Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

[quote mine] Charles Darwin: “all has been intelligently designed”

Salvador Cordova
August 20, 2007
Humor, Intelligent Design
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From Letter 3154 — Darwin, C. R. to Herschel, J. F. W., 23 May [1861]

One cannot look at this Universe with all living productions & man without believing that all has been intelligently designed

Charles Darwin, 1861

I think that would make a perfect textbook sticker.

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All (esp P and DK): This has been a useful thread, m-pile problems notwithstanding.* In particular, astute onlookers will be able to see for themselves just how hard it is for EM thinkers to account for the 4th of the four big bangs faced by the EM thesis of origins by chance plus necessity from hydrogen to humans; as Ms Denise O'Leary speaks of in this blog and elsewhere. At least, without running afoul of the issue of self-referential inconsistency aptly summarised by P in 159 above (in turn a reasonably good summary of my own summary in 49 etc, and of the wider discussion on the issue of the self-referential undermining of EM as a worldview that claims to be grounded in and to ground “Science.” That in itself suggests the likelihood of a vicious logical circle . . .):
I. Materialists believe that everything is physical. II. That means materialists must explain thought only in terms of the physical. III. The physical explanation for the origin of thought relies heavily on chance plus necessity. IV. There is no warrant for believing that chance plus necessity will result in accurate thinking patterns that lead to truth. V. Materialistic beliefs about thought are self-referentially incoherent since following them to their logical conclusion brings into question the reliability of thought itself.
Of course, much of what we need to focus on lies in the details, but such a summary is helpful in highlighting the core issue. (NB: Plantinga's discussion as linked is 58 tightly argued pages, and Dallas Willard's is about 20. Reppert wrote a 128 p. book-length summary.) Of course, also, DK has announced his closing off, so this is my own final remark. [*NB: It is also my final focussed contribution in this blog under current m-pile circumstances, esp. given the unmet problem of how to resolve it. From time to time, I may make comments on points that are of importance, but not in any context that requires a back-forth, which the persistent m-piling hampers. However, I must express appreciation for the opportunity afforded since Feb or so, and for many useful exchanges that will help me in my own work here in the Caribbean.] Now, on a few final points of interest: 1] Fare thee well, DK: I too appreciate the generally reasonable tone of this thread, and DK's role in that. I trust that as he moves on, he will reflect on the issues that have surfaced, and the perhaps surp[rising to him gaps in EM as a worldview. 2] Moral and sane? I concur with P in his remarks, noting only that our reasonableness is bounded by our finitude and fallibility; and that the sense in which we are moral includes that we struggle to live up to our moral intuitions. The challenge to EM thinkers is not that Materialists are immoral and insane [beyond the sadly usual run of all of us all too fallible s-i^n-ners], but that they lack a good warrant for their intuitive reliance on logical, factual and moral reasoning within their worldview, which points to its dynamical and logical incoherence – despite the often heard assertion that such a view is scientific and the only one credible for an educated person in the modern world. 3] Pragmatism: For Americans especially, this is a hardy perennial as an approach to truth and knowledge (and even morality): in effect, if it “works,” it is credibly true or warranted as knowledge, or even in some cases “right.” But in fact, it falls afoul of several issues linked to the above discussion, and this is why almost 100 years ago, it was more or less abandoned at professional level in philosophy. (I am aware of Rorty's attempted resurrection; I am not impressed.) Just to bring up a few: what does it mean to say that something “works”? What about the fact that sometimes things that “work” for a long time turn out to be falsified by further data [e.g. several major scientific theories]? What of things that initially did not work very well but later turned out to capture key insights that led to progress towards the truth? What of this: sometimes, things “work,” not because they are right, but because they are wrong but exploit the weaknesses of others and/or are backed up by power? And, does the point where something stops working mark where it suddenly changes from truth, knowledge or right to falsehood, error or wrong? Is that the same thing as what is normally meant by truth, knowledge and right? So, now, Cheers GEM of TKIkairosfocus
September 14, 2007
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Hey DK, I think in the end that we do believe the same thing about truth as revealed by:
We must not conflate Tom’s belief about what he saw with the fact that he saw someone.
Whatever that thing is here that we must not conflate with belief -- that's what I am calling truth. Unfortunately, for you to admit to this would sink your argument, since it rests precisely on conflating belief and truth as in:
If I touch a flame, I get burned. That is all the grounding I need for believing that flames can burn me.
I understand the precarious position this puts you in, and can appreciate the difficulty in pursuing this further.
Despite your arguments, I still believe that I am moral and sane...
If you are implying that either KF or I have argued that you are immoral or insane, then that is a grevous mis-characterization and a poor parting shot. It should be clear from previous posts that KF and I believe that your are both moral and sane. KF has said as much, so I hope he doesn't mind me speaking for him. We don't think that your materialism gives your grounding for trusting your belief about your own morality or sanity, but since we are not materialists, we don't suffer from that same predicament at all, and can affirm with a good deal of confidence that you are both moral and sane. :D In any case, good luck. I hope your pragmatism continues to work for you. If you ever find it wanting, however, perhaps you'll remember this conversation and consider looking beyond materialistic explanations for meaning and purpose in your life. :)Phinehas
September 13, 2007
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P#213: I thought after your #209 that we had agreement on some basic premises regarding the meaning of the word "truth," but your latest seems to revert to an earlier stage in this discussion. So I despair of making further progress. Debates like this never end unless one party throws in the towel. Which is what I am doing now. It' been a learning experience for me and I thank you and kf for taking me seriously enough to engage my postings. Despite your arguments, I still believe that I am moral and sane, so I will end where I started in my post #27 on August 21: "Pragmatism works for me." All the best, DKDaniel King
September 13, 2007
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. . . evolution is interested (so to speak) only in adaptive behavior, not in true belief. Natural selection doesn’t care what you believe; it is interested only in how you behave. It selects for certain kinds of behavior, those that enhance fitness, which is a measure of the chances that one’s genes are widely represented in the next and subsequent generations . . . But then the fact that we have evolved guarantees at most that we behave in certain ways–ways that contribute to our (or our ancestors’) surviving and reproducing in the environment in which we have developed . . . there are many belief-desire combinations that will lead to the adaptive action; in many of these combinations, the beliefs are false.
P is therefore entirely correct to challenge: what seems entirely improbable is that RM + NS would result in beliefs or perceptions that actually reflect fact, or truth, or whatever else you want to call that thing which we must not conflate with beliefs. The materialist has no warrant for believing that this is the case, which means EM undercuts its own beliefs regarding itself. In other words, it is incoherent. In short, there are a great many ways to be wrong, and a comparatively few to be right. So, the proposed EM mechanism that in the end relies on chance and necessity is forced to try to hit a tightly coordinated, fine-tuned, complex target by chance in a vast space of possible outcomes. In short, again we see surfacing the core challenge to such mechanisms: the only known reliable mechanism for getting to such functionally specified, informationally complex and fine-tuned entities, is: intelligent agency. That is, we see here EM being – yet again [the same holds for the three previous big bangs: origin of the fine tuned cosmos, origin of the same type of information in cell-based life, origin of the same in body-plan level biodiversity (including of course origin of the brain), and now origin of the mind as an entity reasonably reliably capable of apprehending truth.] -- dynamically incoherent and impotent. And, since this issue is one of the mind as a reasoning entity, self-referentially absurd. 5] the materialist does not need an a priori warrant for trusting his beliefs. His warrant is experience and learning, which occur when the mind encounters the external world. The materialist here has reason to accept as credible, that his mind is capable of reasonably reliably apprehending truth. What he has not addressed is whether his worldview -- which claims to account for all of reality as the product of materialistic evolutions from hydrogen to humans -- is dynamically capable of supporting that reliability, thence, whether his position is simplistic: unable to account for a blatant fact he needs to even arrive at his belief system. Thence, self-stultification. 6] DK, 212: “What are the data that can possibly be found to test Plantinga’s hypothesis?” He has provided none nor has be pointed to where such data may be found. Now, I must note with a bit of disappointment: ignoring or brushing aside evidence and reasoning is not at all the same as warranting the claim that such does not exist.. Further to this, you have failed to seriously engage what Plantinga actually argues, in the article linked above (even failing a good link at 127, it is not hard to find online; try Naturalism Defeated plus AP's name). Namely, that by the generally known assertion of NDT, RM + NS work on BEHAVIOUR not belief, which opens up the gap that Plantinga addresses in his formulation of one of the challenges faced by EM thinkers as they seek to ground the mind. [Note, too, I have always pointed out that Plantinga raises one of several objections, and have taken time to cite multiple cases of how EM thinkers consistently end up in self-referential absurdities when they seek to think about things of the mind and how they can be grounded relative to EM premises.] And since you failed to engage what Plantinga actually has to say about Bayesian probabilities, your citation on Bayes and remarks following are simply addressed to a strawman of your own making, not to the actual case to be answered. 7] Natural selection doesn’t care what you believe; it is interested only in how you behave assumes that what you believe is somehow disengaged from how you behave. But this is not only an unwarranted assumption, it is prima facie incorrect. Again, you unfortunately address a strawman. It is blatant that beliefs and belief systems may be sharply de-coupled from behaviour, as Plantinga actually draws out in painstaking details in the paper. Cf for instance his discussion of the creature, “Paul.” [This too serves as an adequate counter to the case on fire that you mention. Yes, WE believe fire burns and thus fear it, but that is besides the point that EM mechanisms are utterly unable to account for the fact of a mind that is reasonably reliably capable of apprehending truth and acting into the physical world on it – here, hangs the whole Em-tinged debate on how our minds can be anything more than an epiphenomenon, an ineffective ghost that emerges somehow magically from the machine once it reaches a certain threshold of complexity . . . ]. 8] P, 213: As I’ve stated above, however, the issue isn’t the grounding of beliefs, but the grounding of that which must not be conflated with beliefs. P here states the bottom-line very well indeed. And, I can only add that it is painfully evident that EM thinkers have consistently failed to meet this challenge. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
