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On worshiping the right God: Jerry Coyne asks a sensible question

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It had to happen sooner or later. Professor Jerry Coyne has identified what he sees as an inconsistency in Dr. William Lane Craig’s Divine Command theory of ethics, and after reading his latest post on the subject, I have to agree that Coyne is basically right and Craig is wrong. Consider the following statements by Professor Craig (see here and here):

Remember: on perfect being theology, God is a maximally great being, a being which is worthy of worship.

According to the version of divine command ethics which I’ve defended, our moral duties are constituted by the commands of a holy and loving God.

On voluntaristic theories God’s commands are based upon His free will alone. He arbitrarily chooses what values are good or bad and what our obligations and prohibitions are….

Most divine command theorists [including Craig himself – VJT] are non-voluntarists who hold that moral values are not grounded in God’s will but in His nature. Moral duties are grounded in His will or commands; but moral values are prior to His will, since God’s own nature is not something invented by God. Since His will is not independent of His nature but must express His nature, it is logically impossible for Him to issue certain sorts of commands. In order to do so, He would have to have a different nature, which is logically impossible. (Emphasis mine – VJT.)

So far, so good, but Craig also says this:

On divine command theory, then, God has the right to command an act, which, in the absence of a divine command, would have been sin, but which is now morally obligatory in virtue of that command. (Emphasis mine – VJT.)

One might ask: could God legitimately command someone to kill, then, or would that be murder? Craig responds:

No, it’s not. Rather, since our moral duties are determined by God’s commands, it is commanding someone to do something which, in the absence of a divine command, would have been murder.

Comments Coyne:

If that’s not voluntaristic DCT [Divine Command Theory], I don’t know what is. It basically says that God’s commands ARE the arbiter of right and wrong.

I have to say that I think Coyne has a legitimate point here. In order for Professor Craig to extricate himself from the inconsistency that he appears to have fallen into, he would have to do the following:

(1) show that there are certain actions that God could not possibly command us to do, because they would be contrary to His character;
(2) specify at least some of these things that God cannot command us to do; and
(3) explain why ending someone’s life isn’t one of the things that God cannot command us to do.

Meeting the first requirement is fairly easy, if one defines God as a maximally perfect (and hence, all-loving) being, as Craig does. For then it follows that God could not command any action which can only be justified by appeal to values which run contrary to universal love.

The real problem, as I see it, lies in the second requirement. Consider the example of torture. If the infliction of torture is not self-evidently wrong, then it is hard to see what would be. But now consider a surgeon operating on a patient back in the old days before anesthetics had been invented. Surgical patients had to be forcibly held down during operations, because the pain was so great. Was that torture? “Obviously not!”, I hear you reply. “After all, the surgeon was intending to heal the patient, and the infliction of pain was unintentional.” But now consider this: what if God is like a surgeon, inflicting pain on us for our own good? C.S. Lewis explored this possibility in his book, A Grief Observed:

The terrible thing is that a perfectly good God is in this matter hardly less formidable than a Cosmic Sadist. The more we believe that God hurts only to heal, the less we can believe that there is any use in begging for tenderness. A cruel man might be bribed—might grow tired of his vile sport—might have a temporary fit of mercy, as alcoholics have fits of sobriety. But suppose that what you are up against is a surgeon whose intentions are wholly good. The kinder and more conscientious he is, the more inexorably he will go on cutting. If he yielded to your entreaties, if he stopped before the operation was complete, all the pain up to that point would have been useless. But is it credible that such extremities of torture should be necessary for us? Well, take your choice. The tortures occur. If they are unnecessary, then there is no God or a bad one. If there is a good God, then these tortures are necessary. For no even moderately good Being could possibly inflict or permit them if they weren’t.

But now ask yourself this: what if God, instead of inflicting these tortures on us Himself for our own good, were to ask some human being to inflict them, acting in His name? Would it be possible for an all-loving God to command someone to do that? If you are inclined to answer “Yes,” then you can no longer hold that God could never command us to torture someone.

“But surely,” it will be urged, “an all-loving God could never command the torture of innocent children?” Not so fast. What if God (by virtue of His infallible foreknowledge) foresees that if a certain degree of suffering is not inflicted on this child, he will grow up to become a bad person, and eventually be damned? Would it then be consistent with the character of an all-loving God to command a human being to inflict the torture on the child – perhaps because it would have a more salutary effect on the child if it is inflicted by a human authority figure (e.g. a parent or schoolmaster)? And where does one draw the line between corporal punishment and torture, anyway? It seems that someone acting with good intentions, and at the behest of a Being possessing unlimited foreknowledge could justly inflict any degree of pain on an innocent human being, provided they knew that it was necessary for that person’s ultimate good.

Now, someone might object that while it would be theoretically possible for God to act in this way, it would be epistemically irrational for any human being to trust what purported to be a vision of God commanding them to torture someone: for how could they be sure that the Being in the vision was God, and not the Devil? And since critical reason is a God-given gift, God could hardly blame us for prudently rejecting any such command – which in turn means that it could never be obligatory, which implies that God could never justly command such a thing in the first place. But this objection assumes that it is impossible in principle for a human being to distinguish a vision from God and one from the Devil. That hardly seems likely. And if it were true, it would rule out the possibility of our having a warranted belief in any revealed religion.

One way out of this ethical impasse would be to hold that there are certain things which it is morally acceptable for God to do, but which He may not command human beings to do. On this view, it may be all right for Him to inflict painful tribulations on people, for the sake of their ultimate good (i.e. their eternal salvation), but it could never be right for Him to command us to inflict these tribulations on our fellow human beings.

Fair enough; but then the nagging question arises: why, precisely? Why would it be wrong principle for us to do these things to others, if God may licitly do them? One plausible answer is that it would violate some principle of fellowship which we share with our fellow human beings: all men are brothers, and you don’t torture your own brother. But you don’t kill your own brother, either. If torturing another human being contravenes the principle of fellowship, then surely killing another human being does so, too. In that case, Professor Craig will be unable to meet the third requirement I specified above: explaining why ending someone’s life isn’t one of the things that God cannot command us to do.

Another possible answer is that the act of inflicting torture is inherently desensitizing, for the person who inflicts it: it hardens the torturer’s heart and dehumanizes him in the process, corrupting his soul and placing his own salvation in mortal peril. And since God cares about the salvation of each and every human being, He could not justly command one person to inflict torture on another human being: while the act just might (conceivably) prove to be conducive to the eternal salvation of the victim, it would at the same time jeopardize the eternal salvation of the torturer. But once again, it seems that the same train of logic would rule out the possibility of God commanding one human being to kill another. For if killing someone is not desensitizing, then what is?

