Survival of the Sickest, Why We Need Disease

_{Salvador Cordova

April 27, 2009

Darwinism, Intelligent Design}

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“It’s not a bug, it’s a feature!”

This is a phrase a software engineer will use to jokingly confess his software has a defect.

When Sharon Moalem wrote the NY Times Bestseller, Survival of the Sickest: Why We Need Disease, he probably did not intend to make a joking confession of flaws in Darwin’s theory, but he succeed in doing so.

Recall the words of Darwin:

Natural Selection is daily and hourly scrutinising, throughout the world, the slightest variations; rejecting those that are bad, preserving and adding up all that are good.

C.DARWIN sixth edition Origin of Species — Ch#4 Natural Selection

If Darwin’s claim is true, why then are we confronted with numerous, persistent, hereditary diseases?

Can it be that Darwin was wrong? The obvious answer is yes. But in the face of an obvious flaw in Darwin’s ideas, Moalem argues that what appears to be a flaw in Darwin’s theory is actually an ingenious feature! Moalem extols the virtues of disease, and since disease is virtuous, natural selection will favor it.

It is accepted that sickle-cell anemia persists because of natural selection, but what about other diseases? Moalem explores many other diseases like diabetes, hemochromatosis, high cholesterol, early aging, favism, obesity, PANDAS, CCR5-delta32, xenophobia, etc. showing how natural selection incorporated these “virtuous” diseases into our species.

Moalem is not alone in arguing that natural selection creates through the process of destruction. For example, Allen Orr suggests that natural selection is the cause of blindness in Gammarus minus. In the world of Darwin, what happened to Gammarus minus isn’t the loss of vision, it is the creation of blindness. And since selection favors blindness in Gammarus minus, blindness is a functional improvement! Once again, Darwinism is immune to any testability through the process of constantly redefining what is considered “good”.

The net result is that Moalem’s book becomes an unwitting critique of Darwinian evolution. It highlights numerous empirical examples of how natural selection actually goes against Darwinian ideas of constant progress, and instead demonstrates how natural selection can be an agent of demise.

