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Metaphysics and ID

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I have just been re-reading R. G. Collingwoods “Essay on Metaphysics”, and am now more that ever convinced that Collingwood’s perspective is incredibly important to the ID debate.

Collingwood was a mid-20th Century British Philosopher who was WaynFlete Professor of Metaphysical Sciences at Oxford University, and who worked himself to death. He published many works – all of them in style that is incredibly easy to read, but very challenging to the reader. Unlike many philosophers he was very interested in the natural sciences, and documented the course of Western science in his “Idea of Nature”. Yet, in his last days he warned that natural science, as now conceived in the West, will ultimately destroy Western Civilization. And this would be because of metaphysics.

Now, metaphysics has had a bad two centuries, and in the popular culture it is simply ridiculed. But there is no escape from it. Rather than argue about particular metaphysical ideas, Collingwood introduced the idea of metaphysics being absolute presuppositions. An absolute presupposition is a proposition that cannot be proven or disproven – it can only be accepted or rejected. Absolute propositions are the foundation of all of our thinking. If we even question one of them that we hold, then all our thinking collapses like a house of cards. For instance, the US Declaration of Independence says “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal”. This is not anything that can be proven scientifically – you either accept it or reject it. It is an absolute presupposition. Don’t imagine you can prove – or disprove it – scientifically. You cannot – you accept it or reject it and build from there.

Collingwood, having established absolute presuppositions, went on to show how absolute presuppositions have varied with time in Western civilization (meaning there is no such thing as “human nature”), and how they probably vary across cultural lines. From this he referred metaphysics to history and said that the function of metaphysics is to discover the absolute presuppositions at any point in time in every culture. He then went on to say that the set of absolute presuppositions you hold will determine the questions you ask, and that in turn will determine the answers you get. And that, he said, will determine the answers you get from your science.

Collingwood was very big on science being the capacity to formulate questions for which you could get answers. In the Baconian tradition, he saw the scientist acting as the prosecutor would never be allowed to act – torturing Nature to get answers from her. But you will never ask questions that question your absolute presuppositions – the very act of doing so destroys them. Your absolute presuppositions dictate the answers you will get from your science because they constrain the questions you will ask.

From this we can see how evolutionary biology is moribund. You cannot ask why cockroaches have remained unchanged since the Carboniferous, or why dinosaurs have not evolved multiple times, or why men don’t have babies. Just to ask these questions calls into question the absolute presuppositions – the metaphysics – that underlie evolutionary biology. And not asking these questions guarantees the answers that evolutionary biology does give. Therefore, ID should boldly ask precise scientific questions that challenge the established orthodoxy. It is questions, far more than their answers, that matter.

Comments
Paul Giem @81: Very nice!StephenB
May 23, 2010
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Sooner Emeritus (#60), Thank you for clarifying the discussion. You have not challenged the logic in #59, which is based on repeatable observations. You apparently concede (like Dawkins in a frank moment) that embodied entities are a reasonable hypothesis, at least in principle. And I agree that ID implies the power to make as well as to design. Your real objection is that you do not believe that intelligence can exist apart from a body. If there is someone with vastly superior intelligence to us, he/she/it must have a material manifestation. "God is a spirit" is not an option. That would be smuggling spirits into discourse. Your objection is not so much to design as such. It is rather that you are afraid of where this might go. ID is about scientific evidence and its explanation. It does not identify the designer or the method of design, except as that can be determined empirically. Your objections are metaphysical if not religious. This is science versus religion, or at least science versus philosophy. That's fine, as long as we're clear about it. But with that attitude, your first statement ("There is no empirical evidence of incorporeal intelligence.") is not surprising, and not particularly helpful. If you start by ruling out incorporeal intelligence, how could you ever recognize any evidence for it?Paul Giem
May 22, 2010
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Paul Giem, There is no empirical evidence of incorporeal intelligence. The experience of scientists is that Occam's Razor -- "entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily" -- gives a good, clean shave. You can conceivably offer testable hypotheses that embodied entities who preceded us made life on Earth. You do not have license to multiply entities unnecessarily when trying to account for past events. Detaching our abstraction of "intelligence" from the embodied makers we observe publicly and our abstraction of "design" from the made objects we observe publicly, and then granting the abstractions physical existence as unobservable entities, is just a way of smuggling spirits into discourse. And if intelligence should be "really real," so what? That gives you no warrant to say that intelligence can exist apart from a body. Any scientific inference that life is designed is an inference that something with a material manifestation made it.Sooner Emeritus
May 21, 2010
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Cabal (#76), Take your time. I'd appreciate your digging into the argument. It will help if you understand it. Your first hurried pass was somewhat inaccurate:
My reasoning us that we have no material evidence for design; only an inference that I translate to “if it looks designed, it is designed”. That may be too terse; “Some things are too complex to be the result of natural causes; they must be designed.” is closer.
