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William J. Murray Shines

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In this exchange with Elizabeth Liddle, William J. Murray gives one of the most succinct and insightful rebuttals of determinism I have ever seen:
Murray’s Argument:
Determinists are no more capable of framing a determinist argument without using libertarian assumptions and phrases than Darwinists are capable of framing discussions of biology and evolution without using design assumptions and phrases.
The determinist uses “we”, “I”, and “our”, and the acts of such agencies, as if they are libertarian commodities – first sufficient causes in and of themselves, ignoring the necessary causation of what produces the sensation of personhood and the sensation of choosing and the sensation of making contingent models.
The sensation of self, thought, act, concept, reflection, choice and meaning are all entirely self-referential to the same thing – sensations produced and experienced by the actual sufficient and necessary cause in the determinst’s world – the ongoing interactions of physical matter.
IOW, the monists view is entirely self-referential, and thus incoherent. X means X, or means Y, or means nothing if the aggregate physical interaction (API) results in it “believing” that is what it means. Incoherent arguments are soundly logical if the API (which is all logic is, logic being a mental construct, and thus the product of the API) says so. Up is down, right is left, and a barking dog makes more sense than Aristotle, if the API so dictates.
And thus, by the only arbiter of sound logic and good arguments, since my API says “you’re wrong”, then you are wrong by the only arbiter there is of such things, from the determinist perspective. I don’t even have to tender an argument, or logic, because logic and arguments are not “more valid” than any other expression of the API.
If all things are consumed by the API, and the API is all we have to evaluate the API by, then I’m right, you’re wrong, and that’s all the debate I need make here by the determinst standard.
Nobody with any self-respect and intellectual merit actually argues that way, which would be the necessary consequence of determinism. Except, of course, if determinism were true, then you couldn’t help arguing in a way that is based on your argument not actually being true (and being forced by API to not recognize the intellectual dishonesty inherent in your argument), any more than leaves can help rustling in the wind (and perhaps thinking they were making sound arguments, if the API so directed).
This is one of the reasons I don’t believe everyone has free will; they are actually leaves blown by the API wind, saying and believing whatever self-refuting nonsense their aggregate physical interactions dictate.
What is truly ironic is that Elizabeth argues for a model of reality where she couldn’t hope to know (other than as self-referential programming) if she was being intellectually dishonest or not (since she would just be programmed by physics to believe one way or another), so she cannot actually be “intellectually dishonest”, since there is no independent and sufficient “Elizabeth” in existence to moderate, check, supervene or arbit what the aggregate physical interaction knowns as “elizabeth” says and believes.
IOW, Elizabeth argues that we are arguing with a programmed computer simulation (a biological automaton) that is incapable of independent reflection and examination. The only thing the machine has to check its programming with is .. its programming.
Of course, if we were to accept Elizabeth’s assertion that we are all just programmed biological automatons forced to believe and say and do whatever the aggregate physical interaction commands, why bother arguing with anyone? Why bother debating? We have no means by which to independently arbit truth or reality.
According to the determinist perspective, are necessarily material solipsists, our sensations, interactions, beliefs, views and ideas all individually generated and inescabable, with no way of knowing or discering what – if anything – is true and real.
The API produces both the madman and the scientist, Gandhi and Hitler, kindness and cruelty with equal belief each is true and right; that makes them all true and right by the only arbiter of such thing – what physics actually produces.
Dr. Liddle reponds:
Have you actually read my argument? I’m saying that “I” is a great deal more than “a collection of materials and interactions” or can be, if we choose to do so. If set the boundaries of the self so close that the “I” – the agent we assign responsibility for our actions to – is a mere spectator on a surge of material interactions, then, sure, we have no moral responsibility, but, by the same token, we have defined ourselves almost out of existence.
Murray responds:Unless drawing larger boundaries and mentally taking responsiblity for more stuff factually transforms “materials in a deterministic process” into something else, calling it “a great deal more than a collection of materials in a deterministic process” is the very essence of equivocation, because under determinism that is all you can ever be, regardless of what you think, believe, or do.
Or, perhaps you are just saying we should lie to ourselves, like a rock saying “I’m a great deal more than just a rock!” when, in fact, it’s just a rock.
You’re sneaking in the stolen concept again. You having nothing other than “collections of materials in a deterministic universe” to work with or to end up with, regardless of what kind of mental gymnastics and equivocations you use to hide the facts of such an existence from yourself.

Comments
Wait a minute. How do you know that this property that you term "free will" would choose differently from a brain that follows the laws of physics? The laws of physics clearly allow two different brains, obeying the same laws, to choose differently given the same external inputs.wrf3
August 21, 2011
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Elizabeth:
Well, no, it didn’t demonstrate that. There is no basis to “disagree” with a randomly presented digit.
It demonstrates freedom to choose on *any* basis regardless of quantum uncertainty. A freedom to agree, disagree or ignore. The experiment isn't about morals or reasons, it is about demonstrating the difference between the genuine free will of human consideraton versus the unfree, constrained, limited materialistic and deterministic randomness of a quantum universe.
You are merely asking your hypothetical subject to play a game of their choosing.
It demonstrates they are free to choose, even when quantum level materialism and determinism are taken into account.
but I am familiar with experiments in which participants have to, depending on conditions, move the finger instructed, or choose which finger to move. We know that different parts of the brain are implicated in each of those conditions. Different physics, if you like.
Still irrelevant. The experiment I posed is about free will, not the physio-kinetic motor responses that implement a free will choice. But you already knew that,
Oh, and you can stop “wondering” about my intellectual honesty”. I am honest.
and yet you persist in flagelating a deceased equine.
