Steve Fuller asks, Why shouldn’t religious commitments influence one’s science?

_{Denyse O'Leary

May 4, 2011

Intelligent Design}

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File:Aj-ayer-philosopher.jpg — AJ Ayer:Was he right?

Agnostic Warwick U sociologist Steve Fuller, author of Dissent over Descent (2008) offers:

One wishes that the US legal system exercised the same diligence in authenticating people’s religious beliefs s their scientific beliefs. Ayala, Miller and Collins claim that their scientific inquiries are driven by their faith in God. Yet, as they are the first to admit, the science they do is indistinguishable from those who do not share that faith.One might reasonably wonder: how exactly does their faith influence their science, especially given the enormous import of their religious commitments? Would it not be reasonable to expect their Christian beliefs, assuming they have some cognitive content, to colour the theories they propose and the inferences they draw from the evidence? If not, why should we think that their Christianity has any impact on their science whatsoever – simply because they say so?

Perhaps logical positivists like A.J. Ayer were right, after all, when they dismissed religious utterances as no more than emotional outbursts.

In any case, theistic evolution appears to be the kind of religion that even Richard Dawkins could love, since it appears to exact no psychic cost from its scientific adherents. Their religious beliefs spin as decorate but cognitively idle wheels.

What follows? Not necessarily that theistic evolutionists are liars. But if not, then either their theism must be very weak or it is held in a state of captivity, as if they fear its public expression would invite persecution. (pp. 108-9)

Note: When Ayala received the Templeton Prize in 2010, he refused to talk about his religious beliefs, but presumably Fuller’s comments apply to Miller and Collins who explicitly say they are Christians.

For a curious story about A.J. Ayer, go here.

Comments

Ted, kairosfocus writes this: "Modern science therefore emerged as collectively and cumulatively thinking God’s creative and sustaining thoughts after him, in light of empirically anchored investigations, modelling and analysis, towards understanding and working with his world for the benefit of man. While there are remoter roots of that that go far back in time and to many places, the synthesis in the period in view is historically pivotal, and it is directly rooted in the Judaeo-Christian worldview, once the civilisation began to emerge from the destabilising and disintegrative impacts of collapse of empire, invasions, and plagues." Can we both agree with this characterization and move on?StephenB_{May 13, 2011
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--Ted: "I was deliberately implying that he didn't know enough about Copernicus to apply his own standard." Yes, so your challenge is to show what specific activities Copernicus did that would prove Stark wrong (in terms of Stark's definition, of course]. To merely claim that you know something important and relevant that Stark doesn't know is not sufficient. You must show that you know something important and relevant that Stark doesn't know.StephenB_{May 13, 2011
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StephenB @78: "As a matter of logic, you must reject either Stark’s definition of science or you must reject his account of why Copernicus did not meet that standard." It's logically consistent to reject both, Stephen. I was deliberately implying that he didn't know enough about Copernicus even to apply his own standard.Ted Davis_{May 13, 2011
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F/N: It is reasonably clear that across the 1500's and 1600's a transformation occurred in the world of scholarship, and affected the wider culture then the globe. For instance, our political sense of "revolution" is apparently tied to this period and the impact of Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, Newton et al. That movement was rooted in a worldview then prevalent in Christendom -- and there was a sense of commonality above local origins there [observe, e.g. the retention of Latin as a common language of scholarship] -- that was rooted in the understanding of a God of order who created a world that was orderly and intelligible, indeed reasonable, and that spoke of its Author; here, contrast the volitionally centred view that pope Benedict remarked on recently by citing a Byzantine emperor in his Regensburg lecture. Modern science therefore emerged as collectively and cumulatively thinking God's creative and sustaining thoughts after him, in light of empirically anchored investigations, modelling and analysis, towards understanding and working with his world for the benefit of man. While there are remoter roots of that that go far back in time and to many places, the synthesis in the period in view is historically pivotal, and it is directly rooted in the Judaeo-Christian worldview, once the civilisation began to emerge from the destabilising and disintegrative impacts of collapse of empire, invasions, and plagues. While reasonable credit to roots, transmitters and forebears is due, the impact of that transformative synthesis and the worldview matrix in which it was born should not be obscured. (And, I get the impression of just such obscuring from a general pattern I see in a lot of discussion of this era and other topics. I observe that the tracing of roots and forebears is in fact often used as a red herring, sometimes unwittingly, sometimes with intent. Well do I recall having had to argue with those who imagine that by pointing to claimed forebears, e.g. in Egypt, they discredit the NT and OT religion.) Synthesis is hard, very, very hard, and on history it is very powerful. And, science as a cumulative, culture transforming movement is a phenomenon that is something like 350 - 450 years old, with a very specific provenance.kairosfocus_{May 13, 2011