You have a hodgepodge here, badly describing both premises for design, and then confusing them. So let me restate them. A) Some things, now including the DNA code, as far as we know, required for life (in the sense that if you remove the code, the life ceases to exist), strongly resemble objects which we reasonably know are produced by intelligent agents (never mind how intelligence operates, or whether it requires more than material entities, it exists; the denial of this fact has certain negative self-referential consequences). This point is quite apart from point B, and would be true even if B were false. It is reasonable to postulate that intelligent agents can be a cause of many objects, including the DNA code that is currently necessary for life. B) There is currently no known pathway from non-life to multiple objects, specifically including the DNA code currently necessary for life, that does not include intelligence as an essential ingredient. C) Therefore, it is reasonable to tentatively reach the warranted conclusion that some structures are the product of intelligent design, specifically including the DNA code that is necessary for life as we know it. The logic seems sound, and the premises seem sound, at least to me. Feel free to challenge them. But do tackle them in their strongest form. Otherwise, you are creating and knocking down a straw man, and I hope better of you. If you understand this logic, maybe you can "get beyond that fundamental tenet of ID" and find "more meat on the bones."Paul Giem
May 21, 2010
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PS: Onlookers, notice how Cabal inserts the objection that inference to design in the universe is an assumption. Of course he probably lives in a house, drives a car, on roads in a country with cities etc. All o these brim over with that functionally specific complex "wired" organisation of elements and components that is the main sign of design. Cabal et al have never shown that such signs are the routine spontaneous product of chance + necessity in our observation; he knows they are routinely produced by intelligent agents. But, he wants to seize the default in the teeth of the evidence so he casts a loaded word: assumption. Sad.kairosfocus
May 21, 2010
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Cabal: Strawman, on a red herring. You live in a world where you are surrounded by designs. There are patterns that are reliable well tested signs of design. Many of them. Signs that are routinely recognised on a day by day basis. Inferential knowledge on good warrant is jut that: warranted, credibly true belief i.e knowledge. (And strictly, we infer the external world from the information of our senses, but only a fool would use that to dismiss its reality or the confidence with which we know that inferred external world outside our heads.) What you really mean is that, not having a good case to show how chance + necessity can routinely spontaneously produce functionally specific complex information, you want to sow doubt that we can reliably infer to design on empirically tested signs. Reduction -- sadly -- to selective hyperskepticism, in short. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
May 21, 2010
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Paul Giem, I'd need a little more time to dig into your argument but right now I can only say it was the term 'material evidence of design' that caught my attention. My reasoning us that we have no material evidence for design; only an inference that I translate to "if it looks designed, it is designed". That may be too terse; "Some things are too complex to be the result of natural causes; they must be designed." is closer. I am afraid my problem is that I can't get beyond that fundamental tenet of ID; I'd like to see more meat on the bones. Isn't that the #1 complaint from scientists too?Cabal
May 21, 2010
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Cabal (#74), You are attacking a straw man. You have been around this site long enough so that you should know better. But I'll give you the benefit of the doubt and assume that you are really ignorant of what you are doing. You imply that the ID case is 'If I think it looks designed, it is designed – and that is evidence". Usually we get the opposite accusation; that ID is simply based on the absence of any known evolutionary pathway (or naturalistic pathway if you prefer, that is if you are willing to define nature as excluding intelligence). But in fact, ID is based on both those ideas; that some phenomena look remarkably like designed objects (and after Venter, life in particular looks this way), but that after considerable searching there is no known pathway to life in particular that does not involve intelligence. Therefore one may draw a warranted, if tentative, conclusion that life required intelligence. Now you may protest that this is not proof, and in the absolute sense I would agree. But we reach warranted tentative conclusions, that we are willing to act upon and base further theories on, all the time without absolute proof. You probably (at least I hope you do) presume that I am a real person, and that this communication is not coming from static or white noise in some telephone line, even thought you cannot prove it. And you might even consider answering this comment based on that tentative conclusion based on fallible but presently persuasive evidence. You certainly have done that in the past for a presumed entity calling him/her/itself kairosfocus (It's himself, but never mind how I reasonably concluded that). So do you really challenge the reasonableness of that tentative conclusion? You ask, is the assumption that there is design in the universe falsifiable? That is not the right question. The question on which ID stands or falls is, is there reasonably detectable design in the universe? If we draw the tentative conclusion that life is designed, then the answer is yes. Will that new, revised question meet Zolar Czaki's criterion in #63?