Comments

Thank you for the well documented post at 184, Allen. The idea that we learn a certain kind of thing by examining natural causes only, and by explaining natural things in terms of natural causes, has a long history that is compatible with a belief in God. Many of the great founding fathers of modern western science believed in God, but they were also aware that the explanations they were devising did not invoke him as a proximate cause. And to tribune7: I think it is quite wrong to think that a materialist can't have faith because, in your opinion, faith is immaterial. You may think faith is immaterial, but it is precisely on this point - that ideas and our cognition in general is grounded in the material world - that the materialist disagrees with you. You are put into a spin by trying to contemplate being a materialist when you aren't really one, but the materialist himself does not have this problem.hazel_{April 29, 2009
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"one can even be a materialist and acknowledge that truths about the physical universe may be out of the reach of empirical science.” I have to disagree, Sal. Once the materialist admits to this he confesses to a faith, and it is impossible for faith to be material. This would mean that the materialist admits to believing in the immaterial, which would put him in a permanent spin.tribune7_{April 29, 2009
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Thank you, Nakashima; as usual, you are correct.Allen_MacNeill_{April 29, 2009
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Re stephenB in #145: Your assertion that no one in the sciences used methodological naturalism to investigate nature until the 1980s is laughable. It may indeed be the case that no one called it "methodological naturalism" until fairly recently, but the worldview subsumed by that term has been used by philosophers and scientists for almost 3,000 years. The pre-Socratics of Ionia (circa 7th century BC) are generally credited with initiating "methodological naturalism" as a viewpoint from which to investigate the natural world. Virtually all historians of philosophy and science agree that Thales, Anaximander, Leucippus, Democritus of Abdera, Empedocles, Heraclitus, and most of the other pre-Socratics were doing exactly what you assert wasn't done until the 1980s.
"The modern emphasis in methodological naturalism primarily originated in the ideas of medieval scholastic thinkers during the Renaissance of the 12th century:
"By the late Middle Ages the search for natural causes had come to typify the work of Christian natural philosophers. Although characteristically leaving the door open for the possibility of direct divine intervention, they frequently expressed contempt for soft-minded contemporaries who invoked miracles rather than searching for natural explanations. The University of Paris cleric Jean Buridan (a. 1295-ca. 1358), described as "perhaps the most brilliant arts master of the Middle Ages," contrasted the philosopher’s search for "appropriate natural causes" with the common folk’s habit of attributing unusual astronomical phenomena to the supernatural. In the fourteenth century the natural philosopher Nicole Oresme (ca. 1320-82), who went on to become a Roman Catholic bishop, admonished that, in discussing various marvels of nature, "there is no reason to take recourse to the heavens, the last refuge of the weak, or demons, or to our glorious God as if He would produce these effects directly, more so than those effects whose causes we believe are well known to us."
Enthusiasm for the naturalistic study of nature picked up in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as more and more Christians turned their attention to discovering the so-called secondary causes that God employed in operating the world. The Italian Catholic Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), one of the foremost promoters of the new philosophy, insisted that nature "never violates the terms of the laws imposed upon her." [Ronald L. Numbers (2003). "Science without God: Natural Laws and Christian Beliefs." In: When Science and Christianity Meet, edited by David C. Lindberg, Ronald L. Numbers. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, p. 267.]
There's more:
Isaac Newton, when asked about the lack of mention of God in his works on physics, is said to have replied, "Hypotheses non fingo." ("I do not make hypotheses.") Similarly, Pierre Simon de Laplace, when asked about the lack of mention of God in his work on celestial mechanics, is said to have replied, "I have no need of that hypothesis." During the Enlightenment, a number of philosophers including Francis Bacon and Voltaire outlined the philosophical justifications for removing appeal to supernatural forces from investigation of the natural world. Subsequent scientific revolutions would offer modes of explanation not inherently theistic for biology, geology, physics, and other natural sciences.
Here, apparently is the source of your confusion:
The term "methodological naturalism" for this approach is much more recent. According to Ronald Numbers, it was coined in 1983 by Paul de Vries, a Wheaton College philosopher. De Vries distinguished between what he called "methodological naturalism," a disciplinary method that says nothing about God's existence, and "metaphysical naturalism," which "denies the existence of a transcendent God."
[...de Vries, then at Wheaton College,...it at a conference in 1983 in a paper subsequently published as “Naturalism in the Natural Sciences,” Christian Scholar’s Review, 15(1986), 388-396. De Vries distinguished between what he called “methodological naturalism,” a disciplinary method that says nothing about God’s existence, and “metaphysical naturalism,” which “denies the existence of a transcendent God.” (p. 320 of: Ronald L. Numbers, 2003. “Science without God: Natural Laws and Christian Beliefs.” In: When Science and Christianity Meet, edited by David C. Lindberg, Ronald L. Numbers. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, pp. 265-285.)
The term "methodological naturalism" had been used in 1937 by Edgar Sheffield Brightman in an article in The Philosophical Review as a contrast to "naturalism" in general, but there the idea was not really developed to its more recent distinctions.[ http://www.calvin.edu/archive/asa/200603/0501.html ]
