Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

“Put Up or Shut Up!” OK, UD Puts Up $1,000.00 Prize

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ID is often disparaged as “creationism in a cheap tuxedo.” One assumes the point being made is that ID is a stalking horse for theistic creationists. Now, as has been explained on this site many times, while many ID proponents are theists, ID itself stands apart from theistic belief. For the umpteenth time, ID does not posit a supernatural designer. Nor does ID posit any suspension of the laws of nature.
To drive this point home UD is going to put its money where its mouth is. UD hereby offers a $1,000 prize to anyone who is able to demonstrate that the design of a living thing by an intelligent agent necessarily requires a supernatural act (i.e., the suspension of the laws of nature).
Update: Some commenters have gotten bogged down on whether an immaterial mind counts as supernatural. The answer is “no.” If an immaterial mind counts as supernatural and all intelligent agents including humans have immaterial minds, then all volitional acts of all intelligent agents would be supernatural acts. That’s a silly way to construe the word “supernatural.” It is not how the word is used in ordinary English usage and it is not how the word is used for purposes of this contest. Resolving the hard problem of consciousness is not necessary for this contest. Therefore, we will simply avoid it, and contestants shall operate under the assumption I made in this post. Specifically, I wrote: “Therefore, I am going to make a bold assumption for the sake of argument. Let us assume for the sake of argument that intelligent agents do NOT have free will, i.e., that the tertium quid does not exist. Let us assume instead, for the sake of argument, that the cause of all activity of all intelligent agents can be reduced to physical causes.”


Comments
rhampton (42.3.1.1.2): I do not say it is impossible that God could have created natural processes which work in the way that quantum events are sometimes said to work. I think it is difficult to conceive, but perhaps it is not impossible. Nonetheless, you fail to see the logical implication of the existence of such things, which is that outcomes are unpredictable, even to the creator. (And if you object that God knows all through his timeless foresight, I've already acknowledged that, but that kind of foresight is not what is meant by prediction. I am talking about prediction as in the phrase "prediction and control.") Once God has created a radioactive atom, if the account of quantum events which you endorse is true, he has no control over when it will give off its emissions. Why? Because, ex hypothesi, God *designed* that atom precisely so that he would not have such control. If he had wanted control, he would have designed it so that its individual emissions would all be timed by unbreakable natural laws. Of course, if God allows himself to intervene, via special divine actions (commonly referred to as "miracles"), then he can of course exert control over the precise timing of the emissions. But for some reason I have the strong impression that you will not allow such special interventions. You wrote: "One, it’s logical to conclude that there must be a such a thing, otherwise proximal causes would precede into an infinite regress." No. There is no infinite regress, because the world has a temporal beginning. Your revered Aquinas says so in the Summa, and it's basic to Christian creation doctrine. Are you sure you want to continue to pose as a theological expert? "Two, to say such a thing is impossible when it (presumably) exists is tantamount to disproving God (in the Christian sense)." First, I have not asserted the impossibility of anything that is known for certain to exist. The existence of "truly random" events as I define the term is debatable, quantum theory notwithstanding. Second, the last part of your statement is entirely bizarre; God has nothing to with it. If I asserted that something could not possibly exist, and then an example of the thing was discovered, I would simply have made an error in judging that its existence was impossible. Nothing about the existence or nonexistence of God (a Christian God or any other) can be derived from such errors. You are going wildly off the rails. "But I can show that what you confidentially describe is impossible is only so within certain philosophies — at least one widely respected philosophical tradition (relevant to the discussion) claims the impossible is possible." But you haven't shown that. You have produced no passages from Aquinas in which he discusses the existence of truly random events. And if he doesn't even discuss them, we cannot determine whether he thinks that they would be within God's providence. Finally, I will know whether or not you sincerely accept my cautionary statement by your fruits. If you really take it to heart, your discussion of metaphysical matters will adopt a more dialogical, give-and-take, I-could-be-wrong-because-this-stuff-is-really-hard tone appropriate for a theological layman such as yourself, and will drop the magisterial, lecturing stance that would be appropriate only for an advanced scholar from a great university or Catholic seminary. I agree with you that I, too, need to guard against overconfidence in my statements; but I try to not to exceed a healthy proportion between my degree of assertiveness and the high level of formal training that I have in these matters. It seems to me that your assertiveness-to-training ratio is notably higher than mine. I was suggesting that you should alter that ratio, either by raising the size of the denominator or lowering the size of the numerator. I probably will not reply further on this thread. T.Timaeus
October 19, 2011
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But he cannot have predetermined that they should occur — not if they truly are generated by no sufficient cause and he has chosen to refrain from special divine action (intervention) at that point. Thus
If radioactive decay is truly random, then I believe it is well within God's power to create an entity that has no prior proximal cause other than God, the first cause. One, it's logical to conclude that there must be a such a thing, otherwise proximal causes would precede into an infinite regress. Two, to say such a thing is impossible when it (presumably) exists is tantamount to disproving God (in the Christian sense).
