Stephen Meyer Events, Visits to Churches

Stephen: An effect is something that begins to happen. So, it is not self-explanatory. It is caused, and must meet not only the necessary factors [without which it cannot happen] bust also sufficient ones [on which it will happen]. That is simple common sense. And, insofar as events are realities and we do observe triggering and/or sustaining factors at work, this is not mere tautology. To see why that is so, it is helpful to go to a concrete, key case study -- one that, predictably, the objectors have made very heavy weather of, and have not been able to directly address: 1 --> Consider a fire: without any of the key generic factors heat, fuel and oxidiser, if cannot occur. 2 --> Likewise so soon as and so long as the three are together [under of course particularising circumstances], it will occur and/or be sustained. 3 --> A fire is an iconic effect, and it has both necessary and sufficient causal factors. Without the former it cannot occur, and with the latter it will occur. 4 --> general thesis: necessary facrtors and sufficient ones are both required for an effect. 5 --> So, if we see something that begins to exist, it must be under circumstances where necessary factors and sufficient ones are present. (This, whether or no we know or can trace the factors in detail.) 6 --> Humans of course begin to exist, and our behaviours similarly begin to exist. Thus, we are caused and our behaviours -- including our thoughts -- are caused. Necessary factors must be met, and sufficient ones are met. 7 --> When we observe causes, immemorial, we see that sometimes there are mechanical and dynamical chains, sometimes there are stochastic situations where contingencies simply flow from a distribution [i.e are the products of credibly undirected contingency, e.g. noise in a communication system]], and sometimes there is purposefully directed contingency. 8 --> This last, traces to of course intelligence. 9 --> Our reasonings and decisions are iconic examples of such intelligence [which should bot be equated to wisdom -- our species name is a bit presumptuous]. 10 --> At the same time, considering our bodies -- which include our brains -- as cybernetic systems, we observe by comparison with those cybernetic systems that we make, that the intelligence in a cybernetic system is not credibly self-created; it is impressed from outside by intelligence. 11 --> Also, as the Welcome to Wales lucky noise thought exercise shows, it is not credible that intelligent and contextually relevant information and information processing of any complexity arise by chance-based stochastic processes. (For, the associated configuration spaces so rapidly overwhelm t6eh search resources of the observed cosmos, that brute trial and error are maximally unlikely to ever get us tot he shores of islands of function once we are at or beyond 1,000 bits of information capacity. Which is very easy to exceed.) 12 --> We know from observation and personal experience, that we are minded creatures who think and reason, acting through our bodies, thus also our brains [which are parts of our bodies]. 13 --> Indeed, we must rely on our ability to think and reason correctly sufficiently often to survive and thrive in our world. 14 --> Thus, we know we are minded, and we know that mind is not credibly the product of mere dynamics and stochastic contingencies. Otherwise we fall at once into irretrievable self-referential incoherence and absurdities. 15 --> Thus, we have reason to believe that we here encounter an aspect of our being that points beyond the merely physical. (And, no wonder we encounter here the issue of the so-called hard problem of consciousness . . . attempts to reduce mind to matter as it has evolved through chance + necessity across eons end up in such self-referential incoherence.) 16 --> In that context, it is at least a reasonable live option that there is more than the merely physical at work, an that that more than the merely physical can influence and indeed sometimes control the physical. (And the idea that our physics etc may be an incomplete picture of reality at this time -- just as in many former eras -- should provoke no astonishment from those who know their history of science. [Nor, should resistance to changes that do not sit easy with preferred views of the world.]) 17 --> And, indeed, there is room in Q-mech for such influences. For instance the Casimir effect shows how the "virtual reality" of particles popping into and out of space has measurable large scale effects. (And, repeat, space is not nothing. Nor, on this view, would be minds.) So, let us not close our minds. GEM of TKIkairosfocus

June 8, 2009

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StephenB:

Your opening question read, “Does human behavior have effects?” —and if I recall, the reciprocal formulation, “Is human behavior caused?” Was this latest round of questions prompted by my earlier argument that no physical events can occur without causes? It was, after all, in that context that you first introduced the question albeit on another thread.