September 13, 2007
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P & DK (and others): The thread continues. However, it is a bit hard for me to interact because of the unresolved problem of the now plainly predictable m-piling. I will soldier on, due to the importance of this thread; a point that includes the issue raised in my post of yesterday, in which CD PERCEIVED design in the cosmos including in life-forms, but sought to lay that to one side on grounds of his incredulity of what God in his estimation would do as designer and creator. In short, the scientific issue of inference to design is inextricably tied to the question of the grounding and warranting of perceptions and of knowledge and truth claims. (Thence, too the problem of selective hyper-skepticism which injects not only question-begging but also inconsistency into the world of skeptical thought.) Now, following up on points: 1] DK, 208: Asserting “the concept of truth transcends perception” is not logically equivalent to asserting that there is a subtance called “truth that transcends perception.” Of course we here see how DK's rhetorical move of addressing only P gains him an “advantage.” For, he has here ignored the above discussion on how we imply and assume the existence of truth so soon as we assert that something is true – when we make a truth claim we accept that what is true says of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not. And, Dk here plainly makes a claim that he intends be taken as truth not mere perception. So, the pretence that truth does not exist beyond perception self-refers, and undercuts itself. 2] To say, “Tom had a perception,” gains nothing by elaborating, “It is true that Tom had a perception.” Now, of course what happens here follows from the correction just above: The second simply makes explicit what was in the first. Namely, someone is asserting that “[IT IS TRUE THAT] Tom had a perception.” And to make a truth claim is to go far beyond to simply state a proposition, P; “ Tom had a perception,” which may well have truth value 0 or 1 depending on circumstances. When we say that IT IS TRUE THAT P, we assert that, on whatever grounds and with whatever warrant, P is true, holding truth value 1. (And this was already long since pointed out, but simply ignored above.) Once we see these two corrections to DK's argument, the whole pretence that truth is a suspect notion, an immaterial essence that one has to prove -- by what standard, and how is such to be done without assuming or implying the very thing that was to be shown? -- exists before it can pass muster, collapses of its own unsupported weight. For the skeptic, then, to try to make the objection, is forced to rely on the objective existence of what he wishes to make us doubt: truth. In short, that truth exists is undeniable on pain of self-referential absurdity such as we just saw. And, P cites a most telling def'n from DK on the point: a descriptive term for accurate accounting of experience [Just ask yourself, what does it imply to make an ACCURATE account of reality (here, as experienced), without immediately implying that truth says of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not?] 3] If there is a substance called “truth,” is there also a substance called “falsehood” or “untruth?” . . . Where does one stop in the creation of metaphysical entities? The answer is plain from Einstein's observation that explanations should be as simple as possible but not simpler than that. Truth exists, as that which accurately refers to reality; error exists – undeniably so, BTW as shown supra – as that which intends to but fails to so refer. Errors are per definition, untrue or false. If the falsehood is intentional and by intent deceptive, we deal with a l-i-e. Each of these is credibly non-material indeed (no atom or neuronal discharge is true or false . . .) but so soon as we engage in serious interaction in a community the reality of all of these is immediately entailed. So, too, we can see that the EM account that hopes to doubt these is too simple – simplistic – and that the one who asserts selectively hyper-skeptical attempted rebuttals, immediately descends into self referential inconsistencies. Last but not least, William of Occam most indisputably accepted that truth exists, and that it is possible to be in error about it. That is the context for his recommendation that hypotheses should not be multiplied without necessity. 4] DK, 211: the issue would then come down to whether it is plausible that purely natural processes could have generated mechanisms in living beings that enable those beings to correctly interract with the material world . . . . If natural selection had not enabled its products to interact factually with the world, those products, including human beings, would not be here. Of course, this neatly ignores the point actually made by Plantinga, as repeatedly excerpted [127, point 2, 203 point 3] and as linked [nb, sorry, link in 127 is broken; strange indeed . . . ] on the gap between what RM + NS rewards, adaptive BEHAVIOUR, and accuracy of belief systems that are in effect transparent to the behaviour: . . .kairosfocus
September 13, 2007
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DK: I am pleasantly surprised to learn that we are not far apart in understanding that our beliefs about the material world must be tested against evidence (facts).
Am I to take it then that you have abandoned your previous formulation of truth as "…a descriptive term for accurate accounting of experience (as in 'I swear to give the whole truth and nothing but the truth')?" You have agreed that this falls short, since it only covers, for example, what Tom believed in his recounting and not that thing which we must not conflate with belief? If so, then we are indeed not far apart.
...I am curious to know what those “three big bang hurdles” are.
Feel free to satisfy your curiosity by reading KF @ 180:
KF: Now, notoriously [Cf. Denyse’s many posts on this here and at her own blogs], the C + N –> Cosmos view runs into difficulties with four “big bangs” and one corollary: [1] origin of a fine-tuned, life-habitable, scientifically observable cosmos; [2] origin of life based on immensely complex and functionally specified molecular information systems in DNA, RNA, enzymes, ribosomes, etc, which is well beyond the credible reach of C + N within the ambit of the observed cosmos [3] origin of body-plan level biodiversity on earth which requires the same information-generation and processing, moving across a bit length from about 1 Mbits to 3 – 4 Gbits, well beyond the reasonable reach of C + N on the scale just described. [4] origin of a credible mind [and of associated morality . . .] required to think through the issue. –> Our focus here is on 4, and the point is that as 49 summarised, evolutionary materialist mechanisms are asserted to be dynamically capable of achieving each of the four big bangs, on an inference to best explanation basis.
Based on the following, I am now confused about whether or not we are close in our understanding of truth.
DK: So the issue would then come down to whether it is plausible that purely natural processes could have generated mechanisms in living beings that enable those beings to correctly interract with the material world. Yes, I have rephrased your sentence; not to create a strawman, but to make a beginning towards explaining why I don’t buy it.
Those who create strawmen always do so in order to make a beginning towards explaining why they don't buy it. Why not explain why you don't buy what I've said instead of explaining why you don't buy what you've said? The fact that you've tried once again to redefine truth, this time as "correctly [interacting] with the material world" demonstrates that you still feel uncomfortable with how truth transcends beliefs or perceptions and are trying to slip a different concept of truth in the back door. How else to explain your rephrase?
Why does it seem improbable to you? There must be an underlying assumption that warrants your skepticism.
Must there be? So it is therefore impossible that there are instead underlying assumptions informing your faith in the power of RM + NS?
Phin: The materialist has no warrant for believing that this is the case, which means EM undercuts its own beliefs regarding itself. In other words, it is incoherent. DK: I disagree. As I stated in my post #199: On the contrary, the materialist does not need an a priori warrant for trusting his beliefs.
You say you disagree, but it seems pretty clear that you are not in fact disagreeing with my statement that "the materialist has no warrant." On the contrary, you appear to be agreeing with that statement.
If I touch a flame, I get burned. That is all the grounding I need for believing that flames can burn me.
Sure, you have grounded your belief. As I've stated above, however, the issue isn't the grounding of beliefs, but the grounding of that which must not be conflated with beliefs.Phinehas
September 12, 2007
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On Plantinga's argument. kairosfocus #203 and other postings on this subject:
What Plantinga did was to analyse origins of thought, and along the way to use a Bayesian analysis of the likelihood of a reliable mind emerging from EM-driven proposed dynamics of human [etc] origins. His core observation, as excerpted above in 127, point 2 (the elaboration is well worth the read . . . go to 127 for the link . . . . ): . . . evolution is interested (so to speak) only in adaptive behavior, not in true belief. Natural selection doesn’t care what you believe; it is interested only in how you behave. It selects for certain kinds of behavior, those that enhance fitness, which is a measure of the chances that one’s genes are widely represented in the next and subsequent generations . . . But then the fact that we have evolved guarantees at most that we behave in certain ways–ways that contribute to our (or our ancestors’) surviving and reproducing in the environment in which we have developed . . . there are many belief-desire combinations that will lead to the adaptive action; in many of these combinations, the beliefs are false. In short, belief and thought are transparent to EM, and are not subject to the crucial component of its “design” mechanism, natural selection. (The other main design mechanism, RM, is even more challenged to get to the obviously large quantum of functionally specific, complex information required relative to the configuration space of DNA chains of length longer than about 250 – 1,000 elements, but we need not go into that here; cf. My always linked through my handle.) Therefore, we have no grounding for the reliability of mentality [including of course, morality] relative to EM premises, and the probability of reliable thought and belief mechanisms forming on EM premises is low or at best inscrutable [i.e. Insufficient data to get there]. But EM thinkers have to rely on just this suspect mechanism to get to their EM beliefs, at least if this is rationally based; thence, snap! The bruised reed breaks: self-reference, dynamical incoherence, thence logical incoherence. Not-Q, so not-P..
