Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

Tolstoy’s Last Letter

William Dembski
February 24, 2006
Intelligent Design
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[From a colleague:] Leo Tolstoy’s last completed letter, dictated from his sick-bed at the Astapovo train station on November 1, 1910 (six days before his death), and addressed to his son Seryozha and daughter Tanya, included a warning that Seryozha should not allow himself to be seduced by Darwinism. Here is the relevant passage:

“The views you have acquired about Darwinism, evolution and the struggle for existence won’t explain to you the meaning of your life and won’t give you guidance in your actions, and a life without an explanation of its meaning and importance, and without the unfailing guidance that stems from it is a pitiful existence.”

—Tolstoy’s Letters: Volume II, 1880-1910, selected, edited, and translated by
R.F. Christian. London: Athlone Press, 1978; No. 607, p. 717.

Comments
Valerie, I began the argument by attempting to build up a hierarchy of human goods, starting with things like food, clothing, etc. I agreed to abide by your request to short-circuit that part of the argument and get to the conclusion, although I didn't think it would actually speed things up, because we would end up back where we were, discussing the constitution of the hierarchy of human goods. So instead of establishing the nature of the hierarchy of human goods, I just stated that there was one: “The hierarchy is common to all human beings insofar as we have a common human nature…It is also true that we have aspects of our individual natures that are not common to everyone, but these are in addition to rather in competition with the common human nature we all share.” You responded with this objection: "Is that true? If my desire for adventure causes me to place myself in physically uncomfortable or dangerous circumstances, doesn’t that demonstrate a conflict between aspects of my nature? The part of me desiring safety and comfort cannot be fully satisfied without denying the part desiring adventure, and vice versa." The only way for me to answer this is to go back to the patient build-up of the hierarchy of human goods, and through that show the relationship between the desire for adventure and the desire for safety. I can't answer your question in any other way. "I think you and I can safely agree on the prohibition of mass murder, but there are distressingly large segments of humanity who think that genocide is sometimes permissible as a preemptive defense of something they consider sacred. How do we get them on board with this system?" Getting people to recognize universal morality is a different question than whether there actually is a universl morality. I did not claim that I would be able to get everyone on board with the system. What I am attempting to show is that we can demonstrate through reason that there are certain universal moral norms that everyone ought to obey. But people will only recognize these norms to the extent that they are reasonable and interested in discovering them. Not everyone is reasonable and/or interested. Mass murderers usually fall into both of these categories. I'm addressing the argument to you because I find you both reasonable and interested. I want to make sure that we really agree on mass murder. We don't agree if you think our agreement is based on coincidence, that is if we agree that mass murder is wrong but for different reasons. My point is that mass murder is against a universal moral norm because such an action can in no way lead to the fulfillment of human nature, whether the mass murderer recognizes that or not. If we don't agree that this is the reason mass murder is wrong, then our agreement is only superficial and we will only confuse ourselves if we don't hash it out now. "Also, I thought the idea was to come up with an objective system which could (at least in principle) answer all moral questions. Now it sounds like you are just trying to establish a least common denominator for morality. " Again, I think we are trying to hurry up the argument in a way that won't help. The system I am describing may, in principle, be able to answer all moral questions (although I don't claim to have thought it through for every possible moral question). But you are asking me to prove the fundamental theorem of calculus before we have agreed on the basics of algebra. By the way, I of course think that there are moral questions that are difficult to answer and may be practically unresolvable by reasonable people. The position I am defending is that not every moral question is like that. Some, indeed many, moral queestions can be resolved in terms of universal moral norms (what everyone "ought to do") that can be recognized through reason. "Also recall that Adrian was looking for a way to objectively ground what he called the “oughtness” of moral standards. Even if you could consistently base a moral system on the idea of the fulfillment of human nature, you haven’t grounded the system until you’ve shown that the concept at its base (what I would call the “moral axiom”) has the objective “oughtness” that Adrian seeks. By your own admission, you’ve simply defined the fulfillment of human nature as good, rather than demonstrating it." This is a fair point. Once we have resolved the other points, I will address this one. Cheers, Dave T.taciturnus
March 5, 2006