My original question was "Are human behaviors "effects?" And it did originate in the context of our previous discussion vis effects, causes, etc.Diffaxial

June 7, 2009

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----Diffaxial: "Ultimately, it is my contention that paradox is present in Stephen’s position as well, as there are uncaused events hiding in his construal of the sufficient causes of particular choices, in contradiction to his previously expressed self-evident truth that all effects have causes. He doesn’t agree (that’s fine), and that is probably where I’ll leave it for now." It seems to me that I have covered all the bases, nor can I conceive of any other cause that has not been addressed. In the end, this appears to be another version of the debate about free choice, and, of course, I argue in the affirmative. On the other hand, it may be about something else entirely, which leads me to ask Diffaxial a question: Your opening question read, "Does human behavior have effects?" ---and if I recall, the reciprocal formulation, "Is human behavior caused?" Was this latest round of questions prompted by my earlier argument that no physical events can occur without causes? It was, after all, in that context that you first introduced the question albeit on another thread.StephenB

June 7, 2009

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Upright Biped:

Diff: “The answer cannot be, “their God given capacity for volition” (or any of the other necessary causes) because they share that, yet arrive at different volitional outcomes.”

I see. I didn't recognize your paraphrase of my post. I posed a series of questions to StephenB that attempt to draw out implications of his response to my original question, "Is human behavior an 'effect.'" It was my observation that God's sustenance of human volition (his view) cannot account for particular outcomes of the exercise of that volition, because our identical agents share that factor. (Stated another way: a constant cannot serve as an independent variable, as a variable must vary before the values of a dependent variable can be causally associated with it.) Stephen appeared to agree, and instead situated the sufficient conditions for those different outcomes within the volition of the agents themselves. This all flows from Stephen's position. StephenB didn't have any difficulty understanding that, and didn't have any problem with my posing these questions, either. I would not attempt to justify either position (individual choices do, or choices do not, issue from God's sustenance of human volition) because I am somewhere between agnostic and atheistic regarding the existence of God. I also would expect that agents who were identical in all of the above enumerated respects (were that possible, which it isn't, due to quantum indeterminacy) would exercise identical volition - an obviously paradoxical assertion, a paradox that goes to the question of how "volition" is defined, and to what it refers (far from an easy philosophical problem). I do have some thoughts on the matter grounded in and pertaining to human evolutionary history. Ultimately, it is my contention that paradox is present in Stephen's position as well, as there are uncaused events hiding in his construal of the sufficient causes of particular choices, in contradiction to his previously expressed self-evident truth that all effects have causes. He doesn't agree (that's fine), and that is probably where I'll leave it for now.Diffaxial

June 7, 2009

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Folks, 2: Back on the thread's main issue: In the original post, this thread is about Mr Meyer's programme of visits to churches, on which Mr Cordova raises the issue of the conflict over theistic evolutionism vs the intelligent design movement (with the Biblical Creationism theme lurking in the background). In so doing, he observes:

Those of us who are part of promoting ID know how hard it is to get churches to appreciate the importance of ID. Most of the biology teachers who opposed ID at Dover were professing Christians and Sunday School teachers. The unfortunate situation in Dover is not unique. Darwinism has remained in the culture because churches have allowed it to spread. Churches have allowed it to spread because they are unwilling to engage the facts but rather resort to theology. I often get harsh reactions from fellow creationists when I tell them they have to stop arguing theology and start engaging the facts. Recall the words of the father of modern ID, Phil Johnson, “Get the Bible and the Book of Genesis out of the debate.” Theistic evolution can be successfully opposed in the churches by arguing the facts. Maybe your experience is different than mine, but I’ve not known a single individual who was truly converted away from Darwinism by purely theological means or trying to pound them over the head with theology and the Bible…

Now, there actually is a bit of quite relevant Bible, that -- because it poses a point of empirical test on the creational component of the Judaeo-Christian worldview -- can open the door to a way forward for Christians in general, but also in particular for those Christians who happen to be science educators, scientists and theologians:

Rom 1: 19. . . what may be known about God is plain to [men], because God has made it plain to them. 20For since the creation of the world God's invisible qualities—his eternal power and divine nature—have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that men are without excuse. 21For although they knew God, they neither glorified him as God nor gave thanks to him, but their thinking became futile and their foolish hearts were darkened. 22Although they claimed to be wise, they became fools 23and exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images made to look like mortal man and birds and animals and reptiles . . . . 28Furthermore, since they did not think it worthwhile to retain the knowledge of God, he gave them over to a depraved mind, to do what ought not to be done.