There’s another problem with the “desensitization” argument, too. God, being omnipotent, can heal the wounds of the heart. That which has been desensitized, he can re-sensitize. What if God were to reassure the torturer that He would reverse the hardening of the heart resulting from obeying His commands – or even better, prevent it from occurring in the first place?

Perhaps, then, we need a more radical solution. Perhaps it would be wrong not only for human beings, but also for God to deliberately inflict pain on human beings, even if it is intended for the sake of their ultimate good (e.g. to break their stubborn pride and induce them to repent). “Why?” one might ask. Because the supposition is premised on the assumption that God knows what would happen to us if the pain were not inflicted – in other words, that there are true counterfactual statements about what I would or would not choose, if placed in these particular circumstances (e.g. the statement that if I were to suffer paralysis, I would repent and turn to God). But if we have genuine libertarian free will, then it seems that such statements make no sense: for what they amount to is a kind of psychological determinism.

This sounds more promising, but it also entails that God may not justly bring about someone’s death for the sake of procuring their salvation – a conclusion that some believers may find surprising and even counterintuitive.

Another apparent problem with the radical solution proposed above is that while it seems absurd to suppose that there is a there is a true counterfactual statement about what I would or would not choose, in each and every possible situation, there are surely at least some true counterfactual statements about what I would or would not choose, in some situations. For instance, if I were starving, I would surely eat a piece of bread that was dangled in front of my nose. And if I were an alcoholic, then there are surely some situations in which I would find a glass of wine irresistible.

Now, a libertarian might grant this, but still urge that to the extent that there are true counterfactual statements about what I would or would not choose, in some situations, then precisely to that extent, my will is not genuinely free. And since decisions which are not genuinely free are not truly choices on my part, they cannot possibly be conducive to my ultimate good or eternal salvation. (For if I am eventually saved, it can only be through some freely chosen act on my part, even if the supernatural grace required to make that choice can only come from God.) Hence it would be impossible for God to appeal to these counterfactuals in order to justify inflicting pain or death on innocent people.

In that case, then, we have to conclude that God is not like the surgeon after all: He does not inflict pain or death on people for their ultimate good.

So where are we now? It seems that the acts which God cannot command us to do – and which God cannot justly do either – are simply those which are not good for us. And we cannot appeal to counterfactuals about good consequences that would occur or bad consequences that would be avoided, in order to justify the performance of these acts. For as we have seen, these counterfactuals are irrelevant to the extent that we possess libertarian free will.

So far we have only spoken of the innocent, but what of the guilty? May God justly punish the guilty? Surely the answer is yes. May He then command human beings to punish the guilty, acting in His name? And if so, is there any limit to the punishment that one human being may inflict upon another, when acting at God’s behest?

Here, it seems, the difficulty is genuine. For whatever one thinks of corporal and capital punishment, there are surely some cases where the infliction of these punishments brings wicked people to their senses, causing them to repent of their sins. And who among us (little children excepted) is not guilty of some personal sin? (I am not speaking here of original sin.) It seems, then, that there is no reason in principle why God could not justly command one person to punish another. And the severity of that punishment might amount to what we would call torture.

The only answer I can propose here is that it would be out of place for God to ask a creature to perform a task which belongs to the Creator. Judgement of the wicked is a task for God (Who sees into our souls) to perform; punishments inflicted on the basis of that judgement are also God’s responsibility, not ours. Not can it be urged that the State is an instrument of God’s Will in this regard; for the purpose of the State is not to secure absolute justice, but social harmony, and lawbreakers are punished only insofar as they disrupt this harmony by tearing a hole in the fabric of society. For this reason, a pure theocracy, in which human judges strove to be instruments of God’s Will, would be a fundamentally immoral society.

And that’s about as far as my deliberations have taken me. But perhaps I have overlooked something. What do readers think?

One last request. Could we please keep the Bible out of the arguments below, for the sake of polite discussion? I’d like readers to try to resolve the difficulties I have posed above, by appealing to general ethical principles. And now, over to you.

