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Now Materialists Are Trying to Turn Occam’s Razor On Its Head

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 Give me a break will ya.  In their feverish efforts to prop up the teetering materialist paradigm, to justify the unjustifiable, our materialist friends have now resorted to saying, essentially, black is white.  In a recent post a commenter turns Occam’s Razor on its head when he states:

 

It is a common misconception among ID supporters that scientists deliberately defy Occam’s Razor and pursue multiverse theories simply because they are uncomfortable with the idea of a designer.  This is false.

 

The commenter cites physicist Aurélien Barrau in support.  In this article Barrau states:

 

In any case, it is important to underline that the multiverse is not a hypothesis invented to answer a specific question.  It is simply a consequence of a theory usually built for another purpose. Interestingly, this consequence also solves many complexity and naturalness problems.  In most cases, it even seems that the existence of many worlds is closer to Ockham’s razor (the principle of simplicity) than the ad hoc assumptions that would have to be added to models to avoid the existence of other universes.

 

The sheer presumption, the overweening fatuity, of these statements (both the commenter’s and Barrau’s) beggars belief.  One must conclude that either they simply have no idea what Occam’s Razor means or they are deliberately trying to distort its meaning to support their conclusion.  I suspect the latter.

 

So, to set things straight, we will discuss first, what the Razor means, and secondly how it applies to the multiverse.

 

What Does Occam’s Razor Say?

 

William of Ockham (or, commonly, “Occam”) was a Franciscan friar and scholastic philosopher from the village of Ockham in Surrey, England who lived from the late 1200’s to the mid-1300’s.  Today, he is best remembered for Occam’s Razor.  Ockham’s formulation of the Razor, like all learned texts of the time, was expressed in Latin.  He stated:  entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem.”  This is usually translated: “entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity.” 

 

What Does Occam’s Razor Mean?

 

Occam’s Razor is anothe way of statig the “principle of parsimony.”  Britannica Concise Encyclopedia states that Occam’s Razor is:

 

A rule in science and philosophy stating that entities should not be multiplied needlessly.  This rule is interpreted to mean that the simplest of two or more competing theories is preferable and that an explanation for unknown phenomena should first be attempted in terms of what is already known.  Also called law of parsimony.

 

Karl Popper argued that a preference for a simpler theory over a complex theory, other things being equal, is justified by his falsifiability criterion, because a simpler theory applies to more empirical cases and therefore is more “testable” and may be falsified more easily. 

 

If Multiverse Theory Violates the Razor, Does that Mean it is False?

 

We concede at the outset that should we conclude multiverse theory violates the Razor that would not, in itself, be the death knell for the theory.  Occam’s Razor is not a scientific theory itself.  It is a heuristic maxim.  Thus, a theory could violate the Razor and still be true.

 

Nevertheless, the Razor has stood the test of time, and remains useful.  A theory that violates the Razor has less standing than a theory that does not.  That is the very reason our commenter and Barrau have tried so hard to fit multiverse theory within the confines of the Razor, which, as we shall see, is like trying to fit Andre the Giant’s foot into a ballerina’s slipper.  No matter how you stretch it, it ain’t gonna fit.

 

Does Multiverse Theory Violate the Razor?

 

Of course it does.  Let’s go back to the original formulation of the Razor:  “entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity.” 

 

The multiverse theory posits that there are an infinite number of universes, and we just happen to live in one where the conditions for the existance of life are just right.  In other words, if there are an infinite number of universes, every condition that is not logically impossible will somewhere be instantiated. 

 

Thus, multiverse theory clearly violates the Razor. because it does not keep entities to an absolute minimum.  Indeed, by definition, the multiverse theory multiplies entities to an infinite degree!  This is why our commenter’s and Barrau’s statements are so staggering.  Far from meeting the conditions of the Razor, multiverse theory is the exact opposite of a theory that would meet the conditions of the Razor.  In other words, if multiverse theory, which posits the existence of infinite entities, does not violate the Razor, no theory does.