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Stephen and Ted: Can I suggest that as a rule no one piece of scientific work is going to address the full spectrum of scientific work, from description to explanation or modelling, to prediction to testing and validating, influencing and/or controlling phenomena? So, if one is contributing to the overall process s/he is doing science. Even, when it was emerging as a collective enterprise and before the full dawn of the Newtonian synthesis. On the part of the design inference, it is doing something truly foundational: it is asking, on causal factors, how can we characterise law-like necessity, chance and design, which are empirically known causal factors? Some of it may seem simple, but this is important for addressing what has gone wrong with origins science that is even beginning to corrupt the very definition of science itself. I find it very liberating and empowering. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{May 13, 2011
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Ted, thanks for your response. My knowledge about the birth of science is by no means informed solely by Stark’s account. I was simply answering in detail your multiple inquiries about why he would dare assert that Copernicus’ status as a real scientist is questionable. Indeed, you characterized his position as a “howler.” Based on your unduly negative interpretation of his arguments, I concluded that you did not fully appreciate the rationale for his thinking. So, I took the time to explain his argument in as few words as possible. As a matter of logic, you must reject either Stark’s definition of science or you must reject his account of why Copernicus did not meet that standard.StephenB_{May 12, 2011
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Finally, StephenB, let me respond to this claim of yours: "modern science began in the 11th Century through the efforts of scholastic monks and then gained traction at a time that we now call the “Scientific Revolution.”" I don't think so. You are clearly referring to someone like the great Gerbert of Aurillac (Pope Sylvester at the millenium), who went to Spain to learn from Muslim and Jewish scholars about Aristotle's logic and other aspects of ancient learning. What exactly did Gerbert do that was new and different, relative to those Muslim and Jewish scholars? Yes, he initiated major changes in the medieval Catholic schools, and that was enormously important, but the content of what he brought back, though new in Christendom at that time, was derivative from other cultures, none of which was based on Christianity. The same can be said of the universities that came ca. 150 years later: they began as places where scholars and students came together to study *ancient texts*, which had just become available to them from the Muslims--who had in turn gotten them centuries earlier from Hellenistic scholars. Christians played a crucial role in that, I'll grant (I mean the Nestorians in Baghdad, who served as translators from Greek into Syriac and then into Arabic), but they did not add significant contributions to the *content* of those texts. Islamic scholars did add significant content, esp in optics and astronomy--and some of those ideas later influenced scholars in Christendom. Now, we need to give Christians a lot of credit for founding the universities, which provided the locus for the great medieval debates about logic, philosophy, and theology that *do* provide powerful tools for what becomes modern science. If this is what you want to argue--that medieval Christianity "caused" modern science--then at least you've identified a key component of modern science. But (again), medieval science is different from modern science--what Stark calls "real science." Logical tools are not "real science" in Stark's definition; they are abstract devices that are crucial to doing real science, but not science themselves. Natural philosophy got a great deal of attention in those universities, as you know. But, the content of that natural philosophy was almost entirely in the form of commentaries on Aristotle. So, if medieval natural philosophy counts as "real science" (as I think it does, and as you might be implying by dating the origin of science to the 11th century), then so does Aristotle: they were building directly and closely on him. I cannot escape the impression, StephenB, that you are attracted to Stark's stark thesis, not b/c you have a wide and deep knowledge of the history of science and Stark accounts for it so convincingly; but, b/c you like what he says for other reasons and you then read what you know of that history through his lenses. I know that you don't believe you are doing this, but I can't get past this impression. I have now said all I want to say about this topic. My views are sufficiently clear, esp my objections to Stark's thesis. His bizarre interpretation of Copernicus is the birdie in the mineshaft: the air is going bad, and you might want to go somewhere else. But, you have to make your own decisions. I wish you well.Ted Davis_{May 12, 2011
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My address: tdavis[at]messiah[dot]eduTed Davis_{May 12, 2011
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OK, StephenB, let's talk about Copernicus. As you point out, Stark says that "Scientific theories are abstract statements about why and how some portion of nature (including human social life) fits together and works.” And, abstract statements are scientific only “if it is possible to deduce from them some definite predictions and prohibitions about what will be observed.” In other words, the scientist must make observations “relative to the predictions and prohibitions.” So, did the work of Copernicus qualify as science given this definition? You say no, based on Stark. I say yes, based on reading both De revolutionibus and scholars who know Copernicus very well--especially Owen Gingerich, but others as well. One thing Copernicus did not do, as Stark knows: he did not put forth a convincing physical theory for how the solar system works--but, he did realize that we needed a new one, if he was right, and he talked about elements of it (such as, the idea that objects in the vicinity of a planet must have motions centered on that planet. If we did not count as "scientific," an theory that does not provided