I fail to see, however, why Thomist philosophy should have any privileged position in discussions of these matters.
Yes, any philosophical supposition that extends into the metaphysical relies upon accepting its founding assumptions. I can no more prove that Thomism is true then you could prove it false. But I can show that what you confidentially describe is impossible is only so within certain philosophies -- at least one widely respected philosophical tradition (relevant to the discussion) claims the impossible is possible. Lastly, I accept you cautionary statement. Please accept mine.rhampton7
October 19, 2011
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rhampton7: I never said that I knew the cause of the timing of radioactive emissions. I asked you what your view was on the subject. If you believe the timing of the emissions is "truly random" in the sense that I mean "truly random," and if you believe that the emissions are a natural event which require no direct/special divine action to happen, then you believe that the emissions are natural events which occur without sufficient cause. (If you don't know what is meant by "sufficient cause" in philosophy, I can give you some references to help you out.) God can of course "foresee" such events, as all events, even those without sufficient cause, are present to him. But he cannot have predetermined that they should occur -- not if they truly are generated by no sufficient cause and he has chosen to refrain from special divine action (intervention) at that point. Thus, they will be outside of his providence, as the term "providence" is normally used. Just an aside: I am not ignorant of Thomist philosophy. I have read not only important portions of the ST on Creation, but also substantial amounts of Gilson and Copleston, two of Thomas's great expositors. I fail to see, however, why Thomist philosophy should have any privileged position in discussions of these matters. In any case, I do not agree with your application of Thomist philosophy. Thomas did not discuss "truly random" events as we mean them in this discussion; or at least, he did not discuss them in any passage that you have adduced. (He did of course discuss contingent events, but "contingent" and "random" do not mean the same thing.) Your final paragraphs show that you are confusing God's foresight with God's providence, or at the very least, that you are not giving an adequate account of the relationship between the two. I see a more sophisticated, nuanced and scholarly discussion of the subject in Dr. Vincent Torley's post below. But of course, as Dr. Torley points out, there are differences of opinion among the greatest Thomist scholars on how Thomas is to be interpreted. This is why I would caution you against writing publically about the thought of Aquinas unless you have advanced scholarly training in medieval philosophy. Without such training, you are liable to confuse others, and yourself. T.Timaeus
October 19, 2011
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How can I give you an answer to something that, at present (the cause of radioactive decay - that is, the particular timing of a given event), is undetermined? Do you honestly believe you know the answer? However, for all practical purposes, radioactive decay appears to be a truly random event without specific cause, and so we (I) work with this knowledge.
If you believe that there are such events, then you believe in events which are, by an inexorable logic, outside of God’s providence;
You appear to be ignorant of Thomist philosophy. Truly random events are no different then Free Will in the sense that God need not have direct control of them or their outcome in order to preserve Divine Providence. In this view, Judas was truly free to choose to betray Christ or to remain loyal. Think of the implications had Judas chosen that later. Jesus would not have been crucified on that Friday, and perhaps not ever. Perhaps another would betray him in the future, perhaps Jesus would sacrifice himself in some other manner. Now, does this mean God gambled all of Mankind and our salvation on the decision of one mortal? No. Although many potential futures were possible, God's sustaining will and omnipotence meant that he knew what Judas would freely choose before Creation existed, and so it was part of his plan. Likewise, God factors in random events.rhampton7
October 19, 2011
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Your view is that of the watchmaker -- The watch is separate, detached, and independent from the watchmaker. But God makes all things happen by giving things their nature and sustaining them, not merely by seeing (although its a useful analogy for we humans to understand). Should God's will change, the watch would disappear or transform -- that is not the case with the watchmaker.