I was talking about the causal chain in my example, not yours.
Yes, for all your intellectual honesty, you deliberately spoke right past my example and substituted your irrelevant strawman in its place.
But I see [no] reason why any causal chain should be limited in your example. It’s just that it would not be apparent to an external observer, at least until a behavioural pattern emerged.
There is no behavioural pattern to emerge and be observed: a) If the subject agreed with every output of the quantum random number generator, there is *no* pattern - their behavior is truely random, yet indistinguishable from the quantum physics based causal chain that drives the generator. b) If the subject ignored or disagreed with every output of the quantum random number generator, perhaps even to encode the prime numbers between 1-100, then the emergent pattern has no correspondence to the causal chain of the quantum random number generator and their freedom is regardless unlimited and predictible only to the extent they so choose. If based on their first 50 responses, you think the subject's behavior is to produce the prime numbers between 1-100, they need only deviate after that to prove your "pattern modelling" wrong. Again, they are free to do so or not, and you can't predict their behavioural pattern nor the generator's random output. And you don't have any "causal chain" to model in your "uncaused decisions" example. That is the incoherence of your argument.
I’m saying that brains aren’t any old beaker. They are very cool pieces of kit that make forward models on the basis of incoming data that enable the bodies that house them to collect new relevant data and thus navigate the world successfully.
They are pieces of kit that are regardless subject to the laws of physics and chemistry, and you have yet to demonstrate how they simultaneously ahve causative free will, but they aren’t “uncaused”!
Why should it? [ “forward modelling” arise from something other than its bio-electrochemical constituents and the quantum events impinging upon it.]
Because the experiement demonstrates that pure quantum effects, physics and chemistry do not forward model.
Forget the quantum level, for now:
No. You have on other threads taken refuge in the quantum uncertainty as giving rise to freedom of thought, and yet here you reiterate that physics and chemistry are not violated (which at base are quantum processes with differing micro and macro effects). If physics and chemistry are not violated and since quantum events are truely random, a randomness which the brain can overule while limited to the laws of physics and chemistry, you have yet to demonstrate a materialistic, deterministic process by which brains "ahve causative free will, but they aren’t “uncaused”! You don't get to argue And I say that my “physics” allows me to do all those things, and your “free will” allows you nothing in addition. and then dismiss the incovenient quantum physics and assert that free will is simultaneously caused and uncaused. That would be intellectually dishonest.Charles
August 21, 2011
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Sadly, Ilion is no longer with us.
I'm sure he'll accept a fake apology.Mung
August 21, 2011
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Charles:
Elizabeth:
If you present a human subject with a random series of, say, ones and zeros, but there are more ones than zeros (in other words, the sequence is random, but drawn from a probability distributionin which ones are more probable than zeros) and you give the human subject a point for for guessing each one correctly before it appears, most human subjects will guess both ones and zeros, with more “one” guesses than “zero” guesses.
Irrelevant. The experiment I posed demonstrates not an effort to guess at what will come next, but the ability to agree, disagree or ignore whatever came next. The experiment I posed demonstrates free choice. The experiment you pose demonstrates fallible quesswork. Guessing outcomes and choosing outcomes are not the same. One wonders at the intellectual honesty that would argue such a strawman.
Well, no, it didn't demonstrate that. There is no basis to "disagree" with a randomly presented digit. You are merely asking your hypothetical subject to play a game of their choosing. I merely suggested the game, and my point, though tangential, has some relevance, in that it reveals how people make forward models. Possibly I didn't understand your experiment, but I am familiar with experiments in which participants have to, depending on conditions, move the finger instructed, or choose which finger to move. We know that different parts of the brain are implicated in each of those conditions. Different physics, if you like. Oh, and you can stop "wondering" about my intellectual honesty". I am honest.
So yes, brains-with-bodies have “causative free will” that means that we select our actions based on complex forward models – but it does not mean that our decisions are “uncaused”. Indeed we can model the causal chain in this kind of instance quite easily.
No, you can not model any such causal chain. If you could, you would always be in agreement with the quantum number generator, you could not disagree or ignore it as the “causal chain” (whether modelled perfectly or imperfectly) would limit your repsonse. If the causal chain of your brain is unbroken, there is no opportunity to disagree with or ignore the causal chain of the quantum random number generator.
I was talking about the causal chain in my example, not yours. But I see now reason why any causal chain should be limited in your example. It's just that it would not be apparent to an external observer, at least until a behavioural pattern emerged.
move towards an electrode as causes an ion in a neuron to move through a membrane doesn’t mean that the beaker is like a neuron, and it certainly doesn’t mean the beaker is like a brain. A brain has completely different properties, and one of them is the capacity to forward-model.
Materialistically, deterministically, the brain at all material levels is subject to the exact same physics as is a beaker at all material levels. But if the beaker could demonstrate forward modelling, you would ascribe it to something beyond the matter from which the beaker is composed and the quantum particles impinging upon it.
No, I wouldn't, but it wouldn't then be merely a beaker. I really do not see what you are getting at here, and clearly you do not understand what I am getting at either! I'm saying that brains aren't any old beaker. They are very cool pieces of kit that make forward models on the basis of incoming data that enable the bodies that house them to collect new relevant data and thus navigate the world successfully.
Likewise whatever “forward modelling” the brain does, arises from something other than its bio-electrochemical constituents and the quantum events impinging upon it.
Why should it?