 

Comments
Peter, Perhaps we can agree on this: Among competing theories, we should prefer the theory that best explains our observations while making the fewest ad hoc assumptions. Take string theory. Much of the excitement surrounding string theory centers on the fact that it actually predicts gravity. Gravity no longer has to be assumed, as was the case with the Standard Model. So string theory explains more while assuming less, which is exactly what we want a theory to do. Just as string theory predicts gravity, it also predicts the multiverse. As you point out, we can't observe other universes, so we can't directly confirm this prediction. At the same time, this means that we can't falsify the multiverse either (though we can still falsify the theory that gives rise to it). Nothing we observe is incompatible with the existence of the multiverse. But we already have a reason to prefer string theory over competing theories: it predicts gravity! So scientists take string theory very seriously, despite the fact that it makes this weird prediction about the existence of a multiverse. It's reminiscent of quantum mechanics. QM makes a lot of predictions that clash with common sense, like the fact that it's possible for a particle to be in many places at once. Despite the weirdness, scientists embrace QM because it is so overwhelmingly successful at explaining what we observe. The bottom line is that while assuming an unobservable should count against a theory, predicting an unobservable should not, particularly if the theory does a better job of explaining what we do observe while making fewer assumptions.ribczynski
December 7, 2008
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ribczynskI: Firstly, I would like to thank you for all your effort in this blog critiquing ID. I welcome your critique. If your criticisms are valid then ID will have to improve. If they are not then you show that ID's views are valid. So far I would have to say that most of your comments are of the later. You wrote:
You are wrong to claim that the universe is defined as all that we can observe. The visible universe is defined that way, but astronomers know that our universe is much larger than the part we can ever hope to observe.
This clearly shows your difficulty understanding definitions. This could be a result of your worldview. It is difficult to say knowing only what you blog here. I said '*all* that we can observe.' "All" is a very simple word, and yet you misunderstand. All means everything. So that includes effects of things that are invisible. I did not restrict my definition to the visible light spectrum. So the pull of the sun's gravity on the earth is an effect that we observe. Now to the point. The universe is defined as the time, matter, energy and space of all (everything) that was created at the big bang. Which includes obviously dark matter and energy. So according to everything science knows at present, there is no way to detect and verify another universe, which would also have been the result of another big bang. The spaces would be different, and therefore there is no possible way an effect could travel between universes. A mutliverse theory is therefore impossible to verify using observable (natural) science. It is therefore outside of the natural. You could call it 'extra' natural, or super-natural. Take your pick. They both mean the same. Therefore a theory that entails a multiverse is entailing an entity that can never be verified by methodological naturalism. This is the key point of this blog. This is why mulitiverse violates Occam's razor. It is not the quantity of entities that you multiply unnecessarily. It is that you add one entity that is outside the realm of science. It would be perferable to have no explanation than a multiverse one. That would be consistant with methodological naturalism. Of course, having a natural explanation would be the best. Who is invoking the 'super' natural to fill in the gaps now? There are many theories that are incomplete. Nowhere else in science is untestable hypotheses resorted to. BTW. I thing science should stick to methodological naturalism. They should stick to things that they can verify. What I object to is when they make unverifiable claims, either for their own status as knowledge purveyors, or to prop up their atheistic worldviews. You wrote:
Incidentally, I am not a methodological naturalist. I believe that science can address falsifiable supernatural hypotheses that have observable consequences. Alas, so far there seems to be no evidence for any such hypotheses.
In this case your definitions are correct. God is supernatural. However, science can not prove God's existence. But reason can be used to make a conclusion. We all believe in love, although it is not possible to prove its existence scientifically. For me the big bang creation of the universe, the fossil record of rapid creation of life (Cambrian explosion is one example), the complexity of the cell which entails its extreme improbability, and the mind of man are all strong indications that a God creator exists.Peter
December 7, 2008
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gpuccio asks:
Are you stating that all the billions of examples of blatant CSI we observe in the biological world are “false positives”?
Apart from Dembski's failed attempting at establishing the CSI of the bacterial flagellum, I'm not aware of any attempts to go through the motions and compute the specified complexity of a biological structure. Could you point to worked-out examples, if you know of any, where Dembski's method has been used to show that particular biological structures are designed?
