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Only Those Who Admit the Foundation of Argumentation Will Be Allowed To Argue at UD

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The law of non-contradiction (“LNC”) states that for any proposition “A,” A cannot be both true and false at the same time and in the same formal relation.

The existence of the LNC is the very basis of all argumentation, and anyone who denies it also denies meaning, order, truth and logic. For obvious reasons, therefore, it is not only useless but also affirmatively harmful to the search for truth to argue with someone who refuses to admit unambiguously the LNC. Arguing with a person who denies the basis for argument is self-defeating and can lead only to confusion. Only a fool or a charlatan denies the LNC, and this site will not be a platform from which fools and charlatans will be allowed to spew their noxious inanities.

For that reason, I am today announcing a new moderation policy at UD. At any time the moderator reserves the right to ask the following question to any person who would comment or continue to comment on this site: “Can the moon exist and not exist at the same time and in the same formal relation?” The answer to this question is either “yes” or “no.” If the person gives any answer other than the single word “no,” he or she will immediately be deemed not worth arguing with and therefore banned from this site.

We will start with Petrushka to demonstrate the application of the policy. Petrushka, can the moon exist and not exist at the same time and in the same formal relation?

Comments
Brent, the proof that the square root of two is irrational uses the law of contradiction. I didn't say it "did anything" to the LNC, whatever you mean by that. Also, if you meant just the number 7, then yes, I agree that "it will always be what it is, and never what it is not."Aleta
February 17, 2012
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such as the proof that the square root of 2 is irrational.
How do you know it's irrational? Is it actually irrational, or both irrational and non-irrational? The point is, this does nothing to the law of non-contradiction.Brent
February 17, 2012
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I didn't mean mathematics, just the number "7", for example, being non-material, and that it will always be what it is, and never what it is not.Brent
February 17, 2012
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Also, when I asked Brent for an example of something non-material to which the LNC might apply, he responded "7=7": i.e., I presume, mathematics. Leaving aside the question of the non-materiality of mathematics, of course the LNC applies to math. Math and logic are all part of the same system of symbolic tools. In fact, the LNC is very explicitly used in the technique of proof by contradiction, such as the proof that the square root of 2 is irrational.Aleta
February 17, 2012
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Brent writes, "Then they are having a definitional problem, not a LNC problem. If they or anyone else wants to claim that it throws the LNC into question, then they are just off their rocker." Exactly the point I'm trying to make. I'm not trying to throw the LNC into question - I'm trying to discuss the difference between logic as an abstract system and the use of logic as a tool for manipulating meaningful concepts as we try to understand the world. Logic can be used to manipulate everything from meaningless and useless symbols to very meaningful and useful symbols - it is not logic itself which gives the symbols meaning and utility. (A and ~A) = false is a purely logical statement of the LNC. Any statement that replaces A with a proposition in language is a combination of logic and other elements of understanding. The underlying logic doesn't change - the LNC logically holds - but the meaning and application varies depending on what proposition A is.Aleta
February 17, 2012
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Folks: In this thread, I first addressed a serious concern about trends of confused thought in our civilisation and how I think we should respond to the genuinely confused, therapeutically not with litmus tests. (The stubbornly disruptive, disrespectful and uncivil or outright nihilistic are another matter.) In so speaking, I highlighted the depth of confusion about first principles of right reason that is now so utterly commonplace, pivoting on the concept of self-evidence as the connexion between what could be dismissed as arbitrary axioms for games we call mathematics and the like, and the real world in which we have to live. (Let the puzzled reflect on the Josiah Royce example: "error exists" to see a case of what a self-evident truth looks like, and how we recognise such and put them to work.) Subsequent events in the thread have underscored why the therapeutic approach rather than the litmus test approach, will have to be central. I frankly feel almost like a fool for having to drum home what should be basic and simple, patently obvious truths. But, this is a measure of just how sick our civilisation is. And, of just how deep the confusions in our thought go. Let us start with a basic point, as can be seen in the discussion here on in context: the first step in serious thinking about anything, is to make relevant distinctions, so for each such case we divide the world into A and not-A. (Notice the example of a bright red ball on a table. Or, you can take: Me and not-Me, etc etc. It helps to start with the concrete and obvious so keep that nice red ball you got when you were say 6 months old in mind.) Once there is a clear distinction, the relevant laws of thought follow directly, let's illustrate:
World: || . . . || On identifying a distinct thing, (A), we distinguish: || (A) . . . NOT-A . . . ||
From this seemingly simple and commonsensical act of marking a distinction with a sharp border so to speak, the following follows, once A is indeed identifiably distinct at a given time and place under given circumstances:
(a) the part labelled A will be A (symbolically, [A => A] = 1), (b) A will not be the same as NOT-A ( [A AND NOT-A] = 0); and (c) there is no third option to being A or NOT-A ( [A OR NOT-A] = 1).