a physical account to show "why" a description is true, then ID will always be less than scientific, b/c ID concerns itself *only* with detecting design, not with explaining how it got there in the first place: merely saying that a "designer" did it, is hardly equivalent to saying *how* a designer did it. I agree that a theory that can both describe and explain causally is what we want to get; there, I agree with Stark that Kepler and Newton went further than Copernicus. However, both needed the work of Copernicus to get where they got--and that argues strongly that Copernicus was fully scientific. Furthermore, Copernicus did do something very important, something that matches perfectly Stark's criterion of "why." His system predicted (for example) that Venus should have a full set of phases, of rather markedly different apparent sizes; when Galileo observed precisely this previously unknown phenomenon, he knew that it "confirmed" Copernicus. I say "confirmed," rather than confirmed, b/c the same observations were fully consistent with the Tychonic view, so they did not "confirm" Copernicus in a simple, unambiguous way. But, they were flatly inconsistent with the Ptolemaic model, and fully consistent with the Copernican model. This counts for Copernicus being fully "scientific." And, the great attraction of the Copernican theory, for its early adherents (such as Kepler and Galileo), is that it fits together so very well: Copernicus himself says this; he knew he had provided a *single* theory for *all* of the planets, not separate theories for each of them. An important consequence of his theory was to sort out for the first time the motions of Mercury, Venus, and the Sun. Under Ptolemy, all 3 have the same overall period of revolution about the earth; but, in the new theory, Mercury and Venus each have unique periods of revolution about the Sun. Gingerich stresses the significance of this. The whole basis of astronomy since Plato's student Eudoxus, was to give a mathematical theory that *does* make correct predictions about what will be seen, when, and where; and, what will not be seen. Even though astronomers eschewed a causal physical theory--partly b/c you can't go into the heavens to verify it--they were making predictions and checking those predictions against observations. That's fully scientific in my book--and Stark's also. So, not only was Copernicus scientific, so were pagan Greek astronomers.Ted Davis_{May 12, 2011
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Ted, I have not been successful in finding your e-mail address.StephenB_{May 12, 2011
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---Ted: "Incidentally, StephenB, I find your suggestion about Christianity & the messianic overtones of science very interesting, and my instincts are identical to yours on that point." On this point, I may be receiving credit for someone else's idea. I seem to recognize allanius' fingerprints @69 with his use of the term "messianic overtones."StephenB_{May 11, 2011
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Ted, I thank you for an interesting discussion. As you point out, we have both had our say on the matter and I am pleased that we could exchange ideas so cordially and with so much transparency. [a] On the matter of private discussions, I would be privileged to interact with you any time. I will make it a point to e-mail you if I can find your address. [b] I certainly agree that the Greeks deserve due credit for their part in providing the intellectual soil for what would later become the famous faith/reason synthesis. With reference to their contributions on natural philosophy (some would say science) the amount of credit would seem to depend on how we define science. If we define science in such a way that Greek experimentation rises above "technology" [Stark's term] and meets the higher standard of scientific research, then their efforts do, indeed, loom large; if we define science in such a way that their efforts fall short of that standard, they do not stand quite so tall (in a scientific context). Naturally, their philosophical contributions cannot be denied in any context. [Hence, the importance of our being consciously aware of the assumptions, definitions, and global world views that we bring to the table]. [c] To honor your request, I will take this opportunity to respond to your question about Stark’s claim that Copernicus was not doing “real” science. In order to save space and time, I will have to pass over several points, but I think I can reduce the problem to its simplest essence. Let us begin with Stark’s definition of science: “Science is a method utilized in organized efforts to formulate explanations of nature, always subject to modifications and corrections through systematic observations.” He goes on to say that science “consists of two components, theory and research.” Theorizing is “the explanatory part of science. Scientific theories are abstract statements about why and how some portion of nature (including human social life) fits together and works.” Later, he says that abstract statements are scientific only “if it is possible to deduce from them some definite predictions and prohibitions about what will be observed.” In other words, the scientist must make observations “relative to the predictions and prohibitions.” It is not some mere trial and error process. The question we are considering, then, is this: Did the work of Copernicus qualify as science given this definition? It would seem that it does not. In a general sense, modern science began in the 11th Century through the efforts of scholastic monks and then gained traction at a time that we now call the “Scientific Revolution.” [Here I hearken back to the “vision” that I alluded to in another post]. In a particular sense, the model that Copernicus was said to have discovered was really passed on to him by Scholastic monks of an earlier era. So, Copernicus did not build his model around facts gained through empirical observation; he arrived at it through Aristotelian deduction, building on a model that had been bequeathed to him. On that subject, Stark writes this: “His [Copernicus’] heliocentric conception of the solar system was merely a DESCRIPTIVE claim (almost all of it wrong). He had nothing useful to say WHY planets remain in their orbits around the sun, or moons about the planets (meaning he provided no EXPLANATION). Until Newton, there was no scientific theory of the solar system.” Put another way, Copernicus was not doing “real” science [science as defined by Stark] because he did not provide explanations; he did not build his model around facts arrived at through empirical research; and he did not make observations relative to predictions and prohibitions.StephenB_{May 11, 2011