Question 8 The Existence of God in Things — Article 1 Whether God is in all things? God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent is present to that upon which it works. For an agent must be joined to that wherein it acts immediately and touch it by its power; hence it is proved in Phys. vii that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Now since God is very being by His own essence, created being must be His proper effect; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. Now God causes this effect in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as they are preserved in being; as light is caused in the air by the sun as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing has being, God must be present to it, according to its mode of being. But being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all things since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing, as was shown above (Question [7], Article [1]). Hence it must be that God is in all things, and innermostly. Question 8 The Existence of God in Things — Article 3 Whether God is everywhere by essence, presence and power? Reply to Objection 3: Knowledge and will require that the thing known should be in the one who knows, and the thing willed in the one who wills. Hence by knowledge and will things are more truly in God than God in things. But power is the principle of acting on another; hence by power the agent is related and applied to an external thing; thus by power an agent may be said to be present to another.
rhampton7
October 19, 2011
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rhampton7, Thank you for your post. Briefly: I don't think of randomness as merely potential. A random sequence of numbers, or of radioactive decay events, is actual. If it's actual, then God timelessly knows it by virtue of what theologians call His "knowledge of vision". Here's how Aquinas explains it in his Summa Theologica, I, q. 14, art. 13 (Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?) at http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1014.htm#article13
Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said above (Question 10, Article 2). Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their own causes. (Emphases mine - VJT.)
This seems to imply that God is timelessly made aware of random events. However, it isn't that simple. For Aquinas , contingent means: liable to fail at times. The possibility of failure is built into the secondary cause. However, as Prime Mover, God is perfectly capable of determining that a particular secondary cause should fail on some occasions but not on others. For a coin, failure could be defined to mean: coming up tails instead of heads, when tossed. Tossing does not necessitate coming up heads, but the action of the principal cause (God) on a particular occasion when the coin is tossed may guarantee this result. If this is so, then God knows the result by determining it, even if the means through which He determines this result is (generally speaking) fallible. If this interpretation of Aquinas is correct, then God's knowledge of vision is not passive after all; God really knows future contingents by making them happen. The latter interpretation of Aquinas makes more sense of passages like Summa Theologica I, q. 23 art. 5 (see reply to objection 3) and I-II q. 79 art. 4. However, different followers of St. Thomas (e.g. Molinists, Congruists and Banezians) read him in different ways on the subject of grace and free will, so I'll stop here and say no more on this highly contentious matter.vjtorley
October 19, 2011
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rhampton7: I wrote no diatribe. I made a series of comments analyzing your earlier remarks, and asked you a series of questions designed to allow you to clarify your conception of randomness and your conception of the cause of the timing of radioactive decay. You have declined to respond to my comments and questions, so we can't get any further. I cannot respond to your "challenge" until you commit yourself to a position on whether there are in fact events that are entirely natural (i.e., do not involve any special intervention by God) and yet occur without sufficient cause. If you believe that there are such events, then you believe in events which are, by an inexorable logic, outside of God's providence; so if you believe this, I hope you have a large bank account, because you are going to be handing out $1,000 prizes to anyone here who understands the basic principles of logic and metaphysics. On the other hand, if you do not believe that there are such events, if you believe that the chain of sufficient causes is unbroken, then your money is safe, because all events are then within God's providence. In making these remarks, I take it as a working assumption that you know enough theology not to confuse "providence" with God's timeless "foresight" of events. If you don't, you shouldn't be offering such "challenges." T.Timaeus
October 18, 2011
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Forgive the delay, but when I replied to this comment long ago, I must have accidentally hit the [reply] button instead of [post comment], for my answer is no where to be found. vjtorley, As best as I recall, I said that Aquinas did mean to include randomness in his discussion of contingency, for Aquinas permits only two kinds of causation. It must be one or the other. Furthermore, Aquinas specifically states that God has knowledge of things that exist only in potential, like randomness:
Question 14 Of God's Knowledge -- Article 9 Whether God has knowledge of things that are not? Reply to Objection 1: Those things that are not actual are true in so far as they are in potentiality; for it is true that they are in potentiality; and as such they are known by God. Reply to Objection 2: Since God is very being everything is, in so far as it participates in the likeness of God; as everything is hot in so far as it participates in heat. So, things in potentiality are known by God, although they are not in act.