Just like you ascribe the intentional agency of a robot to something other than the chips & wires from which it is constructed. The robot’s “intentional agency” (and I do not grant you that a robot’s programmed “consideration” is anything like human “consideration”) did not arise from its silicon wafers and electrons.
It didn't?
Yes, brains-with-bodies ahve causative free will, but they aren’t “uncaused”! Or, at least, your thought experiment hasn’t shown that. What your thought experiment showed is that all kinds of “causes” factor in to the output of a brain, whereas only the mechanicss of the hardware RNG causes its output. That was my point to Meleager – to claim that because “physics” in one system produces meaningless, non-intentional output does not mean that “physics” in another system will, and a brain is a very special system.
What the thought experiement shows is that regardless of all kinds of “causes” (materialistic, deterministic and random) which determine, at the quantum level, the effects upon machines and living matter, the human mind is free to disregard all those causes.
Forget the quantum level, for now: in what sense is the human mind "free" to disregard all those causes, and in what sense would so disregarding them, render it "free"?
Your simple agreement that “brains-with-bodies ahve causative free will” and your incoherent disagreement that “they aren’t uncaused” is not sufficient. For your argument to prevail, you have to demonstrate that the physics of the beaker and the physics of the brain are different physics.
No, what I have to demonstrate is that they are different systems with different systems-level properties, which clearly they are, and have.
The thought experiment demonstrates that at the quantum level, they are both subject to the same stochastic, materialistic, deterministic inputs. You have to demonstrate that while the bio-electrochemical processes of the brain abide by the same rules of physics and chemistry as does the beaker and quantum events, the brain regardless violates those very same rules to produce an intentional (free will) outcome that is nonetheless caused (not uncaused) by those very same quantum inputs.
Well, it doesn't violate them. What it does do is forward modelling, which enables people to take account of the likely consequences of their actions when selecting them, rendering them considered, not reflexive.
You can not pretend that quantum inputs are the same and effective for beaker and brain alike while simultaneoulsy arguing the brain can overule the same laws of physics and chemistry by which it functions materialistically and yet produce a “free will” output that is “caused” by very same quantum events and physics that it overruled.
No, well, I'm not arguing that.
You can’t argue the brain is simultaneously subject to (i.e. that its output is not uncaused) and yet overrules those very same causes of physics and chemistry (i.e. that it has free intentional will).
I'm not saying it over rules them. Perhaps you might re-read my earlier post?
If the brain can somehow overrule its bio-electrochemical processes and the quantum events impinging upon it, then those overrulings are not “caused”. But if the brain’s output is entirely caused by bio-electrochemical processes and quantum events, then it does not have free will, rather its “choices” are artifacts of materialistic and determined physics and chemistry, just like a beaker (however complex a beaker or brain you may wish to argue), regardless, its material complexity will never be sufficient to overrule the material laws of physics and chemistry.
OK, you do seem to have missed my point. I thought I'd made it reasonably clearly. Oh well. I'll try again later.Elizabeth Liddle
August 21, 2011
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Which models?Mung
August 21, 2011
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You could exercise much more care in the statements you choose to make.Mung
August 21, 2011
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Elizabeth,
So yes, brains-with-bodies have “causative free will” that means that we select our actions based on complex forward models – but it does not mean that our decisions are “uncaused”. Indeed we can model the causal chain in this kind of instance quite easily.
Charles replied:
No, you can not model any such causal chain. If you could, you would always be in agreement with the quantum number generator, you could not disagree or ignore it as the “causal chain” (whether modelled perfectly or imperfectly) would limit your repsonse. If the causal chain of your brain is unbroken, there is no opportunity to disagree with or ignore the causal chain of the quantum random number generator.
Charles is right, and nor could you ever hope to get outside the causal chain, to have an objective point of view to say that there is even a causal chain; all "conclusions" would die the same fate.Clive Hayden
August 21, 2011
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Elizabeth:
If you present a human subject with a random series of, say, ones and zeros, but there are more ones than zeros (in other words, the sequence is random, but drawn from a probability distributionin which ones are more probable than zeros) and you give the human subject a point for for guessing each one correctly before it appears, most human subjects will guess both ones and zeros, with more “one” guesses than “zero” guesses.
Irrelevant. The experiment I posed demonstrates not an effort to guess at what will come next, but the ability to agree, disagree or ignore whatever came next. The experiment I posed demonstrates free choice. The experiment you pose demonstrates fallible quesswork. Guessing outcomes and choosing outcomes are not the same. One wonders at the intellectual honesty that would argue such a strawman.
So yes, brains-with-bodies have “causative free will” that means that we select our actions based on complex forward models – but it does not mean that our decisions are “uncaused”. Indeed we can model the causal chain in this kind of instance quite easily.
No, you can not model any such causal chain. If you could, you would always be in agreement with the quantum number generator, you could not disagree or ignore it as the "causal chain" (whether modelled perfectly or imperfectly) would limit your repsonse. If the causal chain of your brain is unbroken, there is no opportunity to disagree with or ignore the causal chain of the quantum random number generator.
Just because “the same physics” causes an ion in a beaker in a lab to move towards an electrode as causes an ion in a neuron to move through a membrane doesn’t mean that the beaker is like a neuron, and it certainly doesn’t mean the beaker is like a brain. A brain has completely different properties, and one of them is the capacity to forward-model.