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Hi Dave, By calling you an Aristotelian, I'm not implying slavish devotion to everything Aristotle wrote. I label myself a Darwinian, but that certainly doesn't mean I agree with Darwin's racist beliefs or his partly Lamarckian model of heritable variation. It's just that I've never met anyone who agrees with Aristotle on all three of those crucial concepts (form, the mean, and ethics, and so I find it worth commenting on. "The hierarchy is common to all human beings insofar as we have a common human nature...It is also true that we have aspects of our individual natures that are not common to everyone, but these are in addition to rather in competition with the common human nature we all share." Is that true? If my desire for adventure causes me to place myself in physically uncomfortable or dangerous circumstances, doesn't that demonstrate a conflict between aspects of my nature? The part of me desiring safety and comfort cannot be fully satisfied without denying the part desiring adventure, and vice versa. "I believe one standard of morality that meets this goal is that “no one ought to commit mass-murder.” If you agree, then we have established that at least one such moral norm exists and we can move on to more controversial cases." I think you and I can safely agree on the prohibition of mass murder, but there are distressingly large segments of humanity who think that genocide is sometimes permissible as a preemptive defense of something they consider sacred. How do we get them on board with this system? Also, I thought the idea was to come up with an objective system which could (at least in principle) answer all moral questions. Now it sounds like you are just trying to establish a least common denominator for morality. "I use the word “good” to mean “that which fulfills the nature of something.” Human goods are those things that fulfill human nature." If human goods (and hence human morals) are to be defined solely with respect to human nature, that would seem to imply that we should disregard the natures and interests of animals in our dealings with them. Our only criterion for how we treat them, in your system, would seem to be how our choices impact the fulfillment of our human natures. Similarly, it seems to be far from guaranteed that fulfilling one's own nature will never impede another person's attempts to fulfill his or her nature. How does your system address this conflict? Also recall that Adrian was looking for a way to objectively ground what he called the "oughtness" of moral standards. Even if you could consistently base a moral system on the idea of the fulfillment of human nature, you haven't grounded the system until you've shown that the concept at its base (what I would call the "moral axiom") has the objective "oughtness" that Adrian seeks. By your own admission, you've simply defined the fulfillment of human nature as good, rather than demonstrating it. Regards, Valerievalerie
March 4, 2006
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Valerie, It is true that the argument I am making can be traced back to Aristotle. The reason I make it though, is because it is true, not because it is Aristotelian. I think describing me as a modern-day Aristotelian is like describing people who use c2 = a2 + b2 as modern-day Pythagoreans. Anyway, I take it as a compliment... The hierarchy is common to all human beings insofar as we have a common human nature. That's why my argument started with goods like food, clothing, shelter and education. But there are others. It is false that the pursuit of starvation, nakedness, exposure and ignorance as themselves fulfilling of human life can lead anyone to happiness. It is also true that we have aspects of our individual natures that are not common to everyone, but these are in addition to rather in competition with the common human nature we all share. No one is born with a "quirk" of human nature that allows them to live without eating anything. But I may be born with a taste for Mexican food and you with a taste for French food. As far as mass-murder vs. murder, I deliberately chose the mass-murder case because it is non-controversial. Remember our goal as you described it (quoting Adrian): "In my mind, we’re looking for standards of morality which can, in Adrian's words, “provide an objective reason why, even if we could get away with it, we shouldn’t do something terribly wrong,” and which people would regard as absolute, meaning (among other things) that they would trump any competing standards in determining whether something is right or wrong. " I believe one standard of morality that meets this goal is that "no one ought to commit mass-murder." If you agree, then we have established that at least one such moral norm exists and we can move on to more controversial cases. If you don't agree, then there is no point in trying to resolve more controversial cases before we have resolved the less controversial ones. "This raises the question, as I mentioned to jacktone, of why the fulfillment of human nature is a good thing in the first place. Our intuition says that it is, but how can we objectively say so?" I think you are using the word "good" in a different sense than I am. I use the word "good" to mean "that which fulfills the nature of something." (The reason I wanted to start the argument carefully was in an attempt to head off this kind of misunderstanding.) Human goods are those things that fulfill human nature. Your question doesn't make sense in terms of my understanding of good, because it just asks why the fulfillment of human nature is a fulfillment of human nature. "Good" as used in my argument is not based on intuition but on empirical human nature. Sincerely, Dave T.taciturnus
March 3, 2006