In other words, are you stating that a serious statistical analysis whose rejection limit is drawn at 1:10^150, and which for compelling methodological reasons assumes a practically uniform distribution of the search space which nobody can deny, is still giving practically 100% of false positives just because it cannot “establish an accurate upper bound” of the probability of the target space...
You seem to be confused here. Dembski's method does not compute the probability distributions of the non-design hypotheses. It takes them as parameters.
...because it does not account for all of the other non-design hypotheses which nobody can even start to imagine?
Follow this link for a quote in which Dembski confirms that all non-design hypotheses, known and unknown, must be factored into the determination of specified complexity.ribczynski
December 3, 2008
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ribczynski: Just to understanding your thought. Are you stating that all the billions of examples of blatant CSI we observe in the biological world are "false positives"? In other words, are you stating that a serious statistical analysis whose rejection limit is drawn at 1:10^150, and which for compelling methodological reasons assumes a practically uniform distribution of the search space which nobody can deny, is still giving practically 100% of false positives just because it cannot "establish an accurate upper bound" of the probability of the target space because it does not account for all of the other non-design hypotheses which nobody can even start to imagine? Is that your brilliant argument?gpuccio
December 2, 2008
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Sal Gal writes:
Keep in mind that all Dembski does to get information is to take the negative logarithm of a probability. It is of paramount importance to keep in mind the source of the probability.
Yes. And that probability is the sum of the probabilities of all of the non-design hypotheses. Unless you can establish an accurate upper bound on this probability, Dembski's method is subject to false positives.ribczynski
December 2, 2008
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Sal Gal: I perfectly agree with your post #107. Especially where you say: "Again, the probability is not given to us by nature. It does not come from empirical observation. It is calculated in terms of a model, implicit or explicit." That's exactly what I have often tried to say. Most problems here are problems of models and methodology, and not only statistical issues. Statistics acquires empirical meaning only if the model which incorporates it is correct.gpuccio
December 2, 2008
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Sal Gal, very good post (107) (CSI of the flagellum) is calculated in terms of a model, implicit or explicit. How is the model flawed?tribune7
December 2, 2008
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gpuccio, you quote me as saying, “The only sense in which probability is physically measurable is though observation of outcomes of repetitions of a controlled experiment.” I've added emphasis to indicate that I'm not actually saying that probability is physically measured. My objective was to make a statement consistent with the dubious QM slogan "information is physical." The only justification for saying that information is physical in QM is the predictability of distributions of outcomes, and not particular outcomes, with large numbers of replications of tightly controlled experiments. There is no similar justification for saying that the CSI of, say, the flagellum is physical. As an event, the flagellum has occurred only once, to our knowledge, and we can do nothing analogous to QM experiments to obtain an empirical distribution on outcomes. This brings us back to my original claim, which is that most IDists believe that CSI inheres in, say, the flagellum, when it is in fact imputed. Keep in mind that all Dembski does to get information is to take the negative logarithm of a probability. It is of paramount importance to keep in mind the source of the probability. Again, the probability is not given to us by nature. It does not come from empirical observation. It is calculated in terms of a model, implicit or explicit. I think some confusion arises from terminology. In math, a probability space is a measure space, but this does not mean that probability is measured in the same sense that, say, temperature is.Sal Gal
December 2, 2008
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"Put simply, ID is easily falsifiable: you just need to show, in a lab or on a computer, how CSI can be generated according to a definite credible model based on randomness, and incorporating correctly NS. Or just in any possible way, in absence of a designer." I think that most EvoBiologists and plenty of compScientists would argue that this has been done, and done again and again. There may be a couple of obstacles to getting ID theorists to agree though so if I can pick apart what you said... We of course would need to agree if a model in question is 'credible' which has some issues, and of course what constitutes NS in the context of a designed experiment. It could be argued that ANY lab experiment, whether with biological matter or in a simulation, can't reproduce NS because these experiments are designed and therefore not 'Natural'. I would also be easy to claim (but possibly harder to demonstrate) that any experiment had CSI built in (I think the term is front loading?). In order to construct such an experiment both sides would have to agree on the credibility of the model, which I think could be hard. Incidentally, although I'm a little hazy on what Dembski means by CSI I have seen people on this site claim that computers cannot generate novel information - as far as I can see (as a computer scientist) they can generate ANY information you want given enough time and memory.LaminarChipmonk
December 2, 2008