Materialistically, deterministically, the brain at all material levels is subject to the exact same physics as is a beaker at all material levels. But if the beaker could demonstrate forward modelling, you would ascribe it to something beyond the matter from which the beaker is composed and the quantum particles impinging upon it. Likewise whatever "forward modelling" the brain does, arises from something other than its bio-electrochemical constituents and the quantum events impinging upon it. Just like you ascribe the intentional agency of a robot to something other than the chips & wires from which it is constructed. The robot's "intentional agency" (and I do not grant you that a robot's programmed "consideration" is anything like human "consideration") did not arise from its silicon wafers and electrons.
Yes, brains-with-bodies ahve causative free will, but they aren’t “uncaused”! Or, at least, your thought experiment hasn’t shown that. What your thought experiment showed is that all kinds of “causes” factor in to the output of a brain, whereas only the mechanicss of the hardware RNG causes its output. That was my point to Meleager – to claim that because “physics” in one system produces meaningless, non-intentional output does not mean that “physics” in another system will, and a brain is a very special system.
What the thought experiement shows is that regardless of all kinds of “causes” (materialistic, deterministic and random) which determine, at the quantum level, the effects upon machines and living matter, the human mind is free to disregard all those causes. Your simple agreement that "brains-with-bodies ahve causative free will" and your incoherent disagreement that "they aren’t uncaused" is not sufficient. For your argument to prevail, you have to demonstrate that the physics of the beaker and the physics of the brain are different physics. The thought experiment demonstrates that at the quantum level, they are both subject to the same stochastic, materialistic, deterministic inputs. You have to demonstrate that while the bio-electrochemical processes of the brain abide by the same rules of physics and chemistry as does the beaker and quantum events, the brain regardless violates those very same rules to produce an intentional (free will) outcome that is nonetheless caused (not uncaused) by those very same quantum inputs. You can not pretend that quantum inputs are the same and effective for beaker and brain alike while simultaneoulsy arguing the brain can overule the same laws of physics and chemistry by which it functions materialistically and yet produce a "free will" output that is "caused" by very same quantum events and physics that it overruled. You can't argue the brain is simultaneously subject to (i.e. that its output is not uncaused) and yet overrules those very same causes of physics and chemistry (i.e. that it has free intentional will). If the brain can somehow overrule its bio-electrochemical processes and the quantum events impinging upon it, then those overrulings are not "caused". But if the brain's output is entirely caused by bio-electrochemical processes and quantum events, then it does not have free will, rather its "choices" are artifacts of materialistic and determined physics and chemistry, just like a beaker (however complex a beaker or brain you may wish to argue), regardless, its material complexity will never be sufficient to overrule the material laws of physics and chemistry.Charles
August 21, 2011
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Sorry, still getting the hang of of the threaded format - the above was a response to your afterthought below. I think I have addressed your other point in my original response.Elizabeth Liddle
August 21, 2011
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Well, what do you mean by "the same physics"? We are talking about radically different systems. Just because "the same physics" causes an ion in a beaker in a lab to move towards an electrode as causes an ion in a neuron to move through a membrane doesn't mean that the beaker is like a neuron, and it certainly doesn't mean the beaker is like a brain. A brain has completely different properties, and one of them is the capacity to forward-model.Elizabeth Liddle
August 21, 2011
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Charles: Thank you for your thoughtful and challenging response! Here we go:
Here’s a thought experiment for your “forward modelling brain”: Assume you use a hardware quantum random number generator (they are commercially available) to output a string of bits (1?s or 0?s) and then you decide or choose to respond to each bit with either “agree” meaning you choose to match the string as each bit is generated or “disagree” meaning you choose the opposite value of the generated bit, or “ignore” meaning you choose neither and wait for the next generated bit. The quantum hardware generated bit string is truely random, truely stochastic and reflects the quantum uncertainty of the universe in which we live. It is simultaneously truely unpredictible and can not be matched (its output predicted) by any parallel computation or device, and it is materialistic and deterministic in that its output is not intentional but determined by the materials from which it is constructed and the quantum events it samples. If your string of responses is strictly limited without exception to “agree”, then your brain isn’t forward modelling at all and instead is truely, both deterministic and stochastically random, just like the quantum processes that drive the generator. If, alternatively, your string of responses includes “disagree” or “ignore”, then your brain is free to “forward model” a non-random choice. You know you are in fact free to choose an unending, unbroken string of “agree”, or “disagree”, or “ignore”. You know you are in fact free to choose intentional patterns in your response, alternating “agree”, “disagree”, and “ignore”. You know you are free to choose to encode the prime numbers between 1 and 100 in your responses. But all the while the quantum random number generator is not free. It is a function of the materialistic quantum physics from which it is constructed and event samples from the quantum universe which determines its output. It can do no other. It is constrained to be materialistic, deterministic and random in the truest, deepest sense of those terms. Any unconfused, non-argumentative, intellectually honest person knows their choices are free to “disagree” or “ignore” the quantum randomness of the generator, and hence “disagree” or “ignore” the very quantum nature of their own brains and the universe in which they live. That very same freedom of choice extends to their “agree” responses as well, so even when they “agree” with random quantum events, they agree “freely”. The hardware quantum random generator and the events it samples are intrinsically unpredictable and fundamentally deterministic in every sense that is coherent. The generator has an inbuilt physics limitation which your uncaused cause self does not. You are free to intentionally self-cause your choices independant of the limited quantum nature of your brain or the universe.
Yes, to almost all the above, and the only "almost" is a quibble that I think is irrelevant, so that's fine.
As challenged, the thought experiment demonstrates that. Brains-with-bodies have uncaused causative free will that is independent of the materialistic and deterministic limitations of quantum physics and the surrounding universe, in every sense that is coherent.