Can an intelligent agent be an entity?
Sure, so long as the agent is postulated/modeled/described (etc.) in such a way that necessary empirical consequences flow therefrom, rendering the theory testable.
Paul Giem
May 21, 2010
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Sorry, premature. KF:
Instead, ID seeks to inject the professional discipline to say what can actually be said of the evidence – the material evidence of design – and reject the politically imposed (and non-falsifiable) assumption that there is no evidence of design in the cosmos.
"Material evidence of design"? Does that translate to "If I think it looks designed, it is designed - and that is evidence"? I also wonder, is the assumption that there is design in the universe falsifiable?Cabal
May 21, 2010
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KF:
in light of inference to the best current explanation on empirically credible causal factors and dynamics.
That rings like "If it looks designed, it is designed" to me. But how do we establish "empirically credible causal factors"?
Instead, ID seeks to inject the professional discipline to say what can actually be said of the evidence – the material evidence of design – and reject the politically imposed (and non-falsifiable) assumption that there is no evidence of design in the cosmos.
Cabal
May 21, 2010
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Upright Biped: Congratulations on your well-worded summary @70.StephenB
May 20, 2010
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kairosfocus: Your well-thought out contributions on this site are both illuminating and indispensable.StephenB
May 20, 2010
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...and...if there is an equivocation (and there will be because there must be) then "rejecting the standard" as a non-falsifiable assumption within an empirical framework of investigation is the only proper thing to do. ID does not impose one non-falsifiable standard in place of the current one, it simply rejects ther current one because it is 1) arbitrary, 2) political, 3) historically invalid, and 4) does not comport to the evidence. Instead, ID seeks to inject the professional discipline to say what can actually be said of the evidence - the material evidence of design - and reject the politically imposed (and non-falsifiable) assumption that there is no evidence of design in the cosmos.Upright BiPed
May 20, 2010
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Speaking of shoes that fit: what is the test to verify the materialist' assumption that only unguided processes are at work in the cosmos? Given that this is the core of the arbitrary rule, will there be an equivocation?Upright BiPed
May 20, 2010
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Steve Just for kicks, here is my own semi-popular "definition" of what science at its best should be, in terms of the sort of a generic, popular level:
The unfettered (but ethically and intellectually responsible progressive, open-ended pursuit of the truth about or world, by observation, hypothesis, experiement, induction, theorising and modelling, simulation, logico-mathematical analysis and discussion by the informed, in light of inference to the best current explanation on empirically credible causal factors and dynamics.