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Sal Gal: My previouse post was in response to your #102. I have read only now #101, and so here are a couple of comments (I apologize for the disorder, it's the consequence of always being in a hurry!): First of all, you say: "You are not at all the typical ID proponent." As I suppose it is intended as a compliment, thank you! But I must say that, if you mean that I stick to the substance of scientific discussion, I am certainly not the only one to do that here. Others may do different things, and IMO they are entitled to that (in the limits of convenience, obviously). This is a blog, after all. It is true, we discuss sometimes (I hope often) very important things, but still it is a blog. Moreover, it would be useful, IMO, if you distinguished the ID "movement" from the ID "theory". They are not the same thing. While you are perfectly entitled to have, and express, your personal judgement on the ID movement, why judge ID theory from the behaviour of some of its supporters? In that way, you could easily discard any of the many scientific theories, philosophies, religions and political ideas in the world. First of all darwinian evolution, a social territory where name calling and similar seem to abound more than in any other known place (maybe for natural selection) :-) For the rest, I believe I have in some way answered in the previous post. I will repeat it here in a slightly different way, form, the sake of clarity: a) Not all science is done by "practical experimental tests", least of all a science of origins. That is obviously valid for both ID and darwinian evolution. In that case, science is mostly done by gathering indirect data and reasoning on them (that is, retrospectively). b) It is not ID which needs support from data and theory: it is darwinian evolution. Everybody forgets that when we compute probabilistic model about darwinian evolution, we are not doing something essential for ID: we are ding something essential for darwinian evolution, which darwinists have never done. You say: "The notion that all beliefs are tenuous is at the heart of science." That's perfectly true. I agree with all my heart. Bravo. Then you say: "ID proponents typically believe that intelligent design of the cosmos and / or biological life is fact that, once accepted, cannot possibly be overturned." But that's not true! Where do you get that strange idea from? Maybe someone can think that way, but it's not in the theory. ID posits itself as a scientific theory, as a "best explanation", not as absolute truth! If at present it is, IMO, the "only credible explanation" available, it's just because other available explanations are so poor... Moreover, it's darwinists who have made the infamous epistemological affirmation that darwinian evolution is a fact and not a theory, and that it is not only better, but even different in nature, from common scientific theories like gravitation or quantum mechanics. You can find their foolish ramblings about that everywhere. You say: "This is a religious, not scientific, mode of belief." You are right, if you are speaking of darwinists. You say: "Put simply, when you’re sure you’re right, it doesn’t occur to you that you need to advance means of showing that you’re wrong. " Put simply, ID is easily falsifiable: you just need to show, in a lab or on a computer, how CSI can be generated according to a definite credible model based on randomness, and incorporating correctly NS. Or just in any possible way, in absence of a designer. About multiverses, I have already written that one thing is a definite multiverse hypothesis which arises from independent considerations in physical models, and therefore can in some way be tested together with those models, and another thing is postulating without reason a super infinite, super continuous set of multiverses where anything is possible, just to discredit serious scientific and philosophic arguments of design.gpuccio
December 2, 2008
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Peter wrote:
Apparently it is you who does not understand methodological naturalism. You are supporting theories that entail the multiverse, and yet it is impossible to test for a multiverse. The universe is defined as all that we can observe. You may want to point to some effect as result of another universe, but there is no way that you can actually observe said universe to prove or disprove such a claim. So, far from supporting methodological naturalism, you are supporting theories that rely on entities that can never be observed in nature. You are not practicing methodological naturalism, but super-natural wishful thinking.
Peter, You are wrong to claim that the universe is defined as all that we can observe. The visible universe is defined that way, but astronomers know that our universe is much larger than the part we can ever hope to observe. Even within the visible universe, there are aspects that are unobservable. The Standard Model entails the existence of quarks, for example, and their existence has been inferred experimentally, but it is impossible to observe a quark in isolation because of the monstrously high energies required. Even so, methodological naturalism does not require us to deny the existence of quarks or of parts of our universe that are too distant to see. Likewise, it does not require us to deny the existence of other universes if our best theories entail them. While it's true that methodological naturalism excludes the supernatural, your mistake lies in regarding other universes as supernatural. If they are subject to the same fundamental laws as our own universe and derived from a common source, then it makes sense to consider them as part of nature. The supernatural consists of hypothetical entities that are not limited by the fundamental laws underlying nature. Incidentally, I am not a methodological naturalist. I believe that science can address falsifiable supernatural hypotheses that have observable consequences. Alas, so far there seems to be no evidence for any such hypotheses.ribczynski