Aquinas then explains how God can possibly understand contingency given that it is determined by proximate cause:
Question 14 Of God's Knowledge -- Article 13 Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things? Reply to Objection 1: Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which is the first cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are contingent on account of their proximate causes, while the knowledge of God, which is the first cause, is necessary. Reply to Objection 3: Things reduced to act in time, as known by us successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is above time. Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who goes along the road, does not see those who come after him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling by the way. Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be known by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the divine knowledge, as already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes. Hence also this proposition, "Everything known by God must necessarily be," is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the thing, or to the saying. If it refers to the thing, it is divided and false; for the sense is, "Everything which God knows is necessary." If understood of the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense is, "This proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is necessary."
Timaeus, Your diatribe on randomness is tangential at best. From what I have read, ID theorists such as Stephen Meyer and William Dembski do not doubt that "randomness" exists in general, nor deny that random mutations exist in particular. For all practical purposes, I do not see a reason to object to my use of randomness. However, let's tackle this by considering both options: First, assume that randomness truly does exist in the radioactive decay of atoms, and more importantly, that it does exist in the operation of biology (see comments section in Not only is genome alteration for placental pregnancy a “huge cut-and-paste operation,” study finds, but …). Then proceed with my challenge. Second, assume that randomness truly does not exist. By what term and definition would you describe those things currently referred to as "random"? Whatever your answer, substitute it for the term "truly random" in my initial offer and then proceed with my challenge.rhampton7
October 18, 2011
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Well, vjtorley, it seems plain that rhampton7 is not going to reply to either of our inquiries, so I guess we are not going learn any more of what he thinks about either the science of randomness or the theology of randomness. Regarding your comments, let me say that if I were to go over to Biologos, and collect every statement regarding God and randomness and indeterminism made by every columnist and every commenter there since Biologos started a couple of years ago, and then distill the whole collection for its core substantive ideas, I would not come up with as much intellectual meat as you have come up with in your six points above. Very well done! Of course, there is not a serious, trained philosopher to be seen anywhere in the vicinity of Biologos. This is why the people there have trouble figuring these things out. They are trying to answer very sophisticated questions in philosophical theology on the strength of Ph.D.s in population genetics combined with some desultory reading of semi-popular books of evangelical theology. That's simply inadequate intellectual preparation for dealing with these difficult metaphysical questions. You have shown the better way. One must be familiar with the classical texts, e.g., Aristotle and Aquinas and Augustine and Boethius and so on, and one must have high-level training in wrestling with the ideas of those texts. The project over at Biologos must inevitably fail, because the leadership has not taken steps to insure that its team includes people with such training. One cannot accomplish the grand harmonization of science and theology without the "middle term" of philosophy. T.Timaeus
September 19, 2011
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Thats my point exactly. Would you agree that the Mandelbrot Set is the best example of complexity nature alone can produce via C & N via recursive/feedback if we exclude Biological systems? I'd like to hear your thoughts on this and others, if possible.computerist
September 16, 2011
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The Mandelbrot Set doesn't count as CSI because it is entirely generated through chance and necessity.Eric Holloway
September 16, 2011
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An excellent discussion in No. 42, vjtorley. My only complaint is that rhampton7 may use it to jump right into the theological question, when he hasn't yet satisfactorily explained his understanding of randomness even on the natural level. Not to slight your very pertinent discussion, but I hope he will answer my questions first. For this reason, I'm going to defer making any comments on your thoughtful post for the time being. At this point I will say only that we approach these questions in very much the same way. I suspect that we have much in common in our intellectual training. T.Timaeus
September 15, 2011
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rhampton7 Re your offer of $1,000 for anyone who can demonstrate that scientific/mathematical randomness excludes Divine Providence: Let me say up-front that I don't want your money, so you can relax. But I think your offer raises a number of theological questions. 1. Quoting Aquinas won't help here. When Aquinas wrote about chance, he was talking about the convergence of two different chains of causation. His classic example was two servants of the same master meeting in the market place. Each of them has been sent on a different errand, so each regards the meeting as accidental. From the master's point of view, however, it was foreseeable, even if not intended. Now, with radioactive decay, there is no convergence of two chains of causation. Instead, there is ONE chain of causation (radioactive decay) operating on a group of atoms, with no built-in tendency to choose between atom A and atom B (otherwise it wouldn't be random). 