If I understand you and Phinehas, you consider Plantinga's argument to be non-tautological. That is, it is based on a synthetic, rather than an analytic (tautological) premise. Thus, what you have quoted above must be a hypothesis; it cannot be anything else. (Making that distinction is why I called it "the main event" earlier in discussion with Phinehas.) Since the only way to test a hypothesis is to examine how it fits the data, one must first ask, "What are the data that can possibly be found to test Plantinga's hypothesis?" He has provided none nor has be pointed to where such data may be found. Regarding Bayesian analysis especially: Is it not a way of analyzing probabilities in such a way that we can choose between alternatives, namely "likelihood" vs "unlikelihood?" If so, is it not incumbent upon Plantinga and anyone who cites his argument to provide some numerical bases of comparison (as I asked of Phinehas)? Here is a quote from Wikipedia on Bayesian inference:
Bayesian inference uses aspects of the scientific method, which involves collecting evidence that is meant to be consistent or inconsistent with a given hypothesis. As evidence accumulates, the degree of belief in a hypothesis changes. With enough evidence, it will often become very high or very low. Thus, proponents of Bayesian inference say that it can be used to discriminate between conflicting hypotheses: hypotheses with a very high degree of belief should be accepted as true and those with a very low degree of belief should be rejected as false. However, detractors say that this inference method may be biased due to initial beliefs that one needs to hold before any evidence is ever collected.
Note the references to hypothesis and evidence. It's even worse: The key proposition that you have so helpfully highlighted: Natural selection doesn’t care what you believe; it is interested only in how you behave assumes that what you believe is somehow disengaged from how you behave. But this is not only an unwarranted assumption, it is prima facie incorrect. Example: I have learned from experience that fire burns. This warrants my belief that fire burns. One behavioral manifestation of this belief is that I will run away from forest fires, thereby increasing the likelihood of my survival and subsequent opportunities to propagate.Daniel King
September 12, 2007
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Phinehas #209: I am pleasantly surprised to learn that we are not far apart in understanding that our beliefs about the material world must be tested against evidence (facts). I am especially relieved to learn that you do not consider "truth" to be a metaphysical entity. If those assertions are correct, we can safely move on to address your main point:
To bring this back around to the main point, I find nothing abnormal in a claim that RM + NS (assuming for the moment that it had the creative power to overcome the other three big bang hurdles — huge assumption that this is) could arrive at beliefs or perceptions.
An excellent point that I am grateful for, although I am curious to know what those "three big bang hurdles" are.
But what seems entirely improbable is that RM + NS would result in beliefs or perceptions that actually reflect fact, or truth, or whatever else you want to call that thing which we must not conflate with beliefs.
So the issue would then come down to whether it is plausible that purely natural processes could have generated mechanisms in living beings that enable those beings to correctly interract with the material world. Yes, I have rephrased your sentence; not to create a strawman, but to make a beginning towards explaining why I don't buy it. To elaborate: Why does it seem improbable to you? There must be an underlying assumption that warrants your skepticism. If natural selection had not enabled its products to interact factually with the world, those products, including human beings, would not be here.
The materialist has no warrant for believing that this is the case, which means EM undercuts its own beliefs regarding itself. In other words, it is incoherent.
I disagree. As I stated in my post #199:
On the contrary, the materialist does not need an a priori warrant for trusting his beliefs. His warrant is experience and learning, which occur when the mind encounters the external world. If I touch a flame, I get burned. That is all the grounding I need for believing that flames can burn me. And so on ad infinitum.
I add this for your consideration: Is this not the procedure you yourself use in all of your transactions with the external world?Daniel King
September 12, 2007
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By the way, thank you very much for what I believe was an honest attempt to address the issue at hand. I hope that we can continue in this regard, choosing dialog over dismissal or distraction. :)Phinehas
September 11, 2007
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DK: I agree completely. The “concept” of truth obviously transcends perception, inasmuch as concepts are thoughts and perceptions are not thoughts. Thus, all concepts transcend perception.
This is not at all what I meant by truth transcending perception. However, the following comes awfully close.
We must not conflate Tom’s belief about what he saw with the fact that he saw someone.
The way you use the word "fact" in this concept is very similar to how I've been using the word "truth." Even further, if you were to substitute "perception" for "belief" here, I'd be hard pressed to say how this sentence was not precisely what I have been saying. Can you point out to me the difference between the two? If for some reason you still prefer "belief," I don't think I'd have a problem reformulating the definition of truth to: The facts that transcend one's beliefs. In the end, one believes according to what one becomes "aware of directly through [using] any of the senses" so I am not sure why "perceptions" doesn't work just as well.
When one testifies in a court of law to tell the truth, one is promising not to contradict what one believes, based on what one has knowledge of. Tom can be mistaken about whom he thought he saw and correctly testify to it, because that is what he actually believes.
Indeed. Your very use of the word "mistaken" sets up a dichotomy between perceptions (or beliefs, or what one becomes aware of through the senses, or whatever you want to call it) and truth (or the actual facts). In other words, as KF pointed out:
KF: My favourite example, courtesy Josiah Royce through Elton Trueblood, is: error exists. To deny this affirms it, and it in turn means by example that truth exists.
But the concession you make above seems very different to your original formulation of truth as:
DK: ...a descriptive term for accurate accounting of experience (as in “I swear to give the whole truth and nothing but the truth”)?
I hope you now see why the above is not an acceptable formulation, since as you pointed out, we should not conflate Tom's beliefs (in giving the whole truth and nothing but to the best of his ability) with the actual facts that transcend those possibly mistaken beliefs.
It begs the question to assume that there is a substance called “truth” that transcends perception and experience.
Since I have never claimed there is a "substance" called truth, your question-begging accusation is pointed at a strawman. And as I have pointed out above, by making the dichotomy between beliefs and facts, or by appealing to the concept of being "mistaken," you are in essence admitting to something called "truth" or "fact" that transcends "belief" or "perception." Now, I haven't made the claim that you are creating metaphysical entities by doing this. So, are you? If not, then neither am I. If so, then you are not a very good materialist. :D To bring this back around to the main point, I find nothing abnormal in a claim that RM + NS (assuming for the moment that it had the creative power to overcome the other three big bang hurdles -- huge assumption that this is) could arrive at beliefs or perceptions. But what seems entirely improbable is that RM + NS would result in beliefs or perceptions that actually reflect fact, or truth, or whatever else you want to call that thing which we must not conflate with beliefs. The materialist has no warrant for believing that this is the case, which means EM undercuts its own beliefs regarding itself. In other words, it is incoherent.Phinehas
September 11, 2007
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kf, thank you for your posts #202-204. They very helpfully lay out your arguments and I will respond to each as time allows. However, for the moment, I would like to address the latter part of Phinehas #205 (all emphases are mine)
The only real attempt that has been made to undermine the reductio argument that has been outlined has been to attempt to define truth in terms of perception. But as was clearly demonstrated in DK’s own illustration, the concept of truth transcends perception. Even if it could be demonstrated that it does not, this too would tend to saw off the branch on which reason rests.
I agree completely. The "concept" of truth obviously transcends perception, inasmuch as concepts are thoughts and perceptions are not thoughts. Thus, all concepts transcend perception. (This is a tautology, by the way, as are all definitions of terms.)
At this point, I think the task for the materialist is clear: demonstrate that there is warrant for trusting that NS + RM will result in methods of thinking that accurately reflect a truth that transcends perception.
Here is a prime example of how lack of precision in the use of language can generate lack of precision in thinking. Asserting "the concept of truth transcends perception" is not logically equivalent to asserting that there is a subtance called "truth that transcends perception." For example, "I conceive of a purple unicorn" is not logically equivalent to the assertion, "A purple unicorn exists." This creates a nice seque into my promised response to Phinehas #187:
DK: "To say that something is true is to assert that thing. Thus, to say that the proposition, “I saw you downtown last week,” is true, adds nothing substantive to Tom’s original statement. So, asserting the truth of a proposition is logically superfluous. Similarly, to say that the proposition, “Tom saw Dick downtown last week,” is false, is simply to deny that proposition." This doesn’t seem very responsive. I asked several pointed questions, and suddenly you switch from talking about perceptions to talking about propositions. I’m still wondering the following about your perception -oriented concept of truth. 1. How does Tom’s perception about Dick being downtown not make it true? 2. If Tom were to go to court and tell a Judge that he saw Dick downtown with another woman on this particular date, how would this not meet your standard of truth, since Tom, to the best of his ability, would be giving an accurate accounting of his experience? 3. You seem to be suggesting that Tom’s perception and experience fall short of actual truth, but if truth does not transcend perception and experience, how is this possible? Could you please help clear these up before jumping on to other things?
