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More Insane Denial

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If a man tells you he cannot know the truth, you can be sure he will probably act as if he has no obligation to tell the truth.

At this point our readers may be asking, why is Barry so focused on the issue of the materialist tactic of insane denial? It is a fair question. And the answer is I have a (possibly perverse) curiosity about whether there is any limit to how many times they will deny a truth in bad faith all the while knowing that everyone knows exactly what they are doing. Is there any limit to the earth they are willing to scorch? Will they go on saying the red pen is a flower pot forever?

I have to admit that I find the spectacle simultaneously revolting and fascinating. Like a train wreck one just can’t look away from. Here is yet another example:

For weeks Learned Hand insisted on a radical falliblism that denied the possibility of certainty about even the most basic truths. Finally, under the crushing weight of rationality, he budged just a tiny bit. Whereas, before he said, “I cannot therefore be logically, absolutely certain of anything—not even that A=A,” he finally had to admit that was not true. He grudgingly conceded, “Defining A as equal to A is defining A as equal to A; the proposition is not fallible if the only metric is its own definition.”

Amazingly, LH, Carpathian and eigenstate immediately turned around and said that LH had been right all along! They said the second statement was not a change in position but a clarification of his initial position. HeKS responded:

It’s plain as day that first holding the position that there is absolutely nothing we can know for certain and then holding the position that there’s at least one thing we can know for certain, however supposedly trivial, constitutes a change of position.

In response they went into full bore “insane denial” mode.

LH:

To take one sentence, cut it out of context and hold it up as a complete and total summary of my position is absurd.

Notice what LH is doing here. He is suggesting that HeKS misrepresented his prior argument by quoting him out of context when he previously denied that he could be certain A=A. The truth, of course, is exactly the opposite. Far from being a distortion of LH’s argument, the radical falliblism on display in that quote WAS HIS ARGUMENT for weeks, as is easily demonstrated by several more quotes:

I think that in practice I’m perfectly safe making some assumptions, and that I can’t really do much of anything without making assumptions like “A=A.” But I don’t know how I can be infallibly certain in the abstract.

And I have no way to check whether a slice can be greater than the whole other than by testing it, which can never prove absolutely as a logical matter that the proposition is true.

I cannot therefore be logically, absolutely certain of anything—not even that A=A.

I think the trickiest question here is whether I can be certain that “I think, therefore I am.” But even there, is the fact that I cannot imagine any reason to doubt it because it’s perfectly true, or because I have an imperfect and limited mind?

I reiterate that in practice I’d never doubt the basic mathematical principles at issue. The possibility of error is a logical formality

I cannot be certain about anything other than uncertainty.

I was sloppy when I wrote “I’m perfectly comfortable agreeing…”, because that can be read as a statement that I agree that I can be absolutely certain that p/slice can’t exceed p/whole. I didn’t mean that

That doesn’t mean that I expect future physicists to upset the “A=A” cart. But what’s the objective, infallible principle dividing “A=A” from “particle=particle”

I take the formal position that one cannot be logically certain of anything without an infallible perspective from which to assess it

This presupposes, for example, that the law of identity would be broken on a human scale if it weren’t absolute. It could be violated in ways that aren’t apparent to you, and thus not absurd.

You can’t measure all cases, to see whether A is literally always A

What we’re really talking about here are whether things like “A=A” are proven concepts or axioms that we just assume are true. I think most people take the latter approach, stymied by the obvious impossibility of a human being logically proving themselves to be infallible

I’ve never doubted that A=A in the real world, and I would never expect to find (nor can I conceive of) a counter-example. But to say that I’m infallibly certain would require taking the position that I’m infallible, and I can’t do that.

[LOI, LNC and LEM] are very effective axioms. . . .we assume they are true because we cannot imagine any way in which they could be false. But to say that our failure to imagine a counterexample means there cannot be a counterexample is to arrogate to ourselves infallibility.

Now that we’ve dispensed with that attempted misdirection, on to LH’s change of position. After all of the above, he finally grudgingly admitted:

Defining A as equal to A is defining A as equal to A; the proposition is not fallible if the only metric is its own definition.