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Hi Dave, Wow. You really are a modern-day Aristotelian, aren't you? On the other threads it was "form" and the Aristotelian mean. Now it's a very Nicomachean-sounding ethical system. "There is also a hierarchy to the goods of human nature. That is, some are more valuable than others, value being judged by their relation to the fulfillment of human life." Is the hierarchy identical for every human? What happens when there is a conflict between the fulfillment of human A and the fulfillment of human B? "Every human being naturally “desires” happiness. I put “desires” in quotes because I don’t necessarily mean a conscious desire, although it can involve that." I agree. "Certain actions cannot, by their nature, serve as a means to the fulfillment of human nature in terms of the goods peculiar to it. That is, no one can achieve human fulfillment through them. For example, it is impossible to achieve truth, friendship, justice or virtue through mass murder." Mass murder is a fairly non-controversial case. What about murder itself? On another thread I used the example of a person who has the opportunity to murder Hitler, potentially saving millions of Jews in Europe from persecution and death. How does the decision of whether or not to murder Hitler play out in your scheme? "These actions can be categorized as moral absolutes, meaning that “no one ought to ever do them.” Why should anyone pay attention to this ought? Because they possess a human nature that cannot be fulfilled through those acts under any circumstances." This raises the question, as I mentioned to jacktone, of why the fulfillment of human nature is a good thing in the first place. Our intuition says that it is, but how can we objectively say so?valerie
March 3, 2006
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"A noble goal, Valerie. Do you think it reachable?" jacktone, I'm skeptical, but I do think it's a worthy goal. That's why I was interested in hearing Dave's proposal. In my comment I said that the goal was to find objective, universal standards of morality which, in Adrian's words, would “provide an objective reason why, even if we could get away with it, we shouldn’t do something terribly wrong.” The use of the word "wrong" in that sentence is interesting because it already assumes a moral code. Adrian, like many of us, wants an objective moral system which will back up and justify his pre-existing intuitive moral code. An objective system which condones the torture of infants will be rejected by all of us as not being truly moral. For most of us, that response is immediate and obvious. Only if pressed would we feel the need to further justify the protection of babies. For Dave, as an Aristotelian, the justification would presumably be that torturing babies cannot lead to the fulfillment of our human natures. For me and many others, the argument would be that causing gratuitous pain in other sentient beings is wrong. In each case, the justification itself begs the question "Why is this justification valid?" In Dave's case, we can ask "Assuming that you're correct that torturing babies does not fulfill our human natures, why is it a good thing to fulfill our human natures in the first place?" And however he responds, we can ask yet again "Why is that good and not bad?" My point is that any moral argument rests on axioms, just as a logical argument does. Just as you can't prove anything logically without assuming certain axioms, you can't justify a moral code without at some point resorting to "moral axioms". What dissatisfies Adrian is the idea that our moral axioms evolved, because he thinks this strips them of any objective weight. They lose the force of their "oughtness". This problem seems unavoidable to me. No matter what objective moral system is presented, we will always have to ask if its moral axioms are "right" or "wrong", which means judging them against our own internal, intuitive morality. My hope resides in the fact that we as humans take our intuitive morality very seriously, even when (as in my case) we believe that its origins are evolutionary. We may not be able to come up with an all-encompassing morality that satisfies everyone, but there might be a core of morality that we can all share in common (except for those whose brains, due to damage or unusual wiring, simply do not support even that common core). Valerievalerie
March 3, 2006
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Hi Dave, Thanks for laying out the argument. I plan to answer in detail after a good day's sleep (worked all night last night). Valerievalerie
March 1, 2006
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Valerie, The goal is as you stated. I don't mind giving the end of the argument now. But I suspect that after we go back and forth a few times, we will end up where we were in my last post. Be that as it may, a quick summary of my argument would be: 1. Human nature is such that certain empirically identifiable goods are necessary to merely sustain life. Among these are food, clothing and shelter. Analysis of these goods would show that, in order to obtain these goods with regularity, other goods are necessary, among which are education and community. We can further analyze human nature and identify goods that are not strictly necessary to survival, but fulfill or complete human life based on its empirical character. Among these are goods like friendship, truth, justice and virtue. The important point is that these goods are based on human nature, not an arbitrary decision. Possession of these goods is the state of being happy, lack of these goods (to the extent that they are lacked) is a state of misery. (These are definitions). 2. There is also a hierarchy to the goods of human nature. That is, some are more valuable than others, value being judged by their relation to the fulfillment of human life. 3. Every human being naturally "desires" happiness. I put "desires" in quotes because I don't necessarily mean a conscious desire, although it can involve that. What I mean is that every person, based on his or her common human nature, is naturally fulfilled by the goods of human nature whether they recognize it or not, and experiences an impulse to achieve those goods that it recognizes. 4. Certain actions cannot, by their nature, serve as a means to the fulfillment of human nature in terms of the goods peculiar to it. That is, no one can achieve human fulfillment through them. For example, it is impossible to achieve truth, friendship, justice or virtue through mass murder. 5. These actions can be categorized as moral absolutes, meaning that "no one ought to ever do them." Why should anyone pay attention to this ought? Because they possess a human nature that cannot be fulfilled through those acts under any circumstances. Dave T.taciturnus
