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What are the First Rules of Right Reason? Are They Negotiable? Do They Matter?

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About two weeks ago, I read a scientific report that challenged my perceptions about the relationship between philosophy and science. So much so, that it forced me to doubt some of my erstwhile convictions about the value of logic and prompted me to revise major elements of my global world view. As it turns out, an empirically-based study indicated, within a 1% margin of error, that there are more people in the city of Los Angeles than in the entire state of California. I would never have accepted this counter-intuitive claim had there been no evidence to support it.

At this point, my readers might wonder how I could be so pathologically gullible as to accept such an absurd proposition. Or, more likely, they will recognize my scenario as a playful exercise in misdirection that conveys an important point: No amount of evidence or appeal to the authority of science could ever invalidate a self-evident truth. The city of Los Angeles simply cannot have more people than the entire state of California. Any such claim would violate one of the first principles of right reason: A finite whole can never be less than any one of its parts. Drawing on that same principle, I can be equally certain that a man’s head cannot displace more water than his entire body or that our sun cannot weigh more than the solar system of which it is a part.

On reflection, we should be able to appreciate the significance of these examples and place them in the context of a broader principle: Evidence does not inform the rules of right reason; the rules of right reason inform evidence. That is because self-evident truths, the starting point from which all rational inquiry begins, provide the means by which all other truth claims, scientific or otherwise, must be evaluated. Accordingly, we don’t reason our way TO these principles; we reason our way FROM them. Evidence, at least of the scientific variety, cannot invalidate or pass judgment on them because evidence is the thing being validated and judged.

Among reason’s most authoritative judges, the Law of Identity, the Law of Non-Contradiction, and the Law of the Excluded middle reign supreme. Ontologically, a thing cannot be what it is and also be something else. Logically and psychologically, a proposition cannot be true and false at the same time and in the same sense. The thinking process begins with the understanding of what is and what cannot be. Without this constraint, that is, without the ability to rule things out, reasoned analysis and meaningful dialogue are impossible. One can say, “If A, then B”, only if everything except B is understood to be an impossible consequence of A.

Postmodernist skeptics often try to argue that these points apply only to our mental framework and the ways that we think about things. The careful reader will notice, though, that the aforementioned laws are both objectively and subjectively true. They apply to both the world as it is (ontology) and the world as we perceive it (epistemology). That is why we can differentiate between a sound argument, which is both internally consistent and consistent with truths found in the real world, and a valid argument, which may only meet the first condition. If one begins with a true premise about the real world and reasons perfectly, he will arrive at a true conclusion about the real world; if one begins with a false premise and reasons perfectly, he will arrive at a false conclusion. In terms of logic and causation, then, our mental models correspond with real world facts. There is no divide between them however passionately the skeptics might wish it to be so.

Among reason’s most pragmatic judges, the Law of Causality and the Principle of Sufficient Reason define the rational standards for all philosophical and scientific investigations. Everything must have a reason or cause for its existence and an explanation for why it undergoes change. Let’s consider a simple example of the former: Person A enters a room with person B and says, “Look, there is a red ball sitting on the table. I wonder how it got there.” Person B, amazed at the question, asks, “What do you mean, ‘how did it get there?’ Obviously, someone put it there.” This is, of course, the correct response. The red ball is, after all, contingent and finite; someone had to bring it into existence and put it in place. Now, let’s blow the ball up to the size of a house. Has the argument changed or lost any of its force? No. The only thing that has changed is the size of the ball. Now, blow the ball up to the size of the United States—now to the size of our Solar system—now to the size of the universe. Has the argument changed? No. Is the ball any less finite or less dependent on a cause? No. Only its size is different. Obviously, someone put it there.

Again, the careful reader will notice that the Law of Causality applies not only to those things that come into being but also those things that undergo change. In the latter context, the principle can be further simplified: A cause cannot give what it does not have to give. There is no reason, for example, to conduct an empirical investigation to negate or affirm the hypothesis that a gold bar could come from a gold sliver, or that a sand castle could come from a single grain. In either case, there is nothing in the cause that could produce the effect. Additional raw materials would have to be gathered by an outside agent and fashioned into a new product. No amount of evidence could override these metaphysical truths.

It often escapes the notice of professional cynics that reason’s rules also establish the rigorous standards for scientific methodology even before evidence enters the picture. Among the many questions which must be answered are the following: What is the difference between causation and correlation? When is it appropriate to use ordinal, nominal, or interval measurements? What is the most dependable way to isolate variables? Can variables be totally isolated at all? When should we apply mathematical principles? When should we apply statistical principles? What is science? What counts as evidence? What is an experiment? What is a theory? What constitutes a proof? What is the difference between probability, virtual certainty, and absolute certainty? In what ways does a philosophical investigation differ from a scientific investigation? Do they overlap? We cannot interpret evidence in a rational way until we answer these and many other questions.

Objective rational standards are, for want of a better term, epistemological safeguards. Under their jurisdiction, all parties must check their political motives and personal agendas at the door: Religious believers will not presume to use the book of Genesis as a scientific textbook, and secular doubters will not presume to disallow a “Divine foot in the door.” The role of scientists, after all, is to sit at the feet of nature and allow her to reveal her secrets. In that context, there is always an ethical component involved in their research: Either they will follow the evidence according to reason’s rules, or they will lead the evidence according to their own biases and prejudices. There is no middle ground for interpretation. One is either drawing information out of the data or injecting ideology into the data.

In this respect, the micro world is subject to the same metaphysical principles as the macro world. Quantum theorists, therefore, cannot reasonably challenge first principles on the grounds that quantum particles behave in strange and surprising ways. It was, after all, those same principles that brought attention to the strange and surprising behavior in the first place. In the absence of reason’s rules, we could not have known the difference between what is odd and what is normal or apprehend the counter-intuitive nature of quantum activity. Any scientist who presumes to negotiate away reason’s rules is, in effect, trying to put out of business the same principles that put him in business.

Meanwhile, the big questions remained unanswered. If one thing can come into existence without a cause, why cannot anything else do the same? Why not everything? Within such a “liberated” framework, how can the scientist know which events are caused and which ones are not? In any case, it appears that the special pleading of the quantum theorists has ended. At first, we were told that their claim on behalf of causeless events was a one-time deal. If, just this once, we would exempt their specialty from rational standards, there would be no more breaches—that is, until Lawrence Krauss exclaimed that the entire universe popped into existence without a cause. So much for special limits. But the development was entirely predictable. Irrationality knows no limits. That is why it is irrational.