And that's doesn't follow! Yes, brains-with-bodies ahve causative free will, but they aren't "uncaused"! Or, at least, your thought experiment hasn't shown that. What your thought experiment showed is that all kinds of "causes" factor in to the output of a brain, whereas only the mechanicss of the hardware RNG causes its output. That was my point to Meleager - to claim that because "physics" in one system produces meaningless, non-intentional output does not mean that "physics" in another system will, and a brain is a very special system. In fact I'll bring up my quibble here, as it's a nice example. If you present a human subject with a random series of, say, ones and zeros, but there are more ones than zeros (in other words, the sequence is random, but drawn from a probability distributionin which ones are more probable than zeros) and you give the human subject a point for for guessing each one correctly before it appears, most human subjects will guess both ones and zeros, with more "one" guesses than "zero" guesses. Interestingly, this is not a strategy likely to yield maximum points (the best strategy would be to guess "one" on every trial, even though you know that you will sometimes be wrong), but it is, nonetheless, what most people do. This is easy to explain in an evolutionary model - the world, on the whole, does not present us with random events from drawn from unchanging probability distributions, and a system that constantly updates its forward model in the light of recent events is, on the whole, more likely to generate useful predictions than one that keeps on responding mechanically, no matter what new data come in. So that is the first major difference between the "physics" of the quantum RNG, and the "physics" of a brain, and it turns out that it is very difficult to get human beings to produce truly "random" sequences, although they can be trained to do so! (pigeons seem to be able to do it more easily). So yes, brains-with-bodies have "causative free will" that means that we select our actions based on complex forward models - but it does not mean that our decisions are "uncaused". Indeed we can model the causal chain in this kind of instance quite easily.
By testing our models against data, and, if they don’t fit the data well, revisiting our premises.
Dr. Liddle, scientist and self-avowed honest intellectual, now test your models against the data of the above thought experiment and revist your premises.
Done, and model retained :)Elizabeth Liddle
August 21, 2011
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Elizabeth: An after thought:
And I say that my “physics” allows me to do all those things, and your “free will” allows you nothing in addition.
Your physics are constrained as are the physics of the universe, the random quantum number generator, and your brain. The same physics applies equally to all. But it is uncaused-causative "free will" that added the ability to choose differently than the materialistic and deterministic random quantum events impinging upon your brain-in-a-body.Charles
August 21, 2011
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Elizabeth:
You seem to have decided that the thing you call “physics” has inbuilt limitation that your uncaused cause does not. I’m asking you to demonstrate this, with examples.
Ok, let's go there. Above you wrote:
whether the universe is deterministic or not. It’s something that theoretical physicists still debate – whether events are intrinsically unpredictable or whether there is a fundamentally deterministic system underlies quantum uncertainty. I just don’t think the answer is germane to the question of whether we are free agents in any sense that is coherent.
And just now you wrote:
Meleager, I am talking about a free-will-agent. My point is that brains-with-bodies have free will. And, indeed, they do what we describe as “consider”.
Here's a thought experiment for your "forward modelling brain": Assume you use a hardware quantum random number generator (they are commercially available) to output a string of bits (1's or 0's) and then you decide or choose to respond to each bit with either "agree" meaning you choose to match the string as each bit is generated or "disagree" meaning you choose the opposite value of the generated bit, or "ignore" meaning you choose neither and wait for the next generated bit. The quantum hardware generated bit string is truely random, truely stochastic and reflects the quantum uncertainty of the universe in which we live. It is simultaneously truely unpredictible and can not be matched (its output predicted) by any parallel computation or device, and it is materialistic and deterministic in that its output is not intentional but determined by the materials from which it is constructed and the quantum events it samples. If your string of responses is strictly limited without exception to "agree", then your brain isn't forward modelling at all and instead is truely, both deterministic and stochastically random, just like the quantum processes that drive the generator. If, alternatively, your string of responses includes "disagree" or "ignore", then your brain is free to "forward model" a non-random choice. You know you are in fact free to choose an unending, unbroken string of "agree", or "disagree", or "ignore". You know you are in fact free to choose intentional patterns in your response, alternating "agree", "disagree", and "ignore". You know you are free to choose to encode the prime numbers between 1 and 100 in your responses. But all the while the quantum random number generator is not free. It is a function of the materialistic quantum physics from which it is constructed and event samples from the quantum universe which determines its output. It can do no other. It is constrained to be materialistic, deterministic and random in the truest, deepest sense of those terms. Any unconfused, non-argumentative, intellectually honest person knows their choices are free to "disagree" or "ignore" the quantum randomness of the generator, and hence "disagree" or "ignore" the very quantum nature of their own brains and the universe in which they live. That very same freedom of choice extends to their "agree" responses as well, so even when they "agree" with random quantum events, they agree "freely". The hardware quantum random generator and the events it samples are intrinsically unpredictable and fundamentally deterministic in every sense that is coherent. The generator has an inbuilt physics limitation which your uncaused cause self does not. You are free to intentionally self-cause your choices independant of the limited quantum nature of your brain or the universe. As challenged, the thought experiment demonstrates that. Brains-with-bodies have uncaused causative free will that is independent of the materialistic and deterministic limitations of quantum physics and the surrounding universe, in every sense that is coherent.
By testing our models against data, and, if they don’t fit the data well, revisiting our premises.