December 2, 2008
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Sal Gal: I don't agree with you. You say: "The only sense in which probability is physically measurable is though observation of outcomes of repetitions of a controlled experiment." That's simply not true. There are tons of examples, for instance in medicine, where probabilities are calculated without any controlled experiment taking place, using only already existing, often historical, data. They are called retrospective studies. And how would you suggest to perform a "controlled experiment" about science of origins? Are you saying that all science of origins is not a science, but only natural history? Please, take notice that science does not take place only in the lab. Moreover, I think that you, while certainly understanding fully the subtleties in interpretation of probabilities which remain hidden to us common folks, are strangely missing a fundamental epistemological distinction between "physically measuring probabilities" (which is not very precise however, because what you measure are not probabilities, but empirical occurrences), and "calculating the probabilities implied by a specific explanatory model", which is what we in ID (and most scientists all over the world) regularly do. In other words, if I (the darwinists) am proposing a causal explanatory model for an information sequence (say a protein) where random variation plays an essential role, I have the duty to detail that model and to compute, as precisely as possible, its theoretical probabilities to verify that they are in accord with the model itself, otherwise my model is simply not credible. And if I don't do that, others (ID) have the right and the duty to correct me.gpuccio
December 2, 2008
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Sal Gal--If Popperian falsification is so important to science, then where are ID theorists’ public proposals of specific and practical experiments that would falsify their theories? Um, where are the public proposals to falsify NeoDarwinism? Anyway, Michael Behe just finished a book showing that NDE has a limit. Show how his observations are fundamentally unfounded and you falsify a good chunk of ID. A great deal of ID-related writing is indeed name-calling and branding. Can you give some specifics? Anyway, no one in ID is demanding anybody lose their job/grant money/college admission etc. just for believing in NDE. ID is in fact preoccupied with debunking modern evolutionary theory. If NDE is right -- that all life and biodiversity can be explained by natural selection acting on random genetic changes -- then ID is wrong. OTOH, if NDE is wrong that doesn't necessarily make ID right. An undiscovered law that's not design, could explain life and biodiversity, for instance. So to say that something is incompatible with a particular paradigm, or that one paradigm is better than another doesn't mean one is motivated to "debunk". If NDE is fatally flawed, why defend it?tribune7
December 1, 2008
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gpuccio says,
I don’t agree that “there is no direct observation or measure of CSI”. The complexity part of CSI is measurable, even if it is often difficult to measure it exactly.
The only sense in which probability is physically measurable is though observation of outcomes of repetitions of a controlled experiment. This is at the heart of the notion of objective probability (i.e., the frequentism emphasized by Dembski). How, precisely, do you make a material object into the outcome of a controlled experiment? You have to know the process giving rise to the object and repeat the process over and over. The objective probability of the object is the limit, as the number of repetitions of the experiment goes to infinity, of the ratio of the number of times the object results to the number of times the experiment was conducted. If you review Dembski's neat-and-clean examples of application of CSI, you will see that there is knowledge of the process that "would have" generated the event in the absence of intelligent intervention. When you don't know the process giving rise to an event (e.g., the flagellum), you have no basis for claiming to have access to the objective probability of the event. It seems to me that the frequentist approach does not work for historical events occurring under unknown circumstances. Simply knowing the processes theorized by evolutionists does not get you the historical conditions under they operated. I have a feeling that Dembski has heard something along these lines from probabilists reviewing his journal submissions. There are subtleties in interpretation of probability that most folks do not begin to appreciate.Sal Gal
December 1, 2008
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gpuccio says,
the “negative” part of ID does not consist in branding the “adversaries” as naturalists or materialists, but rather in falsifying a bundle of scientific theories which are bad scientific theories and yet are vastly successful. The “positive” part of ID consists in proposing a design-based scenario for future scientific investigations. In its true essence, ID is simple and humble, like all good scientific theories.