The bottom line is that HeKS’s summary is perfectly apt. There really is no debate. That the speaker changed his position is not in question. The only issue is whether they will continue their insane denial indefinitely.

In response Carpathian wrote:

Barry Arrington:
There really is no debate. That the speaker changed his position is not in question.

Of course it’s in question.

Are you taking the position that I haven’t been arguing with you about it?

I don’t think I have ever seen a more pristine example of the phenomenon Robert L. Kocher described when he wrote:

But, observable basic reality does not make a dent in countering the psychotic arguments underwriting the chaotic consequences which are occurring. No matter how airtight the refutation, the talk continues. No matter how inane the talk, the issue is still considered unresolved. Capacity to continue speaking has become looked upon as a form of refutation of absolute real-world evidence.

Earth to Carpathian: The ability to keep typing is NOT the same as the ability to make a rational argument.

UPDATE

In comment 72 below, HeKS makes a very cogent observation:

Barry & LH,

The thing I don’t get about this conflict is expressed in my original comment in the other thread, partially quoted in this OP. I went on to say:

LH should be commended for simply recognizing that he had overlooked something in his initial formulation of his position. The problem stems from the subsequent fact that everyone wants to insist that the positions are identical

Again, it’s plain as day that there was an adjustment to LH’s position, and precisely the one Barry has identified. As far as I can tell, Barry highlighted it simply because it took so long to get LH to recognize that the adjustment, however minor some may think it is, was quite obviously necessary. But the fact is, sometimes obvious stuff can elude us. It could elude us just because we don’t understand the ultimate point the other person is making and when we do, then it becomes obvious. It’s not shameful to adjust or reformulate your position when you realize it’s necessary, and LH could have just been commended for making the adjustment if the issue had been left there so the overall discussion could continue. The big problem is that it wasn’t left there. Instead, there has been a push from those more or less on LH’s side of the debate to insist that the two formulations of LH’s position are identical, when they quite plainly are not. This is made all the more noteworthy by the fact that the people claiming the formulations are identical are precisely the people who insist we don’t know that the Laws of Identity or Non-Contradiction actually apply to the external world. On the one hand, then, they are merely being consistent by refusing to acknowledge the distinct identities of the formulations. On the other hand, however, they are showing precisely what happens to rational discussion in the real world once you refuse to accept that it is necessarily consistent with the Laws of Identity, Non-Contradiction and the Excluded Middle.