Comments
VJT
Getting back to Dr. Lydia McGrew’s blog post: there is something profoundly dehumanizing in the enterprise of justifying an act by its consequences. For it is not the consequences which justify an act, but the attitude of heart and mind on the part of the person performing them, which renders an act good or bad. And to say that some acts are intrinsically bad is to say that some acts cannot be performed by a person with the right attitude – namely, one in which each and every human being is seen as an end-in-themselves, and not merely as a means to an end. [...] For several years, I have bent over backwards, intellectually speaking, in an attempt to rationalize the slaughter of the Canaanites. I now think it is more important for me to hang on to the ethical intuitions I’ve got, as the psychological effects of trying to justify the conduct I’m alluding to are corrosive: they lead to hardening of the heart.
Justifying the morality of an act solely by consequences is called consequentialism. Judging the morality of an act solely by the attitude of heart and mind of the perpetrator may collapse into modern individualist relativism. In my view, morality and ethics in natural theology are a complex framework where individual motives, consequences of the act to everyone involved, broader social sense of justice, logical support for what is "natural" and what is God's command are all considered. Slaughter of the Canaanites falls into perspective when we consider the kind of religion that Canaanites had, when we consider that the Israelites had arrived to claim the Promised Land promised to them by God, and when we consider the general way conquests occurred in Bronze Age. Canaanite religion would inevitably end up corrupting Israelites (in the desert years Israelites showed tendency to religious self-corruption even without any outside influence) and Canaanites naturally wouldn't adopt the Israelite religion just so, so they couldn't remain in the land. From the Canaanite point of view, politically the situation was an invasion and in religious sense it was a battle between tribal gods. In terms of Bronze Age mentality, it would have been a sign of fatal weakness if Yahweh didn't decisively establish his own superiority. From the Israelite point of view, God's command of genocide against Canaanites was a direct extension to the promise concerning the Promised Land, and fit the general Bronze Age tribal mentality. An alternative to direct genocide would have been expulsion. This would either simply postpone the death of Canaanites as they travel to other hostile lands or, if they managed to settle elsewhere, their folklore would carry a grudge against Israelites (they would even have a narrative of exodus to counter Israelite narrative) and this would become a continuous threat to Israel which might actualize as a war in some generation when Canaanites become strong again. Lydia and other Christians are particularly pained over the fate of the Canaanite children, who were ordered to be killed by Moses. But even this command falls into perspective, when one considers that Canaanite religion included child sacrifice. Had the Canaanites been expelled, the children would have either died more painfully or, if survived, they would carry the national narrative of exodus and become a potential threat to Israel later. Another small thing I'd like to point out is that in case of expulsion, Canaanite deaths would be Canaanite responsibility, which would add more to their already heavy burden. In case of direct genocide however, it would be the responsibility of Israelites to bury the dead. In the end, while it may seem utterly demoralizing for us to read about these things, then considering the entire context there was not much choice. Also, considering the general Bronze Age mentality, it was perhaps not so demoralizing for Israelites to carry out these commands. Quite possibly perceived it differently than we do in our days. Moreover, the price of acquiring the Promised Land perhaps induced the Israelites to value their new home more. Let's also consider what actually happened. Israelites didn't kill all Canaanites as methodically as commanded, but instead mixed with them. Consequently, Israelite mode of worship was corrupted and the land and the people fell into God's disfavor many times over the history. All this serves to put the genocidal command at least into some perspective, if not completely justify it.E.Seigner
September 30, 2014
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Hi Matt Flanagan, Thank you for your post. The reason why I haven't responded sooner is that I've been having computer problems. I'm at an Internet cafe now, so I'm afraid this will have to be brief. In your post #125, you considered the question: "is it possible for a God who is loving, just, impartial (i.e has all the character traits God is said to possess) to command the torture of children in the hypothetical situation you envisage." You considered two possibilities: yes and no, and you wrote:
If the answer is No, the a DCT does not allow the action to be morally permissible and so the disturbing implication doesn't follow. If the answer is yes, then you're correct: the theory entails that torture of a child is permissible, but note: it entails this only under certain hypothetical circumstances, circumstances such that a just, loving, impartial, person who was fully informed of the facts would endorse torturing a child; it's under those hypothetical circumstances and only those hypothetical circumstances where torturing a child is permitted. The problem is it's not obvious to me that torturing a child would be morally wrong, under those circumstances.
That last sentence of yours (which I have highlighted) was reason why I interpreted you as cautiously endorsing a "yes" answer to your question. However, you now assure me that you were not endorsing a "yes" answer. At the same time, you are unwilling to declare that torture is wrong under all possible circumstances. So I stand corrected; but I'll have to assume that you are genuinely undecided on the question of whether there are some possible circumstances under which torture is justifiable. I might add, however, that I find it rather odd that you are willing to declare that taking the life of an innocent child is justifiable under some extreme circumstances, but that you are not willing to say the same for torturing an innocent child. I would like to ask: why? In your recent post #151, you write:
I think you misunderstand natural law theory here. Natural law theory is a teleological view of ethics. On the standard view of Aquinas actions are prohibited on the basis that they procure the common good, and enhance human flourishing. This is in fact a form of consequentialism.
I'm afraid you are labouring under a misunderstanding. Aquinas' reasoning looks consequentialist, but it's not. The logic is as follows. First, universal ethical norms are grounded in our natures. (What else could they be grounded in?) Second, in order to identify what's natural, you have to ascertain what holds true of human beings, or is conducive to human flourishing, all or most of the time - the idea that if it holds true always or nearly always, then it cannot be accidental and so must be natural. Finally, the norm is ethically binding not in virtue of its leading to good results all or most of the time, but in virtue of its being a statement about one of our natural ends. Observations of what leads to human flourishing simply enable us to identify those ends; the flourishing isn't the reason why the norm is binding. You add:
As I point out in the above link, in fact every meta-ethical and normative ethical theory has the implication you refer to Consider utilitarianism: the theory that an action is obligatory if it maximizes happiness and good. It follows from this that if torture maximizes happiness, torture is obligatory. Similar things apply with Kantianism: the view that an action is obligatory if and only if it is categorically prescribed by reason. It follows that if torture is categorically prescribed by reason then it is obligatory to torture. The same is true with virtue ethics, the view that an action is obligatory if and only if, it would be performed by a virtuous person. It follows that if a virtuous person would torture then torture is obligatory. The same is true with natural law theory, natural law theory entails that if it was in accord with natural law to torture then torture is ok.
I'm afraid this doesn't follow. If the antecedent is logically (or by definition) impossible, then the consequent doesn't follow, and hence could never hold true in any possible world. That's the kind of ethical theory I'm looking for: one which makes killing the innocent and torture wrong by definition. How? Well, if (i) human beings are ends in themselves, as many deontological ethical theories hold, and (ii) human beings have libertarian free will, so that it is impossible to say about what choices they would (freely) make in this or that set of circumstances, then it follows that killing the innocent cannot be justified by appealing to (i) the greater good (as utilitarians do) or (ii) the long-term well-being of the individual involved (as Craig does, by appealing to counterfactuals relating to the bad choices the individuals would have made had they lived. The same goes for torture. You add:
It's possible for a person to have the right to do something and yet still not do it due to a just disposition... One can claim that it's logically impossible for God to issue unjust commands without claiming he is under an obligation or duty to refrain from doing so.
I'm afraid this doesn't make sense, if we're talking about moral rights (as I assume we are). By the way, your example relating to the New Zealand parliament is not germane here, as it relates to legal rights as opposed to moral rights. If I have a moral right to do something then by definition, I do not act unjustly if I do it. And if a command would be unjust for God to issue, then by definition, it would be unjust to someone. In that case, someone is wronged by that command, and God has a moral duty to that person, not to issue that command. Well, my time is up. Got to go.vjtorley
September 30, 2014
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Jerry can not demonstrate: “But everything no matter how unpleasant one can describe it or think of it, is finite while the Christian God offers everyone something that dwarfs all the unpleasantness ever suffered by everyone.
I can demonstrate that all so called evils are finite. It is part of Christianity that there is an infinite reward. That can be demonstrated too. The purpose of the statement is to show that Coyne can not use so called evil happenings against the Christian God. This is the theodicy issue. The theodicy issue fails against the Christian God by logic. He can argue against another type of God but not the Christian God. One can say that I have not demonstrated there is a Christian God, but that was not the question. But given the Christian God and the fact that all so called evils are finite, the theodicy argument fails.jerry
September 26, 2014
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Vj Torley. I think you have misread what I wrote above. You state
What you’ve just acknowledged is that the torture of an innocent child is not intrinsically immoral. It may be immoral in 99.999999999% of all possible situations, and it may even be immoral in 100% of all actual situations, but it isn’t immoral under all possible circumstances. And by extension, the same conclusion goes for any harmful or degrading that one human being might inflict on another: detonating a bomb in a crowded theater, for instance, or even raping someone. Theoretically, such an act could be justified, if Dr. Craig’s logic is correct.
But that’s not what I said at all, above I proposed a dilemma: I said either its is possible for a loving and just fully informed virtuous impartial person to demand I torture a child or this is not possible. If the latter a DCT, does not entail that God could command this. If the former then torture is not intrinsically wrong because there are possible situations where knowingly commanding it is compatible with being loving, just virtuous and so on. Note the conditionals here.As you’ll know, claiming that one thing follows if another is true does not commit me to claiming the antecedent of this conditional is true nor does claiming that one thing is the case or the other is does not commit me to holding either disjunct. So I never claimed it was possible for a loving and just person to endorse those actions, nor did I claim it was possible for them to be not wrong.
At first sight, it seems eminently reasonable to say that an action is right if it’s the sort of action that an all-just, all-loving, impartial and omniscient person would endorse. Who could argue with that? But what’s doing the work here is what the omniscient person knows: namely, the consequences of the action, given the choices that this particular person in this particular situation would make. ...It’s not just the loving, virtuous character of the person that determines the morality of the action; it’s also the information about the consequences of the act, given the choices that the people affected by the act would make, which determines whether the act is right or wrong.
This is simply a non sequitur, it does not follow from the claim that an action is endorsed by an all-just, all-loving, virtous, impartial and omniscient person would endorse an action that, the person endorses it because of its consequences. Obviously an omniscient person will know all the consequences, as well as every other non-moral fact, but whether these facts are what determines the decision will depend on whether or not they are relevant to a person who has the character traits in question. No substantive claim about whether that is the case or not is entailed by the concept of a loving and just person.
In other words, deontological natural law is out the window: we can no longer look at an act and say that by its very nature, such an act is bad (or good). Instead, what we have is a God’s-eye version of consequentialism and situation ethics. At least from God’s perspective, acts – no matter how heinous they may appear to be – can be justified by appealing to the long-term consequences, which means that as far as God is concerned, the end justifies the means.... there can be no universal moral norms – only general indicators. At best, all we can say is that there is a very strong presumption that this kind of act (e.g. torture of the innocent) is wrong, and that it can only be justified in very exceptional circumstances.
As I note above the fact an act is endorsed by a “loving and just, virtuous fully informed rational person doesn’t entail its endorsed solely because of its consequences. But even if it did, your suggestion this entails situationism and there are only “general indicators” is false. First there are other consequentialist theories such as rule utilitarianism which allow for universal and absolute rules which don’t have the situationist consquences you mention, these rules can be as strong as any Kantian account is. And second there is a modal confusion here. If it’s possible that a loving and just person could endorse torture, then it follows there is a possible world in which torture is right. It doesn’t follow that there are situations in the actual world where he does so, it could still be the case that in the actual world a loving and just person would never endorse it which would entail it was absolutely prohibited in the actual world. Thirdly, I think you misunderstand natural law theory here. Natural law theory is a teleological view of ethics. On the standard view of Aquinas actions are prohibited on the basis that they procure the common good, and enhance human flourishing. This is in fact a form of consequentialism. What I think you are suggesting here is that Kantian type theories are ruled out, but even this doesn't follow. On a standard deontological Kantian view, moral requirements are categorical requirements of reason. So, unless you have already ruled Kantianism out as false from the outset, it doesn’t follow that a perfectly rational person will not endorse Kantian style deontological rules.
Now that I have come to realize that Dr. William Lane Craig’s version of the Divine Command theory of ethics allows for the theoretical possibility of God’s commanding one person to torture another human being, I feel obliged to publicly oppose it. On a personal level, I will say that the believing that torture could be justified, and being mentally and emotionally prepared to inflict torture if commanded by God to do so, is profoundly dehumanizing – and demoralizing as well. Don’t believe me? Just try walking around for a day, telling yourself, “If God were to command me to torture someone, then yes, I would do it.” You’ll go bananas, and you’ll lose your moral sensitivity in the process.
I have rebutted that argument here. http://www.mandm.org.nz/2013/02/divine-commands-and-psychopathic-tendencies.html. Its incoherent. But, First as I noted above, I never allowed for the possibility that God could command torture. I simply looked at what followed if a being with the attributes he has did. Second, As I point out in the above link, in fact every meta-ethical and normative ethical theory has the implication you refer to Consider utilitarianism: the theory that an action is obligatory if it maximizes happiness and good. It follows from this that if torture maximizes happiness, torture is obligatory. Similar things apply with Kantianism: the view that an action is obligatory if and only if it is categorically prescribed by reason. It follows that if torture is categorically prescribed by reason then it is obligatory to torture. The same is true with virtue ethics, the view that an action is obligatory if and only if, it would be performed by a virtuous person. It follows that if a virtuous person would torture then torture is obligatory. The same is true with natural law theory, natural law theory entails that if it was in accord with natural law to torture then torture is ok. Let P be any property one considers to be identical with the property of being obligatory. It will be true that this meta-ethical theory entails that if P is possessed by the action torturing children then torturing children is obligatory.
And to say that some acts are intrinsically bad is to say that some acts cannot be performed by a person with the right attitude – namely, one in which each and every human being is seen as an end-in-themselves, and not merely as a means to an end.