Now, where did I get such weird ideas from, and who ever set me up with a "right" to try to define science? (Apart from: it helps when you have to teach it . . ., and the part about ethical responsibility says not only :no cheating," but also "no help to future would be Hitlers." ) Well, let's try this fella for starters:
As in Mathematicks, so in Natural Philosophy, the Investigation of difficult Things by the Method of Analysis, ought ever to precede the Method of Composition. This Analysis consists in making Experiments and Observations, and in drawing general Conclusions from them by Induction, and admitting of no Objections against the Conclusions, but such as are taken from Experiments, or other certain Truths. For Hypotheses [in the sense of unsupported guesses] are not to be regarded in experimental Philosophy. And although the arguing from Experiments and Observations by Induction be no Demonstration of general Conclusions; yet it is the best way of arguing which the Nature of Things admits of, and may be looked upon as so much the stronger, by how much the Induction is more general. And if no Exception occur from Phaenomena, the Conclusion may be pronounced generally. But if at any time afterwards any Exception shall occur from Experiments, it may then begin to be pronounced with such Exceptions as occur. By this way of Analysis we may proceed from Compounds to Ingredients, and from Motions to the Forces producing them; and in general, from Effects to their Causes, and from particular Causes to more general ones, till the Argument end in the most general. This is the Method of Analysis: And the Synthesis consists in assuming the Causes discover'd, and establish'd as Principles, and by them explaining the Phaenomena proceeding from them, and proving the Explanations. [Opticks, Query 31]
Y'know, that weirdo Called Isaac, who wrote a couple of books that never saw the light of peer review, called himself a mathematician of sorts, said he was doing something called Natural Philosophy, spent a lot of time speculating on apocalyptic Bible texts, dabbled in alchemy, and went on to play at detective to catch counterfeiters. Nobody of any account. Especially by comparison with a certain C. Robert D. who came along a hundred and more years later. NOT! What he summed up is an obvious root source of many pre-"methodological" a priori materialist attempts to redefine science in ways that twist it away from being an open-minded open-ended pursuit of the truth about our cosmos [never mind how often we will err --Newton knew that too], into applied materialistic atheism, enforced by a new magisterium in lab coats in the name of claims that "it is self-evident that the practices of science provide the surest method of putting us in contact with physical reality [which to such minds is in practice even if not in theory all of reality]." So, a couple of dictionaries of some note:
science: a branch of knowledge conducted on objective principles involving the systematized observation of and experiment with phenomena, esp. concerned with the material and functions of the physical universe. [Concise Oxford, 1990] scientific method: principles and procedures for the systematic pursuit of knowledge [”the body of truth, information and principles acquired by mankind”] involving the recognition and formulation of a problem, the collection of data through observation and experiment, and the formulation and testing of hypotheses. [Webster's 7th Collegiate, 1965]
When instead we see the sort of radical attempted redefinition as was tried out in Kansas in 2001, and which was endorsed by the US National Academy of Sciences [which -- surpise [NOT] -- just happens to have an over-representation of atheists and fellow travellers in it] -- “Science is the human activity of seeking natural explanations of the world around us.” -- we can be sure that a hidden agenda game is in play. But, that builds in the a priori that he only explaining factors that will be tolerated lo and behold are those that just happen to sit well with materialism. And as for the excuse that such is the centuries old practice of science over the past 300 - 500 years, that is a lie, a lie because those who make it or repeat it know they should do their homework first. One that can easily be countered by looking at what major scientists have had to say (why not read the whole of Query 31 as linked?]. And it imposes an implicit censoring constraint on what would otherwise be a credible candidate explanation: intelligence [i.e. art, as opposed to the ever so convenient strawman: "the supernatural" -- which BTW, if intelligent could conceivably leave traces of intelligent action . . . ], wherever that is inconvenient for materialism. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
May 20, 2010
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---Zolar Czakl: "I gather from your responses that ID does not meet this standard. Hence your only move is to reject the standard." My how quickly you catch on. The entire debate is centered around the self-serving nature of that standard. As I pointed out earlier, probing through your Pennock-inspired fog, materialist metaphysics informs methodological naturlism. Because both methodological naturalism and your novel formula are designed to rule out ID in principle, it follows as surely as night follows day, that ID would not meet its arbitrary qualifications. If you lift your head of of the fog, you will discover that repeating your own definition of science does not speak to the question of who has the right to define it. Much less does it address the point about one group of bureaucratic busybodies imposing it definitions on everyone else.StephenB
May 20, 2010
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zeroseven:
That is some of the most beautiful, elegant, and concise language I have seen on this topic.
Thank you zeroseven.Zolar Czakl
May 20, 2010
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StephenB:
What you are describing is the same classic methodological naturalism introduced in the mid 1980’s, dealing solely with naturalistic causes and predictable effects.
Scientific theories must be testable by means of empirical evidence. To be testable, they must specify predicted empirical findings that flow from the theory. I gather from your responses that ID does not meet this standard. Hence your only move is to reject the standard. "If the shoe fits," as they say.Zolar Czakl
May 20, 2010
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What you are describing is the same classic methodological naturalism introduced in the mid 1980's, dealing solely with naturalistic causes and predictable effects. We already know how those things work, so using three more examples to emphasize the point does not illuminate. What everyone is fussing over is the methodological naturalist's presumptive declaration that science must be limited to that which you describe. Describing it over and over does not answer that question. In effect, you are are straining at gnats and swallowing camels. To impose materialist metaphysics by another name, using the language of "empirical inevitability" and "explanatory entity" does nothing to justify the imposition. What is not clear is whether or not you recognize that fact.StephenB
May 19, 2010
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StephenB:
So a proposed model is an entity? Perhaps you had better define “entity.” What is its role?