2. Now, this raises the question of how God knows which atom will decay next. We both agree that God is outside time, so to speak of God's knowledge as being temporally prior to radioactive decay events would be anthropomorphic. God has timeless knowledge of these events. Which brings us to the question: is God's knowledge of these decay events logically prior to or subsequent to these events? Or putting it another way: does God determine these events, or is He determined by them (i.e. timelessly made aware of them), making him dependent on creatures for information about events occurring in the natural world? Which way do you jump? 3. You could say that God determines these events. If so, how? (a) Does He use a mathematical program to choose which atom will decay next - say, a pseudo-random number generator using a very large prime number? Well, that's fine - except that it's not mathematically random any more. (b) Or does He choose in an arbitrary fashion, for each and every group of radioactive atoms, exactly which one will decay next? That's possible too - but it seems to give God a lot of work, making zillions of arbitrary choices. It also makes the universe deterministic again - except that the determinism is theological rather than physical. 4. Or you could say that God is determined by radioactive decay events. Perhaps there is a genuine indeterminacy at the heart of matter, so that even God has to (timelessly) obtain knowledge of how things pan out from the universe itself? That's interesting, but it raises the question: how on earth did God make something indeterminate in the first place? Did He just say: "Let there be something that can decay randomly, with a half-life of 1,000 years, in a way that even I can't predict in advance (logically speaking)"? Could He make a being like that? Or would it be like making a stone He cannot lift - a contradiction in terms? 5. If the cosmos is unpredictable at some level, then of course that raises questions regarding providence. If events can occur that may (timelessly) surprise God, then obviously He can't provide for them. So at the very least we have to say that He foresees the possibility of their occurring, in advance, and takes steps to prevent anything catastrophic (e.g. an event, triggered by a single radioactive decay, that would wipe out life on Earth). Of course, if God is controlling radioactive decay events then providence is not a problem - but then they are at most mathematically random and not theologically random. 6. Perhaps God uses a pseudo-random number generator for decay events occurring outside the bodies of sapient (or alternatively, sentient) beings. Perhaps He allows top-down causation from the minds of sapient (and perhaps also sentient) organisms to determine events at the sub-microscopic level which occur in the bodies of these organisms, thereby preserving libertarian freedom for humans. That would be my guess. 7. Well, that's my two cents. What do you think?vjtorley
September 15, 2011
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rhampton7: There seems to be a self-contradiction in saying that the timing of an individual emission is "bound" on the one hand, and that the timing of an individual emission is random on the other. "Bound" means tied to something; "random" implies the lack of tie to anything. If the timing of an individual emission is random, i.e., can occur literally any time between 5 seconds from now and 5 million years from now, without violating any law of nature, there is little point in saying that it is "bound" by anything. Thus, your exposition is not clear. In any case, how do you know that the apparently random pattern of radioactive emissions is not the result of deeper laws of subatomic reality, laws with which we are not yet acquainted, but which, if known, would predict the exact timing of every emission just as astonomers predict eclipses? The use of radioactive decay to generate random numbers is of course dependent upon the assumption that the pattern of emissions in radioactive decay is in fact random. If it is not, if there are in fact unknown laws governing it, then the string of "random numbers" generated will in fact be not random but what is called "pseudo-random" -- close enough to "random" for all kinds of practical uses, but not really random. So why do you believe that the pattern is random? Because you have read that the physicists think that it is random? Doesn't that mean you are accepting an argument from authority, rather than reasoning it out for yourself? And in any case, are you sure that all physicists agree that it is random? Are you not aware of the existence of a school of deterministic quantum physicists? What do they say on this subject? Before we can even begin to discuss science and theology, we have to distinguish clearly what "science" can legitimately claim to have shown about nature from what some scientists and philosophers speculate about nature. If we are going to discuss "randomness" in nature in relation to Christian theology, we had better first make sure that the scientists who talk about randomness, and the philosophers who talk about randomness (based on their quite possibly imperfect understanding of what the scientists are saying), are not over-claiming in their description of nature.Timaeus
September 15, 2011
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rhampton7: I did not raise any theological objections, so I don't know why you wrote this long reply. We can't discuss theological objections to combining God with random natural events if we first aren't very clear on what "random" natural events would be, and whether "random" natural events could even occur.Timaeus
September 15, 2011
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To answer your theological objections, understand that Catholic theology agrees with the view of Thomas Aquinas:
Question 22. The providence of God - Article 4. Whether providence imposes any necessity on things foreseen? I answer that Divine providence imposes necessity upon some things; not upon all, as some formerly believed. For to providence it belongs to order things towards an end. Now after the divine goodness, which is an extrinsic end to all things, the principal good in things themselves is the perfection of the universe; which would not be, were not all grades of being found in things. Whence it pertains to divine providence to produce every grade of being. And thus it has prepared for some things necessary causes, so that they happen of necessity; for others contingent causes, that they may happen by contingency, according to the nature of their proximate causes... Reply to Objection 3 That indissolubility and unchangeableness of which Boethius speaks, pertain to the certainty of providence, which fails not to produce its effect, and that in the way foreseen; but they do not pertain to the necessity of the effects. We must remember that properly speaking "necessary" and "contingent" are consequent upon being, as such. Hence the mode both of necessity and of contingency falls under the foresight of God, who provides universally for all being; not under the foresight of causes that provide only for some particular order of things.