Comments
Because I've given up the quest for justification. Apparently, that is something you cannot or refuse to comprehend.Popperian
September 29, 2015
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SB. then how do we get intelligible text in English from him? He has to implicitly trust what he professes to doubt. KF PS: Lunar eclipse about 1/3 way in as I type.kairosfocus
September 27, 2015
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Mung, Popperian isn't certain that A key and the T key are not the same key.StephenB
September 27, 2015
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Popperian, if you want a 'T' to appear on the screen, don't hit the 'A' key. No better way of reducing errors than abiding by the law of identity.Mung
September 27, 2015
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Popperian, more than enough has been said for the onlooker. At this stage, that is enough. KFkairosfocus
September 26, 2015
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KF:
Then you don’t really believe in the magic of grue and apart from armchair hyperskeptical games will use induction when it is convenient. Game over. KFB
You missed the rest of the comment....
From a critical rationalist perspective, the traditional problem of induction isn’t a problem at all, because we’re non-justificationists. In our view, justification is both impossible to attain and, in any case, unnecessary for rational assent. There is no need to justify–analytically or synthetically–any principle of induction. Instead, such a principle may be conjectured talis qualis, and it may be held rationally until found wanting through critical analysis and discussion. There would, however, be little point in doing so. When rejecting the demand to justify knowledge, the problem that induction was intended to solve no longer prevails. That is, there’s no longer any impetus to justify–by sensory experience or anything else–our expectations and hypotheses about the future. There is, in this case, no need for induction at all.
KF:
Inductive knowledge, patently, is not in the same class as recognising distinct identity and the import of world partition etc, which is undeniably true.
If the Stanford website doesn't agree, then you'll change your mind? http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity/ It doesn't seem so undeniable there, including criticism from Quine and others.Popperian
September 26, 2015
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Popperian, strongly grounded inductions are morally certain not absolutely certain. That is, you are willing to make decisions with serious consequences on what you have in hand because the credible evidence is that ignoring such carries a stiffer cost. As in let grue be suddenly you can flap hands and fly. Willing to jump off roofs on that speculative possibility? Then you don't really believe in the magic of grue and apart from armchair hyperskeptical games will use induction when it is convenient. Game over. KF PS: Inductive knowledge, patently, is not in the same class as recognising distinct identity and the import of world partition etc, which is undeniably true.kairosfocus
September 26, 2015
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How does that help you identify something with certainty before you learn about it or before time t?Popperian
September 26, 2015
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Popperian, if what we learned of as a precious stone we labelled emerald turned out to have colour-shift properties, the label would remain as we adjusted our understanding of the properties. Which is an example of inductive reasoning, recognising patterns i/l/o experience and using what is empirically reliable s.t. revision on future warrant. Mebbe it's grue not green without actual empirical warrant is simply posing empty speculation as though it overturned the matter. And it is easy to show that as finite beings our warranting frameworks will be finite, with chains going to start points. The issue is to be factually adequate coherent and explanatorily simple but not simplistic, with comparative difficulties across serious alternatives removing the issue of undue question-begging. Grue without empirical warrant fails the test. Last but not least, dismissiveness about inductive reasoning in a world where we depend on being able to recognise stable patterns is indeed insane denialism. Far better, to simply accept the provisional nature of induction, as Newton and Locke did 300+ years ago. Don't forget, post Godel, mathematics is also inherently provisional. KFkairosfocus
September 26, 2015
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Emerald are identified by the property of always being green. Something that has the property of being bleen is not an emerald, which would be a case of mistaken identity.
Rather than challenging people to justify their use of induction, Goodman undermines the presumption that induction is of much use in the first place. If there are infinitely many grue-like predicates for any supposed induction, then induction is too weak–for any given set of premises–to establish a unique conclusion (or even a finite list of conclusions). The question of what to expect from the future is utterly undecidable by inductive means.
The set of premises that induction is too weak to establish includes identifying something with certainty. A tautology does not help solve this problem. As is foundationalism. Even if we assume the basic beliefs you mentioned, they are to limited to construct our common-sense view if the world. From the link you provided above...