Or, in broader terms:
[a] A thing, A, is what it is (the law of identity); [b] A thing, A, cannot at once be and not-be (the law of non-contradiction); [c] A thing, A, is or it is not, but not both or neither (the law of the excluded middle).
And since there is a tendency to use classical quotes, let me cite one, from Paul of Tarsus, on the significance of all this, even for the very act of speech, the basis for reasoned, verbalised thought:
1 Cor 14:6 Now, brothers, if I come to you and speak in tongues, what good will I be to you, unless I bring you some revelation or knowledge or prophecy or word of instruction? 7 Even in the case of lifeless things that make sounds, such as the flute or harp, how will anyone know what tune is being played unless there is a distinction in the notes? 8 Again, if the trumpet does not sound a clear call, who will get ready for battle? 9 So it is with you. Unless you speak intelligible words with your tongue, how will anyone know what you are saying? You will just be speaking into the air. 10 Undoubtedly there are all sorts of languages in the world, yet none of them is without meaning. 11 If then I do not grasp the meaning of what someone is saying, I am a foreigner to the speaker, and he is a foreigner to me. 12 So it is with you. Since you are eager to have spiritual gifts, try to excel in gifts that build up the church . . .
In short, the very act of intelligible communication pivots on precisely the ability to mark relevant distinctions. Indeed, the ASCII code we use for text tells us one English language alphanumeric character encodes answers to seven yes/no questions, why it takes up seven bits. (The eighth is a check-sum, useful to say reasonably confident that this is accurately transmitted, but that is secondary.) So, let us get it deep into our bones: so soon as we are communicating or calculating using symbols, textual or aural, we are relying on the oh so often spoken against laws of thought. This BTW, is why I have repeatedly pointed out how when theoretical physicists make the traditional scratches on the proverbial chalk board, these principles are deeply embedded in the whole process. These are not arbitrary mathematical conventions that can be made into axioms as we please, they are foundational to the very act of communication involved in writing or speaking about such things. Beyond that all the attempts to wander over this and that result of science in a desperate attempt to deny or dismiss actually rely on what they would dismiss. They refute themselves through self-referential incoherence. For instance, just now, someone has trotted out virtual particles. Is this a distinct concept? Can something be and not be a virtual particle under the same circumstances? If so, the suggested concept is simply confused (try, a square circle or a triangle with six corners); back to the drawing-board. (But of course there are effects that are traced to their action, so they seem to have reality as entities acting in our world below the Einstein energy-time threshold of uncertainty. The process that leads us to that conclusion is riddled with the need to mark distinctions, and to recognise that distinctions mark distinct things.) And, BTW, we can extend to the next level. The number represented by the numeral, 2, is real, but it is not itself a physical entity; it just constrains physical entities such that something with twoness in it can be split exactly by the half into equal piles. Similarly, the truth asserted in the symbolised statement: 2 + 3 = 5 constrains physical reality, but is not itself a material reality built up of atoms or the like. All the way on to 1 + e^pi*i = 0, etc; thence the "unreasonable: effectiveness of ever so much of mathematics in understanding how the physical world works. That is, we have a real, abstract world that can even specify mathematical laws that specify what happens and what will not happen. Even, reliably. All of this pivots on the significance of marking distinctions. So, those who seek so desperately to dismiss the first principles of right reason, saw off the branch on which they must sit. It is a sad reflection on our times, that we so often find it hard to see this. I know, I know: "But, that's DIFFERENT!" (I am quoting someone caught up in a cultic system, in response to correcting a logical error.) No. It is NOT actually different, but if we are enmeshed in systems that make us think errors are true, the truth will -- to us -- seem to be wrong. Which is part of why en-darkening errors are ever so entangling. It takes time and effort for a critical mass of corrections to reach breaking point and suddenly we see things another way. In that process, empirical cases are crucial. But, there is another relevant saying: experience is a very good teacher, but his fees are very dear. Alas for fools, they will learn from no other. Sadly, there are yet worse fools who will not even learn from experience, no matter how painful. But then; it is ever so for those bewitched by clever, but unsound, schemes. I hope that a light is beginning to dawn. G'day GEM of TKIkairosfocus