That raises the prior question about why anyone in any specialty would question reason’s rules. In large part, the answer lies with members of the educational elite and their desire to take reason’s place as the final arbiter of right thinking. If reason has no rules, then power does the ruling. In order to facilitate that strategy, elitists promote the anti-intellectual doctrine that only empirical knowledge is real knowledge. If a concept or idea cannot be verified thought scientific means, then it doesn’t qualify as legitimate knowledge. Obviously, that philosophy refutes itself since it cannot pass its own test. It cannot be proven to be valid through empirical methods.

Wouldn’t it be easier to dispense with all this nonsense and simply acknowledge self-evident truths for what they are? What could be more reasonable than affirming with confidence that which we already know? It isn’t just the integrity of science that is at stake. Our ability to engage in any kind of rational discourse depends on it. Every long journey begins with a single step. Surely, we can all agree that there could never be more people in the city of Los Angeles than in the state of California without adding the words, —“yes, but”….” Or can we?

Comments
The First Cause ArgumentMung
July 31, 2013
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kn @110. Precisely! I just love Jaki's writings. When you finally get the other book I sent (assuming you do), let me know and I'll send a copy of The Oxford Handbook of Causation to you. Some people talk about causation, some people read about it. :)Mung
July 30, 2013
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Liz
That’s why I said:I don’t know if “nothing” is even a coherent concept.
Yet you are open to the idea that, what you think may be incoherent, is a physical possibility. There is a whole book just recently written that posits that the universe is from nothing. Like I said metaphysics disguised as science. The title itself is ludicrous as if there is a there there. The word from is itself incoherent when used with nothing since there is no from. Since nothing can not be physical how is it physically possible that something comes from it as the author contends? How can you be open to the idea that it is physically possible that non physicality be physical? It would have to be META physical. Vividvividbleau
July 30, 2013
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That's why I said:
I don’t know if “nothing” is even a coherent concept.
Elizabeth B Liddle
July 30, 2013
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Liz
Yes, I’m open to the possibility,
Hopefuly you realize that can never be a scientific or physical position it would be metaphysical.Nothing has no physical property. To postulate that it maybe physically possible is not science it is metaphysics disguised as science. Vividvividbleau
July 30, 2013
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vividbleau: Yes, I'm open to the possibility, although as I said, I don't know if "nothing" is even a coherent concept. The reason I brought up mind is that in some parts of this discussion, the thing that causes things to come into existence is posited to be something with a mind. That's why I brought it up.Elizabeth B Liddle
July 30, 2013
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Stephen I think maybe we have done this subject to death. I have enjoyed it and it has made me think a bit more deeply about causation although I remain utterly unconvinced of your main thesis. Thanks MarkMark Frank
July 29, 2013
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#122 vividbleau
Do either one of you think it is physically possible that these elementary particles appear, for lack of a better term since nothing is inconceivable, “from” nothing?
From my limited understanding of quantum mechanics I understand they do not appear from nothing. Certain conditions have to be in place - energy levels or such like - and the creation of a particle involves changes elsewhere. What seems to be inherently unpredictable is when the creation takes place. There seems to be no other event that causes the change to take place at that time. Is it physically possible for something to appear from nothing? Like Lizzie I have no idea and I am not sure I know it means.Mark Frank
July 29, 2013
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Liz
I don’t know, vividbleau,
If you don't know then it seems to me it means you are at least open to the idea that it is physically possible. Am I wrong?
and I’m a long way from being any kind of physicist!
I am not a physicist either and fail to understand why one has to be one in order to answer my question. I assume physicists deal with the physical no?
But what I don’t think we can assume (however much we want to) that the reason there is something rather than nothing is a mind.
Hmmm... my question had nothing to do with assuming any kind of mind, why bring it up? Vividvividbleau
July 29, 2013
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I don't know, vividbleau, and I'm a long way from being any kind of physicist! I think the problem is that when we drill down to elementary particles, and time-before-time, we simply don't have the ordinary language to describe what the scientists observe - which is why, presumably they use math. But what I don't think we can assume (however much we want to) that the reason there is something rather than nothing is a mind. It may be that the reason that we can't conceive of nothing is that it is ultimately an incoherent concept - perhaps "nothing" is not possible. In which case, that's why there's something.Elizabeth B Liddle
July 29, 2013
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Correction. My question for both you and Liz is this. Do either one of you think it is physically possible that these elementary particles appear, for lack of a better term since nothing is inconceivable, “from” nothing? For purposes of this discussion I define nothing as “that” which cannot be described. Vividvividbleau
July 29, 2013
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MF and Liz
Actually it is a bit more complicated than that because what they have done is hypothesise no causality and found that hypothesis fits the evidence.)
What evidence could one possibly produce that would evidentially verify non causality? If there is no cause there is no evidence that cause is lacking, but I digress. My question for both you and Liz is this. Do either one of you think it is physically possible that these elementary particles appear, for lack of a better term since nothing is inconceivable, "from" nothing. For purposes of this discussion I define nothing as "that" which cannot be described? I have italicized from and that because nothing has neither a from or a that. Vividvividbleau
July 29, 2013
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Mark,
Here is the crux of the problem. I don’t think it is a first principle. So how do we decide if something really is a first principle or not?
When you question causality as a first principle, I am not sure I understand. Are you saying that the LNC is the only first principle? Or are you saying that there are no first principles? If you accept LNC as a first principle without empirical proof, why do you not accept LoC without empirical proof? On the question of deciding on first principles, I think it is a question of appreciating the implications of denying them. I recognize, for example, that it is absurd to suggest that a baseball could, on its own, leap off a countertop and fly toward your head at sixty miles-per-hour without a cause. You do not seem to recognize the absurdity. Indeed, you seem to allow for the possibility. SB: What can be demonstrated is that the LoC and the LNC are inextricably tied together.
To try and avoid getting into disputes about the meaning of “contingent” I invite you to show the link between LoC and LNC without using the word. You seem reluctant (unable?) to do this.
Well, I have done it in other ways, showing, for example, that a thing either brings itself into existence or is brought into existence by something else. A thing would have to exist before it existed to do the former, which means that it must have been brought into existence. However, you claim that such a formulation leaves open a third option, namely coming into existence with no cause at all—as if that was something different from bringing itself into existence. Still, there are even other ways to prove the point. The LoC and the LNC are tied together such that the same cause (causation) cannot produce opposite effects (LNC). So, if I say that pouring potassium on water will cause an explosion, I am also making a statement about the law of non-contradiction. In other words, the cause/effect relationship (water and potassium explode) is inextricably tied to the LNC (it cannot both explode and not explode). The two principles cannot, as you would have it, be separated.