First, let's ty to eliminate possible ambiguity about the term "perception." I say that, because the term is equivalent to the term "that which is perceived," and the verb "to perceive" has several definitions. So what follows rests on the following definition of "perceive": To become aware of directly through any of the senses, esp. to see or hear. Reply to question 1: A perception is something perceived. To say it is true or not true is to make a statement (proposition) about it. To say, "Tom had a perception," gains nothing by elaborating, "It is true that Tom had a perception." By the same token, to say "Tom did not have a perception," gains no additional meaning by elaborating, "It is false that Tom had a perception." We must not conflate Tom's belief about what he saw with the fact that he saw someone. It was Tom's belief that led him to tell Dick that he saw Dick downtown. To elaborate that it was true that Tom believed that he saw Dick downtown adds no additional meaning. Reply to question 2: When one testifies in a court of law to tell the truth, one is promising not to contradict what one believes, based on what one has knowledge of. Tom can be mistaken about whom he thought he saw and correctly testify to it, because that is what he actually believes. Truth in a legal sense is "what actually happened." The aim of court proceedings is to discover what actually happened through weighing evidence. Often (maybe more often than we would hope) we fail to discover what actually happened. "What actually happened" is not a metaphysical substance that exists somewhere, although our mental habits may make it seem so. Reply to question 3: It begs the question to assume that there is a substance called "truth" that transcends perception and experience. If Tom's belief about his downtown observation is not correct, it will remain incorrect until evidence is presented that contradicts his belief and convinces him otherwise. Some related observations: The words "correct" and "accurate" are synonyms for "true." If one substitutes either "correctness" or "accuracy" for "truth" in propositions, it doesn't have quite the same emotional force. To say, "I am a warrior for accuracy" lacks the force of "I am a warrior for truth." If there is a substance called "truth," is there also a substance called "falsehood" or "untruth?" Are there individual truth substances for every perception and belief in addition to or included within an overarching substance called "truth?" Where does one stop in the creation of metaphysical entities? William of Ockham, of the famous "razor," denied the real existence of metaphysical universals, in opposition to Platonic idealism. Old Bill had it right. Indeed, it is the metaphysician's task to prove the existence of metaphysical entities. Even if one wanted to argue otherwise, it would be impossible to prove the negative.Daniel King
September 11, 2007
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4] I doubt that materialists argue that there is a transcendent reality (independent of what we can perceive) We do not so much argue to transcendent reality as imply or assume it, as we go about learning, living and even arguing. (Indeed, if it did not exist independent of our existence as contingent creatures, we would not be here to discuss it – before us, there was something else that plainly existed independent of us and that is foundational to our existence. That extends to the observed universe of contingent entities and processes that credibly traces to ~ 13.7 BYA, thence the issue of an underlying necessary being as the sufficient reasonable basis for the existence of such a contingent cosmos as we observe. And a powerful and intelligent agent intending to create a cosmos fine-tuned for life as we know it, then fill it by whatever biogenetic and diversification processes used, is a credible candidate for that necessary being.) In short, what is, is. We may be in error as we think and talk about it, but that is on the way to learning from what it is not, what it is. Indeed, as already drawn out, that undeniable fact of error immediately implies that, however provisionally and partially, we are capable of asserting of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not. Truth exists, and is for us partly knowable. So, the intellectual duties outlined by Locke as cited above, at 79 [cf. 76 – 77], and 188 . So also, if EM thought has difficulty accepting such a fundamental datum, as it sits uncomfortably with their premises [cf here Plantinga, Willard, etc!] then that speaks all the more eloquently to why EM is incoherent. That brings us back to: 5] the task for the materialist is clear: demonstrate that there is warrant for trusting that NS + RM will result in methods of thinking that [often enough to be trustworthy] accurately reflect a truth that transcends perception. Failing this, resorts to selective hyper-skepticism reveal the faith-based foundation on which materialism rests as it hopes in a reality that is at odds with science and logic. Now, of course I contend that all worldviews in the end -- on pain of unattainable infinite regress -- rely on unproved, unprovable presuppositions that are their first plausibles. In short, all worldviews have faith-points. The real issue is to assess the credibility of the faith points of live option worldviews, across comparative difficulties: factual adequacy, coherence [dynamical and logical], and explanatory elegance vs ad hocness or simplisticness. So far, EM is failing badly on the four big bangs it must address: origin of the fine-tuned cosmos, origin of life, origin of body-plan level biodiversity, origin of mind [and morality as a key function of mind]. So while there may well be many clinging to an ever diminishing hope that EM will yet come through with a solution it its troubles, it is plainly rational to challenge and reject EM on grounds as just discussed. So, why then is there an institutional power move – even in declaratively Christian institutions such as Baylor – to impose EM in the teeth of such evidence and issues? GEM of TKIkairosfocus
September 11, 2007
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Hi P (And DK etc . . .) The thread still lives! And is getting even more interesting! The good news: it seems a Compaq Presario, DV, is on the way – my no 2 choice. The not-so-good: I am definitely consistently in the m-o-d-p-i-l-e, and can't figure out why. But, let's soldier on, as this thread is speaking to a key, usually not mentioned side of all this stuff we have been discussing at UD. [Y'know, stuff on what it means for us to be intelligent, and what the mind is about, and so we see at least a little bit of the underlying issues in the Lakatosian worldviews core of the current debate over paradigms, research programmes and the bests of theories and models in which we do science, as design and associated complex, co-adapted, fine-tuned, functionally specified information emerge as critical empirically well-established FACTS to be accounted for.] Now on a couple of key points: 1] Tautologies again. If we look at the 17 [if memory serves . . . ] basic laws of Boolean Algebra [the laws of logic, so-called], we will see that they are formulated as tautologies. To see that, set up truth tables and assign a full set of truth values to the variables appearing in the expressions. Work through the different blocks on the LHS and RHS of the overall expression and then compare, which will result in classic “all ones” in the final result. De Morgan's law, for instance, is a tautology, but it is nonetheless very useful in BA reduction of logical expressions; indeed one use is to turn standard expressions into all-NAND or all-NOR, very useful in terms of building logic circuits for control, as these are easier to build electronically. So, tautologies are not necessarily “useless.” 2] P--> Q, not-Q so not-P In the real world case, P is often a composite proposition, of form A AND B AND C . . . AND K. So, we may be looking at jointly testing a set of sub-propositions. So, we are looking at a case where one may choose to say that it is because of other propositions that not-Q arises; but in this case the key connexions are DYNAMICAL, i.e we have a framework model of cause-effect chains under certain assumed boundary conditions. (That is, if we use BA to reduce the expressions, we will be using perhaps many tautologies along the way, but they do not affect the material result.) And, as was just summarised from DW as well as Plantinga, the root problem is that the dynamics of Em as a model are not properly able to account for the mind that is required to arrive at even the “conclusion,” EM. So it is arguably inescapably dynamically incoherent, and by virtue of the fact that it is minds we use to arrive there, self-referentially inconsistent. (Indeed, note how DW as excerpted points out hat quite often EM thinkers have argued that we are not thinkers in any recognisable sense – and the resort to mind is an epiphenomenon ends up back at the slipping in of magic into the argument; dualism kicked out he front door, only to be sneaked back in under a different name, at the back.) 3] The only real attempt that has been made to undermine the reductio argument that has been outlined has been to attempt to define truth in terms of perception In general, the claim that there is nothing more to truth than what seems true to me or you -- however expressed -- is self-referentially incoherent. For, having tried to kick truth out the front, it has snuck it back in at the back: “IT IS TRUE that there is nothing more to truth than it seems true to you or me . . . .” The first IT IS TRUE is of course claiming that the following says of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not. So, it is useless and self-referentially absurd to deny the existence of truth. My favourite example, courtesy Josiah Royce through Elton Trueblood, is: error exists. To deny this affirms it, and it in turn means by example that truth exists. But it is a humbling truth indeed – that we must be aware of our fallibility. But then there is also hope, for here we see how we may in fact discover some truths! So let us be humble but hopeful, honest and diligent. This brings us back to DK's comment in 177: . . .kairosfocus
September 11, 2007
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Hi KF, I see I was not very clear on tautologies, so thanks for the clarification. I should have written that having a tautology as a premise is not necessarily a good thing. But further than this, in the specific case of a reductio argument (P --> Q, not Q, so not P) it makes no sense whatsoever to use a tautological premise, since the conclusion (not P) would be automatically disqualified because you would have already guaranteed the truth of premise P by using a tautology. So, having a tautology as a premise in a reductio argument is not a good thing. But again, this is a sideshow. The only real attempt that has been made to undermine the reductio argument that has been outlined has been to attempt to define truth in terms of perception. But as was clearly demonstrated in DK's own illustration, the concept of truth transcends perception. Even if it could be demonstrated that it does not, this too would tend to saw off the branch on which reason rests. At this point, I think the task for the materialist is clear: demonstrate that there is warrant for trusting that NS + RM will result in methods of thinking that accurately reflect a truth that transcends perception. Failing this, resorts to selective hyper-skepticism reveal the faith-based foundation on which materialism rests as it hopes in a reality that is at odds with science and logic.Phinehas
September 10, 2007
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Naturalism [the broader worldview currently largely anchored to EM thought] staggers back and forth between physicalism (materialism) as a general ontology and first philosophy, and outright physics-ism or scientism . . . . there is no way of identifying and accessing the "successful science" which is proposed as defining Naturalism. At most you get "science now," which is really only "some scientist(s) now." And certainly no science (including psychology) that was not Naturalistic in some strongly physicalistic or at least Empiricist sense would be accepted as "successful" by those inclined to Naturalism. Then we are back in the circle: Naturalism in terms of science--but, of course, naturalistic science . . . .