Some observations: 1--> Here, in a foundational source on core Christian theology, we see that a theology of creation is at the core of the Christian faith [so, creationists -- whatever debates on interpretations of texts may bring up -- have a valid underlying concern], and that that faith is at its core committed to the perspective that design is evident in the world without and from our inner life. (Which is therefore a point of legitimate empirical test, test that can in principle be passed or failed.) 2 --> Also, this issue is onward directly connected to the issue of the moral government of the community [a major citizenship issue and perspective], i.e. it is contended that a culture that turns its backs on such evidence will find its understanding endarkened and find its consciences benumbed, leading to both intellectual and moral chaos. [And, whether or not the public at large in the end agrees with the point, it should at least be aware of it as a serious view (one held BTW by the vast majority of the US' founding fathers -- including the two well-known Deists among them), and with the reasons and historical evidence that speak in its favour.] 3 --> In turn, amoral social chaos [Cf. the Books of Judges and 1 Sam for examples] by which "every man does what seems right in his own eyes" is a well known harbinger of tyranny; whether from within (as would-be political messiahs promise to restore order) or from without (as the culture loses the strength of will to protect itself from external threats). 4 --> So, immediately, we should be alert to the implications of movements in our culture that -- even, in the name of "science" -- try to (as US NAS member Richard Lewontin admitted) a priori exclude the possibility that from the world without and from our minds and consciences within, we may see signs that point to evident design. It is worth noting again what Mr Lewontin said:

It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door.

5 --> That insistence on an a priori imposition rather suggests that Paul was right to observe that signs of design are quite evident in the world and in our inner lives so the influential elites of a culture have to take a positive decision to turn from that evidence if they wish to erect a culturally dominant non-teleological view of the world in the name of "knowledge." 6 --> Instead of such Lewontinian question-begging, we should insist on basic common sense: we know that designers exist, so design is possible in our world and maybe even of our world. therefore we need to identify signs that may allow us to distinguish credible cases of design from credible cases of spontaneity. 7 --> Similarly, we see -- immemorial since Plato et al! (And, underscored in the past generation by the Nobel Prizewinning scientist, Monod, in his Chance and Necessity) -- that causal forces can be reasonably clustered under the heads: natural [= mechanical necessity + undirected contingency, AKA chance] and artificial [= intelligent], where each of these factors leaves characteristic, empirically identifiable and testable signs. 8 --> Namely, (i) necessity leads to low contingency regularities [which we trace to laws of nature and underlying mechanical forces], (ii) undirected contingency leads to stochastic outcomes manifested in probability distributions, (iii) intelligence leads to structures and patterns that reflect a purposeful, information-using mind such as functionally specific complex information and the like. 9 --> So if we look at an object or event or phenomenon, facet by facet, feature by feature, aspect by aspect, we should be able to trace the best explanations of each factor. That is, it is on its face credible that an empirically anchored explanatory filter will be a useful guide to discovering the truth about our world in light of empirical observations and experiments. (Which is what science is about, at its best.) 10 --> And, on matters of the scientific study of origins, we know that we were not there [as Job 38 so forcefully reminds us . . . ] so we must revert to the traces of the unobserved [and perhaps unobservable] past in the present and infer on best explanation to plausible accounts of the roots of our world. This is an exercise in abductive reasoning, and such is not well-served by imposition of worldview level question-begging. (Instead, we need to be able to consider all reasonable models of the possible past, and compare their predictions and explanations on the evidence, without censorship by de jure or de facto magisteria operating under whatever labels.) 11 --> When we do so, comparing well tested signs of intelligence, we see that it is at least credible enough to sit at the table that our cosmos as a whole is purposefully fine-tuned to foster intelligent life like us, that life embeds code-bearing algorithm-executing information systems and structures that point to design, that body-plan level biodiversity manifests innovations in the information that similarly point to designs, and that the credibility of our own minds and the binding force that drives conscience point beyond the capacity of chance plus necessity acting blindly on matter and energy. 12 --> None of this should be overly surprising: it comports well with the majority view of intelligent and informed people across the ages, including many pioneers of modern science. Indeed, it is the imposition of what is now often termed methodological naturalism as an imagined criterion of "being scientific" that has led to this even being a matter of debate much less controversy and polarisation. _________________ So, maybe the time has come for a rethink, similar to what happened when -- in Ac 27 [cf. also 487 in the previous thread] -- at Fair Havens, Paul's prudent counsel on the risks of venturing out from safe though rustic harbour was discarded in the popular rush to comfort, manipulated through interested advice driven by hoped for reduction of commercial risk. Hardly had they ventured out under the winds and waves of rhetoric, when they were caught up in the typhonic chaos of a major storm, and were reduced to sinking, being in the end glad to "only" shipwreck on the north shores of Malta. (I think that Ac 27 should be a lesson to us all on the power of rhetoric to mislead a democratic polity into ill-considered action, and land it in stormy waters. So, we the members of the Clapham Bus Stop society [CBS] need to seek out and heed principles and practices of right reason, as have been a major secondary focus in this thread.) GEM of TKIkairosfocus