February 17, 2012
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Aleta,
What would be an example of the non-physical world that you have in mind?
7 = 7
I’m not “reserving” anything for myself. I’m saying that many scientists in the field of quantum mechanics have serious questions about the extent in which “existence” as we understand it in the macro-world can clearly be said to apply to virtual particles.
Then they are having a definitional problem, not a LNC problem. If they or anyone else wants to claim that it throws the LNC into question, then they are just off their rocker. But the very funny thing is, you emphatically show that you know this! You put the word existence in quotes! And that you did, even though you are comparing two things that you know are distinct; i.e., the macro-world and virtual particles. So even if existence didn't apply to both in the same manner, it still wouldn't violate LNC, because there is a distinction to the type of thing the word is applying to. Question: Are virtual particles actual or not?Brent
February 17, 2012
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Aleta explains what I am getting at so much better than I can, and I am in full agreement with what she is trying to get across. There is not much I could add so I will bow out again of this discussion, except to leave you with this thought: There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, Than are dreamt of in your philosophy. fGfaded_Glory
February 16, 2012
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Brent: “If I understand you correctly, you are doing exactly what is being condemned in this thread. You are reserving a possibility that the LNC may not hold in the “real world”.” Aleta: "I think you do not understand me correctly, then." He understands you correctly.StephenB
February 16, 2012
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Hi Brent. You write, "If I understand you correctly, you are doing exactly what is being condemned in this thread. You are reserving a possibility that the LNC may not hold in the “real world”." I think you do not understand me correctly, then. You write, "The way your post reads, however, makes it seem that such disagreements actually reflect on the LNC, even while you try to couch your language in a fashion to make it seem that the LNC is unassailable." I am not "trying to couch" my language: I'm trying to make a distinction between a purely logical proposition and a model of the real world using language to describe some phenomena. You ask, "Is the LNC always applicable to the physical world or not?" The LNC is applicable to propositions within an abstract logical system. Any application of the LNC, or logic in general, to the physical world involves a combination of logic, language, and empirical investigation. I am a strong supporter of logic (I have taught introductory logic, and lots of math - geometry proofs are one of my favorite parts of math) and I appreciate the incredible power of logic and math. But as I explained, and as I wrote on another thread, the LNC can be applied to any proposition whatsoever, so obviously the LNC itself doesn't lead us to new knowledge. And I said, although you dismissed this, in the case of virtual particles, the problem is not the LNC, the problem is that the proposition "virtual particles exist" might not be a clearly defined or meaningful statement, and therefore applying the LNC might be no more useful that appling it to "All feebles are gumbles." You ask, "Is the LNC always applicable to the non-physical world or not?" What would be an example of the non-physical world that you have in mind? Also, you write,"All your talk of the LNC always holding and not being logically wrong means nothing at all if you are going to reserve for yourself an instance where it doesn’t hold. And this you seem to do when you say that it isn’t so easily applied to the real world of objects." I'm not "reserving" anything for myself. I'm saying that many scientists in the field of quantum mechanics have serious questions about the extent in which "existence" as we understand it in the macro-world can clearly be said to apply to virtual particles.Aleta
February 16, 2012