February 28, 2006
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Dave T, "And, in general, isn’t everything we think about anything at all, be it religion, math, science, evolution, etc. open to rationalization in terms of evolutionary history? Why single out religious and moral belief for this analysis?" I was singling that out because it's the subject of this thread, or so I thought.Raevmo
February 28, 2006
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A noble goal, Valerie. Do you think it reachable?jacktone
February 28, 2006
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taciturnus wrote: "One of these common elements of misery is hunger. By hunger I don’t mean the subjective feeling of hunger but the bodily state of not having sufficient nourishment. I don’t experience your feeling of hunger and you don’t mine, but it is objectively true that we both need food. To the extent that we don’t get sufficient food, we are miserable, and to the extent that we do get sufficient food, we are happy. The same argument can be made for the common elements of clothing and shelter." Hi Dave, Lack of food, clothing and shelter certainly contribute to misery, but I'm not sure I would call them "elements" of misery. Without knowing where your argument is heading, I can't judge whether this distinction is important or irrelevant. Are we heading toward a "felicific calculus" a la Bentham? Some other form of utilitarianism? Or something else entirely? If you don't mind, could you delineate the entire argument you are making? Great detail isn't necessary -- I'll ask questions to fill in anything that isn't clear in your initial sketch. Also, I think we should clarify the goal. In my mind, we're looking for standards of morality which can, in Adrian's words, "provide an objective reason why, even if we could get away with it, we shouldn’t do something terribly wrong," and which people would regard as absolute, meaning (among other things) that they would trump any competing standards in determining whether something is right or wrong. Thanks, Valerievalerie
February 28, 2006
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Raevmo, You may very well be correct that we can rationalize that our moral beliefs evolved -I'm not disputing it. Maybe we only have religious or moral beliefs because our ancestors found them useful in battle. But why stop there? As you seem to agree, our thinking about evolution is just as much affected by evolution as is our thinking about moral beliefs and religion. The state of mind that accepts evolution is very useful today in academic battles, since anyone doubting evolution is not given tenure at prestigious universities or research grants. So, like religious belief, we can see the rational foundation for belief in evolution by seeing how that belief might have evolved. And, in general, isn't everything we think about anything at all, be it religion, math, science, evolution, etc. open to rationalization in terms of evolutionary history? Why single out religious and moral belief for this analysis? Dave T.taciturnus
February 28, 2006
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Dave T said: "And the conclusion from this is…. that therefore our ideas about morality have no rational foundation? Did the fact that our ancestors were monkeys also determine to a large extent our way of thinking about evolution and our ideas about natural selection?" What I am trying to say is that the social fabric of human societies is to some extent a remnant of our evolutionary history. Group living, dominance hierarchies, mating systems, that sort of stuff. These attributes affect what we consider moral and what not, and variation in these attributes explains some of the variation in morality that we can see today. Up to a point our ideas about morality therefore have a rational foundation in the sense that we can rationalize how they might have evolved. The way we think in general has been shaped by our evolutionary history and therefore, yes, specifically also how we think about evolution and natural selection. Clearly, the way you think about it is influenced by your religious feelings, which are a state of mind that might have been quite useful to our ancestors in the battle against competing groups of humans/monkeys.Raevmo
February 28, 2006
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Raevmo, "Believe it or not, your ancestors were monkeys, and that fact determines to a large extent our way of thinking and our ideas about morality, whether you like it or not." And the conclusion from this is.... that therefore our ideas about morality have no rational foundation? Did the fact that our ancestors were monkeys also determine to a large extent our way of thinking about evolution and our ideas about natural selection? Cheers, Dave T.taciturnus
February 28, 2006
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I am reading a lot of nonsense here. There simply is no objective definition of morality. What humans consider moral varies in time and in space. If you were a member of a canibalistic tribe in some far away jungle, it might be immoral for you not to eat your grandmother. That's just the agreement these people made among themselves, perhaps based on their religious believes. There are numerous religions, all with different morals, but with a certain degree of overlap. Perhaps the truth is the intersection of many independent lies? Anyhow, it has nothing whatsoever to do with the scientific theory of evolution. Believe it or not, your ancestors were monkeys, and that fact determines to a large extent our way of thinking and our ideas about morality, whether you like it or not. Wait until we meet alien intelligent live, then we really can test some of the theories anout the origin of morality (assuming the aliens are nice enough not to wipe us out before we get the chance).