Dr. Liddle, scientist and self-avowed honest intellectual, now test your models against the data of the above thought experiment and revist your premises.Charles
August 21, 2011
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Meleager: You keep talking about "physics" as though "physics" were an agent, and moreover you keep citing what "physics" can and can't do. I don't know what you mean by "physics" in this context. We aren't talking about "physics" in any sense of the word I am familiar with. A brain-in-a-body isn't "physics", it's a beautiful decision-making-machine, with very specific properties that aren't the properties (that I can see) of the entity you call "physics". To take your points in turn:
what would a free agent consider when making her choice, and how would that differ from what a non-free agent would consider?
The term “consider” implies the presence of an agency beyond the mere physical computation of interacting physics. Non-free-will agencies do not “consider”; they compute, and produce whatever output the physical computation ends up with.
Meleager, I am talking about a free-will-agent. My point is that brains-with-bodies have free will. And, indeed, they do what we describe as "consider". You can call it "compute" if you want, but that is a very poor description of what brains-with-bodies do, IMO. Yes, the output is a decision, but that would be the same whether you use the verb "consider" or "compute" IMO, and "consider" seems to me to be the better term (brains-with-bodies are not very like computers).
Even if we allow the use of the term; the difference would be that the free will agent can consider anything; the non-free will agency can only consider that which physics allows. More on this important distinction after the next quote.
It seems to me that when you drill down, it’s a distinction without a difference, because if the “uncaused I” is unbound by factors relevant to the decision, then it is not “free” so much as “random”; and if it is so bound, then it is not free.
The problem with your statement lies in your use of the term “relevant”; in determinism (as defined above, sans any claim of predictability) what is considered relevant is generated by physics. We’ve already established that physics produces false beliefs, irrational arguments, and absurd ideas and claims.
Sure it does. And it can produce true beliefs and rational arguments and sound ideas and claims. It can also produce procedures for determining the difference between these. You seem to have decided that the thing you call "physics" has inbuilt limitation that your uncaused cause does not. I'm asking you to demonstrate this, with examples. I think you are underestimating "physics" (or brains-with-bodies) and hugely overestimating "uncaused causes". My challenge is: how does an "uncaused cause" factor in more of what is relevant than "physics" does? And if it does, how is it then "uncaused"?
So,there is no warrant to believe that physics won’t produce a false view of “what is relevant” to the decision at hand. In fact, I’m sure we both have had many interactions with people who list considerations that are entirely irrelevant to the decision at hand, and consider them quite importatant.
Yes, indeed. I never said there were guarantees. There are, however, tests.
Unless one has access to an independent, uncaused capacity to consider, then all one can “consider” is that which an admittedly faulty system allows to be considered. An analogy would be, if physics tells you to choose A or B based on one of three considerations – X, Y, and Z then that is all you can do, because you “are” those physics, and nothing but physics, so all you can do is consider a choice between A and B based on X, Y, and Z, whether that is a complete representation of the actual or potential options and relevant considerations or not. Whether you are barking like a dog and drooling like an idiot while believing that you are considering relevant information and reaching rational decisions or not.
Well, I disagree. What you are dismissing as "physics"
includes all the machinery we possess that enables us to to check our models against data, and, unless our brains are malfunctioning, to fix the models that don't produce reliable predictions.
If my will, however, is not confined as a product of physics, then I can search for different options besides A or B, and search for other considerations besides X, Y, and Z, because I am not bound by physics to such limitations. Under the libertarian scenario, I can search for and find relevant considerations and potential consequences beyond the capacity of physics to realize or compute.
But "physics" isn't bound by your "physics"! Our brain-within-our-bodies are exquisitely suited to doing precision what you insist they can't! - of exploring the implications of alternative courses of action. Our imaginations are gloriously free - and what gives them their freedom is the beautiful "physics" that underlies them! Those billions of neurons and trillions of synapses that can route virtually anything to anything, creating further options as they do so.
Under libertarian free will, physics cannot command me to bark like a dog, drool like an idiot, and (inclusively) concurrently believe I am making a rational argument and reaching sound conclusions. Physics cannot limit me to potentially erroneous considerations. Under determinism, you have no capacity whatsoever to avoid such potentials,because you are only what physics produces.
Well, I profoundly disagree,because I do not share your view of the limitations that "physics" produces - indeed, my point is that anything an "uncaused" homunculus could add would be effectively nothing because the whole point of a moral decision is that it is caused - caused by information from multiple sources, including information generated by forward modelling of the outcomes of alternative courses of action. If we posit an uncaused cause as a factor, all we are adding is a loose wire.
It seems to me that all you buy by positing an uncaused cause as “I” is a stochastic element to your decisions – an inner coin-toss, as it were, and that doesn’t seem to me so much “free” as “indeterminate”.
The ability to search for information, considerations, relevance, reasoning, and consequences beyond that which is available to the physics-limited computations of caused brain activity is as fundamental and non-stochastic and necesary to the concept of free will as an unlocked door is necessary to the concept of physical freedom.
And my point is that it is the "physics" that allows us "to search for information, considerations, relevance, reasoning, and consequences". I am not seeing what your "uncaused cause" can possibly add. As soon as it is influenced by one of those factors (information, considerations, relevance, reasoning, consequences) it ceases to be "uncaused", surely? So why even include it?
The difference between you and I is that you must do and believe whatever physics commands, and have no recourse but to do and believe those things, even if absurd; I have recourse beyond such physics to recognize such impulses or views as absurd and discern options and consequence unavailable to you.
And I say that my "physics" allows me to do all those things, and your "free will" allows you nothing in addition.
There is no limit to what is available to my consideration; you can only consider what physics commands, and must consider it as physics commands you, and must reach whatever conclusions physics commands, whether absurd or not.