June 7, 2009

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Folks (and Diff . . . ): Re Diff, 155: KF, to avoid further misunderstanding, I’ll refrain from responding further to your posts pardon, but let us first underscore the civility issue at stake: Diff could very easily have avoided all "misunderstandings" by simply refraining from using invidious, ad hominem laced (or, adversely suggestive) rhetorical examples. Had he simply made the distinction on the merits that was of concern to him in a sentence or two, and moved on, that would have been fine. Similarly, having seen that the example he did use was at best irritating, he could easily have left it out of this subsequent thread; especially as it had nothing to do with the matters at stake on the merits. And, in so doing, we could have made progress on the important matters on the table, by focussing on them instead of on distractions from them. All of which underscores an unfortunate but significant fact: TO DATE, DIFF. ET AL HAVE STILL NOT YET COGENTLY ADDRESSED THE "ERROR EXISTS" CASE STUDY OF A SELF-EVIDENT TRUTH, OR ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR HYPER-MODERNIST RELATIVISM. And given the Wilsonian rhetorical principle -- "Matters hard to auoyde should alwaies be past ouer, as though wee sawe them not at all . . ." -- that is highly significant on the weight of the point that it is self-evidently true on pain of absurdity that error exists. So, also, sufficiently knowable truth exists that radical relativism falls to the ground. Thirdly, we can see that while we may be in error about potentially knowable truth, if our present view lands us in a morass of self-contradictions a resulting confusions, the absurdity is a strong indicator that this view is in error. That is, we see the significance of the much despised law of non-contradiction. It plainly is a fundamental principle of right reason. So, with all respects to whomever it is due to, let us return the thread to focus . . . GEM of TKIkairosfocus

June 7, 2009

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Diff,

Then it would seem you have the answer to your question. Identical agents can arrive at different outcomes - for the exact reason you say they “cannot”.

You are attributing to me statements made by Serendipity (I think).

Diff: "The answer cannot be, “their God given capacity for volition” (or any of the other necessary causes) because they share that, yet arrive at different volitional outcomes."Upright BiPed

June 6, 2009

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KF:

It is sadly obvious that DA has not understood that using an outrageous and insulting “example” in a distractive context is inexcusable, utterly inexcusable.

KF, to avoid further misunderstanding, I'll refrain from responding further to your posts.Diffaxial

June 6, 2009

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Biped:

Then it would seem you have the answer to your question. Identical agents can arrive at differenct outcomes - for the exact reason you say they “cannot”.

You are attributing to me statements made by Serendipity (I think).Diffaxial

June 6, 2009

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----Diffaxial: "I am attempting to articulate a particular distinction (apparently without much success). I’ll think on it. I appreciate your patient responses." Yes, this is a much better way to dialogue.StephenB

June 6, 2009

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"What is the justification in assuming that volitional agents “would not, or could not, have been so endowed by what caused them?”"

I don’t know, Biped.

Then it would seem you have the answer to your question. Identical agents can arrive at differenct outcomes - for the exact reason you say they "cannot".Upright BiPed

June 6, 2009

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----Diffaxial: "What causes each sufficient cause to assume the “value” that it does (one that results in behavior X, another that results in behavior Y)? The decision maker, or the personal agent, is the cause, meaning that he/she uses the power of intellect to pass judgment on the worthiness or desirability of [value x, value y] then, with the will, decides to ratify or not ratify the intellect's verdict, followed by a an action that reflects the will's decision.StephenB

June 6, 2009

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StephenB:

In both cases, the power of volition conferred by God [created and sustained] is the necessary cause. In both cases the difference between the two decisions is the differences between the respective added sufficient causes? So, in both cases, the decision makers act as causes.