Raevmo
February 27, 2006
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Valerie, To save space, I'm going to define a couple of terms. Again, this is merely a definition at this point, a shorthand for states that we agree are real yet subjective: "Misery" is defined as "The subjective state of misery and frustration". "Happiness" is defined as "The subjective state of delightfulness and satisfaction." Now I am going to make an empirical argument that, due to our common human nature, misery and happiness involve certain elements that are common to everyone. There may be more elements to misery and happiness than I mention at this point, even elements that are peculiar to individuals, but the point for now is that happiness and misery at include at leaste these minimum elements. One of these common elements of misery is hunger. By hunger I don't mean the subjective feeling of hunger but the bodily state of not having sufficient nourishment. I don't experience your feeling of hunger and you don't mine, but it is objectively true that we both need food. To the extent that we don't get sufficient food, we are miserable, and to the extent that we do get sufficient food, we are happy. The same argument can be made for the common elements of clothing and shelter. Are we still in agreement? Dave T.taciturnus
February 27, 2006
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Dear Taciturnus, I'm glad you showed up. Thanks for taking up the baton---you're much better than I am at this. Adrianadrian walker
February 27, 2006
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Why does everyone here seem to think that there is a philosophy that goes with a belief in Darwinian evolution? There most certainly is not. Whether it is a material world or not has little to no impact on the importance of morality in human society. Human society cannot exist without morality. Morality has "evolved" as societies have grown more and more complex, but it never goes away. Whether good and evil are terms for an objective reality or a subjective one does not matter. The fact is that good and evil do exist in human society and necessarily so.ftrp11
February 27, 2006
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"As I understand the way you use these words, the point I am making is that misery, frustration, delightfulness and satisfaction do not change by arbitrary decision. But they are subjective, meaning that they are an expression of a the state of an individual, and may be different between individuals." I'm with you so far.valerie
February 27, 2006
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Hi Scott, Thanks for the URLs. I'll read the papers and report back. taciturnus wrote: "Since Adrian has bowed out of the conversation, I’ll grab the baton and answer your questions, if that is acceptable." Please do. "In making the case for absolute standards, the first thing that we must decide is whether things like misery and frustration on the one hand, and delightfulness and satisfaction on the other hand, are empirical facts. I submit that all four of these things are attested to by experience. More than that, they are not subjective. Frustration doesn’t go away merely by choosing to define a frustrating situation as satisfying. Neither does misery go away by defining a miserable situation as delightful. The same goes for delightfulness and satisfaction. (This, btw, was my point in the earlier post with respect to “dismal”.)" I think I see the problem. For you, something that can't be defined away isn't subjective. For me, something is subjective if it is experienced internally, with the experience being inaccessible to others. The particular contours of my hunger (haven't had breakfast yet) are not available to you, and though we may suspect that you have similar sensations when hungry, we'll never know for sure. You can't "feel" my hunger and compare it to yours. To me, that makes the sensation of hunger subjective, even though we can't "define" ourselves as satiated and make the hunger go away.valerie
February 27, 2006
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Valerie, Our last two posts crossed. I see that we are using the words "subjective" and "arbitrary" with different meanings. As I understand the way you use these words, the point I am making is that misery, frustration, delightfulness and satisfaction do not change by arbitrary decision. But they are subjective, meaning that they are an expression of a the state of an individual, and may be different between individuals. Dave T.taciturnus
February 27, 2006
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Valerie, Since Adrian has bowed out of the conversation, I'll grab the baton and answer your questions, if that is acceptable. "I’m also not sure that absolute moral standards gain you the grounding that you want, unless they are universally known and recognized as worthy of being followed. The question is, how do we reliably come to know them, and how do we persuade people to follow them once they are known? Individuals, religious traditions, and philosophers who try to come up with absolute standards arrive at different answers. How do we judge who is correct, or if there even *are* absolute standards?" In making the case for absolute standards, the first thing that we must decide is whether things like misery and frustration on the one hand, and delightfulness and satisfaction on the other hand, are empirical facts. I submit that all four of these things are attested to by experience. More than that, they are not subjective. Frustration doesn't go away merely by choosing to define a frustrating situation as satisfying. Neither does misery go away by defining a miserable situation as delightful. The same goes for delightfulness and satisfaction. (This, btw, was my point in the earlier post with respect to "dismal".) Now if we don't agree that misery, etc. are empirical facts then I can stop right now, because my case depends on it. Do we agree that the four things I listed are empirically grounded and objective? Dave T.taciturnus
February 27, 2006