Even so, that some things happen by chance (contigency) does not limit God's omniscience.
Question 14. God's knowledge - Article 13. Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things? ...Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said above (Question 10, Article 2). Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their own causes.
...And Thomas goes on to argue that Free Will, like randomness, is by necessity undirected and yet is still known to God.
It is written (Psalm 32:15), "He Who hath made the hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works," i.e. of men. Now the works of men are contingent, being subject to free will. Therefore God knows future contingent things.
Thus Judas might have chosen to remain loyal to Jesus - the choice was his, not God's to make. But does this mean that God rolled the dice on our salvation? No, because he knew the decision Judas would make and so it was accounted for in his plan. In operation, the principle is the same for every random event - though there may be many possibilities, God knows which one will be actualized. All of which is to say that things that are "truly random" are perfectly known to God (which was the point of my 34.3.1 posting)rhampton7
September 15, 2011
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If it is bound by natural laws, then how can it be truly random?
It's not the either-or question you seem to think it is. The timing of individual nuclear emissions is bound by the Law of Radioactive Decay which happens to generate a non-repeatable (random) pattern. This is standard Quantum theory - honest. Incidentally, Hotbits uses radioactive decay - "a process fundamentally governed by the inherent uncertainty in the quantum mechanical laws of nature" - to generate random numbers.rhampton7
September 15, 2011
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*...against CSI (in Biology, ofcourse).computerist
September 15, 2011
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I would like to hear someones thoughts on the Mandelbrot Set and how it stacks up against CSI. I believe it is pertinent and can meet the challenge raised not only in the OP, but satisfy various challenges to ID in general.computerist
September 15, 2011
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rhampton7, re 34.3.1.1.1: I wish you would put things in your own words rather than giving quoted matter. When you give me quoted matter, you double my work, because then I have to interpret not only your own words, but also the quoted matter, which can be confusing, as in this case some of the things said in the quoted matter don’t seem to match what you are saying. Take, for example, these quoted words: "The decay process and the observed half-life dependence of radioactivity can be predicted by *assuming* that individual nuclear decays are purely random events." (Emphasis added.) The "assuming" spoken of may be one made for mathematical convenience, and the author may not intend any statement about the ultimate cause of individual decay events. But you seem to have indicated a view about the ultimate cause of individual decay events, i.e., that they are truly random. So I ask again, and I ask that you give your own view, not the view of some article or some other person: in your opinion, is the timing of individual nuclear emissions bound by natural laws or not? If it is bound by natural laws, then how can it be truly random? If it is bound by laws, at most it might seem random to us, but to one with perfect knowledge of all natural laws, the precise moment of emission would be entirely predictable, just as lunar and solar eclipses are entirely predictable. If, on the other hand, the pattern of emission is truly random, then even one armed with perfect understanding of all the natural laws and infinite computing capacity would do no better at predicting the next emission than a scientifically untutored person who simply guessed. So you have to make up your mind what you believe. Is there a radical indeterminism in nuclear events, an indeterminism in which laws of nature do not apply, or is there only a subtle determinism whose mathematical basis is so complex that science cannot at the present time distinguish it from pure indeterminism? Until this question is answered, it is impossible to decide whether the "randomness" of radioactive decay is harmonious with the claim of divine providence.Timaeus
September 15, 2011
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Precisely. Although there is an observable pattern in the radioactive decay among a large sample of atoms, the reason why any single decay event occurs at t1 instead of t2, t3, etc. appears to be completely random.