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Aleta, If I understand you correctly, you are doing exactly what is being condemned in this thread. You are reserving a possibility that the LNC may not hold in the "real world". All your talk of the LNC always holding and not being logically wrong means nothing at all if you are going to reserve for yourself an instance where it doesn't hold. And this you seem to do when you say that it isn't so easily applied to the real world of objects. Bull! It isn't a problem, ever, in any instance whatsoever, that the LNC is questionable. Once one says that something is defined in such and such a way, and it is "A", then, that's it! It doesn't do anything at all to the LNC if another person disagrees with the definition. It's just completely beside the point. The way your post reads, however, makes it seem that such disagreements actually reflect on the LNC, even while you try to couch your language in a fashion to make it seem that the LNC is unassailable. Is the LNC always applicable to the physical world or not? Is the LNC always applicable to the non-physical world or not? And I don't mean applicable in some "sense", but does it absolutely hold and act as an arbiter of the validity of propositions?Brent
February 16, 2012
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Virtual particles are just mathematical formalisms and do not need to be interpreted realistically. There is no physical evidence for them and indeed cant be any evidence for them. I think its safe to say thet dont exist at all.kuartus
February 16, 2012
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I've been reading the current threads about the law of non-contradiction (LNC), and I'm aware of previous threads on this and related subjects (although I haven't paid much attention here for a year or so). I'd like to provide what is perhaps a broader perspective on the subject, or one that at least adds a few more elements to the discussion. The LNC is a basic assumption of logic: for any proposition A, (A and ~A) is False. This and a number of other assumptions and operations comprise the foundations of symbolic logic, out of which many other complex statements can be determined to be either true or false. It's worth noting that the particular nature of statement A is irrelevant: the LNC is true whether or not A is a "meaningful" statement in respect to the world or not. If A = the moon exists, the LNC holds. If A = the ocean is proud (which is not meaningful because pride or the lack of it are not attributes of the ocean as we understand it), the LNC holds. If A = all boojums tweeble (which is utterly meaningless), the LNC holds. The LNC is a truth about propositions in the abstract, as elements of a logical system, as opposed to the truth or meaningfulness of the propositions themselves as they relate to the world. Another example: "democracy is the best form of government" and "democracy is not the best form of government" cannot both be true, but that in itself tells us nothing about whether in fact democracy is the best form of government. Another example worth considering: let A = X is a point on the earth that is on a mountain. Now surely then, for every particular Xo, either "Xo is a point on a mountain (A) or X is not a point on a mountain (~A)" is true, but "X is a point on a mountain and X is not a point on a mountain" is false. However, if we start looking at actual points on the earth, deciding whether some points Xo are on a mountain or not on a mountain becomes a matter of applying various definitions and criteria, and even, in some cases, of making arbitrary decisions - all of which go beyond the logical proposition A to which we applied the LNC. So the point is not whether logic is true or not (there is no doubt about the logical validity of the LNC),but rather what is the relationship between logic and the world, and/or what is the nature of our use of logic as we investigate the world. A simplistic but fundamental distinction in philosophy is made between what could be called the Platonic and the Aristotelian views. The Platonic idea is that the ideals, including logic, are primary, occurring before, both temporally and ontologically, the material world. Most of the people on this forum are Platonists, I think, and ID in general, for most people, is Platonic in this broad sense: mind precedes matter, and intelligence and rationality, in the form of, among other things, logic and mathematics, informs itself upon matter. The opposite view (and I know that this doesn't really reflect Aristotle's views, although he did have some fundamental disagreements with Plato about this subject) is that the material world is primary, and that logic and math are abstractions that we have make based on our experience of the world. Wikipedia puts the difference this way:
Aristotle disagreed with Plato on this point, arguing that all universals are instantiated. Aristotle argued that there are no universals that are unattached to existing things. ... In addition, Aristotle disagreed with Plato about the location of universals. As Plato spoke of the world of the forms, a location where all universal forms subsist, Aristotle maintained that universals exist within each thing on which each universal is predicated. So, according to Aristotle, the form of apple exists within each apple, rather than in the world of the forms.