By that last sentence I assume you intend that "in both cases the decision maker acts as the sufficient causes." And from your previous posts that you intend that this volitional component that becomes the sufficient cause of the ensuing differences itself has origins other than physical, biological, environmental, psychodynamic, and divine. What causes each sufficient cause to assume the "value" that it does (one that results in behavior X, another that results in behavior Y)? The answer cannot be, "their God given capacity for volition" (or any of the other necessary causes) because they share that, yet arrive at different volitional outcomes.Diffaxial

June 6, 2009

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Fellow members of the Clapham bus stop club: The significance of the reality of self-evident truths is that they are not only foundational to right reason, but expose one of the major cracks in the foundation of hyper-modern thought, which tries to pretend that truth is a matter of opinions and perceptions, no more that "your truth," or "my truth." In so doing, such thought is self-referentially incoherent (as even the attempt to suggest that there is nothing more to truth than perceptions etc immediately leads to). As in: is that YOUR truth, or what? Just so, after turning back from the red herring side-tracks, we can see that DA has still failed to squarely address one of the simplest cases of a credibly self evident truth. Nor is there need to "reify" truth to see the point . . . just, willingness to accept that there is such a thing as error, in the very simple, common, garden variety sense sense of claims that are inaccurate to reality; a patent fact. So, let's simply excerpt from 418 in the previous thread as linked earlier today, to show that his objection such as it is has long been answered, but ignored a la Wilson: _________________ . . . back on the merits of the issue. 1 –> Is error about reality, or merely a matter of a term that appears in sentences? Let’s see: from toddlerhood [and echoing Aristotle as long since cited above], we know that the truth says of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not. So also, error misses that mark of accuracy of claims to reality, whether by accident or by intent. (That was not so hard, was it; nor does it commit us to any “reification” etc., i.e. to any particular metaphysical scheme. Just to a longstanding, plain old common sense consensus. It may contribute, later on, to clarifying which metaphysics makes best sense, but that is another story for another day.) 2 –> For now, we face a much more modest issue: “Error exists” is a candidate self-evident truth; which — note, onlookers — is precisely what Diff ducks addressing in his haste to rage over alleged complex questions and alleged verbal tricks . . . 3 –> Next, do such statements that fail to be accurate to reality exist? ANS: Yes, by general consensus. Indeed, Diff is at pains to try to correct what he perceives as errors . . . 4 –> Is Josiah Royce making “a silly verbal trap”? Not at all, he — a most distinguished American Philosopher, BTW — was using the consensus about and the self-referential nature of the stated claim: “Error exists,” to bring out a key (and often overlooked) implication of said general consensus that error is a reality we have to face. (And, I have given an in-brief, 101 level summary.) 5 –> Namely, to try to deny that error exists necessarily includes in its reference, the statement that “error exists” [if you will, as statements that are inaccurate to reality], so the attempted denial instantiates the claim; warranting it as undeniable. 6 –> That is, it is an undeniably true statement that “error exists.” Putting that another way, denying that “statements exist that are inaccurate to reality” [NB: a matter of patent fact, not reification . . . ] implies that this just last is an error, but in so doing frustrates the attempt by instead actually exemplifying its truth; i.e. ends up confirming it by immediate instantiation. 7 –> Thus, we see a case of a statement that is undeniably true, on pain of self-referential absurdity. It is a true statement, so truth exists, indeed, objective [beyond merely mental or subjective] and I daresay absolute [pure and unadulterated] truth. It is not only objectively true that error exists, but it is absolutely and undeniably true that error exists . . . 8 –> Also, the statement “error exists” is a case of warranted, true belief: knowledge in the strong sense exists, warranted as self-evident truth — on pain of immediate absurdity immediately following from the attempted denial that as a matter of reality not mere words, error exists. (Notice, self evident truths are those that once we — as minded creatures living in a common real world — understand, we see are not just so, but that they must be so; on pain of patent absurdity, inconsistencies of various kinds and confusion . . . ________________ So, we have good reason to see that there are things that are true, and that on understanding them we see they are and even must be true on pain of absurdity. CONCLUSION: That such heavy weather is made out of so simple a matter as the reality of truths that are -- on pain of absurdity -- seen to be true on understanding them, is telling on what has gone wrong with our civlisation's intellectual culture. GEM of TKI PS: It is sadly obvious that DA has not understood that using an outrageous and insulting "example" in a distractive context is inexcusable, utterly inexcusable. Period. [Esp. in a situation where a really nasty similar case was done on a principal of the blog, Mrs O'Leary, recently. "I wasn't serious and anybody should spot that . . . " is no excuse.] Sorry, the subtext of contempt shows; all too plainly.kairosfocus

June 6, 2009

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I am not clear on the stumbling block here. In both cases, the power of volition conferred by God [created and sustained] is the necessary cause. In both cases the difference between the two decisions is the differences between the respective added sufficient causes? So, in both cases, the decision makers act as causes

I am attempting to articulate a particular distinction (apparently without much success). I'll think on it. I appreciate your patient responses.Diffaxial

June 6, 2009

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UB:

What is the justification in assuming that volitional agents “would not, or could not, have been so endowed by what caused them?”