You are not at all the typical ID proponent. I'd find ID much more interesting if your characterization of it were correct. A great deal of ID-related writing is indeed name-calling and branding. ID is in fact preoccupied with debunking modern evolutionary theory. If Popperian falsification is so important to science, then where are ID theorists' public proposals of specific and practical experiments that would falsify their theories? Theorists in the physical sciences commonly describe experiments to test their theories. A theory unaccompanied by doable tests it is effectively not "at risk" (harking to Popper), and is essentially unscientific. The prevailing notion among IDists that their theories are good until their adversaries figure out how to test them is wrong, wrong, and wrong. A group of scientists advancing an explanation are responsible for testing the explanation, perhaps with division of labor between theorists and experimentalists. The notion that all beliefs are tenuous is at the heart of science. ID proponents typically believe that intelligent design of the cosmos and / or biological life is fact that, once accepted, cannot possibly be overturned. This is a religious, not scientific, mode of belief. And I think I have just given a partial explanation of why offering practical experimental tests of theories is not part of ID culture. Put simply, when you're sure you're right, it doesn't occur to you that you need to advance means of showing that you're wrong. (The rest of the explanation, I think, is that Phillip Johnson's emphasis on rhetoric is deeply ingrained in ID culture.) To tie this back to multiverses, the Steinhardt-Turok and Baum-Frampton cyclic models (i.e., positing that the universe has been through an infinite cycle of Big Bangs and Big Crunches) predict different values for a physical measurement that will actually be made by a space probe. Furthermore, the standard Big Bang model and the Steinhardt-Turok model differ in their predictions about gravity waves, which are, if memory serves, presently under observation. The upshot is that theories Barry A. thinks are absurd are being put to strong empirical tests, quite unlike ID theories.Sal Gal
December 1, 2008
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ribczynski writes:
More accurately, I’m defending theories that entail the multiverse (as opposed to positing it) against Occam’s Razor. These theories are still incomplete (though promising), so the jury is out on the existence of the multiverse.
Apparently it is you who does not understand methodological naturalism. You are supporting theories that entail the multiverse, and yet it is impossible to test for a multiverse. The universe is defined as all that we can observe. You may want to point to some effect as result of another universe, but there is no way that you can actually observe said universe to prove or disprove such a claim. So, far from supporting methodological naturalism, you are supporting theories that rely on entities that can never be observed in nature. You are not practicing methodological naturalism, but super-natural wishful thinking. I remember taking complex analysis in university. The theories were beautiful, complex, and extremely useful, unlike the multiverse (unless you are Theophobic). Just because a theory is useful and complete (unlike your theories) it does not stand to reason that the entities are real. You seem to be striving to make philosophical points, not scientific ones. Me thinks you do protest a little to much.Peter
December 1, 2008
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vjtorley: It appears that the word is getting out that the materialists have been using the excesses of radical dualism to attack the common sense of moderate dualism---thanks. I will check it out.StephenB
December 1, 2008
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crow thrall: Thanks for taking time out to provide those links--they do look interesting.StephenB
December 1, 2008
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crow thrall Thanks very much for posting the Web addresses of Gerald Casey's papers, "Immateriality and Intentionality" and "Minds and Machines." I hope you enjoy reading David Oderberg's paper at http://www.rdg.ac.uk/AcaDepts/ld/Philos/dso/papers/Concepts,%20Dualism%20and%20Human%20Intellect.pdf . Here are two more papers you might like, by John O'Callaghan and Alfred Freddoso: http://www2.nd.edu/Departments//Maritain/ti00/ocallagh.htm and http://www.nd.edu/~afreddos/papers/soul.pdf . Enjoy! Seriously, we'll have to put together a collection of good quality philosophical papers refuting materialism. I have a list of some useful papers at this address: http://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/whybelieve2.html .vjtorley
December 1, 2008
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ribczynski writes: -----"Even if were true that they were, it is still true that methodological naturalism was practiced in the 14th century, and so my claim is valid." No one disputes the fact that one or two scientists preferred to limit their research to natural causes. This trend started slowly. Warning: Do not limit your education to Panda's Thumb. It is hazardous to your intellectual health. One subject you must still educate yourself on is the matter of definitions. The "practice" of methodological naturalism by my definition did not precede the coined term; the practice of methodological naturalism by your definition did, in a few rare cases. That point has already been made. The critical point is that I don't accept your self-serving definition. You continue to miss that point. I define and have always defined the "practice" of methodological naturalism as a RULE, which is exactly what it is. THERE WAS NO RULE. You, of course, defined nothing until the last moment. Further, as I indicated, methodological naturalism will not permit the scientist to even consider ANYTHING OTHER than natural causes. Clearly, that situation has never occurred until recently. Further still, to shy away from miracles is not synonymous with methodological naturalism. Dembski and Behe are also dead set against appealing to miracles. The evidence is so heavily weighed in my favor that you accuse me of making up things. Obviously, that is not true. I don't need to make things up because I have many more examples to support my carefully defined thesis. You, apparently have only ONE example even using your self-serving definition. -----"Methodological naturalism is simply an approach to science" (Ah. at last a definition!) Oh really. Well can you tell me then exactly why it is that Dembski, Behe, Meyers, and many others have been slandered for not using that "approach." Can you explain to me why it is that Darwinists take people to court for failing to accede to the approach.StephenB