Ditto.
By testing our models against data, and, if they don’t fit the data well, revisiting our premises.
I said, “other than by relying upon that which has produced the error in the first place”; your “answer” still relies upon that which produced the error in the first place – physics. Since physics has produced the contradictory results in the first place, how can we trust the product of physics to arbit any resolution?
I really don't know what you mean by "physics" here! There are lots of potential answers to your question, but they depend on specifics! For instance, if we take basic perception - the entire "physics" of sensory perception is basic on error-monitoring functions. Sure, they sometimes let us down, but in healthy people, there are layers and layers of checks and cross-checks so that if you make an error, you catch it, and can even check later to make sure you were right that it was an error. Ditto with reasoning - if you make a reasoning error, and your resulting prediction is not borne out by subsequent information, you check the reasoning, or the premises that underlay the reasoning. I'm really not seeing the difficulty, unless I'm really misunderstanding what you are characterising as "physics".
Elizabeth Liddle
August 21, 2011
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what would a free agent consider when making her choice, and how would that differ from what a non-free agent would consider?
The term "consider" implies the presence of an agency beyond the mere physical computation of interacting physics. Non-free-will agencies do not "consider"; they compute, and produce whatever output the physical computation ends up with. Even if we allow the use of the term; the difference would be that the free will agent can consider anything; the non-free will agency can only consider that which physics allows. More on this important distinction after the next quote.
It seems to me that when you drill down, it’s a distinction without a difference, because if the “uncaused I” is unbound by factors relevant to the decision, then it is not “free” so much as “random”; and if it is so bound, then it is not free.
The problem with your statement lies in your use of the term "relevant"; in determinism (as defined above, sans any claim of predictability) what is considered relevant is generated by physics. We've already established that physics produces false beliefs, irrational arguments, and absurd ideas and claims. So,there is no warrant to believe that physics won't produce a false view of "what is relevant" to the decision at hand. In fact, I'm sure we both have had many interactions with people who list considerations that are entirely irrelevant to the decision at hand, and consider them quite importatant. Unless one has access to an independent, uncaused capacity to consider, then all one can "consider" is that which an admittedly faulty system allows to be considered. An analogy would be, if physics tells you to choose A or B based on one of three considerations - X, Y, and Z then that is all you can do, because you "are" those physics, and nothing but physics, so all you can do is consider a choice between A and B based on X, Y, and Z, whether that is a complete representation of the actual or potential options and relevant considerations or not. Whether you are barking like a dog and drooling like an idiot while believing that you are considering relevant information and reaching rational decisions or not. If my will, however, is not confined as a product of physics, then I can search for different options besides A or B, and search for other considerations besides X, Y, and Z, because I am not bound by physics to such limitations. Under the libertarian scenario, I can search for and find relevant considerations and potential consequences beyond the capacity of physics to realize or compute. Under libertarian free will, physics cannot command me to bark like a dog, drool like an idiot, and (inclusively) concurrently believe I am making a rational argument and reaching sound conclusions. Physics cannot limit me to potentially erroneous considerations. Under determinism, you have no capacity whatsoever to avoid such potentials,because you are only what physics produces.
It seems to me that all you buy by positing an uncaused cause as “I” is a stochastic element to your decisions – an inner coin-toss, as it were, and that doesn’t seem to me so much “free” as “indeterminate”.
The ability to search for information, considerations, relevance, reasoning, and consequences beyond that which is available to the physics-limited computations of caused brain activity is as fundamental and non-stochastic and necesary to the concept of free will as an unlocked door is necessary to the concept of physical freedom. The difference between you and I is that you must do and believe whatever physics commands, and have no recourse but to do and believe those things, even if absurd; I have recourse beyond such physics to recognize such impulses or views as absurd and discern options and consequence unavailable to you. There is no limit to what is available to my consideration; you can only consider what physics commands, and must consider it as physics commands you, and must reach whatever conclusions physics commands, whether absurd or not.
By testing our models against data, and, if they don’t fit the data well, revisiting our premises.
I said, "other than by relying upon that which has produced the error in the first place"; your "answer" still relies upon that which produced the error in the first place - physics. Since physics has produced the contradictory results in the first place, how can we trust the product of physics to arbit any resolution?Meleagar
August 21, 2011
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Meleager:
I already answered that question above, Elizabeth; a free agent chooses freely; the non-free agent just produces whatever output physics generates.
Well, I'm trying to drill down below the apparent circularity ("a free agent chooses freely") of that definition! What does it mean to "choose freely"? That's why I phrased my question as it I did! My original question was:
Let’s say you are faced with a choice between making a donation to charity and buying yourself a donut: what, in your view, distinguishes a free choice from a forced choice?
Then I reposed as:
...how would a free agent choose between these two options, and how would that differ from how a non-free agent would choose?
And what I'm trying to get at is (trying again!): what would a free agent consider when making her choice, and how would that differ from what a non-free agent would consider?
Perhaps you missed my earlier question. The following definition of Determinism is from Dictionary.com: 1. the doctrine that all facts and events exemplify natural laws. 2. the doctrine that all events, including human choices and decisions, have sufficient causes. You have said that you are not a determinist; can you tell me how your position differs from those definitions of determinism?