I don't know, Biped. As I don't assert that volitional agents would not, or could not exist in the natural world, I don't see a need to justify that assumption.Diffaxial

June 6, 2009

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Diff: “If I understand Stephen correctly he is stating that there is portion of volition that arises independently of any other causal factors” That is not what I see Stephen saying. He seems to be indicating that the capacity for volition in the natural world can be caused to exist, indeed must be caused to exist. That does not mean however, that it is not volition. What exactly is known about the natural world that suggests a volitional agent is prohibited from existence? Diff: “…your remark brings to mind Dennett’s Freedom Evolves, which makes a similar argument: Just as living organisms can be composed of units that themselves cannot be said to be alive…” This requires a gymnastic twist of reasoning. Diff: “I am trying to draw out StephenB’s position so that I can better understand it.” Stephen is quite capable of illuminating his own position. But you might consider my previous question. What is the justification in assuming that volitional agents “would not, or could not, have been so endowed by what caused them?” If there is no such justification, then perhaps it is here that you can integrate the pieces.Upright BiPed

June 6, 2009

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----Diffaxial: "1. Can they exercise volition and make free choices that differ? (I would assume that your response is “yes.”) I would, indeed, say yes. ----"2. If so, to what is the ensuing difference attributable?" I am not clear on the stumbling block here. In both cases, the power of volition conferred by God [created and sustained] is the necessary cause. In both cases the difference between the two decisions is the differences between the respective added sufficient causes? So, in both cases, the decision makers act as causes.On the other hand, both are caused insofar as they rely on the sustaining power of God to exercise the power of volition, but not insofar as they differ in their decisions and actions as causal agents. I must once again reiterate: In order for an event to be causesless, neither a necessary or sufficient cause can be present.StephenB

June 6, 2009

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your martial behavior

Make that, "your marital behavior." May the twain never meet.Diffaxial

June 6, 2009

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KF @ 136:

in the previous thread was no more substantial than in this one: up to now it has not addressed the actual issue of self-evidence, instead trying to use an outrageous chestnut on wide beating to try to imply that there was a complex question involved, in a context that allowed much airing of a subtext of contempt.

As before, I used "KF has stopped beating his wife. True or false" as an illustration of the fact it is sometimes necessary to ignore imposed dichotomies ("true or false") to give an accurate and complete response. The correct response (IMHO) to "Error exists. True or false" calls for a similar rejection of the true-false dichotomy. I find it impossible to believe that any other reader construed my use of the old chestnut "Have you stopped beating your wife?" - a line worthy of Jack Benny - in this way as a serious accusation or innuendo regarding your martial behavior (are you married?) Indeed, as I said earlier, I selected that example because it is obviously flawed, yet one needs to go outside the "true - false" dichotomy to demonstrate that flaw. I reject the question "Is 'Error exists' true or false?" not because it presents a complex clause, but rather because it is a loaded question. Were I to say "plotnick exists" you may not know to what I am referring, but you do know that I am asserting that an "object" or a "thing" exists, because the grammatical structure of that brief sentence indicates that "plotnick" is a noun. It is by that means that the assumption that the "Error" in "Error exists" is an object rather than a modifier is smuggled into the sentence, and hence "Error," and consequently "Truth," are reified into objects that "exist" rather than descriptors of the accuracy of particular utterances. You haven't yet addressed yourself to this objection.Diffaxial

June 6, 2009

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Upright Biped:

What is the justification given in assuming that agents that have even a modicum of volition would not, or could not, have been so endowed by what caused them. If something can be caused in the natural world, it does not immediately follow that everything about it must therefore be determined.