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StephenB: Incidentally, one of the reasons why I suggested that you contact me to obtain a copy of that essay is that I would like to be able to talk to you privately from time to time--not about these public exchanges, but some other things. You didn't contact me about my essay, so let me repeat my invitation to have you email me. (You know my address, but I don't know yours.)Ted Davis_{May 11, 2011
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Incidentally, StephenB, I find your suggestion about Christianity & the messianic overtones of science very interesting, and my instincts are identical to yours on that point. Let me comment on another point. You credit the idea of "a rational universe discoverable by rational minds" to "the Church." Now, I certainly agree that Christianity has this as a core component, but what do you make of Aristotle's view that "nature" (physis) is a "cosmos" (an order), not a "chaos"? He said this as a reply to the ancient atomists, of course, but his point seems quite clear. He didn't spell out the part about our rationality in this connection, if I recall correctly (I haven't looked this up) but of course he believed in it as fundamental to our human identity. And, Plato said similar things about the "forms"--rather than about "nature," of which we could not (in his view) ever have any genuine "knowledge," as vs mere opinion. So, I don't see why you shouldn't credit the Greeks for this one--taking nothing away from the Church, but simply placing credit where it's due.Ted Davis_{May 11, 2011
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Thank you for responding to my comments about apologetics, with such a clear and direct "apologetic" of your own, StephenB, as I have also done. We've articulated our different attitudes sufficently well, I think, that (at least for my part) it shouldn't be hard for careful readers to see where we differ, and (to some extent) why we differ. That's all anyone can ask for, and I have nothing to add, except this: it is always my goal (as it is yours) to let facts drive theories. Coming back to Stark, however, do you have any comments concerning what I said, responding to your request for me to support my claims about his claims? For example, would you also regard Copernicus as not "truly scientific," simply b/c he did not do what he could not do--that is, he did not advance a new, fully causal (in the physical sense) cosmology, b/c he didn't have the physics of either Kepler or Newton, neither of whom had been born yet? That's basically what Stark says on 124-25 and 138-40, and it seems crucial to his argument to be able to draw that conclusion, since he spends a lot of time on it.Ted Davis_{May 11, 2011
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I should also point out that when discussing the vision that produced modern science, I made a reference to Kant, who of course came along much later. I did that to dramatize the point that Kant's skepticism served to militate against that original vision. Obviously, he had nothing to do with its conception.StephenB_{May 10, 2011
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oops, I mean, even the politically [incorrect] truth.StephenB_{May 10, 2011
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Ted, there are almost as many ways of interpreting history as there are historians. One element of that interpretation, as any victim of political correctness will attest, involves choices a about which events to include, how to describe them, and in what context. Also, some say that history is a study of “causes” while others say we shouldn’t use that word in any context. So, if you have a philosophy of history, great—go ahead and promote it. If that philosophy defines the ways in which the term “cause” should be used or not used, more power to you. According to my philosophy, history, like economics, is subject to some variation of the 20/80 rule: a vital few causes are responsible for the majority of the effects. Almost always, those causes come in the form of ideas. When we take a careful look at history and the history of philosophy, for example, we find a remarkable parallel between the ideas presented and the consequences that follow from those ideas. Without the Declaration of Independence, there is no government of the people, by the people, and for the people. Without the Church, the Bible, and the apostles, there is no Christian religion. Without Marx, Freud, and Darwin, there is no secular revolution to challenge the established theistic order. In the final analysis, people follow ideas and they act on their beliefs, individually, collectively, and historically. Yes, a multiplicity of other factors also played a role, but I am interested primarily in the most important causes, the ones that transform society. After rereading your article, I have concluded that what you are describing is less about the birth of science and more about its early development. To be sure, what happened in that developmental time frame matters, but why it happened matters more. The birth of science was like the birth of any other important movement, it began with a motivating vision. Without the vision, there is no motivation; without the motivation, there is no sustained action. Again, we could easily assign a number of causes to the birth of modern science, but the challenge for the analyst is to identify the vital view causes, and, if possible, the most important cause of all. If we can’t answer the question about which causes matter most, then we don’t know much about anything. In