In short, contemporary naturalism, the wider project of EM, runs in circles of question-begging as it seeks to root itself in “science.” When we turn to the attempt to anchor mind in physical phenomena [the reductionist/emergent properties theme] we see further problems, aptly exemplified on the first part in Crick's neural networks nothing buttery, and on the second in the resort to emergence we saw in this blog and in attempts to dismiss Plantinga as not addressing the emergent properties of the material world on EM views:
. . . no [physical] property or combination of properties constitutes a representation of anything, or qualifies their bearer as being of or about anything. The properties of those properties and combinations thereof are not the same as the properties of representations (ideas, thoughts, propositions, beliefs, statements). If this is correct, and if the narrower Naturalism admits only these properties, then there are no representations in the world of the narrower Naturalism. Truth then disappears from that world, because in it no subject matter is represented; and hence it can never happen that something "is as it is represented or thought to be." With truth, knowledge also disappears . . . . Note that my claim is that such physical properties never constitute a representation. I say nothing here about representation (mental qualities) not emerging from the physical properties of, say, the human brain. This is not because I think they may so emerge, although some form of interaction between them and the brain surely does happen. Rather, it is because I can only regard talk of the emergence of irreducibly mental properties from the brain or the central nervous system as mere property dualism cum apologies . . . .
So, first, the issue of reference as a phenomenon of thought: aboutness, where our mental processes point [often accurately] to processes in the external world, lacks an anchor in the properties of such physical processes, e.g. Neuronal network electrical activity. So, there is no basis for emergence of mind and for mind processes to do more than ride on top of the “real” physical ones in neural networks etc. Thence, our perception that we are thinking ABOUT the world and that we ACT into our world based on such thoughts is relative to EM views, deeply delusional. But that plainly includes thoughts of EM, too, and so we see that the whole process self-undermines and collapses, just as summarised in 49 etc. GEM of TKI.kairosfocus
September 9, 2007
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3] Plantinga etc: What Plantinga did was to analyse origins of thought, and along the way to use a Bayesian analysis of the likelihood of a reliable mind emerging from EM-driven proposed dynamics of human [etc] origins. His core observation, as excerpted above in 127, point 2 (the elaboration is well worth the read . . . go to 127 for the link . . . . ):
. . . evolution is interested (so to speak) only in adaptive behavior, not in true belief. Natural selection doesn’t care what you believe; it is interested only in how you behave. It selects for certain kinds of behavior, those that enhance fitness, which is a measure of the chances that one’s genes are widely represented in the next and subsequent generations . . . But then the fact that we have evolved guarantees at most that we behave in certain ways–ways that contribute to our (or our ancestors’) surviving and reproducing in the environment in which we have developed . . . there are many belief-desire combinations that will lead to the adaptive action; in many of these combinations, the beliefs are false.
In short, belief and thought are transparent to EM, and are not subject to the crucial component of its “design” mechanism, natural selection. (The other main design mechanism, RM, is even more challenged to get to the obviously large quantum of functionally specific, complex information required relative to the configuration space of DNA chains of length longer than about 250 – 1,000 elements, but we need not go into that here; cf. My always linked through my handle.) Therefore, we have no grounding for the reliability of mentality [including of course, morality] relative to EM premises, and the probability of reliable thought and belief mechanisms forming on EM premises is low or at best inscrutable [i.e. Insufficient data to get there]. But EM thinkers have to rely on just this suspect mechanism to get to their EM beliefs, at least if this is rationally based; thence, snap! The bruised reed breaks: self-reference, dynamical incoherence, thence logical incoherence. Not-Q, so not-P.. 4] Dallas Willard on the issue: In the DW article linked at 180, we find an interesting set of issues. First, on the challenge faced by a system that isolates beliefs and mentality in general form the “real” -- i.e “physical” -- world:
We . . . want to know if our belief is "true," "correct," "right." [Hilary] Putnam asks: "Why should we expend our mental energy in convincing ourselves that we aren't thinkers, that our thoughts aren't really about anything, noumenal or phenomenal, that there is no sense in which any thought is right or wrong (including the thought that no thought is right or wrong) beyond being the verdict of the moment , and so on? This is a self-refuting enterprise if there ever was one!" . . . .
This sort of radical relativism anchored in evolutionary materialist worldviews, is all too common, so it is worth pausing to note on its failings first. But, more interestingly, DW goes on to note that: . . .kairosfocus
September 9, 2007
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P, DK and co: It is now clear --- sadly so -- from the persistent resort to selectively hyper-skeptical dismissals rather than serious argument on the EM side, that there will be no serious addressing of the chain of inference laid out from 49 on, and most recently in 193 [Sep 7]. So, astute onlookers will see for themselves where the true balance of the case on the merits lies. However, a few observations will be helpful; here's hoping on the m-o-d-p-i-l-e. 1] Sound, valid, tautological? Deductive arguments whose conclusions follow logically from their premises arevalid. If the premises are true as well, the arguments are then sound. Tautologies are necessarily true, i.e they state equivalencies or the like (which means they are not always useless BTW), or the sort of “A or not-A” argument P just cited – which can sometimes be very useful in a Boolean Algebra, logic as algebra type exercise. Most relevant to our case, is the implication argument, of form P ---> Q, not-Q so not-P. Here, as [A AND not-A] --> “anything”, if Q is a contradiction within itself or contradicts known truth, then we have reason to infer that not-Q is so, so not-P is so. EM, for many reasons and in many ways, falls afoul of this, Plantinga's argument being just one illustration; cf. above the link to Dallas Willard for a more detailed analysis within the discussion since Plato, and especially since EM emerged as a significant contention late C19. 2] Re-looking at 193 (for onlookers . . .) We can easily enough see that the issue is not with a, b or c. For, EM thinkers seek to explain all of observed reality relative to the EM thesis [EMTh]:
EMTh: Chance + Necessity (i.e blind, non-purposeful natural forces similar to say Newtonian dynamics) + matter-energy and space-time --> all of observed reality from hydrogen to humans, which includes human mentality.
This directly leads to the implication, [d] what we subjectively experience as “thoughts” and “conclusions” can only be understood materialistically as unintended by-products of the natural forces which cause and control the electro-chemical events going on in neural networks in our brains. (The result is traced in many ways, bringing to bear genetics, accident of socio-cultural evolution, personal history and circumstances aka “conditioning,” etc, but the underlying point of d remains.) Now, notice what EM thinkers often do at his stage: they use this pattern of cause-effect to explain away beliefs and claims and arguments by those they disagree with. For instance, Freudians often dismiss their “uptight” critics as subjects of over-strict potty training. Skinnerians speak about the effects of operant conditioning. Crick speaks of thoughts etc being nothing but neural networks firing off. Marxians dismiss their “bourgeois” critics as class-conditioned. And the like. But, they only very rarely admit that the knife cuts both ways and so equally undercuts their own belief systems by the force of the same dynamics they cite, i.e if their objections undercut the arguments of their critics, then they MUST be self-undercutting too. The rest of the case in 49 and 193 etc, follows immediately. Thence, through point 1 just above, we are looking at not-Q, so not-P. (Note to DK: Plantinga has not entered the issue to this point!) . . .kairosfocus
September 9, 2007
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Oops, the one quote above should have said:
Tautology Logic An empty or vacuous statement composed of simpler statements in a fashion that makes it logically true whether the simpler statements are factually true or false; for example, the statement Either it will rain tomorrow or it will not rain tomorrow.
Phinehas
September 8, 2007
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No valid deductive argument can guarantee the truth of its premises unless its premises are tautologies.
*sigh* Which only goes to show that posting something isn't the same as understanding it. Perhaps the following from the American Heritage Dictionary will help you understand what the above is saying.
Logic An empty or vacuous statement composed of simpler statements in a fashion that makes it logically true whether the simpler statements are factually true or false; for example, the statement Either it will rain tomorrow or it will not rain tomorrow.
Given the above, why would I claim my premises were tautological? You do understand that having a tautology as a premise is not a good thing, don't you? The point of a deductive argument isn't to guarantee the truth of its premises in the first place. So again, are you claiming that one or all of my premises are tautological of the form, either it will rain tomorrow or it will not rain tomorrow (and if so, please demonstrate how this is the case), or do you just not know what you are talking about?
1. To talk about a “low probability” versus a “high probability” requires some quantitation.
No. It doesn't. (See how easy assertions are?)
You have evidence?
Since you implied that you were "awaiting further evidence" [that would overturn Plantinga's conclusion] (emphasis mine) it would appear that you have evidence. Of course, you also implied that you are hoping for more evidence to make the materialistic case, which demonstrates an admirable amount of faith.