That is a very good point. However, I am trying to draw out StephenB's position so that I can better understand it. If I understand Stephen correctly he is stating that there is portion of volition that arises independently of any other causal factors. I am more inclined to the position you describe. Indeed, your remark brings to mind Dennett's Freedom Evolves, which makes a similar argument: Just as living organisms can be composed of units that themselves cannot be said to be alive, meaningful freedom ("freedom worth having," as he expresses it) can from natural causal factors that are themselves determined. Of course, the causal factors/history he cites is evolutionary.Diffaxial

June 6, 2009

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StephenB @ 133:

I don’t think you can say that even that “part” of volition is totally not traceable to divine causes since its power to operate must be sustained. On the other hand, that sustaining power, though necessary, would not be sufficient for the act, which allows for the possibility of a free choice. The rockslide, on the other hand, would not be a free-choice event.

OK. I'm trying to parse what you are saying. A thought experiment.* Imagine two individuals who are identical in every respect - physically (down to the atomic level and below**), biologically, environmentally, psychodynamically AND with respect to the fact that their capacity for volition is sustained by God. They have identical histories and are placed in identical circumstances. 1. Can they exercise volition and make free choices that differ? (I would assume that your response is "yes.") 2. If so, to what is the ensuing difference attributable? Can that difference be said to have a cause? That is to say, given that the particular behaviors that ensue, to the extent that they reflect free choice, cannot be attributed to any of the above enumerated facts (from the distribution of subatomic particles to their dependence upon God, all held constant), whence that difference? And, given that we have included all possible categories of causation in the constant initial conditions, can that difference be said to be caused? *The experiment can be restated as a single individual arriving a given point in time where volition is exercised. She may exercise one choice - yet may (same atoms, same God) exercise another. Given identical atoms and identical dependence upon God, what accounts for that difference? **Of course, quantum indeterminacy renders the "identical" status of two individuals impossible in principle, but I think you are barred from invoking quantum indeterminacy in light of previous posts. And, of course, chaos theory suggests that their behavior would not ensue identically for long. However, I doubt that you would equate the exercise of volition with quantum indeterminacy amplified by chaotic turbulence. E.g, two rockslides with identical starting conditions are likely to differ in some details for the same reasons, although we would not attribute that difference to "volition."Diffaxial

June 6, 2009

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It reminds me a little of the absurdity of those who claim that there is no absolute truth. Then when you ask them if what they are saying is true they answer, "absolutely!"Frost122585

June 6, 2009

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I love the "Welcome To Wales" argument. It really points out the absurdity at the heart of hyper skepticism.Frost122585

June 6, 2009

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PPS: Rockslides, per the accessible configuration states on the chance + necessity acting, are so maximally unlikely to produce meaningful configs that even if we were to see an apparent rock slide "spontaneously" produce glyphs spelling out "WELCOME TO WALES," we would be suspicious, esp. if this was on the border of Wales. And,t eh physical cause-effect bonds of the rockslide process have NOTHING to do with the meaningfulness of such glyphs as were just suggested. That is, we see here evidence that points out that intelligent cause is radically different from the impacts of chance + necessity on the gamut of the search resources of the observed cosmos. So, once meaningful communication and associated volitional decisions are in play as facts that must be seriously reckoned with, we see that the physicalist/materialist account of reality [and of mind] has a major gap, one that happens to be central to our ability to think symbolically and linguistically and LOGICALLY as minded creatures.kairosfocus

June 6, 2009

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PS: Lamarck, you are right: SPACE is not "nothing" in Q-mech, especially once we have to factor in energy fields that have zero-point harmonic levels and associated quantisation; thence also the energy-time from of the uncertainty principle so there is indeed a sponge of pair production quantum foam bubbling away with higher and higher energy levels accessible as the time gets shorter and shorter. This too was thrashed out on the previous thread, e.g. most recently from 488 on.kairosfocus