In a series of articles and books from 1996 onwards, Robert T. Pennock wrote using the term methodological naturalism to clarify that the scientific method confines itself to natural explanations without assuming the existence or non-existence of the supernatural, and is not based on dogmatic metaphysical naturalism as claimed by creationists and proponents of intelligent design, in particular Phillip E. Johnson. Pennock's testimony as an expert witness at the Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District trial was cited by the Judge in his Memorandum Opinion concluding that "Methodological naturalism is a "ground rule" of science today" Methodological naturalism by Christians is historically supported:
Despite the occasional efforts of unbelievers to use scientific naturalism to construct a world without God, it has retained strong Christian support down to the present. And well it might, for (...) scientific naturalism was largely made in Christendom by pious Christians. Although it possessed the potential to corrode religious beliefs — and sometimes did so — it flourished among Christian scientists who believe that God customarily achieved his ends through natural causes. [Numbers 2003, op cit, p. 284]
I don't know where you learned the history of the philosophy of science, but if you paid tuition to do so, I'd try to get my money back if I were you.Allen_MacNeill_{April 29, 2009
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Mr MacNeill, The only quibble I have is your phrase "has now been falsified". If I read that PNAS paper correctly, it is from 1997. Perhaps the falsification occured deeper in the past.Nakashima_{April 29, 2009
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In #177 Charlie notes:
"That was one big easy gulp from speculation to fact."
Indeed, that's what happens when you find empirical evidence; unverified hypotheses become verified "facts".Allen_MacNeill_{April 29, 2009
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Re UprightBiped in #179:
"Your argument holds no water Allen."
On the contrary, it's the current (i.e. last month) argument from empirical science:
ABSTRACT: In distinction to single-stranded anticodons built of G, C, A, and U bases, their presumable double-stranded precursors at the first three positions of the acceptor stem are composed almost invariably of G-C and C-G base pairs. Thus, the “second” operational RNA code responsible for correct aminoacylation seems to be a (G,C) code preceding the classic genetic code. Although historically rooted, the two codes were destined to diverge quite early. However, closer inspection revealed that two complementary catalytic domains of class I and class II aminoacyl-tRNA synthetases (aaRSs) multiplied by two, also complementary, G2-C71 and C2-G71 targets in tRNA acceptors, yield four (2 × 2) different modes of recognition. It appears therefore that the core four-column organization of the genetic code, associated with the most conservative central base of anticodons and codons, was in essence predetermined by these four recognition modes of the (G,C) operational code. The general conclusion follows that the genetic code per se looks like a “frozen accident” but only beyond the “2 × 2 = 4” scope. The four primordial modes of tRNA–aaRS recognition are amenable to direct experimental verification.
Read the entire article here: http://www.pnas.org/content/94/10/5183.full The reference you quoted (Abel, 2008) has no empirical foundation, and is merely a theoretical analysis, which has now been falsified. If you disagree, please cite references from reputable peer-referenced scientific journals that support your position.Allen_MacNeill_{April 29, 2009
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"...let us not play into the hands of ID propagandists. For instance, be careful about using teleological words to describe biological entities in our teaching and writing. Calling cells “machines that do X” or describing biological structures as “well designed to do Y” will be duly cited in ID propaganda as one more biologist-supporting design." – Rudy Raff, Indiana University "Stand up for evolution" Evolution and Development, 2005
scordova_{April 29, 2009
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Allen, What? There is no physical relationship between nucleic sequences and the amino acids that transpire thereafter. This is not even a question.
The sequencing of nucleotides in DNA also prescribes highly specific regulatory micro RNAs and other epigenetic factors. Thus linear digital instructions program cooperative and holistic metabolic proficiency. Not only are symbol systems used, but a bijection must occur between two independent symbol systems. Bijection (translation; a symbol system to symbol system correspondence) is rule-based, not physical law-based. No cause-and-effect necessity exists in the linking of anticodons, amino acids, tRNAs, and amino acyl tRNA synthetases with codons. The anticodon is located on the opposite end of tRNA from the amino acid. The correspondence between the two languages is arbitrary and abstract. By arbitrary, we do not mean random. Arbitrary means free from physicodynamic determinism. Bijection rules are freely selected. Translation of this linear digital prescription into functionally specific polyamino acid chains cannot be explained by physicodynamics." (The Capabilities of Chaos and Complexity - Abel - Journal List > International Jopurnal of Molecular Sciences > v.10(1); Jan 2009 : Received November 6, 2008; Revised December 27, 2008; Accepted January 4, 2009
Your argument holds no water Allen.Upright BiPed_{April 29, 2009
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Allen, "It is clear to me now that we don’t so much have a “disagreement” as a “failure to communicate”. You seem to be using the terms “natural” and “law” in a fundamentally different way than these terms are usually used by most scientists." That is exactly right, and my quote from Chesterton explains that how the terms "natural" and "law" are usually used are unintellectual, for they assume an inner synthesis between the "laws," and pertaining to the "laws" that we don't possess.Clive Hayden_{April 29, 2009