I am saying the appearance of babies and horses falls into this [physical]category (I seem to have said this about 20 times and I cannot understand what the problem is).
Repeating the same failed argument does not make it succeed. Putting these events into the category of physical possibilities does not, as you are trying to argue, exclude them from the category of logical possibilities. You just agreed that many, perhaps most, things that are physically impossible are also logically impossible and vice versa. Those things that are physically impossible, yet logically possible, are quite limited can easily be identified. (The sky could be green in a different universe). The appearance of babies or horses in your living room is not in that limited category. Such events are both physically and logically impossible.
If I observe the white ball knock the red ball into the pocket do I have to make a metaphysical assumption of causality before finding that the white ball caused the red ball to go into the pocket?
Yes. You do have to make that metaphysical assumption, though it is an assumption based on reason. In fact, the only thing that you really observed was that the red ball moved after it was touched by the white ball. You didn’t “observe” causality, because you can’t observe a concept; you can only grasp it as a principle with your intelligence. You “understood” that there must be a principle of causality involved--anything that moves must be moved by something else. Now, you want to deny that same principle that you once grasped and claim that sometimes things can move without being moved. So, you have to confront the obvious question: If some things can move without being moved, why cannot anything move without having being moved, even those pool balls that seem to have been moved but perhaps were not. How do you know that the white ball caused the red ball to go into the pocket when you can observe only the sequence and the movement---and not the causality? It is because you know that nothing at all can move without being moved, including the red ball in question.StephenB
July 29, 2013
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KF:
PS: Docs, X rays to cross check [things are getting worse, measurably so], MRIs, further consultations. De system moves like a snail, but has massive momentum, so to try to speed it up requires heavy duty clout . . .
Oh, it does indeed! And you can feel like a mayfly being bulldozed by a juggernaut! My thoughts are with you all KF, for what they are worth. :hug:Elizabeth B Liddle
July 29, 2013
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Hi, Stephen Apologies for the delay! You wrote:
On the question of causation as a law, we are not saying that everything that exists must be caused. If that was the case, then God would have had to be caused. That is why we say that everything that begins to exist must have a cause. God did not begin to exist. As I discussed with Mark, the logical link between LNC and Loc is different from the argument that the LoC is true. The point is that denying the latter violates former and leads to a contradiction. I am not clear on why you deny that affirmation. Again, there is also another way of approaching it. A thing either brings itself into existence or is brought into existence by another. Those are our only two choices. If we assume the former, we find that a thing would have had to exist before it existed in order to bring itself into existence, which is ridiculous. Therefore, we take the second option as the only logical alternative. We are not, as you suggested, presupposing the second option.
Where we are disagreeing, Stephen, is on whether “A thing either brings itself into existence or is brought into existence by another” are exhaustive. I’m saying that is not a safe assumption. I agree that given the premise that all things must be brought into existence by an agent, and that an action can only be done by an existing agent, clearly a thing cannot bring itself into existence. But I’m saying that that premise is not necessarily true. It does not violate the LNC to say: some things come spontaneously into existence with probability distribution X. It may not be true, but it does not violate the LNC.
On the question of why you think some things could be caused while others are not, I did study your answer. If I understand correctly, you are saying that [a] since quantum particles are exceedingly small and may come into existence in a decidedly different way than other things come into existence, [b] it follows that the uniqueness of that process renders it exempt from the law of causation. Your ultimate explanation appears to be that some things can, at the lowest level of existence, rearrange themselves. I hope that I have not oversimplified, but that seems to be the bottom line argument. I would agree that quantum particles may come into existence in a different way than other things, though I have no way of knowing. When you think about it, though, there are many different ways of coming into existence, and many different ways of causing it. A sand castle comes to be in a far different way than a baby. A universe would likely come to be in a different fashion than a thunderstorm. Nevertheless, all these things are caused, albeit in different ways. I suspect that quantum events come to be in a fashion analogous to that of a thunderstorm, though I am guessing of course. However, the example seems appropriate since, in both cases, we are referring to causal conditions as opposed to discrete causal factors that can easily be identified. To speak of atmospheric conditions may seem a little vague, just as it may seem a little vague to speak of causal conditions present in a quantum vacuum, but it is still true that these causal conditions are causes. In their absence, there will be no coming into existence.
I am not saying that quantum particles are different because they are tiny. I’m saying that they are different because they are elementary – they are not systems of more elementary things. And the interesting thing is that at that elementary level, the basic particles of stuff seem to be probability distributions rather than the kind of solid, reliable, slow-changing stuff that we call “things” in the macroscopic world, and which consist of systems of lower-level things, which in turn consist of systems of even lower-level things, and so on until we reach the bottom. The fascinating thing about quantum physics is that it revealed that instead of the bottom consisting of a Democratean set of irreducible solid, permanent objects, it is something far stranger – probability fields. Just as we can be absolutely sure that we will not toss 500 heads, but not at all sure that we will not toss one, so we can be absolutely sure that the horse/mountain/baby/even sandcastle we see now, will still be substantially there, insubstantially changed, half a second later, we have no such certainty about any one of the elementary particles of which they consist. So it makes perfectly good sense to talk of these macroscopic systems as being caused by traceable prior events (and there is no intrinsic problem in events having multiple causes, or, for that matter, including feedback loops whereby what the resulting system then affects future configurations), but it doesn’t make sense in the same way to talk of elementary particles being caused (which is why they are called elementary).
On the question of whether things in nature can rearrange themselves, I think a more fundamental question is in play. Can anything ever rearrange itself without being programmed in some way to do so? I would say no. That brings us back to the Law of Causality.
Depends what you mean by “programmed” – can you explain?
On the matter of whether we are extrapolating beyond our range of data or importing assumptions about the universality of causation from the macro world to the micro world, I can only say that the appeal to a special exception for the quantum world seems more like special pleading to me. I would add that their “just this once” appeal didn’t last very long. Soon after Victor Stenger claimed that quantum events are uncaused, Lawrence Krauss claimed that the entire universe was uncaused. So much for special pleading.