This actually undermines your objection. Remember we are talking about wether its possible for God, a perfectly virtuous, fully informed rational person would command torture. If God is perfectly virtuous, then anything he endorses will by definition be performed by a person with the right attitude. So if its impossible for a person with the right attitude to endorse torture its impossible for God to command it, on a non voluntaristic DCT. On the otherhand if there are possible circumstances in which God would command torture (as you argue) then its possible for a person who has the right attitude to command torture and so it’s not intrinsically wrong by your own definition.
But it does mean that it is not God’s prerogative to do with us as He thinks fit. If He were to annihilate us, for instance, that would not only be unloving but also unjust.
This doesn’t refute Craig because Craig’s theory is that our duties are constituted by what a loving and just God would command so he would agree that God can’t act unjustly. Where I think the issue lies is whether this claim is incompatible with the claim that he has a prerogative to do whatever he likes, and this seems to be to be false. Its possible for a person to have the right to do something and yet still not do it due to a just disposition. Consider a parliamentary democracy like New Zealand or the UK, which has a relatively just laws. Such a government is clearly possible. Now given this parliament has just laws, it follows the government is just and acts justly and with reasonable restraint, it may well be unthinkable for any ruling party in such a system to seriously consider say arbitrary execution of political opponents. Yet it will still be true that under the rule of parliamentary sovereignty parliament have the legal right to pass any law they like, that’s there prerogative. This shows its possible for a person ( or legal person) to be both (a) just and (b) have a prerogative to do what they like.
It isn’t just Dr. Craig I disagree with here; it’s also St. Thomas Aquinas. In his Summa Theologica I-II q. 94 art. 5,… Although Aquinas does not say so, the above logic would justify rape (forced sex) as well, at the command of God. The ethically poisonous premise underlying Aquinas’ logic here is that everything – people, spouses and goods – belongs to God, Who can dispose of what He owns as He thinks fit. But if we are not God’s chattels, but God’s children, then not only could God never command rape, but He would be acting unjustly if He did so – and we would also be acting unjustly, if we carried out His command.
Sure, there is a long tradition of interpretation which states God can, on rare occasions, grant exemptions to the moral rule against killing the innocent. : Augustine, Bernard of Clairvaux, Duns Scotus, Gabriel Biel, William of Ockham, John Calvin, Francis Turretin, Peirre d’Ailly, and Paul Althaus all held that God could grant dispensations from the divine law. But note again your misrepresenting Craig as claiming that God can treat us however he likes even if doing so is unjust. That’s the kind of voluntaristic DCT he doesn’t hold. Craig’s view is that while God has no duty to treat us anyway, because he is essentially loving and just its logically impossible for him to issue cruel or unjust commands. That’s why he states explicitly that God cant issue a general command that killing is permissible, or issue commands that contradict the notion that killing is in most normal circumstances wrong. His position is that because God is loving and just he could only exempt an individual from the obligation of the law on highly unusual situations where there was some greater good at stake. The claim that its logically impossible for God to do X is different from the claim it violates a duty for God to do X. This is what people like Coyne, Harris and others who press this argument fail to grasp. One can claim that Gits logically impossible for God to issue unjust commands without claiming he is under an obligation or duty to refrain from doing so.Matthew Flannagan
September 24, 2014
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Silver Asiatic: But you can exit the game any time you want and your debt is wiped out.
No you can't. Once you join the game, it's like strapping yourself into a roller coaster. You have to see the game through to the end, although there are ways of shortening your participation, and thereby "getting off" earlier. Love, compassion, service for others, are ways of achieving that. Some souls do not want to leave the game early. Some do. It may take many incarnations are various levels to achieve. But you joined the game and agreed to see it through to your completion. Everyone did. Knowing the joys and dangers that you will inevitably encounter.Vishnu
September 24, 2014
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You would seek to love if you were seeking to shorten your Karmic “debt” within the game.
But you can exit the game any time you want and your debt is wiped out. For those suffering severely, life is not fun. For those not suffering, there apparently is no karmic debt to shorten, thus no reason to love anyone. It also risks making love utilitarian. We would love for the sake of debt-reduction. There's no way to check what the precise debt-balance is either. If I have a low balance, it can be paid off easily - thus, no reason to do anything more for anyone else. I don't think this gets rid of the problem of evil. There's still a balance sheet with lots of inequality and injustice and no way for anyone living to know how much they owe or how much benefit they get from helping someone else. The fact that it's a game meant for amusement removes any real incentives. In cosmological terms, the game had to come from somewhere. The rules came from a rule-maker. The system of debts and payments had some origin.Silver Asiatic
September 24, 2014
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Silver Asiatic, If they’re irrelevant and ultimately, nobody cares – then its a game with no ultimate meaning.
There is no ultimate meaning, except that it's fun and frightening and interesting. Like a roller coaster. And nobody is forced to participate. Once you join the game they have to see it all the way through, sort of like strapping in to a roller coaster.
I don’t think you can say people should be compassionate and “if there is a Prime Directive of Brahman” it is to love your neighbor as yourself — and at the same time say it’s ultimately irrelevant and nobody cares.
The effects of Karma are part of the game. Love shortens one's Karma. You could say that a big part of the game is to experiences various things then get to the point of wanting to undo your Karmic inbalance. But only if you chooses. You can choose to do harm and increase your Karmic "debt" within the game. This is your choice also.
I mean you can say it, but if the game is irrelevant, then there is reason to follow the directive. If you’ve chosen to live in this dangerous world, the consequences are yours. Ultimately, I would have no need or reason to help you.
You would seek to love if you were seeking to shorten your Karmic "debt" within the game. The game lasts a long time. Eventually it ends for all souls and there return to Brahman, because you are Brahman. Then a new game begins.Vishnu
September 24, 2014
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Thanks, Querius!Silver Asiatic
September 24, 2014
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Vishnu #140 I said:
If there’s no problem of evil, then there’s no reason to remedy evils.
It was in response to your comments:
the moral rules while here ... are ultimately irrelevant But when the game is over, there is nobody to “blame”, because cause ultimately, nobody “cares.”
If they're irrelevant and ultimately, nobody cares - then its a game with no ultimate meaning. I don't think you can say people should be compassionate and "if there is a Prime Directive of Brahman" it is to love your neighbor as yourself -- and at the same time say it's ultimately irrelevant and nobody cares. I mean you can say it, but if the game is irrelevant, then there is reason to follow the directive. If you've chosen to live in this dangerous world, the consequences are yours. Ultimately, I would have no need or reason to help you.Silver Asiatic
September 24, 2014