a. The Problem of Arbitrariness As noted above the regress argument figures prominently in arguing for foundationalism. The regress argument supports the conclusion that some beliefs must be justified independently of receiving warrant from other beliefs. However, some philosophers judge that this claim amounts to accepting some beliefs as true for no reason at all, that is, epistemically arbitrary beliefs. This objection has significant bite against a doxastic form of foundationalism (the language of ‘doxastic’ comes from the Greek word ‘doxa’ meaning belief). Doxastic foundationalism is the view that the justification of one’s beliefs is exclusively a matter of what other beliefs one holds. Regarding the basic beliefs, a doxastic foundationalist holds that these beliefs are ‘self-justified’ (see Pollock & Cruz (1999), 22-23). The content of the basic beliefs are typically perceptual reports but importantly a doxastic foundationalist does not conceive of one’s corresponding perceptual state as a reason for the belief. Doxastic foundationalists hold that one is justified in accepting a perceptual report simply because one has the belief. However, given the fallibility of perceptual reports, it is epistemically arbitrary to accept a perceptual report for no reason at all. The arbitrariness objection against non-doxastic theories must proceed with more care. A non-doxastic form of foundationalism denies that justification is exclusively a matter of relations between one’s beliefs. Consider a non-doxastic foundationalist that attempts to stop the regress with non-doxastic states like experiences. This foundationalist claims that, for example, the belief that there is a red disk before one is properly basic. This belief is not justified on the basis of any other beliefs but instead justified by the character of one’s sense experience. Because one can tell by reflection alone that one’s experience has a certain character, the experience itself provides one with an excellent reason for the belief. The critic of non-doxastic foundationalism argues that stopping with this experience is arbitrary. After all, there are scenarios in which this experience is misleading. If, for example, the disk is white but illuminated with red light then one’s experience will misled one to think that the disk is really red.Unless one has a reason to think that these scenarios fail to obtain then it’s improper to stop the regress of reasons here. One foundationalist solution to the arbitrariness problem is to move to epistemically certain foundations. Epistemically certain foundations are beliefs that cannot be misleading and so cannot provide a foothold for arbitrariness concerns. If, for instance, one’s experience is of a red disk and one believes just that one’s experience has this character, it is difficult to see how one’s belief could be mistaken in this specific context. Consequently, it is hard to make sense of how one’s belief about the character of one’s experience could be epistemically arbitrary. In general, many foundationalists want to resist this move. First, relative to the large number of beliefs we have, there are few epistemically certain beliefs. Second, even if one locates a few epistemically certain beliefs, it is very difficult to reconstruct our common-sense view of the world from those beliefs. If the ultimate premises of one’s view include only beliefs about the current character of one’s sense experience it’s near impossible to figure out how to justify beliefs about the external world or the past. Another foundationalist response to the arbitrariness argument is to note that it is merely required that a properly basic belief possess some feature in virtue of which the belief is likely to be true. It is not required that a subject believe her belief possesses that feature. This response has the virtue of allowing for modest forms of foundationalism in which the basic beliefs are less than certain. Critics of foundationalism continue to insist that unless the subject is aware that the belief possesses this feature, her belief is an improper stopping point in the regress of reasons. For a defense of the arbitrariness objection against foundationalism see Klein (1999) & (2004), and for responses to Klein see Bergmann (2004), Howard-Snyder & Coffman (2006), Howard-Snyder (2005), and Huemer (2003).
Popperian
September 26, 2015
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Popperian, the clinging to absurdities effect is now multiplied by a tangential irrelevancy. That a T exists and that a T key exists suffices to show a world partition, W = {T | ~T}, not just the logical statement reduction {A => A} = 1, that is, A is itself. Once distinct identity exists, and you must use it to type text, the partition exists. Thence instantly, LOI, LNC, LEM. And the partition is literally undeniable as to type or say a denial necessarily relies on what it would deny. KFkairosfocus
September 26, 2015
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Popperian, Recall, there is a dimension of time. That a "grue" entity will be, say: . . . --> 0 --> t_b, green then: --> t_b + --> . . . , blue (and perhaps changing again) simply would mean that it changes colour, it has not negated that it was green up to t_b. (Think the proverbial Chameleon, or colour-changing fish etc.) That at some point t_x, before t_b, we do not know this property has not changed it. The entity, say A that was green at x and up to b, is still a distinct thing, say a Chameleon. KF PS: To then insert switching grue to bleen at t_b, is functionally equivalent to saying A remains green. One has manufactured a distinction without a difference. Including, that in A there is a colour switching potential that was not exercised. That a Chameleon keeps one colour has not made its distinct identity disappear.kairosfocus
September 26, 2015
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First, from a practical perspective, the tautology that A=A provides no guidance as to how to solve the problem of getting a "T" to appear in the comment box. Second, you're projecting your problem to me. I'm not a justificationist. What I'm looking for is a way to reduce errors, not positively justify things. Even then, errors are tentative as our ideas and observations that led us to those those errors are theory laden.Popperian
September 26, 2015
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Popperian, apart from the world partition, distinct identity inherent in typing a textual response or speaking in a language, you have an infinite regress of fallibilities or potential fallibilities. KFkairosfocus
September 26, 2015