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In this context, it is very interesting to me to discover that the question of homochirality (indeed, levorotary homochirality) in biotic amino acids seems now to have been shown to have an entirely “natural” basis.
That was one big easy gulp from speculation to fact.Charlie_{April 29, 2009
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at 173 Allen MacNeill helpfully endorses negative evidence and the validity of at least the one node of Dembski's EF. Unfortunately, he makes a rather blatant error wrt DNA and code. It is not that there is some necessary relationship between DNA and RNA, RNA and AA, etc. But rather, that there is no necessary relationship (via physics and chemistry) exhibited in the ordering of the DNA nucleotides which, ultimately, are responsible (as far as we know) for the AA ordering and the protein product. This is like saying that there is a relationship between how we sound out written letters, and how those sounds are interpreted as words, and how those words form sentences as though this could explain the meaningful ordering of the letters in the first place.Charlie_{April 29, 2009
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----Allen: And I agree that all worldviews are ultimately founded on a metaphysical choice. Well, then, you ought to retract your earlier statement in which you held that metaphysics has nothing at all to do with empirical science, when it is clearly the case that it has everything to do with empirical science. ----In my case, I have chosen methodological naturalism as the most reliable guide for doing science. That said, I personally believe that this choice is not logically connected in any way to my choice to not accept ontological naturalism as valid. To do the latter, one must use completely different logical criteria than to do the former, and I do not (contra Dawkins, et al) think that asserting that methodological naturalism necessarily requires ontological naturalism. The institutional motive, (I can say nothing of your personal motive) for establishing methodological naturalism [in the 1980s] was to rule out the design paradigm. It isn’t any more complicated than that. ----“This statement is demonstrably false. Indeed, that was Ned Burtt’s whole point in his monumental book, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science. In that book professor Burtt emphasized precisely this point: that Newton adhered to methodological naturalism in his science, while hewing to metaphysical theism in his personal beliefs. Hence, his famous dictum “I make no hypotheses!” refers only to his science, as anyone who has read his meandering and ultimately fruitless musings on alchemy can attest.” You misread history in the most profound way. Here is the crucial distinction that you miss, [notice I didn’t say ignore (this is the kinder, gentler me)]: To say science is “primarily” about natural causes is not at all the same thing as to say that science is “exclusively” about natural causes. Methodological naturalism is a recent arbitrary rule which holds that science is “exclusively” about natural causes. Newton did not and could not have embraced such a position. He was well aware that only the individual scientist knows which problem he wants to solve, and therefore only the individual scientist can choose methods appropriate to the problem. The scientist’s methods are either rigorous or they are not, but they need not follow a set of “rules.” If a scientist needs institutional supervision to practice his discipline, he is hardly worthy of being called a professional. Anyone who does not understand this either has never practiced science or is doing it the wrong way. -----Allen: “This is basic history and philosophy of science, stephen, and you have clearly gotten it completely and demonstrably wrong.” Sorry, but the error is on your part. As far as I know, the term “methodological naturalism” is in no book about the history of the philosophy of science or in any treatment of the philosophy of science prior to 1980. If you can provide me with evidence to the contrary, I will modify my position. Meanwhile, it is obvious that Newton was not an advocate of “methodological naturalism,” nor is there any that he could have been. At no time did Newton declare that science is “exclusively” about natural causes, and he was obviously aware of the fact that it need not be so. If that was the case, the Catholic Church could not investigate miracles attributed to saints during the canonization process. Are you prepared to tell the entire medical community that they are not doing science when they distinguish between natural causes and supernatural causes, when that is precisely what they have been called on to do in the name of science? This entire discussion began when you contended that metaphysics have nothing to do with science. Obviously, that is not the case. You are now agreeing with the same point which you attempted to refute in an earlier post. The correct response should not be, “I agree,” but rather, “I stand corrected.” When you finally come to agree with me on this second point, the proper response at that time should also be, “I stand corrected.”StephenB_{April 29, 2009
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Kairsofocus: Analogies are obviously not demonstrative proofs. But, neither are scientific theories, models or definitions — for all of which analogous reasoning is deeply embedded.
Agreed. To add to the idea of analogies being used in science. From Lewontin, Triple Helix page 71:
If the animal is like a mchine, as Descartes claimed in Part V of the Discourse on Method, then it is made up of clearly distinguishable bits and pieces, each of which has determined causal relation to the movement of other bits and pieces. But Decartes's machine model is not only a description of how the world operates but also a manifesto for how to study natural phenomena. ... Such an analytic mode of understanding and study of biological systems, appropriate to a machine, is implied in the very word organism, first used in the eighteenth century. The analogy is between the living body and the musical instrument composed of separte parts that work together to produce a variety of final functions.