December 1, 2008
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Stephen, You're just digging yourself in deeper. To review, yet again: 1. I wrote that “the practice of methodological naturalism long preceded the coining of the term itself.” 2. You replied: “No, as a matter of fact, it did not.” 3. I showed you that it did (in the 14th century, no less). Now, to hide your mistake, you want to claim that a) Buridan and his like-minded contemporaries were an anomaly (as if that would get you off the hook, even if it were true), and b) you want to pretend that I've claimed that "methodological naturalism was the rule for all the great scientists." Where do you get these ideas? Item (b) is just something you made up, so we can dispense with it without further discussion. Regarding (a): 1. Buridan et al. were not anomalies. 2. Even if were true that they were, it is still true that methodological naturalism was practiced in the 14th century, and so my claim is valid. The rest of your comment shows that you still haven't grasped the difference between methodological naturalism and philosophical naturalism. For example, you reproduce this quote about Planck:
In his 1937 lecture “Religion and Naturwissenschaft,” Planck expressed the view that God is everywhere present, and held that “the holiness of the unintelligible Godhead is conveyed by the holiness of symbols.”
Then you ask:
Does that sound like methodological naturalism?
The answer is no, it doesn't sound like methodological naturalism, but neither does it preclude methodological naturalism. Methodological naturalism is simply an approach to science. Philosophical naturalism is about actual beliefs. The quote shows that Planck was not a philosophical naturalist, but it says nothing about whether he was a methodological naturalist. Think about that for a while. The difference is crucially important. By the way, you left this out of your quote about Planck:
...he believed "the faith in miracles must yield, step by step, before the steady and firm advance of the facts of science, and its total defeat is undoubtedly a matter of time."
So much for divine intervention. And Einstein was not a theist, so divine intervention was not a possibility in his worldview, either. Oops.ribczynski
December 1, 2008
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Jehu wrote:
Last I heard from you, you were defending Nick Matzke’s assertion that the malaria parasite cannot reproduce below 68ºF because all the mosquitoes freeze.
No, I was telling you that you owed Nick an apology for making this false claim about him:
I debated Matzke on the topic of Behe’s Edge and Matzke resorted to the claim that malaria causing parasites had never evolved the ability to reproduce below 68ºF because all of the mosquitoes freeze below that temperature. Unbelievable. Matzke is simply not a credible source -ever.
You continue:
Now you are defending the theory that infinite universes exist.
More accurately, I'm defending theories that entail the multiverse (as opposed to positing it) against Occam's Razor. These theories are still incomplete (though promising), so the jury is out on the existence of the multiverse.ribczynski
December 1, 2008
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#90 StephenB
I have called you on it. Let’s get realistic here. Francis Bacon Newton Boyle Faraday Planck Einstein ... You look very foolish trying to argue that methodological naturalism was the rule for all the great scientists.
Good point. Bu t I would be a bit more indulgent with R. After all he is only following the mainstream opinion; that's the more economic way to think, obviously not the better onekairos
November 30, 2008
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On @90, I pulled some of those from the archives and I forgot to put the source and the quotes around the last three or four examples.StephenB
November 30, 2008
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ribczyncksiv Last I heard from you, you were defending Nick Matzke's assertion that the malaria parasite cannot reproduce below 68ºF because all the mosquitoes freeze. Now you are defending the theory that infinite universes exist. Which means every possible universe exists - including bizzaro world were Superman is evil and mosquitoes freeze at 68ºF. And don't forget the universe where God exists and creates life- unless that is the one universe you don't believe in.Jehu
November 30, 2008