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I would again point to comment 7, which expands on this further. AFAIK, no one has yet to address the issue. Namely...
Goodman introduced a new predicate: grue. Something is grue if it’s green before a some arbitrary time in the future, and if it’s blue thereafter. Goodman noted that our past experience with green emeralds would then equally support both that every emerald is green and that every emerald is grue. We may, from the same past experience, induce either conclusion, though each contradicts the other. In principle, there are infinitely many grue-like predicates that, while in agreement about our past experience, each imply something different about the future. The only constraint on what can be induced about emeralds–whether about their colour, shape, size, or whatever–is that our conclusion not contradict past experience, a limit that’s imposed by deductive criteria alone.
Popperian
September 26, 2015
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KF:
SB & TGP, when your a priori certainty that you cannot be certain leads you to cling to more and more patent absurdities that should be a double clue.
I can only speak for myself, but I've already pointed out several times that I'm a fallibilist about fallibilism. I've even referenced an entire article on fallibilism that addresses this very topic. Yet, strangely, no one has actually presented any criticism of it. from this article on uncertainty.
That human beings can be mistaken in anything they think or do is a proposition known as fallibilism. Stated abstractly like that, it is seldom contradicted. Yet few people have ever seriously believed it, either. That our senses often fail us is a truism; and our self-critical culture has long ago made us familiar with the fact that we can make mistakes of reasoning too. But the type of fallibility that I want to discuss here would be all-pervasive even if our senses were as sharp as the Hubble Telescope and our minds were as logical as a computer. It arises from the way in which our ideas about reality connect with reality itself—how, in other words, we can create knowledge, and how we can fail to. The trouble is that error is a subject where issues such as logical paradox, self-reference, and the inherent limits of reason rear their ugly heads in practical situations, and bite. Paradoxes seem to appear when one considers the implications of one’s own fallibility: A fallibilist cannot claim to be infallible even about fallibilism itself. And so, one is forced to doubt that fallibilism is universally true. Which is the same as wondering whether one might be somehow infallible—at least about some things. For instance, can it be true that absolutely anything that you think is true, no matter how certain you are, might be false? What? How might we be mistaken that two plus two is four? Or about other matters of pure logic? That stubbing one’s toe hurts? That there is a force of gravity pulling us to earth? Or that, as the philosopher René Descartes argued, “I think, therefore I am”?
We start out not knowing what things are identical to another. From there, you cannot prove any idea you might have about being identical because the conclusion of an argument might be false if any of it's premises are false. Since you don't start out knowing the truth, any of your premises might be wrong. As such, our only recourse is to propose conjectures and test them against each other. You can't make anything in to an A, in practice, by merely declaring it to be so. The fact that everything is self identical doesn't tell us anything. What we really appeal to is that everything has a unique identity (which even then is problematic, such as with caterpillars and butterflies) and the unique and individual names of things is not based on guidance from the tautology that A=A. Rather, they are concrete, practical problems to solve. IOW, the problem is not negated by the law of identity.Popperian
September 26, 2015
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tgpeeler:
As SB has ably pointed out, the Law of Identity is foundational to all rational thought. In fact, I don’t believe one can even think irrationally without it.
One does not need to know about what is called the Law Of Identity in order to reason anymore than we need to have a basic understanding of thermodynamics in order to know when to put on a coat.Carpathian
September 26, 2015
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SB & TGP, when your a priori certainty that you cannot be certain leads you to cling to more and more patent absurdities that should be a double clue. First, that you are up against a self-evident truth; second, that you are being led into error because of ideology. Cf this other, wrap-up and move on thread: https://uncommondescent.com/design-inference/back-to-id-basics-0-the-distinct-identity-a-is-itself-a-a-challenge/ KFkairosfocus
September 25, 2015
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tg, the most entertaining demonstrations can be found on 1 thread dated Sep 11 and two others on Sep 14. This thread is mostly a wrap up.StephenB
September 24, 2015
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Simply amazing. And they usually claim the intellectual high ground. I'll have to go back and read it all now for entertainment value...tgpeeler
September 24, 2015
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tgoeeler, Thanks for your apt description of LOI. In passing, I should mention that we are dealing with one individual who isn't sure that is not Mount Everest, another who claims that he cannot infallibly identify a saddle and distinguish it from a horse, and a third who isn't sure that a whole pizza weighs more than any one of its slices. Indeed, all parties take all three positions.StephenB
September 24, 2015
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LH
You have conceded that a tautology is true by definition–and that we can be certain about it. That is all that is needed to refute everything LH, you, and all the other hyperskeptics have been claiming.
Is it? That assumes that we’ve only been talking about tautologies.
No, it doesn't. I recently raised the issue.