Radioactive Half-Life The radioactive half-life for a given radioisotope is a measure of the tendency of the nucleus to "decay" or "disintegrate" and as such is based purely upon that probability. The tiny nuclear size compared to the atom and the enormity of the forces which act within it make it almost totally impervious to the outside world. The half-life is independent of the physical state (solid, liquid, gas), temperature, pressure, the chemical compound in which the nucleus finds itself, and essentially any other outside influence. It is independent of the chemistry of the atomic surface, and independent of the ordinary physical factors of the outside world. The only thing which can alter the half-life is direct nuclear interaction with a particle from outside, e.g., a high energy collision in an accelerator... Nuclear Decay Probability Radioactive decay is a statistical process which depends upon the instability of the particular radioisotope, but which for any given nucleus in a sample is completely unpredictable. The decay process and the observed half-life dependence of radioactivity can be predicted by assuming that individual nuclear decays are purely random events...
rhampton7
September 15, 2011
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rhampton7: Please give your interpretation of radioactive decay. Is the timing of the emission of any particular particle or ray “random”? And if so, by “random” do you mean to imply that the timing is not subject to any natural law, known or unknown? I.e., do you mean to imply that, say, an alpha particle might be given off at 3:00 on October 2, 2011, or might be given off at 1:00 on November 10, 2013, and that no reason can be given why the event should happen at one time rather than another?Timaeus
September 15, 2011
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DrBot @ 4.2.1.1.6
We don’t see boundless functional diversity in nature – where are all the wheeled creatures, all the rockets, all the floodlights. There are plenty of things we are able to design, to discover how to make through science, that don’t ever crop up in the natural world
We're losing focus. The premise is that an undirected search can produce innovation and solutions like what we see in biological life, and that GAs are evidence of that. So we should be comparing the output of GAs to biological life. Comparing biological life to human design is irrelevant. And no GA has ever produced anything remotely comparable to the designs found in nature, which are often imitated in human design. First, GAs are intelligent designs with a random element involved, again by design. Second, they deal in abstractions, incorporating or ignoring details according to the wishes of their designers, as opposed to living things which must work out every aspect of manufacturing a given modification in order to successfully test it. And third, they don't produce anything that merits comparison to any living thing. They demonstrate the capabilities of unguided searches and their limitations.ScottAndrews
September 15, 2011
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I'm using a scientific/mathematical determination of randomness, thus when I say that anything that is "truly random within this universe" I'm referring to things like radioactive decay. This is an important point because I see too many ID proponents who believe that such randomness actually does exclude a supernatural, intelligent agent as the ultimate source of design. Then again, while some ID proponents accept that said randomness does not exclude a deist conceptions of God, the concept Christian God is made untenable. So I object when proponents use mistakenly recruit ID theory to make false claims.
The current scientific debate about the mechanisms at work in evolution requires theological comment insofar as it sometimes implies a misunderstanding of the nature of divine causality. Many neo-Darwinian scientists, as well as some of their critics, have concluded that, if evolution is a radically contingent materialistic process driven by natural selection and random genetic variation, then there can be no place in it for divine providential causality. A growing body of scientific critics of neo-Darwinism point to evidence of design (e.g., biological structures that exhibit specified complexity) that, in their view, cannot be explained in terms of a purely contingent process and that neo-Darwinians have ignored or misinterpreted. The nub of this currently lively disagreement involves scientific observation and generalization concerning whether the available data support inferences of design or chance, and cannot be settled by theology. But it is important to note that, according to the Catholic understanding of divine causality, true contingency in the created order is not incompatible with a purposeful divine providence. Divine causality and created causality radically differ in kind and not only in degree. Thus, even the outcome of a truly contingent natural process can nonetheless fall within God’s providential plan for creation. According to St. Thomas Aquinas: “The effect of divine providence is not only that things should happen somehow, but that they should happen either by necessity or by contingency. Therefore, whatsoever divine providence ordains to happen infallibly and of necessity happens infallibly and of necessity; and that happens from contingency, which the divine providence conceives to happen from contingency” (Summa theologiae, I, 22,4 ad 1). In the Catholic perspective, neo-Darwinians who adduce random genetic variation and natural selection as evidence that the process of evolution is absolutely unguided are straying beyond what can be demonstrated by science. Divine causality can be active in a process that is both contingent and guided. Any evolutionary mechanism that is contingent can only be contingent because God made it so. An unguided evolutionary process – one that falls outside the bounds of divine providence – simply cannot exist because “the causality of God, Who is the first agent, extends to all being, not only as to constituent principles of species, but also as to the individualizing principles....It necessarily follows that all things, inasmuch as they participate in existence, must likewise be subject to divine providence” (Summa theologiae I, 22, 2). COMMUNION AND STEWARDSHIP: Human Persons Created in the Image of God
rhampton7
September 15, 2011
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Neither points to the boundless functional diversity we see in nature, and both indicate comparable limitations.