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ribczynsk: This is not the first time you have tried to pass off an anomaly as a trend, and it is not the first time I have called you on it. Let's get realistic here. Francis Bacon developed a God-centered methodology. Does that sound like methodological naturalism to you? Newton indicated numbers as involved in understanding God’s plan for history from the bible. In his system of physics, God is essential to the nature and absoluteness of space. Does that sound like methodological naturalism? Boyle developed his theological views in The Christian Virtuoso, which he wrote to show that the study of nature was a central religious duty." Does that sound like methodological naturalism? Faraday was a devoutly Christian member of the Sandemanians, which significantly influenced him and strongly affected the way in which he approached and interpreted nature. Does that sound like methodological naturalism? Planck made many contributions to physics, but is best known for quantum theory, which revolutionized our understanding of the atomic and sub-atomic worlds. In his 1937 lecture "Religion and Naturwissenschaft," Planck expressed the view that God is everywhere present, and held that "the holiness of the unintelligible Godhead is conveyed by the holiness of symbols." Does that sound like methodological naturalism? Einstein expressed a belief in "Spinoza's God who reveals himself in the harmony of what exists." This actually motivated his interest in science, as he once remarked to a young physicist: "I want to know how God created this world, I am not interested in this or that phenomenon, in the spectrum of this or that element. I want to know His thoughts, the rest are details." Einstein's famous epithet on the "uncertainty principle" was "God does not play dice" - and to him this was a real statement about a God in whom he believed. A famous saying of his was "Science without religion is lame, religion without science is blind." Does any of these sound like methodological naturalism to you. I could list many more. How many more do you have to support your theme? You google Panda's Thumb to find one quote from one scientist who offers an isolated opinion about methodology and suddenly you think you have something? You have hundreds of years of history going against you. You look very foolish trying to argue that methodological naturalism was the rule for all the great scientists.StephenB
November 30, 2008
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StephenB wrote:
Even Panda’s Thumb admits that scientists [of the late Middle Ages] CHARACTERISTICALLY left the door open to Divine intervention.
Of course they did. They were Christians, after all. Even modern-day Christian scientists such as Ken Miller and Francis Collins believe in miracles such as the virgin birth and resurrection of Christ. Yet they are methodological naturalists, and they don't invoke miracles when doing science. As for Buridan, note his exact words:
“in natural philosophy we ought to accept actions and dependencies as if they always proceed in a natural way.” [emphasis mine]
Did he believe in the possibility of divine intervention? Sure. Did he think it had any place in science (aka 'natural philosophy')? Absolutely not. You're simply wrong about methodological naturalism, Stephen. Why is that so hard for you to accept?ribczynski
November 30, 2008
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-----ribczynski writes, "Stephen, you're being dishonest. I wrote that "the practice of methodological naturalism long preceded the coining of the term itself." Here is a quote from Panda’s Thumb, one of the most militantly anti-ID blogs around, and the source that almost everyone draws from to obtain the quote that you used. Notice the second sentence in the paragraph (which precedes your quote) By the late Middle Ages the search for natural causes had come to typify the work of Christian natural philosophers. ALTHOUGH CHARACTERISTI CALLY LEAVING OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT DIVINE INTERVENTION, THEY FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED CONTEMPT FOR SOFT MINDED COMTEMPORARIES WHO IINVOKED MIRACLES RATHER THAN SEARCHING FOR NATURAL EXPLANATIONS….. Even Panda’s Thumb admits that scientists CHARACTERISTICALLY left the door open to Divine intervention. It is exactly as I phrased it earlier. Then, as now, science was supposed to be “primarily” but not “exclusively” about natural causes. The general consensus was that they were “thinking God’s thoughts after him,” which means, of course, that they were ALL design thinkers. Even those who preferred natural causes exclusively, and that number grew slowly, did so to discourage the practice of counting on frivolity and miracles, not to rule out a design inference. I am well aware that some earlier scientists expressed their desire to limit scientific investigation to natural causes. If that is what you mean by methodological naturalism, then I agree that it is nothing new. But that is not really the way methodological naturalism is understood. Under the aegis of “methodological naturalism,” institutions of science now claim that researches may not use systematic methods to detect design in the name of science. In other words, they may not consider or seek evidence for the very same thing that earlier scientists took for granted, even the one that you quote. If the scientist does dare to do any such thing, the academy will discredit him, slander him, and, if possible, ruin his career. Until the enlightenment, design thinking dominated science; after the enlightenment, design thinking became a scandal. Now it is an academic crime. You can’t reasonably assert that this radical change was really no change at all.StephenB
November 30, 2008
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Stephenb you might like these. http://www.ucd.ie/philosophy/staff/casey/ImandIn.pdf http://www.ucd.ie/philosophy/staff/casey/MndMchnes.pdfcrow thrall
November 30, 2008
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Stephen, You're being dishonest. I wrote that "the practice of methodological naturalism long preceded the coining of the term itself." You replied: "No, as a matter of fact, it did not." I showed you that it did (in the 14th century, no less). That means that your categorical statement was wrong. Deal with it.ribczynski
November 30, 2008
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