3. kf’s quote applies only if the argument (Plantinga, kf, P) has traction.
And you are prepared to demonstrate that it doesn't? Or are you simply trying to dismiss it with a wave of the hand and hope no one notices?
For materialistic beliefs to be “self-referentially incoherent” requires that those beliefs be incoherent within the materialistic frame of reference. Your argument ignores the materialistic basis for grounding belief and unconsciously assumes that your theistic basis for grounding belief applies.
Um...no it doesn't. And not it doesn't. Gotta love assertions.
On the contrary, the materialist does not need an a priori warrant for trusting his beliefs.
You got my hopes up there for a moment. I thought you were finally going to address the pointed questions I asked earlier about your perception-oriented approach to truth. Instead, you dodged yet once again. Oh well. Old habits are hard to break.Phinehas
September 8, 2007
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Phinehas #197:
DK: T"he issue, as I see it, is not whether both conclusions have the same wording, the issue is whether your conclusion, which you claim inevitably follows from tautological premises, has the same weakness as Plantinga’s." Tautological? What are you talking about? I certainly made no claim that my premises were tautological. Are you making that claim? Please show how this is the case.
See Phinehas #186 (my emphasis):
DK: A deductive argument consists of premises and a conclusion. A deductive argument must satisfy two conditions: (1) the premises must all be true, and (2) the argument must be valid. If those conditions are satisfied, the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. No valid deductive argument can guarantee the truth of its premises unless its premises are tautologies. You will advise me if you disagree with any of the above. This is becoming a sideshow. A cynical person might suspect that it is becoming so because you feel more comfortable arguing about arguing than addressing the original argument on points. Not being quite that cynical, I will make another attempt. No, I don’t disagree with any of the above. Why would I? I note however, that the above does not state that any deductive argument whose intent is to move logically from one proposition through a series of steps in order to demonstrate self-referential incoherence must only and always be stated as a single syllogism. To make such a restriction is arbitrary and absurd. It would be like saying that a mathematical proof starting at any arbitrary axiom can only ever have one step in it. I feel rather silly even having to explain this, so I really hope we can move past arguing about arguing in order to address the issue on the table.
Back to Phinehas #197:
And if can save us another rabbit trail, I’m happy to stipulate that what I’ve presented has he same “weakness” as Plantinga’s argument.
Whatever you prefer.
"So, in the case of Plantinga’s argument, because a probabilistic premise is not logically binding, it is not unreasonable to withhold judgment on accepting his conclusion awaiting further evidence." However, I could not disagree more strongly with this. It is indeed both unreasonable and irrational to deliberately choose to believe a low probability proposition over a higher probability proposition. To do such a thing reveals faith-based commitments over scientific ones. The current evidence demonstrates that if one accepts the materialist view, there is a low probability that any sort of certitude about anything whatsoever is other than an illusion. Or, as KF pointed out (once again) @ #193: KF: Therefore, [e] if materialism is true, the “thoughts” we have and the “conclusions” we reach, without residue, are produced and controlled by forces that are irrelevant to purpose, truth, or validity. Of course, [f] the conclusions of such arguments may still happen to be true, by lucky coincidence — but [g] we have no rational grounds for relying on the “reasoning” that has led us to feel that we have “proved” them [i.e. Certitude is a perception not a reality]. And, if our materialist friends then say: [h, an objection] “But, we can always apply scientific tests, through observation, experiment and measurement,” then we must note that [i, a counter to h] to demonstrate that such tests provide empirical support to their theories requires the use of the very process of reasoning which they have discredited! In light of this, “awaiting further evidence” is an exercise in faith and hope, not logic. And such an exercise is unreasonable and irrational. In other words, the reductio argument has sufficiently demonstrated an end in irrationality.
There are several problems with your response. 1. To talk about a "low probability" versus a "high probability" requires some quantitation. Note that on occasions Plantinga has fudged this issue, calling the probability of materialism producing grounded beliefs "inscrutable." If Plantinga doesn't know the probability he is claiming, it is difficult to credit your charge that it is "unreasonable and irrational" to doubt his conclusion from that claim. If you know of some numerical basis for his probability claim, please provide it. 2. "The current evidence demonstrates that if one accepts the materialist view, there is a low probability that any sort of certitude about anything whatsoever is other than an illusion." You have evidence? Actual empirical evidence? Lay it on me, Brother. 3. kf's quote applies only if the argument (Plantinga, kf, P) has traction. So, let's cut to the chase and look at one of several formulations of the claim that you and kf have presented in this thread:
P @ #159 “V. Materialistic beliefs about thought are self-referentially incoherent since following them to their logical conclusion brings into question the reliability of thought itself.”
For materialistic beliefs to be "self-referentially incoherent" requires that those beliefs be incoherent within the materialistic frame of reference. Your argument ignores the materialistic basis for grounding belief and unconsciously assumes that your theistic basis for grounding belief applies. Of course that misapplication produces dissonance and incoherence. And it begs the question by assuming what it sets out to prove. On the contrary, the materialist does not need an a priori warrant for trusting his beliefs. His warrant is experience and learning, which occur when the mind encounters the external world. If I touch a flame, I get burned. That is all the grounding I need for believing that flames can burn me. And so on ad infinitum. All of this occurs independently of any theory of origins. Indeed, by this method of testing our beliefs we learn much, perhaps most, of what we need to know before we encounter Darwin (or theistic belief). In this regard, it would enhance my understanding of the theistic position of you would explain how it warrants your beliefs. Which reminds me of the quip: "Does Plantinga tell his Catholic students at the University of Notre Dame that their belief in papal infallibility is not properly grounded?"
Formidable? While allowing you to score such outright winners? How do you figure?
Small potatoes, Phinehas. (I will be traveling tomorrow and Monday and may not be able to get back to you and kf before Tuesday.)Daniel King
September 8, 2007
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P & DK (and onlookers): By now it should be plain that EM thought has a major challenge, through self reference, and through evident lack of dynamical capacity to credibly get to the generally reliable minds we need to think even EM thoughts. Thus, the redefining of science – a move in philosophy, not science, BTW so if one lives by phil one must be willing to die by phil too – in terms of forces, substances, processes etc that are acceptable to EM thinkers, is plainly a highly questionable move. Then, when one also sees that historically much of modern science was developed by thinkers within the Western, Judaeo-Christian theist paradigm, that clinches the matter on the imposition of EM as a criterion of doing science. It is neither necessary nor credible. Then, on looking back at he main issue raised at the head of this thread, originally in jest but with a serious edge to it, we see Darwin's remark:
“One cannot look at this Universe with all living productions & man without believing that all has been intelligently designed; yet when I look to each individual organism, I can see no evidence of this. For, I am not prepared to admit that God designed the feathers in the tail of the rock-pigeon to vary in a highly peculiar manner in order that man might select such variations & make a Fan-tail; & if this be not admitted (I know it would be admitted by many persons), then I cannot see design in the variations of structure in animals in a state of nature,—those variations which were useful to the animal being preserved & those useless or injurious being destroyed.” [JK cite]
Isn't it interesting that CD here used an example of microevolution at best to counter a general observation on the best explanation for the plain intricate fine-tuned, functional, sophisticated structures and systems we see in the world of living forms? Of course, he had the excuse that he did not know about the intricacies of the functionally specific, complex information systems at the heart of life forms, but we have not got that excuse. Of even more interest is his immediate inference to a candidate for the identity of the designer, and his response of incredulity in the face of evidence of intelligent, even artistic design. Could this be a case of selective hyper-skepticism in play, relative to a priori worldview commitments, and providing a perceived – but in fact objectively unwarranted – sense of warrant? [In this regard, Dawkins' remarks on Darwinism making it possible to be “an intellectually fulfilled atheist” may have more of a punch than Mr Dawkins realised, but not in the direction he thinks.] Certainly, it should have been plain even in Darwin's day, that there are many finely-tuned, co-adapted complex features in life forms that cry out design. His struggles with the eye for instance and the current idea that eyes may have evolved up to dozens of times, are tellingly suggestive that there is an underlying wish to find an alternative to design for reasons that seem to be rooted far more in phil than in science proper. Time for a rethink, I think . . . GEM of TKIkairosfocus
September 8, 2007
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DK: The issue, as I see it, is not whether both conclusions have the same wording, the issue is whether your conclusion, which you claim inevitably follows from tautological premises, has the same weakness as Plantinga’s.
Tautological? What are you talking about? I certainly made no claim that my premises were tautological. Are you making that claim? Please show how this is the case. And if can save us another rabbit trail, I'm happy to stipulate that what I've presented has he same "weakness" as Plantinga's argument.
So, in the case of Plantinga’s argument, because a probabilistic premise is not logically binding, it is not unreasonable to withhold judgment on accepting his conclusion awaiting further evidence.