To be fair, it appears Lewontin was critical of the Cartesian approach, but this seems to be the very manifesto of Systems Biology! I'm not necessarily saying how science ought to be run. As I've said, my opinion counts for little. I leave the running of science to the scientists. I'm merely observing that it seems reasoning-through-analogy is par for the course in empirical science. Further, it seems its going to be impossible to exorcise the machine metaphor from empirical science. Subjectivism is becoming the order of the day in empirical science, particularly biology. This sort of subjectivism is par for the course in engineering, and it looks like it is bleeding over into biology.scordova_{April 29, 2009
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I would only agree if it could be conclusively shown, using empirical methods, that there is no necessary relationship between the various levels of the genetic code (that is, between the nucleotide sequences in DNA, RNA, and amino acids). That is, to eliminate the "necessity" alternative, one would have to show that there is no tendency, based on physical chemistry alone, for particular RNAs to be associated with particular amino acids. I assume even you would agree that there is, indeed, a very simple physical/chemical reason why particular RNA nucleotides are associated with particular DNA nucleotides - this was, after all, the realization for which Watson and Crick were awarded their Nobel Prize. By the same argument, it is relatively easy to show that on purely physical/chemical reasons alone, particular protein active sites are associated with particular substrate molecules. This is, after all, how enzymes function; they violate no known rules of physical or stereochemistry. Ergo, the real "hinge" of the OOL debate is the relationship between the sequence of nucleotides in the anticodons of tRNA and the amino acids that are specifically associated with those anticodon sequences. Until this issue is resolved, there will be no resolution to the question of "chance" versus "necessity" versus "design" in the origin of the genetic code. In brief: IF: there is some empirically demonstrated necessary relationship between anticodon sequence and amino acid specified, then a purely "natural" explanation for the origin of the genetic code will almost certainly be forthcoming. However, IF: there is no empirically demonstrated necessary relationship between anticodon sequence and amino acid specified, then there are two alternatives: "frozen accident" (i.e. pure "chance") versus "design". I'm not really certain how these two could be empirically distinguished, although I suspect that an approach similar to that of Dr. Dembski might prove useful. In this context, it is very interesting to me to discover that the question of homochirality (indeed, levorotary homochirality) in biotic amino acids seems now to have been shown to have an entirely "natural" basis. See: http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16779-watery-asteroids-may-explain-why-life-is-lefthanded.html?DCMP=OTC-rss&nsref=comets-asteroids One down, one to go...Allen_MacNeill_{April 29, 2009
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Allen, you are gaming again. I have asserted nothing immaterial (or un-natural or teleological for that matter) I accept (and depend upon) the material world exactly as it presents itself through observation. It is you who is demanding something more from material that material can deliver. And Allen, there are no analogies needed. The transcription and translation system of DNA isn’t like a symbol system - it is a symbol system. It is not like a conventional code, it is a conventional code. If the convention in nucleic sequencing was physically contingent, then it would be a chemical reaction that is like a symbol system - but it is not contingent, nor is it merely as chemical reaction. There is nothing in the physical laws of this Universe that says this information has to exist the way it does, in fact, as far as the physical laws of the Universe are concerned, it doesn’t even have to exist at all. In other words, there is absolutely nothing in the physical laws that makes it exists – but it exists anyway, without physical laws to explain it. This leaves you with only pure random chance to explain how these non-physically-caused instructions and algorithms came to exist in a physical object. This is like asking random chance to explain any other language or instructions – it simply can’t. Nowhere in the history of the Universe can science demonstrate that random chance created a language or formulated instructions in any material object whatsoever. As far as anyone knows, it’s never happened, and there is no scientific reason to believe it ever has, or ever will. Also, there is nothing in the combination of physical law and chance that can explain this evidence. The two acting together cannot even begin to explain the factual existence of complex algorithmic instructions existing in a linear digital code (with meaning) within a material object. (The data even going so far as to say the coding is polyfunctional, creating even further barriers to a chance emergence). To require a priori assumption that chance and necessity are the causes of embedded complex algorithms in a material object - when the evidence is 100% opposite to that conclusion - is patently irrational. And, sticking your head in the sand and assuming that the answer to an intractable physical problem will be forthcoming, therefore it is safe to make an assumption (against the evidence) is…above the physical, it is meta-physical.Upright BiPed_{April 29, 2009
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To the first question, I answer unequivocally, yes. The invocation of teleology in nature is the invocation of something that cannot be empirically demonstrated. Indeed, I would assert that teleology (i.e. “final causes”) cannot be observed, on principle.