Or, as a philosophy student friend of mine said many years ago, it looks like the goat follows the path, but that's because the goats made the path in the first place. That is, we say that nature follows laws, as if the laws are there first and make the world do what it does, but in fact the world does what it does, and we abstract from that behavior certain regularities which we then formalize in abstract systems, which we call the laws of nature. But nature comes first, in respect to our abstractions; the "universals exist within each thing on which each universal is predicated," but without the instantiation of the universal in the particulars of the material world, no universal would exist. No goats, no path. So, in respect to this view, what is the relationship between logic and the world? Logic has an internal consistency within which true and false are clear, and within which the LNC is absolutely true. But as soon as you move from "let A be any proposition" to letting A be a particular proposition about the world, you have left the world of pure logic - like the point X which may or may not be on a mountain, or the statement about whether the ocean can be proud or not. Now what you have is a model, or mapping, where certain aspects of the world (but not the whole world) are mapped to certain propositions which can then be manipulated with logic and math to reach new conclusions. This is a very powerful technique, as we have found. However, the logical manipulations don't necessarily always lead to true conclusions - not because the logic is faulty, but because the model we have built linking the world with the logic is faulty. (incomplete, vague, wrong, not complex enough, etc.) Therefore, after we do the logical manipulations with our propositions (using the LNC and other fundamental tools of logic), we still have to test our conclusions by re-examining the world - we have to see if our model is good, and whether, and in what ways, our model needs to be improved. Thus, logic itself, without this process of creating and testing models, cannot tell us anything about the world. We accept logic and math as tools (extremely powerful tools, with their own internal truths) for reasoning about the world, but we have found, repeatedly, that what seems "logical" today is not so true tomorrow, because the propositions that we put into our logic are faulty. So, and let me now wade into controversial waters, I would say that No, it is not correct to say that the moon can exist and not exist at the same time, for two reasons, one empirical and one logical. The first is that the proposition "the moon exists" is clearly enough defined that I think that the link between the proposition and the reality is strong enough, in respect to both "moon" and "exists", that we have little doubt that logical manipulations will prove to lead to valid conclusions; and the second is the logical reason that the LNC precludes, logically, "A and ~A" from being true. Here we have a good solid model, and thus are quite sure that the LNC can be applied. However, if we replace "moon" with "virtual particle", then things are not so clear: not because the LNC is any less valid (it's always logically valid), but because "exists" is not nearly so much an obvious attribute that applies to virtual particle. Saying a virtual particle exists might be more like saying the ocean is proud than it is like saying the moon exists - it might be ascribing an attribute to virtual particles that is not appropriate. Or perhaps it's more like asking whether a particular point is on a mountain or not - perhaps the nature of virtual particles is such that there is a gradation between things which exist in some sense (however we might define that) and things that don't, and we have to draw an artificial and somewhat arbitrary line in order to force our dichotomous understanding on a world where the lines are not clearcut. In this case, then, if one were to ask if it possible to say "that a virtual particle can exist and not exist at the same time", I would say this: within the world of logic where A = "a virtual particle exists", the proposition is logically impossible, but as a statement about the real world that statement is problematic and uncertain, not because the logic is faulty (the LNC can't be wrong), but because the model we have between our logical constructs and the real world is inadequate.Aleta
February 16, 2012
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FG: You are running all over the world of ideas. Why not take up Einstein's photoemission relation and see what it has to say about photon identity? The photon involved is characterised by a frequency parameter, and if not above a work function threshold no emission. Beyond, energy of released electrons is a function of excess energy. Without the photon being a definable object, and the electron, the analysis would collapse. Indeed, the same extends to the chalk or ink marks, and the symbols and relationships they express, as well as to the observations in the experimental setup. Again, the issues are foundational to reasoning. KFkairosfocus