I've stated a simple notion: That one's causal/explanatory terms (entities, relationships, processes) must have necessary empirical consequences. Otherwise one's theory isn't amenable to empirical test, and therefore cannot claim to be scientific. A few brief examples should make this clear. - In the germ theory of disease the causal, hence explanatory entities are microorganisms and their pathogenic properties. The necessary empirical findings included the detection of pathogenic organisms in persons who suffer the corresponding disease, the occurrence of that disease following the introduction of that pathogen into healthy persons, and so forth (i.e. Koch's postulates.) - In the theory of plate tectonics the causal, explanatory entities are plates that move in relationship to one another, and the dynamics of that movement. Predicted empirical consequences included a spreading sea floor (confirmed by the magnetic striping of the Atlantic sea bed), the subduction of seafloor crust, close geological relationships between now separated continental areas that were once joined, as well as contrasting geological features in areas composed of once separated terranes that are now fused to one another. - In operant learning theory the causal explanatory relationship (a relational entity, in this case) is that between behaviors and the contingent occurrence of reinforcers. The required empirical outcome is a predictable relationship between reinforcement schedule and the frequency and persistence of those behaviors upon which those reinforcers are contingent. And so forth. Each exemplifies a scientific model. The entities, relationships, processes within each model specifies necessary empirical consequences by means of which we can test the applicability/fit of that model.
Can an intelligent agent be an entity?
Sure, so long as the agent is postulated/modeled/described (etc.) in such a way that necessary empirical consequences flow therefrom, rendering the theory testable.Zolar Czakl
May 19, 2010
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Zolar Czakl, That is some of the most beautiful, elegant, and concise language I have seen on this topic. Thank you. I am really enjoying the conversation you are having with StephenB. StephenB, I think it is clear from what ZC is saying that the ID inference would definitely be accepted if, as an explanatory entity, it specified empirical consequences that could then be searched for and studied. I find it curious that you are criticizing ZC for (allegedly) ignoring other scientists and coming up with his own formulation. As you say, darwinists are frequently criticized on this site for doing precisely the opposite.zeroseven
May 19, 2010
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---“Explanatory entity.” From time zero forward we have quite precise models of the unfolding of events in quantum and relativistic terms, and you may insert that account here.” [I had asked what ZC to explain the role of the “explanatory entity” in terms of the big bang.] So a proposed model is an entity? Perhaps you had better define “entity.” What is its role? Can an intelligent agent be an entity? Why or why not? ---“Of course, you are pulling for the ultimate origins (a contradiction in terms?) of the large noisy event. [Big Bang] No, I am trying to get you to define your terms, which is a little like pulling teeth. Why cannot an intelligent agent qualify as an explanatory entity? Further, you have ignored all the other scientists I listed who define methodological naturalism differently than you do, that is, using the “natural/supernatural” dichotomy. Why should I accept your minority account rather their majority account, especially in light of the fact that Darwinists say science should be defined by majority opinion? Further still, the one person on the planet who uses the language that you are using is on record at Dover insisting that science is the search for natural causes and that ID is a foray into the “supernatural.” When he testified at Dover, Pennock, when he was not trying to create a fog with the language, stated clearly that the natural/supernatural dichotomy was the line of demarcation between science and non-science. Thus, it is now evident that the purpose of his new formulation is to retain “naturalism,” [to study nature as if nature is all there is] while creating the illusion that methodological naturalism is more flexible than it really is. ---“That was a “let’s see.” Whether or not we do see is contingent upon whether you play too. I asked you a yes or no question, which means that I was not inviting another question. It is not my task to take your definitions, which I and a long list of scientists [even your Darwinist colleagues] do not agree with and make sense of them. That is your gig. Still, I understand why you didn’t answer the question, so will answer the question for you. Using the very quote you provided earlier, the answer would be “yes.” Pennock writes, ….”so, whatever tentative claims a Methodological Naturalist makes are always open to revision or abandonment on the basis of new, countervailing evidence.” Thus, when the ID scientist presents new evidence, the Methodological Naturalist is, by this definition, bound to accept it as countervailing evidence. But, of course, we know that Pennock does not mean what he says because the word “naturalism” in methodological naturalism, means exactly what it says---no intelligent agent need apply. His point, and yours, is to make methodological naturalism APPEAR to be flexible while rigidly holding to the same old naturalist paradigm. That is the basic Darwinist message” a thing can be true and false at the same time and under the same formal circumstances. “We are flexible, but we are not.” “We admit countervailing evidence, but not really.” I prefer Lewontin’s expression informed by his honest metaphysical commitment, which speaks for all methodological naturalists. As he put it, “we cannot allow a “Divine foot in the door.” If only all Darwinists were as honest and forthcoming as he. If only Pennock would be as clear and honest as he was at Dover. If only you would follow his earlier example.StephenB
May 19, 2010
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StephenB:
Define “explanatory entity” and “necessarily empirical consequences” in terms of the “big bang.” Who or what is playing each role. Describe each role in the language of your definitions.