It’s no more “special pleading”, I suggest, any more than saying God is uncaused is “special pleading”. There seems to be no essential difference between saying that God is exempt because God did not “begin to exist” than between saying that a quantum field is exempt because a quantum field did not “begin to exist”. Both are attempts to say that something – God, a quantum vacuum – did not “begin to exist”, and that that something was such as to render possible the beginning of the existence of other things. The issue to me seems to be: how do we characterise that something? As Aquinas said, we can only say what it is not.Elizabeth B Liddle
July 29, 2013
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And #116 lost all the HTML! Here is the third attempt: Stephen
You don’t think that a precise definition of words is important in an argument? That is an unusual position to take.
Of course it is important. That is why I outlined four different definitions. What I was trying to say was that it doesn’t matter which of those definitions is the formal one – as long as you are clear which one you are using.
You continue to confuse the two arguments. The law of causality cannot be demonstrated. It is a first principle. First principles cannot be demonstrated.
Here is the crux of the problem. I don’t think it is a first principle. So how do we decide if something really is a first principle or not?
What can be demonstrated is that the LoC and the LNC are inextricably tied together.  ….., in order to avoid the force of the present argument about the connection between Loc and LNC, you go looking for an alternative definition of “contingent.”
I believe your demonstration relies on conflating two definitions of “contingent”. There are things which not contingent under definition 1 (dependent on something else) but are contingent under definition 4 (neither logically necessary nor logically impossible). To try and avoid getting into disputes about the meaning of “contingent” I invite you to show the link between LoC and LNC without using the word.  You seem reluctant (unable?) to do this.
If you don’t like the term “brings itself into existence” as an alternative way of saying that a thing is uncaused, then throw it out. There are two possibilities: either [a] a thing comes into existence as a result of a cause or [b] it comes into existence without a cause. To just “not be” and then “be” is to come into existence without a cause. If you know of a third option, I will be happy to entertain it.
I am happy with this.  I thought you thought there was a third option where a thing caused itself to come into existence – which certainly would be odd.
If a baby cannot appear unless the laws of biology cause it to appear, then it cannot appear without a cause? So, which is your position?
Is it your first position? [a] a baby and a horse can appear without any cause at all. or is it your second position? [b] a baby and a horse can appear only if they are physically caused to appear.
Whey you say “can” that is a statement about what is possible  - possibility can be logical or physical. So I repeat – appearing babies and horses are logically possible (can) but physically impossible (can’t). Logically I can run a mile a 2 minutes. Physically I cannot.
Many, perhaps most things that are physically impossible are also logically impossible, and vice versa.
True. But also many things are logically possible but physically impossible. Do you deny this? I am saying the appearance of babies and horses falls into this category (I seem to have said this about 20 times and I cannot understand what the problem is).
Lizzie didn’t address it and neither have you. I asked why it is possible for elementary particles to come into existence without a cause and not larger objects. Lizzie and you answer by saying that this is just is the case. My question persists. Why would size make any difference? I trust that you will not revert back to your argument that the evidence will tell us. Evidence cannot establish the presence or absence of causality.
I am sorry I cannot see why observing a cause cannot be evidence for the presence of causality and failing to observe a cause cannot be evidence for the absence of causality. This seems a very odd position!  I think it is maybe because you believe causality is a first principle – but that of course is just what we are disputing.
Causality cannot be established by observation.
As I have pointed out several times, the presence or absence of causality cannot be proven.
You have asserted it  – but you haven’t shown it to be true. Meanwhile people are busy observing that some things cause other things and some scientists are concluding some things are not caused.
Causes are found because causes are assumed. If causes are not assumed, they are not found.
If I observe the white ball knock the red ball into the pocket do I have to make a metaphysical assumption of causality before finding that the white ball caused the red ball to go into the pocket? 
Earlier, you stated that they “assumed” no cause and now you agree with me that they “conclude” no cause. It would be nice if you would acknowledge the point that you changed your position as a response to my corrective.
I thought it did acknowledge it. But if I failed to do so I am happy to do so now. In fact I delighted to note that it is not necessary to make any assumptions about causality in order to conclude there is no cause in this case. (Actually it is a bit more complicated than that because what they have done is hypothesise no causality and found that hypothesis fits the evidence.)
It is a breach of logic if you draw an unwarranted conclusion.
Yes – but the whole issue we are debating is whether it is warranted to conclude that something lacks a cause. So it is only a breach of logic if you assume your premise – the LoC must be true.Mark Frank
July 29, 2013
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Stephen - on rereading #115 I find there are one or two places where it is unclear. Here is a second attempt: You don’t think that a precise definition of words is important in an argument? That is an unusual position to take. Of course it is important. That is why I outlined four different definitions. What I was trying to say was that it doesn’t matter which of those definitions is the formal one – as long as you are clear which one you are using. You continue to confuse the two arguments. The law of causality cannot be demonstrated. It is a first principle. First principles cannot be demonstrated. Here is the crux of the problem. I don’t think it is a first principle. So how do we decide if something really is a first principle or not? What can be demonstrated is that the LoC and the LNC are inextricably tied together. ….., in order to avoid the force of the present argument about the connection between Loc and LNC, you go looking for an alternative definition of “contingent.” I believe your demonstration relies on conflating two definitions of “contingent”. There are things which not contingent under definition 1 (dependent on something else) but are contingent under definition 4 (neither logically necessary nor logically impossible). To try and avoid getting into disputes about the meaning of “contingent” I invite you to show the link between LoC and LNC without using the word. You seem reluctant (unable?) to do this. If you don’t like the term “brings itself into existence” as an alternative way of saying that a thing is uncaused, then throw it out. There are two possibilities: either [a] a thing comes into existence as a result of a cause or [b] it comes into existence without a cause. To just “not be” and then “be” is to come into existence without a cause. If you know of a third option, I will be happy to entertain it. I am happy with this. I thought you thought there was a third option where a thing caused itself to come into existence – which certainly would be odd. If a baby cannot appear unless the laws of biology cause it to appear, then it cannot appear without a cause? So, which is your position? Is it your first position? [a] a baby and a horse can appear without any cause at all. or is it your second position? [b] a baby and a horse can appear only if they are physically caused to appear. Whey you say “can” that is a statement about what is possible - possibility can be logical or physical. So I repeat – appearing babies and horses are logically possible (can) but physically impossible (can’t). Logically I can run a mile a 2 minutes. Physically I cannot. Many, perhaps most things that are physically impossible are also logically impossible, and vice versa. True. But also many things are logically possible but physically impossible. Do you deny this? I am saying the appearance of babies and horses falls into this category (I seem to have said this about 20 times and I cannot understand what the problem is). Lizzie didn’t address it and neither have you. I asked why it is possible for elementary particles to come into existence without a cause and not larger objects. Lizzie and you answer by saying that this is just is the case. My question persists. Why would size make any difference? I trust that you will not revert back to your argument that the evidence will tell us. Evidence cannot establish the presence or absence of causality. I am sorry I cannot see why observing a cause cannot be evidence for the presence of causality and failing to observe a cause cannot be evidence for the absence of causality. This seems a very odd position! I think it is maybe because you believe causality is a first principle – but that of course is just what we are disputing. Causality cannot be established by observation. As I have pointed out several times, the presence or absence of causality cannot be proven. You have asserted it – but you haven’t shown it to be true. Meanwhile people are busy observing that some things cause other things and some scientists are concluding some things are not caused. Causes are found because causes are assumed. If causes are not assumed, they are not found. If I observe the white ball knock the red ball into the pocket do I have to make a metaphysical assumption of causality before finding that the white ball caused the red ball to go into the pocket? Earlier, you stated that they “assumed” no cause and now you agree with me that they “conclude” no cause. It would be nice if you would acknowledge the point that you changed your position as a response to my corrective. I thought it did acknowledge it. But if I failed to do so I am happy to do so now. In fact I delighted to note that it is not necessary to make any assumptions about causality in order to conclude there is no cause in this case. (Actually it is a bit more complicated than that because what they have done is hypothesise no causality and found that hypothesis fits the evidence.) It is a breach of logic if you draw an unwarranted conclusion. Yes – but the whole issue we are debating is whether it is warranted to conclude that something lacks a cause. So it is only a breach of logic if you assume your premise – the LoC must be true.Mark Frank
July 29, 2013
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Stpehen
You don’t think that a precise definition of words is important in an argument? That is an unusual position to take.