February 16, 2012
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FG: you did it again. The point at stake is that a definable object A has a distinct identity, and that which is not A is just that -- cf the diagram in the already linked, which shows the grounds of the LNC. The point of the QM uncertainty calc is to show that quantum fuzziness on the border of the moon is well below observable limits; indeed the fact that the moon's surface is made of crumbly or powdery rock materials gives a much more fuzzy border than the quantum uncertainty of location. None of these makes a moon/non moon border an issue of consequence -- the moon is not a significantly fuzzy object, and the stability of its identity is not in question; which is all part of what "moon" has long meant. In short, the issue is one of being "blinded with science," and this is promoted in our day because there are agendas that seek to profit from vagueness about things and claims so that it is hoped to smear out that which should be plain. KFkairosfocus
February 16, 2012
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Can you point to one ID criticism or name one ID critic that in your opinion isn’t ignorant or jealous?
As has been pointed out, and as exists with the ToE, there isn't one solid unified theory. What I am trying to say is that we IDists, although showing a somewhat unified front against evobabble, are the best critics of ID as we are far from being unified as to what, exactly, ID entails, as in refinement- ID lacks refinement. So that is a valid criticism. And the "criticisms" from the anti-ID mob ain't going to get us there. If they wanted to provide some proper criticism they would just show us how their position did/ does it so we could do a side-by-each comparison (because the way to the design inference is through necessity and chance).Joe
February 16, 2012
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Subject changing.
Hardly - I relate your post directly to the OP!
The point is that the quantum analysis on position is essentially the same as a classical one, as the correspondence principle reduces to the classical result for large objects, in this case something of order 10^-57 m is well below the threshold of observability, another way of saying it is not even seriously scientific.
I am sure all of us here realise that the quantum computations when applied to objects as large as the moon result in probabilities that are vanishingly small, and that is why I suggested that the practical answer to the OP question is without any doubt 'no'. However, purely mathematically and physically speaking, vanishingly small is not the same as zero. Ergo, if we want to be pedantically theoretical in a physical/mathematical sense, the correct answer should be 'yes'. Of course I understand that Barry wasn't after a mathematical or physical answer to the question, but after a logical one. Ordinary logic obviously says that the moon (or anything else) can't both exist and not exist at the same time (I'm not entirely sure what is meant by 'and in the same formal relation' but never mind that for now). What I find interesting is to consider why there appears to be this tension between the rules of ordinary logic and the theoretical results of QM (which as we know are very well supported by practical experiments). As you say, this tension is vanishingly small when we refer to the moon, but what if Barry's question had been: 'Can a photon both exist and not exist at the same time and in the same formal relation?' If you then did the calculations, what would the outcome be? How would we relate that result to the ordinary logic that clearly says 'no'? fGfaded_Glory
February 16, 2012
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lastyearon,
Can you name one ID critic that in your opinion doesn’t inherently deny LNC?
Yes and no (but not at the same time or in the same sense . . .). Many critics are not entirely critical of ID, for one. They do offer criticisms and are critics in that sense, but not opposed to ID in general. I'm sure there must be those who are more critical of ID in general, that do not deny LNC, but I cannot off the top of my head think of any names. Most vocal critics of ID will be those with a naturalist/materialist worldview, and will lead them to deny LNC, at least practically in relevant areas so as to keep their worldview intact.Brent
February 16, 2012
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These very same LNC denying ideas fill every single book from every single highly respected naturalist, materialist, Darwinist author.