this case, the most important singular cause, in my judgment, was not the dialogue between science and religion that you describe, nor, for that matter, was it the intellectual contribution made by the Greeks, impressive as they were. The most important cause was the theological vision that provided the motivation that produced sustained action in the face of discouragement, doubt, and failure. How else explain the courage and persistence of the early scientists. To use an ID term, that vision was “irreducibly complex.” Among the many pieces of the unified puzzle, we can include a realistic epistemology [Thanks to Aristotle] a belief in ex-nihilo creation [No thanks to Aristotle] the faith/reason synthesis [Thanks to Aquinas] a rational universe discoverable by rational minds [Thanks to the Church-No thanks to Kant] liberation from the myth of eternal cycles and fatalism [Thanks to the Bible, No thanks to Pantheism] the ordered and contingent nature of matter as part of God’s Divine plan [Thanks to the Bible and the Church] and the unity of truth [Thanks again to Aquinas]. Take away even one piece of the puzzle and the vision no longer hangs together. The point is not just that these elements were present in the one culture that produced modern science, but also that they were not present in all the other cultures that did not. Earlier, we corresponded about the analyst’s pre-existent world views about design and the ways that it could influence his perception of historical events. For you, interaction seems to be the key: just as life “emerges” out of the random interaction between an organism and its environment [Darwin], so does science’s intellectual vision “emerge” randomly out of the dialogue between religion and science. For me, vision is the key: just as the design of life “unfolds” purposefully according to the Apriori intent of a designer [Intelligent Design], science’s dialogue is shaped by the Apriori intent of its religious pioneers. I think my argument is the better one because I approach history the same way I approach any other subject. Unlike Darwinists [and I am sorry to say, Christian Darwinists] I don’t try to make the facts fit my theories; I try to make my theories fit the facts. The facts are that the religious vision preceded the science/religion dialogue. So, where does that leave us? In effect, we are juggling three general accounts that describe the role of Christian culture in brining about the birth of science: The atheists say it played no role at all except to militate against it; you counter modestly by saying it played some role, and I counter decisively by saying that it played the main role. What does that mean? It means that, in this context, you object to the word “cause” not simply because analysts use it to describe Christianity’s main role but also because you deny that Christianity did, indeed, play the main role. In my judgment, to play the main role is to qualify as the cause. I use that language because it describes a truth about Christianity’s intellectual and motivational power to transform the way we study nature. If, as you say, that means that I am doing Christian apologetics, I am fine with that. However, don’t miss the significance of that term’s meaning. Christian apologetics is not about misrepresenting reality to make a point. It is about providing a rational justification for believing in the truth by telling the truth—even the politically correct truth.StephenB_{May 10, 2011
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I tend to think it’s kind of simple. “Science,” as in Big Science, is driven by its cultural given. Galileo, Descartes and Newton were Christians who used science (in their minds) to glorify God because they lived in the Christian era in the West. Modern scientists—again in the sense of Big Science, not the honest Joe sitting on the bench—tend to be atheists and to use science (unconsciously or otherwise) to justify atheism, for the simple reason that Nihilism killed God in the Modern age. But Ted, it seems to me there is an interesting distinction between Greek culture and our own. The nexus between empirical science and philosophy that appeared in the 17th century came about because scientists believed the Bible. They believed that “God looked at what he had made and saw that it was very good.” They believed that God created the heavens and earth, that God is good, and that what God created is good; indeed, that his invisible properties could be seen in everything that had been made. It is for this reason—and this reason only—that they based the salvation of the human race on the new science. The ancient Greeks had no such conception or hope for science. In other words, isn’t it likely that the messianic overtones that have attached themselves to Big Science are firmly rooted in Christianity and were unlikely to have come into being without it? Or to put it another way, would science be what it is today—enjoy the cachet that it does, for however long—without its roots in Christian culture?allanius_{May 10, 2011
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Ironically, in parallel with this conversation--in which I am questioning the claim that "Christianity caused real science," I am involved in another conversation over on BioLogos, in which I am defending the claim that Christianity was very important in shaping the modern scientific attitude. Here is that thread: http://biologos.org/blog/christianity-and-science-in-historical-perspective-part-3/ Someone over there finds it incredible that theology had anything whatsoever to do with constructing modern science; some here find it difficult to see why I would *not* say that Christianity caused modern science. Perhaps seeing both thread together will at least shed some light on my own position. Folks there are also commenting on the essay I wrote for the Faraday Institute, so there's a common basis for the two threads. I invite folks here to contribute over there (and vice versa). As I say, it's ironic.Ted Davis_{May 10, 2011