However, I could not disagree more strongly with this. It is indeed both unreasonable and irrational to deliberately choose to believe a low probability proposition over a higher probability proposition. To do such a thing reveals faith-based commitments over scientific ones. The current evidence demonstrates that if one accepts the materialist view, there is a low probability that any sort of certitude about anything whatsoever is other than an illusion. Or, as KF pointed out (once again) @ #193:
KF: Therefore, [e] if materialism is true, the “thoughts” we have and the “conclusions” we reach, without residue, are produced and controlled by forces that are irrelevant to purpose, truth, or validity. Of course, [f] the conclusions of such arguments may still happen to be true, by lucky coincidence — but [g] we have no rational grounds for relying on the “reasoning” that has led us to feel that we have “proved” them [i.e. Certitude is a perception not a reality]. And, if our materialist friends then say: [h, an objection] “But, we can always apply scientific tests, through observation, experiment and measurement,” then we must note that [i, a counter to h] to demonstrate that such tests provide empirical support to their theories requires the use of the very process of reasoning which they have discredited!
In light of this, "awaiting further evidence" is an exercise in faith and hope, not logic. And such an exercise is unreasonable and irrational. In other words, the reductio argument has sufficiently demonstrated an end in irrationality.
DK: And that is the tack (not “tact,” by the way) that I take.
Yeah, I never was much of a sailor. I'm sure KF wouldn't have made the same mistake, thus depriving you of such significant victories, which is why I'm glad I wasn't drinking coffee when I read this:
I haven’t tried to respond to kf’s eloquent posts (including the three large new ones, #188-190) because I find you to be such a formidable opponent.
Formidable? While allowing you to score such outright winners? How do you figure? :PPhinehas
September 7, 2007
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Damn it, screwed up the blockquote again. It looked OK in the preview. Let me try to fix it. If I fail, my response begins with the words, "The issue, as I see it..." Phinehas #192:
DK: Given that the distinguished philosopher Alvin Plantinga (see my post #123) has made a similar Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism and that his argument is based only on the claim that naturalism gives us a low probability of having reliable cognitve faculties, your argument, being 100% conclusive, looks like a major breakthrough. From the original summarization, which DK is so intent on ignoring: IV. There is no warrant for believing that chance plus necessity will result in accurate thinking patterns that lead to truth. I will let discerning readers judge for themselves. Is this summarization not entirely consistent with Plantinga’s findings, since a low probability could not be said to give a warrant for believing that chance plus necessity will result in accurate thinking patterns that lead to truth? But DK is more interested in smoke screens. Or when I broke the argument down to syllogisms for DK’s sake: Therefore, thought cannot be trusted to discern an ideal or fundamental reality apart from and transcending perceived experience. Have I said anything more than what follows from Plantinga? So what is DK going on about?
The issue, as I see it, is not whether both conclusions have the same wording, the issue is whether your conclusion, which you claim inevitably follows from tautological premises, has the same weakness as Plantinga's. For, if one of Plantinga's premises is not tautological, (being probabilistic and synthetic, rather than analytic) then his conclusion lacks the force of yours. A synthetic proposition, being based on empirical evidence, is always at the mercy of the evidence. So, in the case of Plantinga's argument, because a probabilistic premise is not logically binding, it is not unreasonable to withhold judgment on accepting his conclusion awaiting further evidence. And that is the tack (not "tact," by the way) that I take. Plantinga's premise lacks warrant for producing an indubitable and compelling conclusion. But you are claiming that your argument ineluctably proves your conclusion. And what is your conclusion? Is it statement IV above? If so, what is the function of statement V in your post #159? What you call "nitpicking" is my effort to obtain a purchase on your argument. Since you are confident in your argument, surely you would not want it to look incoherent or ambiguous or circular.
Only a moment ago, DK was a champion of perception-oriented truth. Evidently finding no leverage in that regard, or having no answers for pointed questions, he seems to be no longer interested in that tact. Where will he go next?
I beg your patience, Phinehas, and ask that you not be too hasty in condemning me, although I appreciate that you may be weary of this conversation. I have not lost interest in the topic and will return to it in due course. First I want to be sure I understand your argument above so I can try to refute it on logical grounds. I think it's in our mutual interest to try to keep our discussion focused. You have been right to admonish me to keep on topic.
And one last question for the discerning reader: why does DK seem intent on ignoring KF’s posts? Could it be that DK suspects that KF, preeminently more qualified than me in formal logic, would not provide as many opportunities for nitpicking? But if DK is confident in the truth of his position, why would he only be interested in nitpicking?
I haven't tried to respond to kf's eloquent posts (including the three large new ones, #188-190) because I find you to be such a formidable opponent. I feel that you may have me on the ropes and I may soon have to throw in the towel. Having two of you in the ring is more than I can handle. So I apologize for doing the best I can within my limitations and beg for your understanding as I soldier on. I am confident that you are entirely capable of defending a position that you share with kf. If I fail to answer you in a satisfactory way, doesn't it become moot whether I have specifically answered kf? And if at any time either of you find continuing this discussion onerous, you can simply declare victory and walk away.Daniel King
September 7, 2007
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Phinehas #192
DK: Given that the distinguished philosopher Alvin Plantinga (see my post #123) has made a similar Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism and that his argument is based only on the claim that naturalism gives us a low probability of having reliable cognitve faculties, your argument, being 100% conclusive, looks like a major breakthrough.
From the original summarization, which DK is so intent on ignoring: IV. There is no warrant for believing that chance plus necessity will result in accurate thinking patterns that lead to truth. I will let discerning readers judge for themselves. Is this summarization not entirely consistent with Plantinga’s findings, since a low probability could not be said to give a warrant for believing that chance plus necessity will result in accurate thinking patterns that lead to truth? But DK is more interested in smoke screens. Or when I broke the argument down to syllogisms for DK’s sake: Therefore, thought cannot be trusted to discern an ideal or fundamental reality apart from and transcending perceived experience. Have I said anything more than what follows from Plantinga? So what is DK going on about? The issue, as I see it, is not whether both conclusions have the same wording, the issue is whether your conclusion, which you claim inevitably follows from tautological premises, has the same weakness as Plantinga's. For, if one of Plantinga's premises is not tautological, (being probabilistic and synthetic, rather than analytic) then his conclusion lacks the force of yours. A synthetic proposition, being based on empirical evidence, is always at the mercy of the evidence. So, in the case of Plantinga's argument, because a probabilistic premise is not logically binding, it is not unreasonable to withhold judgment on accepting his conclusion awaiting further evidence. And that is the tack (not "tact," by the way) that I take. Plantinga's premise lacks warrant for producing an indubitable and compelling conclusion. But you are claiming that your argument ineluctably proves your conclusion. And what is your conclusion? Is it statement IV above? If so, what is the function of statement V in your post #159? What you call "nitpicking" is my effort to obtain a purchase on your argument. Since you are confident in your argument, surely you would not want it to look incoherent or ambiguous or circular.
Only a moment ago, DK was a champion of perception-oriented truth. Evidently finding no leverage in that regard, or having no answers for pointed questions, he seems to be no longer interested in that tact. Where will he go next?
I beg your patience, Phinehas, and ask that you not be too hasty in condemning me, although I appreciate that you may be weary of this conversation. I have not lost interest in the topic and will return to it in due course. First I want to be sure I understand your argument above so I can try to refute it on logical grounds. I think it's in our mutual interest to try to keep our discussion focused. You have been right to admonish me to keep on topic.
And one last question for the discerning reader: why does DK seem intent on ignoring KF’s posts? Could it be that DK suspects that KF, preeminently more qualified than me in formal logic, would not provide as many opportunities for nitpicking? But if DK is confident in the truth of his position, why would he only be interested in nitpicking?