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taciturnus asks: "Isn’t the qualification “dismal” just as subjective as “evil”? Isn’t one reason we think things are evil is because they are dismal?" Hi Dave, 'Yes' to both questions. "If so, what have we to be thankful about?" We can be thankful that others share our ideas of good and evil to a significant degree. Otherwise they would be motivated to promote what we consider evil, and to suppress what we consider good. We would constantly be at cross-purposes with them. "If most of our fellow citizens were motivated to pursue the 1984 scenario, it would be because they thought the scenario was good rather than evil, delightful rather than dismal. And since these qualities are subjectively defined, the 1984 scenario would in fact be good and delightful because they thought it so." Good and delightful to *them*, yes (although they would need some strange wiring in their brains to enable them to find such a scenario delightful). It would remain dismal and evil to us. "Then everyone would be thankful that they avoided the dismal non-1984 scenario." Not everyone -- just the ones who found the 1984 scenario delightful and good. "If the qualification “dismal” has some level of objective significance beyond our subjective preferences, then I can see how it would make sense to say that we avoided a dismal fate by correctly defining evil (that is, by defining evil in light of what is objectively dismal)." Yes, although that raises an interesting question: what if our subjective sense of dismalness and delightfulness were different from the objective standard? What does it even mean to have an objective standard for these things? They seem inherently subjective: something is delightful because it produces delight, a quintessentially subjective experience. "Otherwise, what are we thankful for? That we arbitrarily defined the dismal and evil as one thing rather than another?" No. The label itself is not significant. The subjective experience is, and the subjective experience cannot be changed by simply applying a different name to it. It is not arbitrary, though it may differ from person to person. "In fact, isn’t one way to avoid a dismal fate merely to redefine it as non-dismal? Since good, evil and dismal are arbitrary subjective definitions, why be upset if the 1984 situation came about, or care one way or another if it does? If it happens, we can simply subjectively redefine the 1984 situation as good and be happy about it." Again, "subjective" does not mean "arbitrary", and changing the labels does not change the subjective experience. We can no more flip a "mental switch" and suddenly experience a formerly dismal scenario as delightful, than we can flip a "perceptual switch" and begin seeing green as red. Regards, Valerievalerie
February 27, 2006
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IF our behaviors are determined purely by the biological machinery of our brains, then even the vilest acts are no more worthy of blame or condemnation than the mechanical failure of an engine. Some papers I strongly recommend that valerie read: http://www.str.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5706 http://boundless.org/features/a0000901.html http://www.arn.org/ftissues/ft9711/articles/johnson.html http://www.str.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5474Scott
February 27, 2006
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Adrian writes: "The point is this: while choice plays a role in morality (that’s a truism), this choice isn’t blind. It follows on reasons. The reasons can be right—and they can also be wrong (=your example of honor killing)." Fair enough, as long as we acknowledge that the honor killers may sincerely believe that their reasons are right, and ours are wrong, abhorrent as that might seem to us. If we want to assert that our reasons are right, we need to make a case for our viewpoint. "We need to use our brains to find out which is which. Natural selection may have something to do with our developing a moral sense, but it cannot ground “oughts” as such, better, it cannot ground “ought nots”: it cannot provide an objective reason why, if we could get away with it, we shouldn’t do something even terribly wrong." Don't you think it's a good idea not to do anything we personally think is terribly wrong, whether or not there is an absolute standard to confirm our judgment? I'm also not sure that absolute moral standards gain you the grounding that you want, unless they are universally known and recognized as worthy of being followed. The question is, how do we reliably come to know them, and how do we persuade people to follow them once they are known? Individuals, religious traditions, and philosophers who try to come up with absolute standards arrive at different answers. How do we judge who is correct, or if there even *are* absolute standards? Some people suggest that morality is defined by God. How do we find out what his definitions are if he's not willing to show us unambiguously? Suppose that his defined morality does not accord with our moral intuitions -- for example, what if God wants us to perform child sacrifices? Do we follow our consciences and defy God, or do we acquiesce while believing that we are doing an evil thing? "It may be that we need a notion of moral absolutes, at least negative ones, if we are going to maintain that moral action is reasonable action, and not just blind choice." Are you saying that we should hold fast to the idea of moral absolutes, even if we don't really believe they exist? Or are you saying that there is a case to be made for the existence of moral absolutes? If the latter, how do you demonstrate their reality? "...not all of your interlocutors argue skfillfully, but you seem to be bent on not understanding the deeper concerns that they are raising underneath their inadequate arguments." I'm doing my best to understand their objections. If you see me missing the point, please step in and show me what you think the correct interpretation is. "It seems to me that holding a position intelligently means understanding the objections to it..." I agree, which is why I'm hanging out here rather than on Panda's Thumb, where I'm less likely to hear those objections. "...not just agilely dodging them while giving the impression that one is completely puzzled as to how anyone could be so benighted as to raise them." I reread the thread to see if I could find instances where I dodge objections (or appear to dodge them), and I'm afraid I can't see them. Please point them out to me, as I certainly want to address all of the objections that are raised. Regards, Valerievalerie