Of course it is important. That is why I outlined four different definitions. It doesn’t matter which of those definitions is the formal one – as long as you are clear which one you are using.
You continue to confuse the two arguments. The law of causality cannot be demonstrated. It is a first principle. First principles cannot be demonstrated.
Here is the crux of the problem. I don’t think it is a first principle. So how do we decide if something really is a first principle or not?
What can be demonstrated is that the LoC and the LNC are inextricably tied together. Your only response is to say that the LoC cannot be proven, which is not exactly a newsflash and is not relevant to this present argument. Meanwhile, in order to avoid the force of the present argument about the connection between Loc and LNC, you go looking for an alternative definition of “contingent.”
I believe your “proof” relies on confusing two definitions of contingent. To try and avoid getting into disputes about the meaning of “contingent” I invite you to show the link between LoC and LNC without using the word.  You seem reluctant (unable?) to do this.
If you don’t like the term “brings itself into existence” as an alternative way of saying that a thing is uncaused, then throw it out. There are two possibilities: either [a] a thing comes into existence as a result of a cause or [b] it comes into existence without a cause. To just “not be” and then “be” is to come into existence without a cause. If you know of a third option, I will be happy to entertain it.
I am happy with this.  I guess you thought there was a third option where a thing caused itself to come into existence – which certainly would be odd.
If a baby cannot appear unless the laws of biology cause it to appear, then it cannot appear without a cause? So, which is your position?
Is it your first position? [a] a baby and a horse can appear without any cause at all. or is it your second position? [b] a baby and a horse can appear only if they are physically caused to appear.
Whey you say “can” that is a statement about what is possible  - possibility can be logical or physical. So I repeat – logical possible (can) but physically impossible (can’t). Logically I can run a mile a 2 minutes. Physically I cannot.
Many, perhaps most things that are physically impossible are also logically impossible, and vice versa.
True. But also many things are logically possible but physically impossible. Do you deny this? I am saying the appearance of babies and horses falls into this category (I seem to have said this about 20 times and I cannot understand what the problem is).
Lizzie didn’t address it and neither have you. I asked why it is possible for elementary particles to come into existence without a cause and not larger objects. Lizzie and you answer by saying that this is just is the case. My question persists. Why would size make any difference? I trust that you will not revert back to your argument that the evidence will tell us. Evidence cannot establish the presence or absence of causality.
I am sorry I cannot see why observing a cause cannot be evidence for the presence of causality and failing to observe a cause cannot be evidence for the absence of causality. This seems a very odd position!  I think it is maybe because you believe causality is a first principle – but that of course is just what we are disputing.
Causality cannot be established by observation.
As I have pointed out several times, the presence or absence of causality cannot be proven.
You have asserted it  – but you haven’t shown it to be true. Meanwhile people are busy observing that some things cause other things and some scientists are concluding some things are not caused.
Causes are found because causes are assumed. If causes are not assumed, they are not found.
If observe the white ball knock the red ball into the pocket do I have to make a metaphysical assumption of causality before finding that the white ball caused the red ball to go into the pocket? 
Earlier, you stated that they “assumed” no cause and now you agree with me that they “conclude” no cause. It would be nice if you would acknowledge the point that you changed your position as a response to my corrective.
I thought it did acknowledge it. But if I failed to do so I am happy to do so now. In fact I delighted to note that it is not necessary to make any assumptions about causality in order to conclude there is no cause in this case.
It is a breach of logic if you draw an unwarranted conclusion.
Yes – but the whole issue we are debating is whether it is warranted to conclude that something lacks a cause. So it is only a breach of logic if you assume your premise – the LoC must be true.Mark Frank
July 28, 2013
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Surely it doesn’t matter which is the formal definition?
You don’t think that a precise definition of words is important in an argument? That is an unusual position to take.
If the argument is sound it should be possible to make it without even using the word “contingent” or fussing about what is the correct definition. You should somehow be able to show that if something is neither logically necessary not logically impossible then it must be dependent on something else. I don’t see how you can do that without assuming exactly what we disagree on.
You continue to confuse the two arguments. The law of causality cannot be demonstrated. It is a first principle. First principles cannot be demonstrated. What can be demonstrated is that the LoC and the LNC are inextricably tied together. Your only response is to say that the LoC cannot be proven, which is not exactly a newsflash and is not relevant to this present argument. Meanwhile, in order to avoid the force of the present argument about the connection between Loc and LNC, you go looking for an alternative definition of “contingent.” SB: Logically, we have only two options: Either a thing brings itself into existence or something (someone) else brings it into existence. There is no third option.
Again that is exactly what we disagree about. I believe there is a third option – X might just come into existence without anything bringing it into existence. I can describe it. One moment X does not exist. The next moment it does. There is nothing else to say about it. You can hypothesise that this does not happen in practice but you have not presented any sort of argument as to why it is logically impossible.