I agree that teleology in biology is a metaphysical intrusion. My sense is that this intrusion is less because of religious motives and more so because the intrusion helps the scientific enterprise so well. Let me explain. There is close kinship between empirical science, engineering, and medical science. In engineering, teleology is the order of the day, albeit the intelligent designer is well known in that case. The language of engineering is being imported into biology,and this has only been speeded up because of the cross-disciplinary exchange of ideas. Medical science treats biology as collection of systems, thus they reinforce the teleological metaphors. Thus medical science together with engineering are sustaining the importation of teleology into empirical science. My view is that this metaphysical intrusion is not damaging the advance of biology. But my opinion counts for little in the scheme of things. The decision will be made by biologists whether to perpetuate or even further these metaphysical intrusions. I suspect teleology can't be successfully removed from biology. It's too useful operationally. And to make a weak tie to the original point, the notions of "sickness" and "wellnes" are best appreciated with reference to teleology.scordova_{April 29, 2009
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Mr MacNeill: Analogies are obviously not demonstrative proofs. But, neither are scientific theories, models or definitions -- for all of which analogous reasoning is deeply embedded. We do not treat them as pretended proofs but as to be validated empirically on a case by case basis. then, we use that which is empirically reliable as rtrustworthy until shown falsified. And, I include definitions in there as these in the first instance are based on concept formation by identified examples and family resemblance thereto. That is, by analogy. And, in fact we develop definitions in terms of precising necessary-sufficient statements by testing them against cases that accord with that concept. (Similarly, on genus-difference.) A classic case in point is the definition of the subject matter of your discipline, life. There is no one size fits all generally accepted definition, and so a list of major typical characteristics has been identified and is used to assess possible cases on family resemblance. So, to make a broad brush dismissal of reasoning by analogy is selectively hyperskeptical; and even self referentially inconsistent. It would be far better to examine the cases and see if the family resemblance claim is warranted. When it comes tot he claimed origin of complex digital information that functions algorithmically by lucky noise; we have not analogy but instantiations of such digital information on a very large inductive data base. There are ZERO cases where such have originated by lucky noise within our observation. And, by turning to the mathematics of large contingency spaces we see why easily enough: islands of function (notice the simplifying analogy to make a valid point) are deeply isolated in the wider space of all configs so that random walk based searches are hopelessly challenged to get to shores of initial function before they can apply hill climbing algorithms. (And of course notice how deeply analogies are embedded in the technical not just the popular level language. No prizes for guessing why.) The real first challenge is for you to show that within the reasonable probabilistic resources of a planet, or a deep sea vent or a comet's ball of ice or whatever, we can on the gamut of our observed cosmos reasonably get to spontaneous formation of first life. Thereafter, you need to show how innovations of body plans -- on teh gamut of several thousand millions of years on a planet of our scale -- would plusibly get to docverns of times over 10's - 100's of mega bits of further bio-functional informaiton required to specify body plans. Without intelligent intervention. We know that intelligent agents can produce 100's k bits to 100's or 1,000 of mega bits of digital functional information all the time. And, we know that in the heart of the cell is a digital, data storing, code using [i.e language using] structured, algorithmic [thus logical-phsyical] information system with flexible programs. That is, a computer implemented with molecular nanotechnologies. Instantiation, as observed, not mere analogy. [Four-state digital systems are digital systems. Digital systems that act in accord with codes and algorithms to effect flexible sequences of actions that lead to definite predictable outcomes, are computers. just as Babbages' machine built in the end with gears etc was a computer, and just as relay machines are computers, as well as valve based ones or transistor or IC based ones. just as it is possible to do so with other technologies. Molecular technologies, we have not yet learned how to implement but on the density of DNA info storage, that looks like it may be well worth doing.) GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{April 29, 2009
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In #168 sal notes:
"...one can even be a materialist and acknowledge that truths about the physical universe may be out of the reach of empirical science."
One can also be a methodological naturalist and acknowledge precisely the same thing. At least, that's what I do, and see no logical contradiction whatsoever. Sal also asks:
"Is teleology in biology a metaphysical intrusion? And has this metaphysical intrusion continued to persist, partly due to those who are not even favorable to ID?"
To the first question, I answer unequivocally, yes. The invocation of teleology in nature is the invocation of something that cannot be empirically demonstrated. Indeed, I would assert that teleology (i.e. "final causes") cannot be observed, on principle. Final causes can only be inferred. The same would be true for "formal causes" as well. It was very fruitful to me to review Aristotle's four causes, in the light of what I understand to be the foundations of modern empirical science. When I did, it became clear to me that modern science simply ignores both formal and final causes, and sticks strictly to material and efficient causes. This is because the former can only be inferred, whereas the latter can be directly observed. In answer to the second question, I would say that evolutionary biologists (including Darwin himself) are at least partially to blame for the persistence of teleological explanations in evolution. There are many "mined" quotes to this effect, and I readily admit that they are unfortunate. This is why I have argued that it may be necessary to jettison the entire concept of "adaptation" in favor of Gould and Vrba's concept of "exaptation". While the latter still includes some echo of functionality, it places the emphasis on the perspective from which one infers such functionality: retrospective, rather than prospective. As I once wrote in an entirely different context, the only thing that makes mortality tolerable is its absolutely intolerable uncertainty.Allen_MacNeill_{April 29, 2009