February 27, 2006
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Valerie, When j wrote: "Why is this [the 1984 excerpt] not what ought to be? Why is this evil? (The Devil’s advocate would ask.)” You responded with: "It’s evil because we define it that way. Thankfully, most of our fellow humans agree with our definition, and are motivated to keep such a dismal scenario from coming to pass." This kind of statement from moral relativists has always puzzled me. Isn't the qualification "dismal" just as subjective as "evil"? Isn't one reason we think things are evil is because they are dismal? If so, what have we to be thankful about? If most of our fellow citizens were motivated to pursue the 1984 scenario, it would be because they thought the scenario was good rather than evil, delightful rather than dismal. And since these qualities are subjectively defined, the 1984 scenario would in fact be good and delightful because they thought it so. Then everyone would be thankful that they avoided the dismal non-1984 scenario. If the qualification "dismal" has some level of objective significance beyond our subjective preferences, then I can see how it would make sense to say that we avoided a dismal fate by correctly defining evil (that is, by defining evil in light of what is objectively dismal). Otherwise, what are we thankful for? That we arbitrarily defined the dismal and evil as one thing rather than another? In fact, isn't one way to avoid a dismal fate merely to redefine it as non-dismal? Since good, evil and dismal are arbitrary subjective definitions, why be upset if the 1984 situation came about, or care one way or another if it does? If it happens, we can simply subjectively redefine the 1984 situation as good and be happy about it. cheers, Dave T.taciturnus
February 27, 2006
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Dear Valerie, With all due respect, you're missing my point. The point is this: while choice plays a role in morality (that's a truism), this choice isn't blind. It follows on reasons. The reasons can be right---and they can also be wrong (=your example of honor killing). We need to use our brains to find out which is which. Natural selection may have something to do with our developing a moral sense, but it cannot ground "oughts" as such, better, it cannot ground "ought nots": it cannot provide an objective reason why, if we could get away with it, we shouldn't do something even terribly wrong. It may be that we need a notion of moral absolutes, at least negative ones, if we are going to maintain that moral action is reasonable action, and not just blind choice. Of course, you might insist that our reaons for moral action are themselves all completely a matter of choice, but then what guides the choice? It would have to be something non-rational. So who is claiming that convention=the arbitrary here? Valerie, I am going to be bowing out of the conversation at this point, but I would like to leave you with this: not all of your interlocutors argue skfillfully, but you seem to be bent on not understanding the deeper concerns that they are raising underneath their inadequate arguments. It seems to me that holding a position intelligently means understanding the objections to it---not just agilely dodging them while giving the impression that one is completely puzzled as to how anyone could be so benighted as to raise them. Valeto, Adrianadrian walker
February 27, 2006
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GilDodgen wrote: "The chance of forming a single functional protein (which requires vastly sophisticated information and an information-processing system) by purely materialistic means, exceeds the probabilistic resources of the universe. The notion that such a process could “tailor our consciences” requires an absurd leap of faith in vanishingly-small probabilities." You're right that the chance of randomly forming a single functional protein *all at once* from amino acids is vanishingly small, but this is not the problem faced by evolution. Evolution is a tinkerer, not a ground-up designer, whether we're talking about protein formation or brain modification. I wrote: “Purpose, like morality, is something we must define for ourselves.” Gil wrote: "In other words, purpose and morality are relative. This is a truth claim about the nature of purpose and morality. If this truth claim is true, there is no reason why anyone should take it seriously, since it must be relative." Sorry, Gil, but your logic doesn't hold up. Let A stand for purpose, B for morality, and C for the claim "A and B are relative". You claim that if C is true, C must be relative. But if A and B are relative, then C is absolutely true, because "A is relative" is absolutely true and "B is relative" is also absolutely true. I think the argument you were trying to make was 1) Let A be the claim "truth is relative". 2) If A is true, it must be relative, to avoid contradicting itself. But if A is relative, then not all truths are relative, which contradicts A. 3) Therefore A must be false, and truth is not relative. The only problem is that I'm not claiming that truth is relative. I'm only claiming that purpose and morality are relative, so the second argument doesn't apply. "My definition of purpose and morality includes the claim that your definition of purpose and morality is false." I'm not sure what you're trying to say. I didn't define purpose and morality; I simply said that they are relative, so there *is* no definition that you can claim is false. Secondly, definitions can't be true or false; a definition merely anchors a term to a specified concept. Third, how can a definition include a truth claim? Were you trying to define purpose and morality to exclude purpose and morality as defined by me?valerie
February 27, 2006