Quoting myself above, I hope everyone understands what I mean. Please note I said "LNC denying ideas." I of course only mean that the ideas expressed in such books, when examined, lead inexorably to incoherent and contradictory ends. Often there isn't really much need to examine them, in fact; they are pretty obvious. But I certainly don't mean to say that if you search such works that you will find explicit denials of LNC or other rules of reason.Brent
February 16, 2012
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Brent, Joe, Thanks for the quick responses. Joe, you said: "Most criticisims of ID stem from ignorance and jealousy. " Can you point to one ID criticism or name one ID critic that in your opinion isn't ignorant or jealous? Brent, you said: "most critics of ID are those who have a particular worldview; one that happens to inherently deny LNC." Can you name one ID critic that in your opinion doesn't inherently deny LNC?lastyearon
February 16, 2012
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Which comes closest to your view: a) All criticisms of ID stem from denial of LNC b) Most criticisms of ID stem from denial of LNC c) Some criticisms of ID stem from denial of LNC
It's not that simple. Most (or all) are committed to a naturalist/materialist worldview, either because they were duped into believing it with faulty evidence and arguments, or just because it is more emotionally appealing to them for metaphysical reasons (they don't want there to be a God). Many (perhaps most, but certainly at least some) do not realize the degree to which such a worldview cannot be coherent and comply with LNC. Understanding then that the root of their denial of the LNC is more fundamental (and really by extension, no one just sets out on a journey to deny LNC), most critics of ID are those who have a particular worldview; one that happens to inherently deny LNC.Brent
February 16, 2012
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FG: Subject changing. The point is that the quantum analysis on position is essentially the same as a classical one, as the correspondence principle reduces to the classical result for large objects, in this case something of order 10^-57 m is well below the threshold of observability, another way of saying it is not even seriously scientific. This sort of thing is a well established result from the 1920's and beyond. And, anyone who has done a first quantum course will know this. So, all of this stuff about superposed states [a superposition is not a contradiction!], or position-momentum uncertainty [which here goes to an observational zero] is blinding with science. The issue is, whatever that thing is we call the moon, can it be and not be at the same time in the same sense: and [Moon AND-not-Moon be true?]. The answer is obviously not, on pain of absurdity. But, there are those who will sit there all day and try to make arguments, because the underlying principles of right reason point where they would not go. I spent enough time already earlier this week, going through the quantum arguments and why they do not go where they are too often said to go, starting with Schroedinger's poor little cat; including by people speaking in the name of "science." (And BTW, most scientists nowadays are not particularly qualified in logic or epistemology, which is where this stuff lives; in Bohr's and Einstein's day [and in a day of antisemitism let me note: both Jewish Nobel Prize holders for Physics . . . ], it was a different matter.) Did you take enough time to see that and think it through, or are you just interested in wasting time? The proper issue for this thread, is, whether we are dealing with talking point games or genuine confusions. If you have a serious objection or concern, let us hear it on a serious point. KFkairosfocus
February 16, 2012
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Perhaps I can ask a question of everyone here: Which comes closest to your view: a) All criticisms of ID stem from denial of LNC b) Most criticisms of ID stem from denial of LNC c) Some criticisms of ID stem from denial of LNC
d) Most criticisims of ID stem from ignorance and jealousy. The "LNC litmus test" is just a verification.Joe
February 16, 2012
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kf, you said:
Let’s do a Heisenberg calc for the moon. (...) So, using the lower bound that we are about the limiter of uncertainty: dx = 7 * 10^-57 m That would be a lot less than the diameter of an atom! Such an uncertainty, even if many, many orders of magnitude higher, would be unobservable and irrelevant to any real world issues. This is just a manifestation of the premise that for sufficiently large, heavy objects quantum results trend to classical ones. We can have high confidence in the moon’s location and speed, never mind uncertainty relations. Considered as a wavicle, the moon is pretty well defined as to size, momentum, location and identity; thank you.