If you don’t like the term “brings itself into existence” as an alternative way of saying that a thing is uncaused, then throw it out. There are two possibilities: either [a] a thing comes into existence as a result of a cause or [b] it comes into existence without a cause. To just “not be” and then “be” is to come into existence without a cause. If you know of a third option, I will be happy to entertain it.
It is logically possible for a baby to appear in your living room but there are many empirical laws of biology that make it physically impossible.
If a baby cannot appear unless the laws of biology cause it to appear, then it cannot appear without a cause? So, which is your position? Is it your first position? [a] a baby and a horse can appear without any cause at all. or is it your second position? [b] a baby and a horse can appear only if they are physically caused to appear.
In the case of an elementary particle it is both logically and it would appear physically possible for it to come into existence. In the case of universes it is logically possible – no one knows if it physically possible.
Why would size make any difference?
Lizzie addressed this.Large objects coming into existence consists in a rearrangement of elementary particles. Some rearrangements are physically possible. Others are not. Elementary particles coming into existence is just that – a single particle which one moment was not there and the next moment is.
Lizzie didn’t address it and neither have you. I asked why it is possible for elementary particles to come into existence without a cause and not larger objects. Lizzie and you answer by saying that this is just is the case. My question persists. Why would size make any difference? I trust that you will not revert back to your argument that the evidence will tell us. Evidence cannot establish the presence or absence of causality.
I am sorry if I am unclear. My position is that it is logically possible for anything to suddenly exist without cause . It is also physically possible for elementary particles. It is physically impossible for objects such as horses and babies. We don’t know what is physically possible for universes which are clearly a very different kind of existence event!
I still don’t understand. You say that it is possible for a baby to come into existence without a cause, but you don’t think it is possible for a baby to come into existence in the absence of biological causes. On the one hand, you say that a baby can just not be one minute and just be the next minute--without any explanation. On the other hand, you say that it cannot just be unless it has a biological explanation. I hope you are not counting on the hope that logical and physical possibilities are mutually exclusive. Many, perhaps most things that are physically impossible are also logically impossible, and vice versa.
Why? I believe that logically any planet might be uninhabited. That doesn’t mean I have no way to distinguish which planets are uninhabited and which are inhabited.
Apples and oranges. Whether or not something is inhabited can, in principle and with sufficient technology, be established by observation. Causality cannot be established by observation. So, I return to my point. If anything can be uncaused, then everything can be uncaused. What is your argument against it? How can you distinguish between which things are caused and which ones are not? As I have pointed out several times, the presence or absence of causality cannot be proven.
I imagine the assumption of causality is pretty important for fetology.
You imagine correctly.
It has proven to be very important for many sciences.
Right you are.
(However, causes have in fact been found – so it is not necessary to assume they were there.) However, the assumption turns not to be essential for all sciences.
Causes are found because causes are assumed. If causes are not assumed, they are not found. Certain physicists, naïve about philosophy, have tried to conclude from evidence that quantum events are not caused, but that is simply a breach in logic on their part.
They conclude no cause and continue to do science based on that conclusion. So in what sense are they wrong?
Earlier, you stated that they “assumed” no cause and now you agree with me that they “conclude” no cause. It would be nice if you would acknowledge the point that you changed your position as a response to my corrective.
It is only a breach of logic if you assume exactly what we are debating. Which is where I came in.
It is a breach of logic if you draw an unwarranted conclusion. Read the quote from Stanley Jaki @110 (courtesy of kairosfocus).StephenB
July 28, 2013
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Stephen I think this debate has run its course.  We have come to the point where we disagree and there are no arguments left. We just disagree. For example:
Definition #4 doesn’t apply to the formal meaning of contingency as the counterpoise to necessity. If we use the formal definition of the word, it follosw that the Law of Non-Contradiction is inextricably tied to the Law of Causality.
Surely it  doesn’t matter which is the formal definition? If the argument is sound it should be possible to make it without even using the word “contingent” or fussing about what is the correct definition. You should somehow be able to show that if something is neither logically necessary not logically impossible then it must be dependent on something else. I don’t see how you can do that without assuming exactly what we disagree on.
Logically, we have only two options: Either a thing brings itself into existence or something (someone) else brings it into existence. There is no third option.
Again that is exactly what we disagree about. I believe there is a third option – X might just come into existence without anything bringing it into existence.  I can describe it. One moment X does not exist. The next moment it does. There is nothing else to say about it. You can hypothesise that this does not happen in practice but you have not presented any sort of argument as to why it is logically impossible.
Don’t you hold that a thing can, in principle, come into existence even in the absence of a physical law? You do, after all, allow for the possibility that a universe with laws can come into existence in the absence of any previous law. So I gather that you also hold that a baby or a horse or anything at all could appear in your living room (unless its larger than your living room) without being the product of a law-like reproductive process.
There are different kinds if impossibility. Something can be logically possible but physically impossible. It is logically possible for me to run a 2 minute mile but physically impossible according the laws of biology. It is logically possible for a baby to appear in your living room but there are many empirical laws of biology that make it physically impossible. In the case of an elementary particle it is both logically and it would appear physically possible for it to come into existence. In the case of universes it is logically possible – no one knows if it physically possible.
Why would size make any difference?
Lizzie addressed this. Large objects coming into existence consists in a rearrangement of elementary particles. Some rearrangements are physically possible. Others are not. Elementary particles coming into existence is just that – a single particle which one moment was not there and the next moment is.
More importantly, it would help if we could establish your position: Do you hold that anything can appear spontaneously with or without a law, as once indicated, or do you hold that some things can and some cannot. Do they need causes (such as a law) or not? You appear to be all over the map on this one.
I am sorry if I am unclear. My position is that it is logically possible for anything to suddenly exist without cause . It is also  physically possible for elementary particles.  It is physically impossible for objects such as horses and babies. We don’t know what is physically possible for universes which are clearly a very different kind of existence event!
It is not possible to establish the presence or absence of causality at all if you don’t accept causality as a law and as a given. One can only assume, in the name of rationality, that causality is always present and then try to find out which is the most likely candidate as the cause. This is one of the points of my post. Evidence does not inform reason’s rules; reason’s rules inform evidence.
Well again this is something we will just have to agree to differ on. My belief is that while it is very useful methodologically to assume there is a cause it is not required to be rational. It is analogous to the belief that earth was the centre of the universe. At one time all cosmology was based on this assumption and increasingly complex solutions were devised as a result. Abandoning the assumptions of a cause was a Kuhnian revolution, not the end of rationality.