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This statement is demonstrably false. Indeed, that was Ned Burtt’s whole point in his monumental book, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science. In that book professor Burtt emphasized precisely this point: that Newton adhered to methodological naturalism in his science, while hewing to metaphysical theism in his personal beliefs. Hence, his famous dictum “I make no hypotheses!” refers only to his science, as anyone who has read his meandering and ultimately fruitless musings on alchemy can attest. This is basic history and philosophy of science, stephen, and you have clearly gotten it completely and demonstrably wrong.
Allen, I'm a pragmatist. I generally avoid debates about demarcation as I don't think it necessarily brings us closer to understanding what is true. Yockey (an agnostic) and Trevors (an atheist) have made strong suggestions that properties of the natural phyiscal universe are outside of scientific inquiry. That is, one can even be a materialist and acknowledge that truths about the physical universe may be out of the reach of empirical science. On a personal level, there may be true statements about the world where all we can offer might be an educated guess. The challenge is that it seems the most important truths often seem the most hidden. As Yockey said, quoting the Apostle Paul, "we see through a glass darkly". That said, I think teleological metaphors being introduced into biology is a metaphysical intrusion. I think this is perfectly legitimate from an operational standpoint, it seems this intrusion seems to work. Even granting my advocacy of teleology in biology might have nefarious motives (wink), can we agree that it is a metaphysical intrution of subjective ideas creeping slowly into science? And this not necessarily because of the ID movement. Actully the revival of the ID movement is a symptom of this metaphysical intrusion as perpetuated by non-ID proponents. I think you've answered the question before, but I just want to make sure I understand your position. Is teleology in biology a metaphysical intrusion? And has this metaphysical intrusion continued to persist, partly due to those who are not even favorable to ID?scordova_{April 29, 2009
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At least not until you're done grading those papers.allanius_{April 29, 2009
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Allen, Allen, you are worried about many things. “Error…madness…great evil”…it’s amazing you can grade all those exams while laboring under such a terrible burden. Allowing the little children to think even for a moment that there might be a designer—one can see why you might be haunted by this horrible thought. But my dear friend, don’t allow yourself to be so distracted by your grief that you keep on changing the subject. The question is whether “science” really can be pure, as you claim, or whether it is mingled inevitably with one’s worldview. The witchhunt against ID, which includes the kind of furious resistance to reasonable doubt seen in so many of your posts, indicates that Darwinism is not merely pure science but also “entails” a worldview that you want to preserve. In other words, the very fervor of your comment disproves your own disclaimer. But let not your heart be troubled. We don’t plan on throwing you in jail.allanius_{April 29, 2009
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If you think that arguments by analogy are valid, consider this one: "Some of the pollution in our environment is produced by us, as a by-product of our intelligence; ergo, all of the pollution in our environment must be a by-product of our intelligence." Clearly false, unless one can show empirically that volcanic eruptions and other "natural" sources of pollution are somehow the product of human intelligence.Allen_MacNeill_{April 29, 2009
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In #158 UprightBiped asserted:
"You do not question the efficacy of chance and necessity in formalizing the algorithmic instructions that are required by Life. You do this in the face of substaintial empirical evidence to the contrary. You are a metaphysical materialist, even as you attempt to parse the issue.
I assume that your are once again referring to the origin of life and the genetic code, here. And what might that "empirical" evidence be? And please, don't resort to arguments by analogy (i.e. some of the information produced by us is the product of intelligence; ergo, all information must be the product of intelligence). Simply repeating the same analogy over and over again adds nothing to its credibility. And I could just as easily assert that you are a metaphysical inmaterialist, even as you attempt to parse the issue. How, exactly, does such name-calling advance either side of the argument?Allen_MacNeill_{April 29, 2009
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In #144 UprightBiped asserted:
The reason it is never answered (in a straight and forthright manner) is because of the position it protects. The rules of opposing force apply. If the position can only be maintained by power, and not by reason - then zero tolerance is its only refuge. In other words, immaterialism cannot attack itself to improve its position - the reasoning behind its support. [Emphasis and the prefix "im" added]
I couldn't have said it better myself (with the slight correction noted in my emphasis, above).Allen_MacNeill_{April 29, 2009