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Valerie: "It's just that evolution has tailored our consciences to benefit our own genes." The chance of forming a single functional protein (which requires vastly sophisticated information and an information-processing system) by purely materialistic means, exceeds the probabilistic resources of the universe. The notion that such a process could "tailor our consciences" requires an absurd leap of faith in vanishingly-small probabilities. Valerie: "Purpose, like morality, is something we must define for ourselves." In other words, purpose and morality are relative. This is a truth claim about the nature of purpose and morality. If this truth claim is true, there is no reason why anyone should take it seriously, since it must be relative. My definition of purpose and morality includes the claim that your definition of purpose and morality is false.GilDodgen
February 26, 2006
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jasonng wrote: "Nothing prevents us from using [the conscience] to help other people, all I’m saying is that doing so would go against Darwinian logic." You seem to be confused here. The reason that conscience was selected and retained by evolution was because we *do* use it to help other people, not in spite of that. Helping other people (within certain limits) improves our ability to get our genes into the next generation. There's no either-or here -- we help others and help our genes at the same time. Note that there's nothing cynical about this. Our consciences cause us to genuinely want to help other people, with no conscious expectation of a "payoff". It's just that evolution has tailored our consciences to benefit our own genes. In other words, causing us to genuinely want to help other people via our consciences is one of our genes' ways of getting us to help them reproduce. Furthermore, you seem to believe that "Darwinian logic" requires us to promote our own survival. You're forgetting that natural selection not only involves the survival and reproduction of the fittest, it also requires the death of the less fit. How do we know whether we're "supposed" to be one of the survivors, rather than one of the dead-ends? If we had to act in accordance with what "Darwinian philosophy" requires, wouldn't we need to know which category we fall into? "...the ideal Christian is self-sacrificing, and the ideal Darwinist is self-serving." You're making the same errors here. Darwinian theory is descriptive, not normative, so there *is* no "ideal". Being "self-serving" in the context of human society may be detrimental to one's genes, not advantageous. Our genes' interests do not always coincide with ours. And Darwinian theory "requires" death as well as survival. "You literally re-invented Christian theology to say that it advocates sin. I don’t need to re-invent Darwinism to say that it advocates survival of the fittest." I didn't reinvent Christian theology. I applied your logic to it and showed that it leads to an absurdity. And "Darwinism" does not *advocate* survival of the fittest. It simply reports that the fittest survive, on average. Remember, it is a scientific theory, purely descriptive. "...a theory with such grand claims naturally carries philosophical implications." It does. Just not the moral implications you're attributing to it. "[Tolstoy] was rightfully concerned that Darwinism carried a philosophy that is inseparable from the scientific theory..." Earlier you admitted that most (practically all, in reality) Darwinians do not hold what you consider to be Darwinian morals. If most Darwinians can so easily separate the scientific theory from what you call the Darwinian philosophy, how can you argue that they are inseparable? "Darwinism provides no moral guidance..." True. Morals cannot come from a purely descriptive theory. "...and says that we are here because we were lucky accidents..." Yes. Think about it -- every one of your ancestors had to survive and reproduce successfully. Then a particular sperm and egg had to meet to produce you. Pretty lucky. "beings little different from animals..." Not just "little different from animals". We *are* animals, but with some unique qualities. "...with no purpose in mind when we were created." Yes. Purpose, like morality, is something we must define for ourselves.valerie
February 26, 2006
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j wrote: "We’re not talking about “an evolutionary origin” (which allows of teleology). We’re talking specifically about a Darwinian (materialist) evolutionary origin, in which our moral sense came about by blind/purposeless/dumb forces acting on inert matter. If that were possible, then good and evil, as well as truth and falsity, would, indeed, be illusory: It’s all just atoms bouncing around." If you consider everything that reduces to atoms (and other particles, and energy) "bouncing around" to be illusory, then yes, good and evil are illusory. But by that criterion the wetness of water and the solidity of rock are also illusory. Is money illusory? Most of my money is nothing more than bits on the disk drives of computers scattered across the country. Yet I can "trade" those insubstantial bits for an elaborate machine that took hundreds of hours to put together, for 100 acres of Nebraska farmland, for a meal in a strange city, or for political favors from a corrupt politician. You might argue that it's illusory, but to me, anything with that kind of power is *real*. The same goes for morality. (By the way, thanks for the attempted spelling correction, but the word really is "redound", not "rebound".) "Why is this [the 1984 excerpt] not what ought to be? Why is this evil? (The Devil’s advocate would ask.)" It's evil because we define it that way. Thankfully, most of our fellow humans agree with our definition, and are motivated to keep such a dismal scenario from coming to pass. Would it be nice if there truly were an absolute moral code, known to everyone, which everyone was willing to obey and which was the best code possible for promoting universal happiness? Sure. But reality has a way of frustrating our desires. I'll repeat: even if there *is* an absolute moral code, we don't know what it is and sincere people cannot agree on its precepts. Therefore we must all use our own judgment in deciding what is moral, or in deciding who we will allow to dictate our morals to us.valerie
February 26, 2006
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