Once you claim that any event was uncaused, you are then committed to the proposition that anything could have been uncaused and that there is no way to distinguish which things were caused and which ones were not.
Why? I believe that logically any planet might be uninhabited. That doesn’t mean I have no way to distinguish which planets are uninhabited and which are inhabited.
This doesn’t really address the question, which is not how we come to know causality but rather whether or not the science of fetology could survive without the assumption of causality.
Well that is a different question. I imagine the  assumption of causality is pretty important for fetology. It has proven to be very important for many sciences. (However,  causes have in fact been found – so it is not necessary to assume they were there.) However, the assumption turns not to be essential for all sciences.
Certain physicists, naïve about philosophy, have tried to conclude from evidence that quantum events are not caused, but that is simply a breach in logic on their part.
They conclude no cause and continue to do science based on that conclusion. So in what sense are they wrong? It is only a breach of logic if you assume exactly what we are debating.   Which is where I came in.Mark Frank
July 28, 2013
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PPS: Let's try that ckt again: + _________/ _________L_________- Better . . .kairosfocus
July 28, 2013
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F/N: Jaki et al: "scientists cannot OBSERVE nothing." (As in, non-being, presumably.) KFkairosfocus
July 28, 2013
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Mung: Like this?
The formulators of quantum theory “are bogged down in an equivocation which is the result of their failure to distinguish between two propositions: one states the limited nature of man’s ability to measure exactly, either in theory or practice, a physical interaction; the other states that because exact measurement of an interaction is impossible, the interaction itself is inexact in the sense that the effect can contain more than what is contained in its cause; that is, the effect is not caused fully, and may not be caused at all. The first of these statements is purely operational, the second is radically ontological. To suggest that the first implies the second is sheer equivocation, the result of an elementary mishandling of the laws of logic. It would not be tolerated in any moderately good freshman course untainted with that modal or subjective logic which Hegel grafted on to modern thought. Yet this equivocation or logical fallacy has become part and parcel of our modern scientific culture. There the notion of chance has grown, soon after Heisenberg’s enunciation of the uncertainty principle, into the basic dogma of anti-ontology. In that culture the real is replaced by the unreal garbed in the cloak of chance. While for the unwary that garb means only the absence of exact measurement, for the “initiated” it is a specious cover-up for a situation in which the real becomes in the end a mere appearance, to the delight of phenomenologist, who forgot their initial resolve to make no utterance whatever about reality as such. Hence, the rise of the widespread belief, amounting to a climate of opinion, that anything can happen and that man therefore is not bound by anything specific such as natural law, which obviously presupposes a specific ontological order.” (Stanley L. Jaki; The Absolute Beneath the Relative and Other Essays)
KFkairosfocus
July 28, 2013
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Folks: It seems we need to go back to a match. Strike it, let it burn, 1/2 way, tilt up, watch the fame die down. This illustrates how fuel is a necessary causal factor [I have described as ON/OFF enabling] for a fire. It can be shown that oxidiser, heat, chain reaction are also needed. Such experiences illustrate and help us understand necessary cause Similarly consider a ckt with switch and lamp: + ---------/ -------L----- - The lamp may only light if the switch is closed [ON]. Once we recognise such factors, we may then see more precisely what contingency is about. The sufficient grounds for a fire is heat, fuel, oxidser, combustion chain reaction. Once something begins or may end, it must be sustained by a sufficient set of factors. This sufficient set must include at least all on/off enabling factors. And obviously, there must be possible circumstances for such a possible being not to be. (If you don't understand this, talk to your friendly neighbourhood fireman.) Now, on/off enabling factors are causal factors. From this we can easily see that phenomena such as radioactive decay, quantum fluctuations and virtual particles etc are NOT a-causal, as there are enabling factors present. Indeed, the physical laws and models we deduce reflect that. That we do not and in some cases evidently may not know exactly the sufficient factors, makes no difference to that. So, let us exclude the ambiguity between causal factors and a set of such that is sufficient (and which must at least have in it all necessary factors). Now, too, the weak form principle of sufficient reason is patently self evident, once we are conscious and able to reflect: if a thing A is, we may ask (and seek) why it is. To be aware of asking oneself why A is, is incorrigible, as a state of self-aware, world aware mind. Similarly, to be aware of seeking an understanding as to why, is incorrigible. We may be mistaken as to the result and some of our perceptions, but that awareness is immediate and incorrigible. In reflecting, we immediately see that key world dichotomies obtain, which per massive and undeniable experience, we can communicate about. Such as { contingent| non-contingent (or, necessary)}, { possible |impossible}, {actual, not actual}, etc. The identity cluster cannot be severed from the PSR and its corollaries. A is, say our bright red cricket ball on the table. Why? 1 --> It exists and has a distinct identity, it is actual and possible. It might not have existed or can go out of existence, and had a beginning, so we know it is contingent. 2 --> To be possible, its attributes -- unlike those of a suggested square circle -- have to be mutually coherent. (Squareness and circularity are not.) 3 --> To be actual, it had a beginning and certain on/off enabling factors had to be present, these must be present during its onward existence, and if withdrawn the entity will cease to be as a cricket ball and its remains may become rubbish [thanks to bowlers, cricket pitches and hard-hitting batsmen]. 4 --> It is contingent and caused. 5 --> It did not and cannot cause itself, nor can it be caused by nothing, non-being. Non-being has no causal powers, and until the ball is existing it is in a state of non-being. It is possible but not yet existent. To cause itself it would have to have been actual before it is actual, which is a no-go. LNC is involved. 6 --> thus we must distinguish between potential being or possible being and actual being. 7 --> There are possible beings that do not have necessary causal factors. Such have no beginning, no end, and are eternal. The number 3 jumps out at me. You can start with the set that collects nothing, {} = 0, then collect it {0} = 1, then collect the two, {0, 1} = 2, then collect the three, {0, 1, 2} = 3 and so forth. 3 is a necessary being, having no cause. 8 --> A serious candidate to be a necessary being, will have to be either possible or impossible. If possible, actual. (Cf S5.) 9 --> So, we see the way PSR leads to cause and contingency, necessity, and implications of non-being etc. 10 --> Of course the most interesting serious candidate to be a necessary being is God, and it is commonly held that necessary things like 3 and truths such as 3 + 2 = 5, are eternally contemplated by God. 11 --> As a corollary, strictly, those who would assert that God -- remember, eternal [no on/off enabling factors!], spiritual, held to be ground of being and goodness -- is not, are implying that God is IMPOSSIBLE. A pretty hard thing to argue, especially now that Plantinga has knocked the former favourite argument from evil flat. 12 --> To assert that one is ignorant of/ lacks belief in/ doubts God, of course, is consistent with God being. the issue here is whether that ignorance or lack of belief or presence of doubt is defensible in light of the evidence of the world around and the messages of heart, mind and conscience within. 13 --> Where on evidence of recent months it is patent that many out there in the land of the design deniers are perfectly willing to dispute and dismiss even the most patent cases of self-evident truths that seem to point where they would not go. 14 --> That is, where self evident truths are truths that are so, are known to be so on understanding them [2 + 3 = 5, the finite whole is more than any of its proper parts, if one is self aware, one cannot be in error concerning that basic fact even if one is regarding just what one is, error exists . . . ], and seen to lead to obvious absurdity on attempted denial. Such as that one is self-aware, and that error exists -- that is, is both possible and actual. 15 --> The sobering reality of selective hyperskepticism stands before us, and its consequences are patently absurd. $0.02, KF PS: Docs, X rays to cross check [things are getting worse, measurably so], MRIs, further consultations. De system moves like a snail, but has massive momentum, so to try to speed it up requires heavy duty clout . . .kairosfocus
July 28, 2013
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I would think that one of the first rules of right reason is that one not engage in question begging.Mung
July 27, 2013
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If you look up the meaning of contingent here you will see there are many definitions. You appear to be adopting definition 1: dependent for existence, occurrence, character, etc., on something not yet certain; conditional
Yes, that is the formal philosophical definition. It is the only one which speaks to the Necessary/Contingent issue and the only one that counts for our purposes. Philosophical definitions are more precise and relevant than dictionary definitions.