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I think there is sometimes among certain Christian apologists--and those who find their writings helpful--a tendency to assume something like necessity in the history of ideas. To be sure, ideas *can* have consequences; but, to think that idea A necessarily leads to idea B, simply b/c we know of instances in which idea A was instrumental in leading certain people to conclude idea B, is sloppy historical reasoning. This is part of my hesitation in using the language of causation in this instance (and many others). The late Francis Schaeffer (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francis_Schaeffer), a prominent and very influential Christian writer, comes across to me in this way. So do some of his contemporary disciples, including at least one or two prominent ID advocates (I'll leave out names so as not to involve them personally in this critique). For example, I've very often heard creationists and ID proponents (as everyone here should know, I don't equate those two groups) connect Darwin to Hitler, as if Darwin's ideas somehow led necessarily to Hitler's ideas. We might as well connect Jesus with the Crusades--there are a lot of dots to connect between those sets of endpoints, and no historical logic I admit will draw those lines in a convincing way. The creationist claim that evolution leads to racism, Communism, sexual promiscuity, abortion, euthanasia, etc., is of this sort. (Most readers probably are aware of this type of over-the-top nonsense. If not, take a quick look at http://www.answersingenesis.org/assets/images/au/2008/07/the-problem.jpg, or go read "The Modern Creation Trilogy" by Morris and Morris.) Aside from the rather obvious fact that all of those things predated Darwin's Origin of Species, and most of them predated even Lucretius, the claim of some clear and obvious link continues to persuade millions of people of the alleged moral evils of evolution. Those same people seem blissfully unaware of the fact that lots of Christian creationists used the Bible to argue for slavery; somehow that doesn't seem to inspire similar claims about necessary links. The history of science is complicated and messy; the chief problem with AD White is in fact that he ran roughshod over this fact to create his "warfare" view. I think we need to hold others to a similar standard.Ted Davis_{May 9, 2011
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As I said above: read Stark with caution. I have the impression, StephenB, that you need the stark view that Stark offers for apologetic reasons. Perhaps I am wrong, in which case I'm sure you will set me straight. My views on this issue would be the same whether or not the ID movement existed at all. They are what they are: conclusions based on the historical evidence I found when I examined this issue many years ago, before there was an ID movement at all. I think that one *can* use my conclusions apologetically--indeed, the essay I wrote for Faraday can be seen as a kind of apologetics--but not the kind of apologetics that Stark is doing, in which he seems to want a "slam dunk" argument for Christianity based on a peculiar, and unhistorical, definition of "real" science.Ted Davis_{May 9, 2011
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Now, StephenB, let me address this--about Stark, not about my own views on "Christianity causing modern science," which I won't address further unless you respond specifically to my essay on the "Foster thesis." Here is what you call for me to do: "I am asking you to provide an in-context quote from him that would justify your assertion that he is overstating the case. I appreciate that you may be interpreting him that way, but I need to know why." OK, fair enough. (1) Page 123, "In this chapter, I argue not only that there is no inherent conflict between religion and science, but that *Christian theology was essential for the rise of science*." (italics his) (2) On pp. 124-27, he argues that only modern science (i.e., the kind of science since the Sci Rev) is "real" science; there was no "real" science outside of Christian Europe. "Of course, these millenia of technological and intellectual progress were vital to the eventual development of science, but it is the consensus among contemporary historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science that real science arose only once: in Europe." (126f) Those are the twin poles of his argument. I don't agree with either one--and (2) is the one that really misleads readers who don't know the literature in HPS. What Stark does, is to define "real science" in such a way that Copernicus (this really is his example) was not doing "real science," a statement he justifies partly at one point (note 55 on 139) by citing IB Cohen's statement (similar to the view of Kuhn) that there was no Copernican "revolution." Well, Cohen's point was that Copernicus left a lot of work for others to fill in, which took quite awhile, and that Copernicus himself wanted simply to improve on Ptolemy, not launch a "revolutionary" new cosmology. I'm quite sure that Cohen regarded Copernican astronomy as "real science," but not by the definition Stark needed to make his thesis convincing to readers who don't know any better. It's very far from a "consensus" picture, to see someone as enormous as Copernicus as not really "scientific." (see 125 for this howler). Stark recognizes the existence of what he calls "Scholastic science," but he ignores the fact that such science was a lot more like ancient science than the "real science" of the Sci Rev. Yes, some of the scholastics entertained non-Aristotelian possibilities, explicitly for theological reasons, but most historians do not think that those speculations (that's what they were) led to modern science. Stark wants us to think so; why else would he call this part (pp. 134ff) "the scholastic beginnings of science? The great Pierre Duhem certainly believed that, but I don't know very many scholars in his day or in our day who agree with this. In the context of this chapter, readers are left with the strong impression that Duhem's view is the consensus view today. Likewise, on p. 152, we find this: "Three factors prevented the Greeks from achieving science." They had inadequate conceptions of God; they believed in an eternal, cyclic universe; and, their religion led