Is that all your comments have been about?
No, it is not what my comments have been about. It is what my comments are now about.
Do you believe you can only be absolutely certain about tautological truths?
No, I can be absolutely certain about all of reasons rules. However, that is not my point, and you know it. The issue is that you agree that a tautology is an infallibly true statement about which you can be certain, which refutes your earlier claim that we can be absolutely certain about nothing.StephenB
September 24, 2015
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p.s. This is also to note that we don't use logic to prove logic. We start with sensation, in the real world, and go from there. We connect to what turns out to be an absolute truth upon the merest of reflection. The truth existed a priori but we came to know it in an a posteriori fashion.tgpeeler
September 24, 2015
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SB @ 1 "The law of identity is, as the very word proclaims, about identities, or more precisely, it is about existent beings with identities in the real world. The purpose of the law of identity is to enable us to think and be certain about what is, what is not, and what cannot be." As SB has ably pointed out, the Law of Identity is foundational to all rational thought. In fact, I don't believe one can even think irrationally without it. I haven't read the entire thread so apologies if someone already noted what follows. We come to know the LID as we come to know all things, by the application of reasoned thought to sense experience. As I look around and see "things" I immediately and without confusion note that everything is what it is and is not something else (apart from the epistemological issue of what that may or may not be). Aha, I say. There is a pattern here. In fact, if I think about it more, I realize that I have stumbled upon the basis for the three rules of logic, which is the first rule of logic. No need to rehash that here. The second thing I note is that if I didn't exist I couldn't do anything. And then if I think about it some more, I realize that no one or no thing could do anything if it did not exist. Try to make a post with a non-existent keyboard. This abstracts to: Existence precedes creation and causality. This gives us the basis for further analyzing causality in terms of Aristotle's four causes, the act/potency thinking of Aquinas, and so on. So, all of the "free thinkers" out there only need to understand three things to be fully rational. 1. I exist. 2. I am I. 3. Were it not for my existence I could do nothing. This may be too much for some people to sign up for but I highly recommend that they try it. Once you have grasped these all important truths, go back and rethink your materialism/naturalism. It may surprise you.tgpeeler
September 24, 2015
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And we do, but you just don't seem to understand the law of identity or you are just dishonest.Andre
September 24, 2015
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Mung:
Mung: The consequences of running that code are the same regardless of the value of A. So what’s your point?
Carpathian: The context of A here..: #define A 1 ..is different than it’s context here: if (A == 1) {}; In the first case, A is defined by the statement. In the second, A is analyzed by running code. LH’s statement contains a conditional that relates to the context of a statement. The second statement is in a different context than the first, unless you ignore the conditional.
Even a non-programmer should have no problem understanding this.Carpathian
September 24, 2015
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You will notice that LH himself has pretty much abandoned the fight with his parting “Barry is a poopyhead for catching me in a lie” shot at 65. Well, isn’t this telling? Barry’s having a fight, not a conversation. That explains why he doesn’t engage with ideas, only relentlessly attacks those who criticize his claims to infallibility. Ideas don’t matter in a fight, winning does. And somehow BA now thinks that an insult is “abandoning” the fight. Not, presumably, when he does it. That’s when he’s being Chesterton, apparently, even though I don’t think Chesterton is best known for insulting people who doubted his unsupported proclamations. I don’t see any insults in 65, except my reference to BA’s sophomoric insults. (BA's comment is the sort of thing that KF would breathlessly describe as a “turnabout argument,” if he were able to turn his scrutiny inwards.) I do see questions, that BA has yet again ignored, as well as Popperian’s interesting comments at 85 and elsewhere. But why not? It’s not a conversation to him, it’s a fight. And in a fight, it doesn’t matter if your ideas are well-supported, as long as you can out-shout the questions.Learned Hand
September 24, 2015
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SB You have conceded that a tautology is true by definition–and that we can be certain about it. That is all that is needed to refute everything LH, you, and all the other hyperskeptics have been claiming. Is it? That assumes that we’ve only been talking about tautologies. Is that all your comments have been about? Do you believe you can only be absolutely certain about tautological truths?Learned Hand
September 24, 2015
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08:46 AM
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Carpathian: if (A == 1) {}; The consequences of running that code are the same regardless of the value of A. So what's your point?Mung
September 23, 2015
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03:54 PM
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Popperian, in order to communicate with text, you have again had to rely on the distinct identity of letters, words, keys, signals, etc. Thus, on the LOI, LEM and LNC which come with that. Just by acting, you have decisively undermined your general case. KFkairosfocus
September 23, 2015
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12:38 PM
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