We don't see boundless functional diversity in nature - where are all the wheeled creatures, all the rockets, all the floodlights. There are plenty of things we are able to design, to discover how to make through science, that don't ever crop up in the natural world - Why is this, why is biological diversity so constrained?
The extent to which the outputs seem more innovative or useful can be attributed to the design and implementation of the GA.
Or in biology the extent to which offspring successfully reproduce can be attributed to what they inherit and the environment they live in.DrBot
September 15, 2011
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Another significant difference between GAs and biological evolution is that GAs do not have to implement any of their designs. It's one thing for a GA improving an antenna to suggest expanding or contracting it here or there. The GA tests the change with no concern for how to actually construct the modification. Living things don't test modifications. They test genetic changes which might result in positive or negative modification or none at all, each of which is unpredictable when the change is made. They incorporate variations like GAs, but the variations require new or modified proteins. They are never abstract ideas but must encapsulate manufacturing, assembly, and function in a single incremental step. That's a lot to ask of any GA.ScottAndrews
September 15, 2011
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DrBot,
But the GA has an origin, and that was a designer who understood that a GA might be an effective method of solving a problem. Which leads us nicely back to the topic of this thread – Who designed the designer and where does the chain of necessary causation end?
We can agree that a GA is an effective method of solving certain problems, but which problems? Before GAs the attempt was to extrapolate all of biological diversity from tiny variations. But the longer and more closely we observe those variations their limitations become more apparent. Similarly, some would extrapolate that GAs can produce significant innovations, but again we see limitations. The extent to which the outputs seem more innovative or useful can be attributed to the design and implementation of the GA. Neither points to the boundless functional diversity we see in nature, and both indicate comparable limitations. That doesn't rule anything out, but there's no basis to attribute more ability to these searches than what we've seen so far.ScottAndrews
September 15, 2011
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@ Joseph in 36.1.1.1.1 (Sorry, thread is too deep for me to reply) My argument is meant to show precisely that point, that a supernatural act is necessarily required *somewhere* in the chain. If you disagree can you identify which premise is wrong, or which deduction is logically invalid?Eric Holloway
September 15, 2011
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GA’s can find solutions that designers don’t, and vice versa.
Not so, ever. Every solution found by a GA was found by whichever designer created the GA.
I would disagree with the way that is expressed but I understand the point. The GA found a solution that would not have been found by a process of intelligent design. But the GA has an origin, and that was a designer who understood that a GA might be an effective method of solving a problem. Which leads us nicely back to the topic of this thread - Who designed the designer and where does the chain of necessary causation end? Of course the arguments over GA's slightly sidestep those over biological evolution - you can create an evolving system without creating a GA, all you need is to create self replicators that reproduce with variety and put them in an changeable environment where they need to compete for resources. People can do this, we know by observation. What ultimate causal factors are necessary for self replicators+environment to exist in the first place - in other words if they were designed then what is necessary for a designer capable of creating them to exist in the first place?DrBot
September 15, 2011
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I'm merely declaring my premises. My conclusion logically follows from my premises. It all depends on whether you accept my definitions or not. If my premises are false, then my conclusion may be false, and my argument as a whole is unsound. On the other hand, if Mr. Arrington accepts my premises, then he owes me $1000:)Eric Holloway
September 15, 2011
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