I haven't tried to respond to kf's eloquent posts (including the three large new ones, #188-190) because I find you to be such a formidable opponent. I feel that you may have me on the ropes and I may soon have to throw in the towel. Having two of you in the ring is more than I can handle. So I apologize for doing the best I can within my limitations and beg for your understanding as I soldier on. I am confident that you are entirely capable of defending a position that you share with kf. If I fail to answer you in a satisfactory way, doesn't it become moot whether I have specifically answered kf? And if at any time either of you find continuing this discussion onerous, you can simply declare victory and walk away. And kf, I directly ask for your patience and understanding also.Daniel King
September 7, 2007
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PS: Again! Tighter and tighter, Prof Hkairosfocus
September 7, 2007
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All (esp P & DK): (First, pardon the multiposts; I now have a lashup Acer 64 MB that is working . . . while we wait for Tosh) It seems that the net result of the discussion is clear to the discerning onlooker; namely, the challenge and objection to evolutionary materialism as the purported foundation of a properly “scientific” worldview, that it is inescapably self-referentially dynamically and logically incoherent (thus, self-defeating), plainly stands. But, EM thinkers are not used to seeing that, and find it hard indeed to see the point of the challenge, even as they find it ever so hard to respond tot he actual challenge. But, it is useful to summarise. Here, again is my formulation, as excerpted in 49, with enumeration by alphabetical characters and a couple of clarifying notes in sq brackets:
[a] materialism . . . argues that the cosmos is the product of chance interactions of matter and energy, within the constraint of the laws of nature. Therefore, [b] all phenomena in the universe, without residue, are determined by the working of purposeless laws acting on material objects, under the direct or indirect control of chance. But [c] human thought, clearly a phenomenon in the universe, must now fit into this picture. Thus, [d] what we subjectively experience as “thoughts” and “conclusions” can only be understood materialistically as unintended by-products of the natural forces which cause and control the electro-chemical events going on in neural networks in our brains. (These forces are viewed as ultimately physical [i.e. Physicalist reductionism], but are taken to be partly mediated through a complex pattern of genetic inheritance [“nature”] and psycho-social conditioning [“nurture”], within the framework of human culture [i.e. Socio-cultural relativism in thought].) Therefore, [e] if materialism is true, the “thoughts” we have and the “conclusions” we reach, without residue, are produced and controlled by forces that are irrelevant to purpose, truth, or validity. Of course, [f] the conclusions of such arguments may still happen to be true, by lucky coincidence — but [g] we have no rational grounds for relying on the “reasoning” that has led us to feel that we have “proved” them [i.e. Certitude is a perception not a reality]. And, if our materialist friends then say: [h, an objection] “But, we can always apply scientific tests, through observation, experiment and measurement,” then we must note that [i, a counter to h] to demonstrate that such tests provide empirical support to their theories requires the use of the very process of reasoning which they have discredited! Thus, [j, a conclusion entailed by the chain of implications a – i above] evolutionary materialism reduces reason itself to the status of illusion. But, [k] , issue of self referential incoherence] immediately, that includes “Materialism.” For instance, Marxists commonly deride opponents for their “bourgeois class conditioning” — but what of the effect of their own class origins? Freudians frequently dismiss qualms about their loosening of moral restraints by alluding to the impact of strict potty training on their “up-tight” critics — but doesn’t this cut both ways? And, should we not simply ask a Behaviourist whether s/he is simply another operantly conditioned rat trapped in the cosmic maze? In the end, [l, bottom-line] materialism is based on self-defeating logic, and only survives because people often fail (or, sometimes, refuse) to think through just what their beliefs really mean. As a further consequence, [m, key applications] materialism can have no basis, other than arbitrary or whimsical choice and balances of power in the community, for determining what is to be accepted as True or False, Good or Evil. So, Morality, Truth, Meaning, and, at length, Man, are dead.
--> a and b simply summarise the EM thesis, Chance + Necessity acting on material objects --> Cosmos, from hydrogen to humans. --> c to e applies this to the world of human thought, considered as a phenomenon in the phycicalist model of the universe; inferring that perceived deliverances of the mind are on EM premises dynamically driven by non-mental forces; i.e. Mind is at most an emergent epiphenomenon of the underlying “real” forces and events in our neurons, as Crick said. --> f and g draw out that EM thinkers thus have lost control on the credibility of the deliverances of mind, as they now have undermined warrant in general, at least relative to rational grounds for conclusions and beliefs, even empirically anchored ones, i.e the stuff of science and common-sense “facts.” [Cf. The examples in point under k; also, d alludes to Crick and a many others in psychology and the social sciences or even philosophy. Plantinga draws it out in just one of many ways that we can see this; i.e the conclusions are much bigger than Plantinga, though IMHCO, he is right too.] --> j – l state the basic conclusion, and M applies it to characteristic challenges of modernity and ultra- [aka, “post-”] modernity. Observe, dear reader, that over 100 posts later, EM thinkers in and around UD have yet to provide a sound objection. Rabbit trails [less politely, red herrings] and misperceptions [i.e probably inadvertent strawman arguments] don't count. Nor does appeal to “emergence” absent an explanation – as my Russian mentors on systems thinking loved to put it – of properties, forces, interactions and dynamics, amount to more than an appeal to magic. So then DK or any other EM thinker, if the above is in error, kindly let us know precisely where and why. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
September 7, 2007
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DK: Given that the distinguished philosopher Alvin Plantinga (see my post #123) has made a similar Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism and that his argument is based only on the claim that naturalism gives us a low probability of having reliable cognitve faculties, your argument, being 100% conclusive, looks like a major breakthrough.
From the original summarization, which DK is so intent on ignoring: IV. There is no warrant for believing that chance plus necessity will result in accurate thinking patterns that lead to truth. I will let discerning readers judge for themselves. Is this summarization not entirely consistent with Plantinga's findings, since a low probability could not be said to give a warrant for believing that chance plus necessity will result in accurate thinking patterns that lead to truth? But DK is more interested in smoke screens. Or when I broke the argument down to syllogisms for DK's sake: Therefore, thought cannot be trusted to discern an ideal or fundamental reality apart from and transcending perceived experience. Have I said anything more than what follows from Plantinga? So what is DK going on about?
I disagree. It looks to me more like the main event.
Again, the discerning reader should note that DK certainly seems inclined to make this the main event. Why is he so intent on not addressing the original argument KF posted in #49? Or my summarization in #159?
If correct, please identify the original premise in your argument that you have chosen to expose as flawed and identify as well the absurd conclusion that obtains when that flawed premise is developed logically.
The original flawed premise has been clearly stated on numerous occasions. Does the discerning reader find any difficulty at all in identifying it as:
KF @ #49 "materialism . . . argues that the cosmos is the product of chance interactions of matter and energy, within the constraint of the laws of nature." P @ #159 "I. Materialists believe that everything is physical." P @ #174 "Nothing exists that has an immaterial component."
One wonders why DK struggles in this regard. One also wonders that, given the wealth of posts consistently pointing out the incoherence, DK appears to not even know what is being claimed.
KF @ #63 "Can evolutionary materialism, relative to its premises, properly warrant the credibility of our minds and of morals as a particularly important function of mind? If not, does that not make it inherently self-referentially inconsistent and thus irrational?" P @ #159 "V. Materialistic beliefs about thought are self-referentially incoherent since following them to their logical conclusion brings into question the reliability of thought itself." P @ #174 "Therefore, thought cannot be trusted to discern an ideal or fundamental reality apart from and transcending perceived experience."
The discerning reader may also ask themselves who in this discussion has remained consistent and who has wandered everywhere and anywhere? Only a moment ago, DK was a champion of perception-oriented truth. Evidently finding no leverage in that regard, or having no answers for pointed questions, he seems to be no longer interested in that tact. Where will he go next? Who knows? If I had to guess, I'd say he'll probably nitpick about how to argue, the difference between incoherence and absurdity, or some other distraction. Or maybe he'll complain that he doesn't understand the difference between changing and challenging a point. Based on past experience, however, what he won't do is address the points that have already been clearly laid out. So that we may get past one of the more recent nitpicks (though I suspect DK will always manage to find more, so long as they keep him from having to address the main issues):
(There was another question that you didn’t answer. It was the last sentence of my post #183, about the unsupported assertion you spoke of in your post #179.)
I was referring to this assertion: "Flawed premise. OK up to “ability,” but then it gets off track with notions of a transcendent reality." I did not realize initially that DK made an attempt later in his post to support the assertion, though I acknowledged it later. I rescind the statement that it was unsupported. It was only poorly supported and then apparently abandoned, like so many other bunny trails that DK seems intent on leading us down. And one last question for the discerning reader: why does DK seem intent on ignoring KF's posts? Could it be that DK suspects that KF, preeminently more qualified than me in formal logic, would not provide as many opportunities for nitpicking? But if DK is confident in the truth of his position, why would he only be interested in nitpicking?Phinehas
September 6, 2007
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Phinehas #186
This is becoming a sideshow.
I disagree. It looks to me more like the main event. Given that the distinguished philosopher Alvin Plantinga (see my post #123) has made a similar Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism and that his argument is based only on the claim that naturalism gives us a low probability of having reliable cognitve faculties, your argument, being 100% conclusive, looks like a major breakthrough. I didn't appreciate your achievement until you said that your argument was a reductio ad absurdum (post #179). You may remember that I asked (but you didn't answer):
I am not familiar with the rules pertaining to a reductio ad absurdum argument. Are there special rules above and beyond the properties I cited above?
It then dawned on me that the reduction to absurdity might be the key to your breakthrough. If correct, please identify the original premise in your argument that you have chosen to expose as flawed and identify as well the absurd conclusion that obtains when that flawed premise is developed logically.
I note however, that the above does not state that any deductive argument whose intent is to move logically from one proposition through a series of steps in order to demonstrate self-referential incoherence must only and always be stated as a single syllogism. To make such a restriction is arbitrary and absurd. It would be like saying that a mathematical proof starting at any arbitrary axiom can only ever have one step in it. I feel rather silly even having to explain this, so I really hope we can move past arguing about arguing in order to address the issue on the table.
I have now learned that I accomplished nothing by asking for a three-term syllogism and I am happy to have you rely on your original five-point argument. Just identify for me the flawed premise and the absurd conclusion. And inform me about special logical rules if you employed any.
On the contrary. I would be absolutely thrilled to have you challenge a premise. You seem to be operating under the mistaken impression that when you change a premise, you have somehow challenged it.
I would be delighted to thrill you, Phinehas, especially after all the distress I seem to have caused you by being such a poor student. Please explain the criteria I must meet to challenge a premise (as opposed to changing it). Your kindness would save us time and might spare me from further embarrasment for not meeting your expectations. (There was another question that you didn't answer. It was the last sentence of my post #183, about the unsupported assertion you spoke of in your post #179.)Daniel King
September 6, 2007
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