June 6, 2009

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Folks: A few footnotes, pardon. 1] B-T Paradox On this Diff is right, it is Nakashima-San who primarily raised it. I should not have rolled him into the remarks. Pardon. (I accidentally conflated two different commenters in my mind.) Nakashima-San, care to address the matter further? [And BTW, I agree that a plainly non-convergent series (Grandi . . . ) should not be treated like a convergent one. It also exhibits the paradoxes of infinities. (And recall a good old fashioned decimal number like 1.9999 . . . is, strictly speaking, a convergent series [it converges to 2]; i.e. this stuff is a lot closer to home than we may realise.)] 2] Wife beating rhetoric vs dealing with self evidence on the merits Oh, ladies and gentlemen of the Clapham Bus Stop, why not look for yourself at what was raised here at what is now 403, and my response here to see why I point out here at what is now 418 that this was utterly uncalled for, and distractive. (That is the response in the previous thread was no more substantial than in this one: up to now it has not addressed the actual issue of self-evidence, instead trying to use an outrageous chestnut on wide beating to try to imply that there was a complex question involved, in a context that allowed much airing of a subtext of contempt. There is not, and if there was fear of such, there was a simple solution -- make the distinction in one sentence and address the question on the merits.) 3] Minds as caused SB is quite correct that if "in Him we live, move and have our being" then minds and the rest of our existence are sustained by God, so being caused is not the issue. The real issue is that on evolutionary materialist presuppositions, mind reduces to teh simply dynamical consequences of chance + necessity as initial and intervening conditions, in a wholly physical world, ending in self-referential incoherence:

. . . [evolutionary] materialism [a worldview that often likes to wear the mantle of "science"] . . . argues that the cosmos is the product of chance interactions of matter and energy, within the constraint of the laws of nature. Therefore, all phenomena in the universe, without residue, are determined by the working of purposeless laws acting on material objects, under the direct or indirect control of chance. But human thought, clearly a phenomenon in the universe, must now fit into this picture. Thus, what we subjectively experience as "thoughts" and "conclusions" can only be understood materialistically as unintended by-products of the natural forces which cause and control the electro-chemical events going on in neural networks in our brains. (These forces are viewed as ultimately physical, but are taken to be partly mediated through a complex pattern of genetic inheritance ["nature"] and psycho-social conditioning ["nurture"], within the framework of human culture [i.e. socio-cultural conditioning and resulting/associated relativism].) Therefore, if materialism is true, the "thoughts" we have and the "conclusions" we reach, without residue, are produced and controlled by forces that are irrelevant to purpose, truth, or validity. Of course, the conclusions of such arguments may still happen to be true, by lucky coincidence — but we have no rational grounds for relying on the “reasoning” that has led us to feel that we have “proved” them. And, if our materialist friends then say: “But, we can always apply scientific tests, through observation, experiment and measurement,” then we must note that to demonstrate that such tests provide empirical support to their theories requires the use of the very process of reasoning which they have discredited! Thus, evolutionary materialism reduces reason itself to the status of illusion. But, immediately, that includes “Materialism.” For instance, Marxists commonly deride opponents for their “bourgeois class conditioning” — but what of the effect of their own class origins? Freudians frequently dismiss qualms about their loosening of moral restraints by alluding to the impact of strict potty training on their “up-tight” critics — but doesn’t this cut both ways? And, should we not simply ask a Behaviourist whether s/he is simply another operantly conditioned rat trapped in the cosmic maze? In the end, materialism is based on self-defeating logic . . . .

That evident (and apparently inescapable) incoherence, oh ladies and gentlemen men of the Clapham Bus stop, is the central challenge of materialism. And it is a most Wilsonian rhetorical move to try to turnabout the issue, as though it were theistic views that had a problem with cause-effect bonds and mindedness. Again, the real solution is to move to open comparative difficulties analysis across worldviews, something that for some four years of regular engagement online I notice that evolutionary materialists are utterly loathe to do. By this time, I have a few suspicions on why. GEM of TKIkairosfocus

June 6, 2009

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Hello - just reading through. What is the justification given in assuming that agents that have even a modicum of volition would not, or could not, have been so endowed by what caused them. If something can be caused in the natural world, it does not immediately follow that everything about it must therefore be determined. This only seems to restate that there is something that has no cause, and everything else required it.Upright BiPed

June 5, 2009

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Diff:"and therefore determined, in the same sense that other events in the world (say, a rockslide) are caused?" A rockslide is determined however a rockslide has no choice in the matter. Vividvividbleau

June 5, 2009

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----Diffaxial: "So, then, that component of volition that is not traceable to physical, biological, environmental, psychodynamic, or divine causes is nevertheless caused, and therefore determined, in the same sense that other events in the world (say, a rockslide) are caused?" I don't think you can say that even that "part" of volition is totally not traceable to divine causes since its power to operate must be sustained. On the other hand, that sustaining power, though necessary, would not be sufficient for the act, which allows for the possibility of a free choice. The rockslide, on the other hand, would not be a free-choice event.StephenB

June 5, 2009

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