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Hi Matthew Flanagan, Thank you for your response. You make a rather startling admission in your post, when you acknowledge the possibility that "under certain hypothetical circumstances, circumstances such that a just, loving, impartial, person who was fully informed of the facts would endorse torturing a child, it's under those hypothetical circumstances and only those hypothetical circumstances where torturing a child is permitted." You add that it's "not obvious to me that torturing a child would be morally wrong, under those circumstances." Finally, you argue that "[t]he reason we oppose torturing children in the real world is because we believe in the real world these circumstances don't hold." What you've just acknowledged is that the torture of an innocent child is not intrinsically immoral. It may be immoral in 99.999999999% of all possible situations, and it may even be immoral in 100% of all actual situations, but it isn't immoral under all possible circumstances. And by extension, the same conclusion goes for any harmful or degrading that one human being might inflict on another: detonating a bomb in a crowded theater, for instance, or even raping someone. Theoretically, such an act could be justified, if Dr. Craig's logic is correct. Now at this point you might ask: "Does this matter? You and I both now that in real life, God is never going to ask us to do any of these things anyway." True. But the real point at stake here is what makes an act morally justifiable. You evidently believe that an action is justified if it is endorsed by a "just, loving, impartial, person who was fully informed of the facts," where "the facts" include the long-term (spiritual) consequences for that person, after taking into account the choices that he/she would make if the action were carried out. At first sight, it seems eminently reasonable to say that an action is right if it's the sort of action that an all-just, all-loving, impartial and omniscient person would endorse. Who could argue with that? But what's doing the work here is what the omniscient person knows: namely, the consequences of the action, given the choices that this particular person in this particular situation would make. Consequences and counterfactuals relating to a particular person in a particular situation - that's what determines the morality of the action. And that is the vital point which you miss when you contend that Craig's version of the Divine Command Theory of ethics is in trouble only if I can show that "it's possible both for an action to be (a) endorsed by a fully informed, virtous, rational person who is loving and just and (b) morally wrong." It's not just the loving, virtuous character of the person that determines the morality of the action; it's also the information about the consequences of the act, given the choices that the people affected by the act would make, which determines whether the act is right or wrong. In other words, deontological natural law is out the window: we can no longer look at an act and say that by its very nature, such an act is bad (or good). Instead, what we have is a God's-eye version of consequentialism and situation ethics. At least from God's perspective, acts - no matter how heinous they may appear to be - can be justified by appealing to the long-term consequences, which means that as far as God is concerned, the end justifies the means. Also, since the consequences of an act vary dramatically from one person to another (because the choices you would make are likely to be very different from the choices I would make), there can be no universal moral norms - only general indicators. At best, all we can say is that there is a very strong presumption that this kind of act (e.g. torture of the innocent) is wrong, and that it can only be justified in very exceptional circumstances. My point is that if we accept this conclusion, then we no longer have a theory of natural law ethics; we just have a bunch of general guidelines, which we're willing to jettison if reliable information comes to hand that they need to be jettisoned. The "reliable information" in question would presumably be a series of revelations from the Almighty, or one of His angels. And while these revelations might be public signs, they need not be, in principle: they could be private visions which the seer found totally convincing (perhaps because of the uncanny accuracy of the information that was communicated in those visions). Now, I have been down this path. Just a couple of weeks ago, Dr. Lydia McGrew wrote an excellent piece on her blog, "Extra Thoughts," titled, "No magic bullet--Copan's insufficient answer to the slaughter of the Canaanites" at http://lydiaswebpage.blogspot.com/2014/08/no-magic-bullet-copans-insufficient.html (Friday, August 22, 2014). In the course of defending the morality of the slaughter in that one-off situation (see the comments on the post), I was even willing to argue that consequentialism, from a God's-eye point of view, might be OK, and that for God at least, the end justifies the means. I also pointed out that we could surely envisage fates worse than death, and that the killing of innocents could conceivably be justified in cases where one was certain - and with good reason (e.g. a revelation from on high) - that an even worse fate would befall these innocents, were they to live. I was not willing, however, to consider the possibility that God could ever command the torture of innocent human beings - which is why I stipulated that if they were killed at God's behest, then God must have somehow rendered them unconscious, so that they experienced neither pain nor dread when they were killed. For me, torture was beyond the pale. Now that I have come to realize that Dr. William Lane Craig's version of the Divine Command theory of ethics allows for the theoretical possibility of God's commanding one person to torture another human being, I feel obliged to publicly oppose it. On a personal level, I will say that the believing that torture could be justified, and being mentally and emotionally prepared to inflict torture if commanded by God to do so, is profoundly dehumanizing - and demoralizing as well. Don't believe me? Just try walking around for a day, telling yourself, "If God were to command me to torture someone, then yes, I would do it." You'll go bananas, and you'll lose your moral sensitivity in the process. One of my personal maxims is that one should never adopt a belief, if holding that belief makes you either crazy or callous. You'll lose your own humanity in the process - and that's the most precious thing you've got. Getting back to Dr. Craig's theory: what's the vital premise that's doing all the damage, here? I think it's the Molinist premise that in every possible situation, there's one and only one choice that each of us would make, and that God (Who knows everything that can be known) knows that choice. But if there is no such choice, then there is nothing for God to know, and God cannot justify a course of action by appealing to counterfactuals about how that action would benefit the person affected, by altering the choices that they would make. In other words, it's not the "Divine command" part of Craig's theory that I object to. It's his strong view of Divine omniscience that really does the damage. Molinism plus DCT is a fatal ethical concoction. Getting back to Dr. Lydia McGrew's blog post: there is something profoundly dehumanizing in the enterprise of justifying an act by its consequences. For it is not the consequences which justify an act, but the attitude of heart and mind on the part of the person performing them, which renders an act good or bad. And to say that some acts are intrinsically bad is to say that some acts cannot be performed by a person with the right attitude - namely, one in which each and every human being is seen as an end-in-themselves, and not merely as a means to an end. And that brings me to another vital point on which I disagree with Dr. Craig. He maintains that God has no duties to us whatsoever, as we (being mere creatures) have no claim on our Creator. I maintain, on the contrary, that God does have duties towards us, and that He voluntarily assumes those duties in the act of creating each and every human being. Since God is our Father, He has the duty to care for us as a parent would. That doesn't mean that He should step in to right every wrong; in the short term, His ability to do so may be constrained by conflicting duties towards otehr moral agents in the cosmos. But it does mean that it is not God's prerogative to do with us as He thinks fit. If He were to annihilate us, for instance, that would not only be unloving but also unjust. No limitation is placed on God's sovereignty by saying that He has duties to us, as He freely assumed those duties in the act of creating us. It isn't just Dr. Craig I disagree with here; it's also St. Thomas Aquinas. In his Summa Theologica I-II q. 94 art. 5, (reply to objection 2), Aquinas argues that since everything (including people, their spouses and their goods) ultimately belongs to God, God can justly order us to kill, have sex with people we're not married to, and confiscate their property:
Reply to Objection 2. All men alike, both guilty and innocent, die the death of nature: which death of nature is inflicted by the power of God on account of original sin, according to 1 Samuel 2:6: "The Lord killeth and maketh alive." Consequently, by the command of God, death can be inflicted on any man, guilty or innocent, without any injustice whatever. In like manner adultery is intercourse with another's wife; who is allotted to him by the law emanating from God. Consequently intercourse with any woman, by the command of God, is neither adultery nor fornication. The same applies to theft, which is the taking of another's property. For whatever is taken by the command of God, to Whom all things belong, is not taken against the will of its owner, whereas it is in this that theft consists.