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jerry suggests that I might want to summarize my thoughts on all of this at my blog. I don't think that blogs are the best place to do this, and so I am currently writing a book on the subject (that is, trying to write a book on the subject while teaching seven courses, raising four children, being a good husband, and trying to get some sleep). It will come, eventually, and I will keep everyone posted as to developments. BTW, I have been helped immensely in the writing of my forthcoming book by our discussions here, and especially by the criticisms brought against my views by my dedicated opponents. This is the true value of lively debate; it helps us come to clarity about what we understand, and to find the weak points in our own arguments. So, to all who have made rational arguments, supported by evidence (and generally free of ad hominem attacks, my heartfelt thanks!Allen_MacNeill_{April 29, 2009
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In #158 jerry suggests:
"I suggest you read Brosius again in the Vrba and Eldredge book and see what he thinks about direction. As I said you can argue that it not a pre planned direction but it definitely exists."
I have read Brosius, repeatedly, and agree that he makes a strong case for directionality in macroevolution. However, as you suggest, directionality is most emphatically not the same as teleology. Simply observing that there is an overall increase in complexity over deep evolutionary time does not necessarily mean that this process is either planned or progressive. On the contrary, a later article by McShea in the same anthology proposes a very interesting hypothesis that "complexification" can evolve without natural selection, via a completely natural process he refers to as "internal variance". I strongly recommend that you read this article, so that we may discuss its implications further, perhaps in later threads.Allen_MacNeill_{April 29, 2009
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In #142, allanius asserts:
There is reasonable doubt about whether purely natural processes can produce the information necessary to life. There is reasonable doubt about whether purely natural processes can produce the fine-tuning that has been demonstrated in the universe. There is reasonable doubt that purely natural processes can produce complex structures like a cell or a body plan. There is reasonable doubt that purely natural processes can produce the excellence of form seen in the species, and indeed in everything that exists. A worldview is evident when reasonable doubts are suppressed in order to protect the reigning paradigm. After all, Allen, what’s wrong with simply admitting that these are reasonable doubts?
On the contrary, I heartily agree with Augustine of Hippo, who asserted:
"Si enim fallor sum"
I strongly believe that there is "reasonable" doubt in both directions, on all of these points. The only way to reduce such doubts is to follow the evidence wherever it leads. This means that one must be able to find empirical evidence; that is, evidence that is "self-evident", that anyone can observe and evaluate. Ergo, the most warranted position is one of consistent skepticism, evenly applied on both sides of the issue. In the case of ID, this means that there must be empirical evidence that unambiguously supports the ID hypothesis, and simultaneously falsifies the evolutionary hypothesis. Simply showing that both hypotheses are possible isn't doing science, it's doing apologetics (and shades into propaganda). Furthermore, for our inferences about nature to be as reliable as possible, such skepticism should be pursued without limit. The empirical sciences are founded on exactly this kind of skepticism. Indeed, since the empirical sciences are ultimately grounded in inductive reasoning, they literally cannot be otherwise. To be a scientist, one must be ready and willing to give up one's most cherished preconceptions about nature. To paraphrase the Bard of Avon:
"Doubt thou the stars are fire, Doubt that the sun doth move, Doubt truth to be a liar, And always doubt your love!"
To do otherwise is to open the door to credulity, which opens the door to error, which opens the door to madness, which opens the door to great evil.Allen_MacNeill_{April 29, 2009
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Allen. Maybe you wan to summarize your thoughts on your blog on all this. I haven't had to time to read everything let alone digest it. But when you post on your own blog, it can be analyzed with less time spent by everyone. I know this imposes a burden on you and you can certainly take your time to do it since I know you have other responsibilities especially current ones. However, I want to say one thing. And that there is a direction in evolution. To say there isn't is absurd. You can argue that it was not a pre planned direction but there is definitely a direction. Just take the number of cell types and extrapolate that out from the Cambrian to now and you will get a direction. Take the various capabilities and extract that out. The main one being neural or mental capability. There is definitely a direction. I suggest you read Brosius again in the Vrba and Eldredge book and see what he thinks about direction. As I said you can argue that it not a pre planned direction but it definitely exists. The very process of whatever evolutionary theory you pick will if it includes fitness will have a direction. You can point to the idea that no one knows what the current environment will do but some of your supposed explanations for macro evolution will lead to organisms with more capabilities surviving. You yourself have even invoked it in the past when it was convenient for you to do so. For example, in the origin of multi-cellular organisms and their increased size. And as far as this direction to evolution is concerned, is it as prevalent in other phyla as it is in vertebrates especially in the last 100 million years.jerry_{April 29, 2009
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Allen, You do not question the efficacy of chance and necessity in formalizing the algorithmic instructions that are required by Life. You do this in the face of substaintial empirical evidence to the contrary. You are a metaphysical materialist, even as you attempt to parse the issue.Upright BiPed_{April 29, 2009
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