them to view nature as a set of living creatures (my paraphrases here). The single footnote for this paragraph cites Jaki (who is the source for at least two of these claims), Lindberg, Grant, and Stephen Mason's almost 50-year old general textbook. Don't you think it's odd to imply that Grant and Lindberg, arguably the two leading experts on medieval natural philosophy in the USA, think that these were the reasons why the Greeks never "achieved science"? Both men have written many things about medieval natural philosophy; they both think that modern science is not the same thing, but they also believe that the people they study were scientific, and they don't think that theological deficiencies (as Stark presents it) were responsible for the "failure" of the Greeks to do science. Lindberg even has a chapter in one of his texts called "Roman and Early Medieval Science," and another called "the mathematical sciences in antiquity." I could keep going, StephenB, but I think this is sufficient to answer your question.Ted Davis_{May 9, 2011
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After you've taken another look at my essay on "the Foster thesis," StephenB, we can talk more fully about my views of the claim that "Christianity caused modern science." That ball in still in your court; I won't hit it again until you hit it back to me. If you wish to leave it your court, we can do that. I'll return your ball on Stark in another post in a few moments. Here, I will comment on this statement of yours, altered according to your qualifier in @59: "Do I think your anti-ID views [about the origin of life] influence your account of the pro-ID views of the early scientists? The only thing I know with reasonable certitude is that very few of us, if any, are totally objective. The best we can hope for is to be fair and open to the truth." We agree that complete objectivity escapes all of us; neither you nor me is immune to this problem. Your last sentence entirely captures my own perspective, and I applaud you for affirming such a strong basis for conversation. My comment is as follows. I've encountered numerous pro-ID people, some here and some in other places, who explicitly or implicitly say or think that the "science-religion dialogue" (as it is often called) is not relevant to them and/or is worthless to them, since most of the standard voices in that "dialogue" do not believe that theology or religious beliefs can have anything normative to say about nature, or about what a proper science of nature ought to be like. To some extent I sympathize with that view, insofar as I do think that many of the leading voices in that "dialogue" have unknowingly accepted White's "warfare" view of religion and science, namely that traditional theology can lead only to "conflict" with science and therefore must be discarded. My critique of the modern "dialogue" on this very point, incidentally, was the substance of my invited address at the Darwin bicentennial session of the American Academy of Religion in Nov 2009. In short, I was not preaching to the choir. However--and this needs to be said here, just as my critique of that "dialogue" needed to be said there--the opposite problem is, that for many pro-ID folks, "science and religion" boils down to debates about the explanatory efficacy of Darwinian evolution, and (as a sort of corollary) to anything else that can be brought in to create a vigorous apologetic for Christianity, against both the Dawkins crowd and against those TEs who don't raise *scientific* objections to "Darwinism." Now, I understand the logic of such a position and (in many cases) some of the underlying motivations for doing this, but I the problem with this IMO is as follows. A whole lot of very thoughtful work by a lot of people who have worked on key aspects of "religion and science" is either overlooked, misunderstood, or entirely dismissed. In short, there is a danger of tossing out the baby with the bathwater. Let me add that an effective way to mitigate this danger is to become involved with a scholarly community in which topics unrelated to debunking "Darwinism" receive a lot of attention. The ASA is such an organization; I recommend it to all here who agree with what I've just said. You've identified yourself here, StephenB, as someone who values a broad range of learning over narrow specialization. I value both a great deal. (As an aside, HPS is an unusually broad area of specialization, and I chose it to pursue as my way of getting into the even broader area of "religion and science," since it seemed the best route available to me at that time. There were no doctoral programs devoted to religion and science then, although there are now.) It is also important to appreciate (never uncritically, it goes without saying) ideas and viewpoints that do not directly support the kind of apologetic I mentioned above. In short, what various scholars (including this one) have written about the early scientists--conclusions that in many cases seem to be very well supported by the evidence--should not be evaluated simply on the basis of whether or not it supports ID. It ought to be evaluated on its own merits, and if it doesn't seem useful for advancing a certain pro-ID agenda, then perhaps an adjustment of some sort in that agenda would be warranted.Ted Davis_{May 9, 2011
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I should rephrase that last statement from "anti-ID views" to anti-ID views about the origin of life. I have no doubt that Ted is pro-ID on matters of cosmology.StephenB_{May 8, 2011