Well "materialist" might be a better word for me than "determinist" - I think minds are the result of brains-in-bodies. But you can regard me as a determinist for all practical purposes, I just don't know (and nobody does, yet) whether the universe is deterministic or not. It's something that theoretical physicists still debate - whether events are intrinsically unpredictable or whether there is a fundamentally deterministic system underlies quantum uncertainty. I just don't think the answer is germane to the question of whether we are free agents in any sense that is coherent. To be specific: the reason I ask my question above is: if there is an "uncaused cause" that determines our action, as you propose (and indeed, I did myself for most of my life) and which we refer to as "I", presumably "I" takes into account many factors before deciding on a course of action? But then so does my postulated materialistic "I". So how do they differ? It seems to me that when you drill down, it's a distinction without a difference, because if the "uncaused I" is unbound by factors relevant to the decision, then it is not "free" so much as "random"; and if it is so bound, then it is not free. It seems to me that all you buy by positing an uncaused cause as "I" is a stochastic element to your decisions - an inner coin-toss, as it were, and that doesn't seem to me so much "free" as "indeterminate". And it seems to me that the thing one wants to ascribe moral responsiblity to is not a coin toss (the very reverse of moral responsibility) but an agent that duly considers all the factors relevant to a decision. "Freedom", it seems to me, if is to mean anything other than simply "unbound", i.e. if it is to denote moral responsibility, must surely mean freedom to consider more than just proximal self-benefit. And that is what our material brains give us. Adding an "uncaused cause" to the process seems to me only to add an irresponsible, morally neutral, element, not a morally responsible one.
Also, you have not addressed these very important questions: 1) Are brains-in-bodies capable of concurrently producing, in the same person, an irrational argument and a sensation of confidence that the argument was soundly logical and conclusive?
Well, I'm not sure exactly what you mean by "concurrently" but, give or take a bit of temporal slippage, the answer is plainly yes.
2) Are all behaviors, thoughts, argumens, etc. ultimately produced by physics?
They are produced by a system of matter and energy that we call a brain-in-a-body.
3) If the answer to #2 is “yes”, then if physics produces both the argument and sensation that X is true, and an argument and sensation that X is false, how are we to discern whether or not X is true or false, except by ralying upon that which has produced an error in the first place?
By testing our models against data, and, if they don't fit the data well, revisiting our premises.Elizabeth Liddle
August 21, 2011
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lastyearon: As Ilion has said, a free will entity doesn't "have" free will; free will is an intrinsic aspect of it. There is no "mechanism" involved; it is a fundamental property. Free will is axiomatically premised as a causal agency that is not lawfully mechanistic, nor is it random. It is intentional.Meleagar
August 21, 2011
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I already answered that question above, Elizabeth; a free agent chooses freely; the non-free agent just produces whatever output physics generates. Perhaps you missed my earlier question. The following definition of Determinism is from Dictionary.com:
1. the doctrine that all facts and events exemplify natural laws. 2. the doctrine that all events, including human choices and decisions, have sufficient causes.
You have said that you are not a determinist; can you tell me how your position differs from those definitions of determinism? Also, you have not addressed these very important questions: 1) Are brains-in-bodies capable of concurrently producing, in the same person, an irrational argument and a sensation of confidence that the argument was soundly logical and conclusive? 2) Are all behaviors, thoughts, argumens, etc. ultimately produced by physics? 3) If the answer to #2 is "yes", then if physics produces both the argument and sensation that X is true, and an argument and sensation that X is false, how are we to discern whether or not X is true or false, except by ralying upon that which has produced an error in the first place?Meleagar
August 21, 2011
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Well, let me ask a slightly different question: how would a free agent choose between these two options, and how would that differ from how a non-free agent would choose?Elizabeth Liddle
August 21, 2011
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Sadly, Ilion is no longer with us.Barry Arrington
August 20, 2011
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Meleager, If I understand you correctly, you're saying that in order for an entity to have free will, it must have some sort of decision making mechanism which doesn't obey the laws of physics. Does this supernatural mechanism obey any laws or regularities? How does it make decisions? What rules does it use? What inputs? Does it learn? How? If it doesn't obey any laws, and has no mechanisms for making choices, then can we consider it completely random? Does free choice for all practical purposes mean random choice?lastyearon
August 20, 2011
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Well, since "thoughts", as they are call in "folk psychology", are but secretions of the brain, it stands to reason that brains and kidneys must do the same job.Ilion
August 20, 2011
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My brain does the same jobs as my kidney. This is especially true after reading one of Elizabeth's posts.Mung
August 20, 2011
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You see, Elizabeth is never wrong, at best, she has created the wrong model.Mung
August 20, 2011
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No.Mung
August 20, 2011
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What difference does it make?Grunty
August 20, 2011
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To say that you don’t (or can’t) know that another person has (*) free will is exactly to assert that he does not.
I'd like to see the reasoning that equates "I don't know if he is a free will or not" with "He is not a free will."Meleagar
August 20, 2011
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"Since I don’t know if they have free will or not ..." To say that you don't (or can't) know that another person has (*) free will is exactly to assert that he does not. (*) everyone speaks of "having free will", but that is simply very sloppy language, and thinking: we don't *have* free wills, as though free will were a shoe, or even as though it were a foot. Rather, we *are* free wills.Ilion
August 20, 2011
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Perhaps you mean, how would I figure out if was making a free or forced choice?Meleagar
August 20, 2011
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"Brains make forward models; kidneys don’t." And how is it that a forward modelling brain was favored for selection but a forward modelling kidney was not, since evolution deemed the kidney sufficiently important to evolve a backup kidney whereas organisms can clearly survive and reproduce without forward modelling brains, yet a forward modelling kidney that pre-empts anemia or diabetes would be life-sustaining? And what is the scientific evidence for the variation that gave rise to forward modelling?Charles
August 20, 2011
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