Although Aquinas does not say so, the above logic would justify rape (forced sex) as well, at the command of God. The ethically poisonous premise underlying Aquinas' logic here is that everything - people, spouses and goods - belongs to God, Who can dispose of what He owns as He thinks fit. But if we are not God's chattels, but God's children, then not only could God never command rape, but He would be acting unjustly if He did so - and we would also be acting unjustly, if we carried out His command. For several years, I have bent over backwards, intellectually speaking, in an attempt to rationalize the slaughter of the Canaanites. I now think it is more important for me to hang on to the ethical intuitions I've got, as the psychological effects of trying to justify the conduct I'm alluding to are corrosive: they lead to hardening of the heart. I hope this makes my position clearer. Cheers.vjtorley
September 24, 2014
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phoodoo, Although it might be tedious, I can certainly demonstrate conclusively that the word "God" is not present in the book of Esther. ;-) My Christian faith is not based on science or the scientific method. In fact, a lot of things in people's lives, especially those that make life interesting and meaningful, are not based on scientific analysis. Love cannot be measured in Hertz (pun intended), curiosity cannot be weighed in grams. Science is a logical and systematic method of investigating our physical domain. As such it involves a subset of the human experience. Christianity includes spiritual, relational, historical (yes, most historians now accept the historicity of Yeshua Ha Natzeret), moral, and wisdom dimensions. But what does it have to do with science or the ID paradigm? In a scientific context there are three points of contact: 1. The ID paradigm presupposing that unknown structures and phenomena have an underlying design. This view is pragmatic, being demonstratably better than the presumption of junk (think "junk" DNA, for example), but it's not exclusively Christian. 2. Christianity provides an ethical foundation for research and experimentation. Not everyone believes ethics are necessary---Josef Mengele certainly didn't. Not everyone agrees with what those ethics should be. Can you demonstrate that they should be yours? 3. Christianity provides a basis for behavioral norms in relationships with other people, particularly my colleagues. For example, "Thou shalt not steal" someone else's research is an arbitrary social restriction on the survival of the fittest, but I adhere to it. Not everyone does. How can anyone know in this life? Well, there is undeniably a possibility that there really is a sentient God who chose to reveal himself to all humanity through the writings of ancient Hebrew prophets and through his only avatar, Jesus (to borrow a description used by my fellow believers in India). If this were true, how would you expect that you could find out without being coerced? Would you even want to know or would it cramp your style? Just something to think about. -Q p.s. Did you know that the first recorded scientific experiment dated about 600 BC is described in the Bible? Included is a hypothesis, a single variable, a control group, a set period of time, and an independent evaluation.Querius
September 23, 2014
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phoodoo: A nicely expressed comment (my thoughts exactly). Except for that last line. Sigh.Graham2
September 23, 2014
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Vishnu, Sorry, no I can't demonstrate the nonsense. And you also can't demonstrate the nonsense, because no one can demonstrate the nonsense making proclamations about what exists in an unseen realm. Querius can't demonstrate a single thing he says about the bible, or what he believes. You can't demonstrate a thing about Vishnu or Brahmanism. You can not demonstrate that "The morality of the relative world is and always has been to decrease the karmic debt of oneself and others." Jerry can not demonstrate: "But everything no matter how unpleasant one can describe it or think of it, is finite while the Christian God offers everyone something that dwarfs all the unpleasantness ever suffered by everyone. Querius can not demonstrate that Jesus said " that you would be able to key a tree from its fruit, the results. He also said that his sheep would know his voice, which implies a personal revelation of some kind.", He can not even demonstrate that there was someone named Jesus, unless he means Jesus Hernandez in Guadalajara. VJTorley can not demonstrate that "If a Transcendent Creator exists, there are no absolute ethical obligations." None of this can be demonstrated, it never will be demonstrated, and it has ZERO to do with the subject of Intelligent Design. In fact, if ID is ever to be taken seriously in the science community, it absolutely can not involve, "what are the ethics of the creator?" It is not for us to know in this life.phoodoo
September 23, 2014
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Dionisio@57, Thank you for the general invitation to "A Third Way of Evolution." Wow, your postings are very impressive, and your questions and knowledge in the area far exceeds anything that I could contribute to! Nevertheless, I'd find following a constructive discussion between you and your peers fascinating and worthwhile. I'd like to see more threads like it, distinguished perhaps by a set of prefixes in their titles. -QQuerius
September 23, 2014
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Silver Asiatic: If there is debt, then there is responsibility. If there is a directive, then there is obedience or disobedience. If there is responsiblity, debt, directives and obedience – there is justice or injustice — and certainly someone to blame. As I see it, to say that there is ‘no “problem” of “evil”‘ in that system is contradictory or at least misleading.
The "good" and "evil" as I have explained is only in the context of the game of Lila, as goals and fouls are in football. It is only relative and transitory and not absolute. You apparently did not closely read what I wrote. Please read it carefully again.Vishnu
September 23, 2014
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Silver Asiatic, Great thought, nicely articulated! -QQuerius
September 23, 2014
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The morality of the relative world is and always has been to decrease the karmic debt of oneself and others. If there is a Prime Directive of Brahman in his Lila of “sport”, this is it: love your neighbor as yourself.
If there is debt, then there is responsibility. If there is a directive, then there is obedience or disobedience. If there is responsiblity, debt, directives and obedience - there is justice or injustice -- and certainly someone to blame. As I see it, to say that there is 'no “problem” of “evil"' in that system is contradictory or at least misleading.Silver Asiatic
September 23, 2014
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anthropic@133 wrote:
I think that given these facts, the burden of proof that his words are mistaken, wrong, deluded is very much on your side.
Again, the words were recorded as Mordecai's words, not God's. Can't a person have an opinion or belief without being judged as "lying," or "mistaken, wrong, or deluded"? Why should I be forced to judge him? Half your opinions are probably wrong and I don't judge you. ;-) -QQuerius
September 23, 2014
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Silver Asiatic: This causes problems for compassion. If a person receives misfortune as his karma based on his own choices – which he gladly accepted – it would be wrong for someone else to alleviate that suffering since it would be taking away the necessary consequences of the choice.
I think differently. Karma simply mean "effects." The morality of the relative world is and always has been to decrease the karmic debt of oneself and others. If there is a Prime Directive of Brahman in his Lila of "sport", this is it: love your neighbor as yourself. Sooner or later it all ends in this. But it ALWAYS takes a long long time. Settle in for the Long Ride.Vishnu
September 23, 2014
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phoodoo: You just demonstrated by example why ethics is a nonsense topic
If you can demonstrate the nonsense, I'd be happy to listen. Otherwise, like any chimp, you're just flinging, well, phoodooVishnu
September 23, 2014
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VJ 124 Thanks for the response! I'll have to think about the difference between temporal and logical necessity. Interesting stuff...anthropic
September 23, 2014
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Q 112 Mordecai is consistently portrayed in Esther as an observant, God-fearing man of great wisdom. If he is lying or deluded about his statements to Esther, it would be utterly out of character as established in the book. And, of course, his words are not contradicted in the scriptures. I think that given these facts, the burden of proof that his words are mistaken, wrong, deluded is very much on your side.anthropic
September 23, 2014
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All souls that choose to be incarnated on a dangerous planet such as earth do it with the full understanding of what the consequences may be. And gladly accept them. There is nobody else to “blame.” Thus no “problem” of “evil.”