In the light of this, would you say that the answer to Barry's question is: Theoretically yes, practically no? fGfaded_Glory
February 16, 2012
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tjguy, You said...
even I have more faith in most Darwinists than to think they all believe such an obvious falsehood [denial of LNC].
Yet, I find Brent's view much more representative of the general feeling here...
These very same LNC denying ideas fill every single book from every single highly respected naturalist, materialist, Darwinist author.
Perhaps I can ask a question of everyone here: Which comes closest to your view: a) All criticisms of ID stem from denial of LNC b) Most criticisms of ID stem from denial of LNC c) Some criticisms of ID stem from denial of LNClastyearon
February 16, 2012
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F/N 2: Let's do a Heisenberg calc for the moon. Let's cite Max Born, to see the heart of this:
...To measure space coordinates and instants of time, rigid measuring rods and clocks are required. On the other hand, to measure momenta and energies, devices are necessary with movable parts to absorb the impact of the test object and to indicate the size of its momentum. Paying regard to the fact that quantum mechanics is competent for dealing with the interaction of object and apparatus, it is seen that no arrangement is possible that will fulfill both requirements simultaneously...
dP*dx >/= h/2*2*pi Let's take side motion, and say we can have it to =/- 1 in 10^4 -- we can measure optically and/or by radar to much better than this. Just to see what we are talking about:
LHS: dP * dx = 10^-4 *(7.36 *10^22 kg* 1.023*10^3 m/s)*dx = 7.53*10^21*dx RHS: 6.626 *10^-34 Js/2*2*pi ~ 5.2728 *10^-37 Js So, using the lower bound that we are about the limiter of uncertainty: dx = 7 * 10^-57 m
That would be a lot less than the diameter of an atom! Such an uncertainty, even if many, many orders of magnitude higher, would be unobservable and irrelevant to any real world issues. This is just a manifestation of the premise that for sufficiently large, heavy objects quantum results trend to classical ones. We can have high confidence in the moon's location and speed, never mind uncertainty relations. Considered as a wavicle, the moon is pretty well defined as to size, momentum, location and identity; thank you. Which brings us back to the point: we have an object we observe in our sky and have labeled the moon, being a well known object ever since humanity looked up into the sky and thought intelligently on it. Can it exist and not exist at the same time in the same sense and place, why? And, those who suggest that say QM allows them to dismiss the point, are plainly challenged: and how did you know that the terms and relations and operations in your equations that led you to those conclusions, were and were not in the same sense at the same time? In short, how do you stop the descent into chaos and confusion? KFkairosfocus
February 16, 2012
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I think that the formation of the proposition is what is essential to any LNC question. If one is going to define Jupiter in the ordinary, macro sense, the answer is an easy "no". If one is going to go all superpositional quantum-theory on us, then the proper question is: can the collection of all potential states of subatomic phenomena collectively referred to as the locations where Jupiter might exist, exist and not exist at the same time and in the same formal relation? Booyah.William J Murray
February 16, 2012
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LYO, I think you are misreading QM on that. The moon may be viewed as a wavicle, but in so doing, it will be of such scope relative to h, that the correspondence principle kicks in, and things like uncertainty on position-momentum go away effectively. Similarly, the moon whether we regard it as a matter-wave or a classical solid body or even a glob of green cheese, is patently there; we cannot reasonably and coherently say it is and is not, in the same sense, time and context of meaning. KFkairosfocus
February 16, 2012
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"Some people do this automagically by default of being human." Maus, I know it was most likely a typo (and not a typo either), but this new, unintentional yet willing, addition to the lexicon is rather appropriate to the moment. Aristotle(not): "They were automagical in their denial of the LNC'. :)Steve
February 16, 2012
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PS: When I looked in the WYSIWYG box just now I saw a weird date [Feb 6616, I think . . . this one is Feb 6099, and I am posting the afternoon at 1:29 pm at that far future date], and I have seen boxes that list me as anonymous on posting though it cleans up when the post comment goes through. Just a note to the web master on Bugs/Features of WP.kairosfocus
February 16, 2012
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