My point is that logically something can be contingent in sense 4 without being contingent in sense 1. You may disagree but you need to show why.
Definition #4 doesn’t apply to the formal meaning of contingency as the counterpoise to necessity. If we use the formal definition of the word, it follosw that the Law of Non-Contradiction is inextricably tied to the Law of Causality.
This seems to imply that everything needs an explanation so that if there is no other explanation it has to explain itself. I am arguing that there are things that have no explanation.
Logically, we have only two options: Either a thing brings itself into existence or something (someone) else brings it into existence. There is no third option. To say that something came into existence without a cause is exactly the same thing as saying that it brought itself into existence. There is no excluded middle or third category.
I don’t think it is a logical requirement. It is a requirement of the laws of biology and quite possibly of physics as well. Those laws are based on observation.
Don’t you hold that a thing can, in principle, come into existence even in the absence of a physical law? You do, after all, allow for the possibility that a universe with laws can come into existence in the absence of any previous law. So I gather that you also hold that a baby or a horse or anything at all could appear in your living room (unless its larger than your living room) without being the product of a law-like reproductive process. Also, you will recall that your earlier position was that small things could appear spontaneously, but you were not sure of a horse because of its size (on the grounds that the latter would violate a physical law). This would seem to contradict your other position that anything at all can come into existence without a cause and it also raises a question that you have not yet addressed, namely your belief that small things appearing spontaneously do not violate a law but big things do. Why would size make any difference? Why would big things appearing spontaneously violate a physical law when small things appearing spontaneously would not? More importantly, it would help if we could establish your position: Do you hold that anything can appear spontaneously with or without a law, as once indicated, or do you hold that some things can and some cannot. Do they need causes (such as a law) or not? You appear to be all over the map on this one.
As I said, to answer this requires an essay on the nature of causality. The fact is that we do establish that some things have causes and on other occasions we fail to do so. Would you disagree with that? It would be nice not to have to get into a lengthy discussion as to what causality is and how we establish it.
I think you will find that it doesn’t matter whether we have a lengthy discussion about causality or not. It is not possible to establish the presence or absence of causality at all if you don’t accept causality as a law and as a given. One can only assume, in the name of rationality, that causality is always present and then try to find out which is the most likely candidate as the cause. This is one of the points of my post. Evidence does not inform reason’s rules; reason’s rules inform evidence. You (nor any others) have no means or methods to discern which events were caused and which ones were not. Once you claim that any event was uncaused, you are then committed to the proposition that anything could have been uncaused and that there is no way to distinguish which things were caused and which ones were not. SB: So, it is not essential for the science of fetology or embryology to assume that babies must be brought into existence by their parents?
Surely this is observed not assumed? Although it is such a common and well-established observation we hardly doubt it. But anyhow many sciences find it an extremely useful approach to assume every event has a cause (even if they can’t always discover it).
This doesn't really address the question, which is not how we come to know causality but rather whether or not the science of fetology could survive without the assumption of causality.
Quantum mechanics has dispensed with that assumption and proceeds just fine.
Quantum mechanics has not dispensed with the assumption of causality. Those paradigms are built on the assumption of causality. Certain physicists, naïve about philosophy, have tried to conclude from evidence that quantum events are not caused, but that is simply a breach in logic on their part. You might as well say that since Lawrence Krauss concluded that the universe came into existence without a cause, the the science of cosmology works very well without causes. That argument simply doesn’t hold.StephenB
July 27, 2013
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Mark Frank:
The scientists are just hypothesising that there is no cause.
So they hypothesize "poof"? How can that be tested?Joe
July 27, 2013
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And obvioulsy Alan is also ignorant of the word "circular". On CSI and its variants Alan is always utterly wrong... Alan doesn't have any arguments.Joe
July 27, 2013
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I’m saying you’re a complete and utter hypocrite to appeal to graciousness after the behavior you engaged in with gpuccio.
Mung world is truly bizarre! Even Davescot had the nous to distinguish between an argument and it's advocate. To disagree with gpuccio's argument (which was both circular and a default argument) is in no way ungracious. I like gpuccio and respect him immensely. On CSI and variants, he is utterly wrong.Alan Fox
July 27, 2013
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Mung #100
All planets are habitable. Therefore Earth is habitable. Begs the question of whether all planets are habitable.
It certainly does. Luckily I was not trying to prove all planets are habitable. All I was doing was giving an example of how a true proposition can be derived from a false premise using valid reasoning. If you want to dispute whether all planets are habitable there are plenty of similar examples. I already provided several. Another is: All planets are inhabited (false) Therefore earth is inhabited (true)Mark Frank
July 27, 2013
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