselves, and so no conflict need arise for anyone practicing law of whether our moral values, upon which laws are based, are either subjective or objective. The problem is as I was getting at above: how can someone trained in law be at peace with himself if he believes that the moral values undergirding the law are only subjective?
I have no problem calling certain acts “wrong.” None. I do so according to my subjective standards, which I prefer to the standards of others. So I feel free to apply that judgment even though someone else might disagree with me. It works the same way for everyone, all the time–the key difference is that I think my underlying moral principles are subjective, while others think theirs are objective. No. I think I need a standard, but it can be subjective. Using a subjective standard renders the judgment subjective, rather than objective. I’m OK with that. It doesn’t make a practical difference, as it doesn’t preclude me (logically or practically) from acting on my beliefs.
If you say my measurement of twelve inches is wrong, it is because you can use a ruler to check. Why does this not apply in ethics?
Your measurement is a physical thing, to which we can apply a truly objective measure. If I ask, “What is the objective measurement”, you can say, “Here. It’s this ruler.” I can see it, touch it, test it. Critically, I can compare it to Allan’s ruler and Bob’s ruler and Cindy’s ruler. If those rulers don’t agree, then we don’t really have an objective standard until we figure it out.
Again, your world is upside-down. You need an objective standard for unimportant things, but for the most important things feelings will do.
Your value measurements don’t have physical, empirical dimensions. When I ask, “What’s the ruler?”, I get silence or incoherent statements like, “It’s just self-evident, and it doesn’t need to be tested or proved.”
But you are only interested in "seeing the ruler" when confronting objectivists. When you are confronted, feelings are enough. You'll forgive me for saying that's a double standard?
Without a real objective test, I can’t call your value measurements (or mine) “objective.” Critically, I can’t directly compare yours to Allan’s to Bob’s to Cindy’s. I can quite easily see that they’re different, though. Allan’s a racist, Bob’s in an interracial relationship. There’s no objective standard to compare their respective values to.
Again, the moral values of the subjectivist and objectivist are the same. Any differences could just as well be differences between two subjectivists or objectivists. And I'd say there is an objective standard to compare them to.
I can, however, compare Allan’s and Bob’s values to my values. Which I think are the right values; that’s virtually a tautology, because they wouldn’t be my values if I didn’t think they were right. (Again, according to my upbringing, culture, past history, etc.) And when Allan’s values don’t measure up to mine, there’s no logical reason I can’t condemn him. Nor is there any logical reason I can’t put my preferences into action by, say, voting for equal protection laws.
What standard, for example, do you appeal to to say that my mass murdering of people is wrong? If that ‘standard’ you appeal to is only subjective, why should I or anybody else care about it? I can say, validly, it is just your opinion, and nothing more.
Thanks, prefer working with practical hypos like this. I think it sharpens the discussion. I apply my standard. I think mass murder is wrong. I think that is a subjective standard. If I’m trying to get you to adopt my standard, I use the same tools an objectivist would: persuasion and coercion. Let’s say I’d start by identifying our commonalities. Do we both think life overall is good? Maybe you don’t–obviously this is hypothetical. But maybe you love your mother. So I’d try to appeal to that to create a principle we could build on: killing all these people will make their mothers sad, will be killing mothers, etc. If that didn’t work, I’d go to coercion. I’d vote for more funding for the police, or stricter anti-mass-murder laws, or I’d just go all Batman on you. The stock phrase for this sort of thing is: “There are three boxes. Soap box, ballot box, ammo box. Use them in that order.”
I appreciate your explanation, but this is just describing practical outworkings, again, of moral values that we agree on. It doesn't get at whether they are objective or subjective.
Obviously this omits one tool that objectivists can use in theory, the appeal to objective standards. (I could try it too, but I want to stay with tools that are consistent with my worldview.) But that’s a non-starter when the stakes are high. The Union didn’t free the slaves by telling the South, “Hey! God really doesn’t like slavery, your opinions to the contrary are objectively wrong!” The Allies didn’t stop the Holocaust by citing objective moral principles of life and liberty.
Absolutely agree and disagree with the emboldened. Of course the slaves were not freed by telling the south they were objectively wrong. But it WAS because people BELIEVED that they were objectively wrong that they put their own lives on the line! The Holocaust was stopped because principled men and women believed there was a Principal behind their principles that gave them ought!
If that ‘standard’ you appeal to is only subjective, why should I or anybody else care about it?
Here’s where I think you’ve lost sight of the real world. Whenever you cite an objective value that’s different from someone else’s, they think it’s just your opinion. Why, then, should they or anybody else care about it? It’s on you to persuade or coerce them. Works the same way for everybody, including objectivists.
I can say, validly, it is just your opinion, and nothing more.
Yes you can. And you will, if you disagree with my opinion. Just like any objectivist who disagreed with your version of “objective” standards would say to you.
This again isn't speaking to the main issue. I may think someone mistaken about a moral issue, but what I'm getting at with you and the subjectivist position is that all moral values are mistaken. They simply do not rise, actually, to morality at all. This is hard to get the subjectivist to see because, as I've said, his values are really the same as mine and I agree with him. It isn't really the values themselves, but the grounding for them that he has eradicated.
The other day on the AM radio, I heard three or four guys debating the meaning of Romans 13. They disagreed vehemently with one another and the callers. Every party to that conversation believed that he knew the objective truth, and felt no need to abandon that truth just because some other guy’s got an opinion.