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Ted Davis, thank you for hanging in there with me. Just three quick (I promise) points: [a] In spite of my philosophical defense of the use of the word cause, I agree that such language can be used irresponsibly in the wrong context, leaving an inaccurate impression about history. On the other hand, it can also be used responsiblty if expressed with the approprite qualifications, even, I suspect, in a historical context. It has been a while since I read Rodney Stark's account of the birth of science. However, the quote I provided, which does not use the word "cause," reflects his beliefs as I remember them. That is why I am asking you to provide an in-context quote from him that would justify your assertion that he is overstating the case. I appreciate that you may be interpreting him that way, but I need to know why. [b] Your essay is less about the semantic issue and more about the substantive dynamic involved, which, as I understand it, is a description of what you see as a reflexive relationship between religion and science. (Now that I have a little more time, I think I will reread it). As I pointed out, it was, in my judgment, the religious perspective that informed the scientific perspective (rather than work with it) and I did my best to explain in limited space why that was the case. So, here our disagreement is not semantic but substantive. [c] On the matter of giving your reading a fair hearing, I agree that all of us do sometimes allow our pre-existing perceptions to leak into our interpretations of what we read. I hope I am not doing that, but I cannot rule out the possibility. While I try to manage my biases and prejudices [we all have them] I am never totally removed from them. I did, however, allow myself to be influenced by your initial summary, which I think accurately summarizes the piece, and it is on the contrast between religion leading science [my view] and religion consulting with science [the way I perceive your view] on which we disagree. Do I think your anti-ID views influence your account of the pro-ID views of the early scientists? The only thing I know with reasonable certitude is that very few of us, if any, are totally objective. The best we can hope for is to be fair and open to the truth.StephenB_{May 8, 2011
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ps for StephenB: I sometimes wonder (from our many previous conversations) whether you are bringing to my views some wrong assumptions about my work, generally speaking. I think you may be assuming certain things about it, b/c I am a TE, rather than reading my work and then drawing conclusions. I suspect that we are actually pretty close in basic outlook, even though you may see a big gap b/c of the TE/ID gap that is on the larger landscape.Ted Davis_{May 8, 2011
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I thank bornagain for the citation to the Darwin essay in BJHS. I'll be sure to read it. From the information in the link, there's nothing here that surprises me; the individual pieces don't seem new. But, if it weren't a new overall argument then it probably wouldn't be in that journal, so I'll want to read it. You might find writings by the late Dov Ospovat interesting, bornagain, given the link you sent. Ospovat died quite young, decades ago, but he's been over quite a bit of the same ground at the essay you linked.Ted Davis_{May 8, 2011
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StehpenB, thank you for reading the Faraday essay. I'm glad you like it. Writing essays of that sort is difficult for me, since you want to simplify things without oversimplifying them. (Well, to be honest, writing *most* things other than blogs and emails is difficult for me. Writing for me seems to go more slowly than it does for a lot of my friends.) I always try to get the forest and the trees right. I doubt that I actually accomplish that most of the time. I understand your point about TEs carrying on in a certain way, and to some extent I share that concern (and to some extent I don't, since I think that science and reason have only limited competence to give us values), but I think that's a big conversation that is not germane to this thread or to my Faraday essay; so, I won't go there. I am still seeing any evidence that you've read any of my scholarly essays on the Sci Rev, StephenB. The Faraday essay is not in that category; I don't try carefully to sift through the question we have been talking about (the "causal" question) there. I couldn't possibly attempt that in that venue. The chapter in the volume edited by Noll, Livingstone, and Hart (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0195115570/qid=924281983/sr=1-2/002-3016226-2224007)is the best one to read. If you can't easily borrow that from a library, then please send me an email and I can send you the pdf. Once you've read that, you'll be in a much better place to see how I'll answer your question about "necessary" and "sufficient" causes. I don't really want to do that, however, until you have read it. In the meantime, the best I can do is simply to affirm (again) that the notion of "causality" in history is not very similar to the notions used by philosophers or scientists. Historians who believe in free human agency and the apparent contingency (leaving theological matters to one side here) of historical events are often reluctant to speak about "necessary" causes, even in intellectual history (such as this question is). To offer a poor analogy: did Bill Mazeroski "cause" the Pirates to win the 1960 World Series? I realize that it will take some time for you to get a copy of the essay I'm asking you to read, but I'm not in any hurry. Blogs move at light speed, it seems, and that's a big drawback for talking about serious stuff. For my part, I'm content to wait awhile before resuming this conversation; I hope that others will be also, since I have nothing more to say about this in the meantime.Ted Davis_{May 8, 2011
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for Mung @53: I haven't read the first two books. Gaukroger is the one I would be more likely to read--once my current project is finished. I'm trying to complete an ongoing project in the next 8 months, and it has nothing to do with early modern science so I'm not doing any systematic reading on the Sci Rev at the moment. Lindberg's book is the new edition (which I have not seen yet) of a text (it's a textbook, not a monograph, although any text by someone as important as Lindberg is worth treating as if it were a monograph) that I used for several years in one of my courses. I knew he was revising it, and he told me about some of the things he was revising, but I haven't seen the final product.Ted Davis_{May 8, 2011
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