This causes problems for compassion. If a person receives misfortune as his karma based on his own choices - which he gladly accepted - it would be wrong for someone else to alleviate that suffering since it would be taking away the necessary consequences of the choice. If there's no problem of evil, then there's no reason to remedy evils. If a person is born into suffering, it's the consequence of individual choice. Thus, no reason to have compassion and mercy on that person since whatever evil we might perceive the person suffering is really not a problem and it is suffered gladly. I think that's a lot like determinism.Silver Asiatic
September 23, 2014
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You just demonstrated by example why ethics is a nonsense topic on an Intelligent Design-Biological sciences blog.
It's not a nonsense topic within evolutionary-biology. Ethical judgements exist. It is claimed they evolved via random/mechanical means, and are produced by physical processes. True or false?Silver Asiatic
September 23, 2014
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Thus no “problem” of “evil
Yes and no. There is no evil in this world, only a continuum of unfortunate happenings that may be ordered from a slight stub of the toe to the horrible pain and suffering from losing your family or friends or your nation in very painful ways due to either natural or human means. But everything no matter how unpleasant one can describe it or think of it, is finite while the Christian God offers everyone something that dwarfs all the unpleasantness ever suffered by everyone. The real evil is the frustration of this not the pain and suffering experienced in this world. Thus there is no theodicy issue because there is no real evil unless we with our free wills choose it. That is if one believes in the Christian God. Someone once told me there is no unforgivable sin except the final rejection of God or what call final impenitence.jerry
September 23, 2014
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Vishnu, You just demonstrated by example why ethics is a nonsense topic on an Intelligent Design-Biological sciences blog.phoodoo
September 23, 2014
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phoodoo, No, the difference is a matter of choice of individual souls (after their differentiation from Brahman.) All souls that choose to be incarnated on a dangerous planet such as earth do it with the full understanding of what the consequences may be. And gladly accept them. There is nobody else to "blame." Thus no "problem" of "evil." After that, the moral rules while here are part of the game. I'm not saying they don't exist, but they relative to the sport, and are ultimately irrelevant, just like a touchdown or pass interference is ultimately irrelevant. The game is the universe of spacetime, in which there are many levels, and and one may choose to go thru many incarnations on many planets for various reasons and interests and activities. But when the game is over, there is nobody to "blame", because cause ultimately, nobody "cares." Game over. Time to go "back home" to Brahman, where all differentiation is gone, and all is bliss. We are all Brahman at play. That is to say, we are all Brahman "at sport" with "himself."Vishnu
September 23, 2014
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Would you not be insulted to read Scientific American writing about Holy Water, and the meaning of the Rosary, or if Original Sin is true? No.I would love to see how they argue about it and contradict themthe bystander
September 23, 2014
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VJ, Your argument ends after statement number 1. None of the rest follows after that. Its doesn't follow that if a creator exists, there are no absolute ethical obligations. Everything after this point is speculation based on the exact word you used, transcendent. It is beyond the limits of knowledge and experience, so making any conclusions based on knowledge which can't be obtained is unnecessary and illogical. A transcendent intelligent creator may exist. That is all we can know. One's own faith must take them beyond that. It is a personal belief based on one's own intuition, nothing more or less. Saying the ethics of said creator belongs in the realm of ID science I believe is just plain wrong, and a disservice to the science that so many are working hard on. If people try to include the idea of the ethics of the creator into the discussion of Intelligent Design, I can understand perfectly well why many would object to ID being taught in schools. The ethics of a creator may well be a subject that is interesting to many here, but it has no more relevance to Intelligent Design, than do the topics of meditation, GMO foods, sports, or your favorite wines. Would you not be insulted to read Scientific American writing about Holy Water, and the meaning of the Rosary, or if Original Sin is true?phoodoo
September 23, 2014
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Hi Vjtorley We have established that Coyne’s suggestion that Craig is a voluntarist is incorrect. You write:
You have conceded that killing is not an action which is intrinsically wrong for human beings to perform: “there are rare circumstances where God can command killing for some greater good.” So that brings me back to my question about God’s commanding someone to inflict pain on another human being. In principle, the infliction of pain on another human being might prove to have a salutary effect on their spiritual well-being. And if (as Craig believes) God has a perfect knowledge of how each person would react to having pain inflicted on them, then God would know precisely which people would benefit from having pain inflicted on them. He would also know if those people would benefit more from having a human being (acting at His behest) inflict the pain on them, in lieu of His inflicting the pain Himself. Moreover, there seems to be no reason in principle why the salutary effects of pain inflicted at God’s command would cut out once the pain exceeds a certain level – say, 1,000 units (I don’t know how one measures pain, but I’m sure you remember the scene in 1984 where O’Brien turns the torture machine up to 3,000 volts). What this means is that in principle, if Craig is right, God could (under rare circumstances) command one human being to inflict any amount of pain on another human being. What’s more, that human being could even be a baby, if God (using His “middle knowledge” of what each of us would choose in every possible future) sees that it would be in the baby’s best long-term interests to be tortured. I think that’s a pretty disturbing moral implication of Craig’s theory, even if Craig doesn’t draw it himself. Don’t you?
I don’t think this argument works. The key question is this: is it possible for a God who is loving, just, impartial (i.e has all the character traits God is said to possess) to command the torture of children in the hypothetical situation you envisage. It seems to me you must answer either yes or no. If the answer is No, the a DCT does not allow the action to be morally permissible and so the “disturbing implication doesn’t follow. If the answer is yes, then your correct the theory entails that torture of a child is permissible, but note it entails this only under certain hypothetical circumstances, circumstances such that a, just , loving, impartial, person who was fully informed of the facts would endorse torturing a child, its under those hypothetical circumstances and only those hypothetical circumstances where torturing a child is permitted. The problem is nots not obvious to me that torturing a child would be morally wrong, under those circumstances . By hypothesis we have granted the circumstances are ones where the torture is not unjust and not unloving, where a doing it is compatible with being virtous, where just and impartial loving concern informed by all the facts mandates the action. The reason we oppose torturing children in the real world is because we believe in the real world these circumstances don’t hold, we don’t think its loving, just to do this and we don’t think any person with compassion or empathy who was concerned about justice and who has virtue would knowingly endorse the action. But these are precisely the facts that are said to not hold in the hypothetical situation. So I don’t think your response really introduces any problem for a DCT. Let me apply this point to your general question:
But what I was asking was somthing different: is there any kind of action which is never justifiable for human beings to perform (with or without a Divine command) under any circumstances? That was what I meant by my condition number (2). In other words, is there any kind of action that would be intrinsically wrong for human beings to perform, full stop, and not just generally wrong?
One can address this question by asking, is there any action which a person who is fully informed, rational, loving, just, virtous, would rule out as an option for us to do? If yes then a divine command theory entails that action is absolutely prohibited. If no, then, it seems to me we have good reasons for thinking that action is not intrinsically wrong. For the objection to create trouble you’d have to hold that its possible both for an action to be (a) endorsed by a fully informed, virtous, rational person who is loving and just and (b) morally wrong. I don’t think that is possible, I think once you grant the action can be (a) you cant sensibly say with confidence that it is (b) .Matthew Flannagan
September 23, 2014
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