Again, missing the point. They disagree over who has the correct understanding, but not whether there is a correct understanding to be had.Brent
November 21, 2013
November
11
Nov
21
21
2013
08:20 AM
8
08
20
AM
PDT
WJM #53 I need  a break from work, so I will have one more go – though I hold out  no great hope of a breakthrough.  
Since what the Nazis believe doesn’t factor into PHV’s views or actions, and because morality, according to PHV, is entirely subjective personal preference, there is no hope of any kind of logical debate or arbitration between the two. There is no reason to look for a shared fundamental premise from which a convincing argument can be made to get the other side to change their views because, according to PHV’s view, the fundamental premise of both sides is necessarily just how they subjectively feel about it.
You overstate your case.  The extreme committed Nazi’s were so alien and perverted that it might have turned out that there was no way to present a convincing argument (how does your "objective" view help you present one if they don't share it?). However, in this ethical dispute, like all others, there is plenty of reason to look for shared premises (I don't know whether they would turn out to be fundamental but I don't see that matters. ). Although morality is in essence subjective we have a core of common subjective opinions with almost everyone. If you can find that common ground then you can argue from it.
Thus, under PHV’s view, no reasoned debate or argument is possible …. Therefore, PHV’s view formally dismisses reason and necessarily endorses might and manipulation as that which must be used in moral disagreements.
No. Subjectivity does not exclude reasoned debate.  You can have a reasoned debate about whether Mozart is a better composer than Beethoven – but I think that in the end we all recognise it is a subjective judgement.Mark Frank
November 21, 2013
November
11
Nov
21
21
2013
07:35 AM
7
07
35
AM
PDT
So now we come to the question of "justification", which is what sinks PHV's argument. Merriam Webster defines justification thusly:
: to provide or be a good reason for (something) : to prove or show (something) to be just, right, or reasonable : to provide a good reason for the actions of (someone)
PHV claims that the only justification one needs to coerce their moral views on others is to feel really strongly about it; a strong personal preference. If the Nazis felt strongly about obliterating the Jews, then PHV must admit that according to his/her own principle, the Nazis were justified in gassing the Jews. After all, they applied the very same principle that PHV claims justifies any similar interventions or coercions: he/she feels really strongly about doing it. You can see the problem here; if PHV admits (as he/she must, according to the offered principle of justification) that the Nazis are justified (have good reason, are right, reasonable) in their actions, how can PHV then turn around and claim that what the Nazis are doing is wrong? You can't have it both ways, either the Nazis are justified in their actions, or what they are doing is wrong. PHV's principle of "strong personal feelings" necessarily justifies the actions of the Nazis; PHV then cannot rationally hold their actions "wrong". PHV's position here is blatantly irrational; but then, PHV doesn't claim his/her argument is rational, or based on any logic - it's based entirely on feeling. If PHV's feelings generate irrational beliefs and result in hypocritical or contradictory actions, it doesn't matter, because it is PHV's feelings that provide PHV all the justification he/she requires to do anything PHV wants, including forcing his/her will on others and calling it "morality".William J Murray
November 21, 2013
November
11
Nov
21
21
2013
06:45 AM
6
06
45
AM
PDT
PHV claims that morality is an entirely subjective commodity - a personal preference, albeit a very strongly felt one. PHV also holds that it is acceptable for a person to coerce one's subjective morality on others if they feel sufficiently strongly about it, without even considering the subjective views or morality of those PHV is coercing. PHV also says that the principle that justifies coercing his personal preferences on others is simply that very thing - a strongly felt personal preference. So, the adjudicating principle between conflicting moral views, under PHV's argument, is "because I feel like it, and because I can" - IOW, might makes right. If one holds that morality is subjective personal preference that allows us to coerce our views on others, then logically everyone who coerces their views on others because of strong personal preference is justifed in so doing through PHV's argument. Logically, PHV must admit that by his own principle of personal preference of the individual committing an act, the Nazis were doing good from their perspective. PHV attempts to solve this problem by claiming that he personally feels that what the Nazis were doing was wrong, and by saying that what the Nazis believe doesn't factor into his views or actions. Since what the Nazis believe doesn't factor into PHV's views or actions, and because morality, according to PHV, is entirely subjective personal preference, there is no hope of any kind of logical debate or arbitration between the two. There is no reason to look for a shared fundamental premise from which a convincing argument can be made to get the other side to change their views because, according to PHV's view, the fundamental premise of both sides is necessarily just how they subjectively feel about it. How can one be logically convinced that their subjective feelings are wrong if the premise of the thing being debated is that subjective feelings are the essence of what is right? IOW, PHV's position is that personal feelings are the very thing that identifies what is morally right to do; trying to convince others that their feelings are wrong on the subject of a moral question is an absurdity. Thus, under PHV's view, no reasoned debate or argument is possible; both sides of the conflict, under PHV's view, are validated as utterly moral by PHV's principle of personal preference. There's no rational argument that can bridge this conflict. PHV's perspective is that gassing the Jews can be both moral and immoral, at the same time, in the same place, when viewed by two different sets of people. The Nazis are completely justified in their view; PHV and others are completely justified in their view. There's nothing left to do but to fight it out and see who wins, and whichever side wins and subjugates the other, that becomes the dominant "moral good". What is "right", in society, is necessarily determined by might (and/or manipulation) under PHV's view, because there is no possible rational arbiter between personal preferences. Therefore, PHV's view formally dismisses reason and necessarily endorses might and manipulation as that which must be used in moral disagreements.William J Murray
November 21, 2013
November
11
Nov
21
21
2013
06:29 AM
6
06
29
AM
PDT
1 2 3

Leave a Reply