OK. I'll play. Then you play too. OK? "Explanatory entity." From time zero forward we have quite precise models of the unfolding of events in quantum and relativistic terms, and you may insert that account here. The "necessary empirical consequences" are abundant: the CBR, the abundance and ratios of light elements, the large scale distribution and evolution of galaxies, etc., all predicted by the model. The failure to observe any one of these would have been sufficient to disconfirm the model. It is by means of a recursive conversation between the evolving model, the predicted empirical observations, and the actual very hard work required to make the required observations that we can state, with a high degree of confidence, that the big bang occurred. That is an astonishing scientific accomplishment, and a beautiful illustration of how the natural sciences work. Of course, you are pulling for the ultimate origins (a contradiction in terms?) of the large noisy event. Vis that, well, tarnation StephenB. Beats me. I'm quite sure I'll never know. Fortunately for my argument, it does not follow from "I don't know" that one is licensed to advance, in the context of scientific inquiry, explanations that have no empirical consequences. Nor would there be any point in doing so. Try as you might, you can't make such postulates do any scientific work.
Is that a no?
That was a "let's see." Whether or not we do see is contingent upon whether you play too. Would you describe an application of the design inference that specifies necessary empirical consequences? Better yet, would you identify an empirical investigation motivated thereby, its findings, and questions for future research suggested by those findings? Such is the daily bread of scientific inquiry.Zolar Czakl
May 18, 2010
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---Zolar Czakl: --"explanatory entities that have no necessary empirical consequences are scientifically useless." Define "explanatory entity" and "necessarily empirical consequences" in terms of the "big bang." Who or what is playing each role. Describe each role in the language of your definitions. ---"Would you describe an application of the design inference that specifies necessary empirical consequences? Better yet, identify an empirical investigation motivated thereby, its findings, and questions raised for future research suggested by those findings?" Is that a no?StephenB
May 18, 2010
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StephenB:
It is not necessary to use your exact formulation, especially since it is, from my perspective, unnecessarily abstruse.
My formulation simply requires that explanatory hypotheses be "defeasible on the basis of new evidence" (see below). That, in turn, requires that one's hypothesis specify necessary/inevitable empirical consequences. Otherwise it cannot be tested. There is nothing obscure or difficult to understand about that.
Even if it resonates among a small group of evolutionary biologists, though I have no reason to believe that it does...
I'd say the opposite is the case: the vast majority of working evolutionary biologists (and working scientists generally) are busy with the business of formulating hypotheses that are amenable to empirical test and then testing them, guided by the constraint I describe above. Most are otherwise not particularly interested in philosophical issues, or this debate.
The language you use differs from the terms found in the official documents offered by the Kansas science standards and by such Darwinist luminaries such as Eugenie Scott, Francis Ayala, Ken Miller, and a good number of others. They all have different ways of expressing the same point. For them, the scientist must study nature as if nature is all there is.
Here is a description of MN from Robert Pennock, one of its more ardent advocates:
The Naturalist view of the world has become coincident with the scientific view of the world, whatever that may turn out to be. Many people continue to think of the scientific world view as being exclusively materialistic and deterministic, but if science discovers forces and fields and indeterministic causal processes, then these too are to be accepted as part of the Naturalistic world view. The key point is that Naturalism is not necessarily tied to specific ontological claims (about what sorts of being do or don't exist); its base commitment is to a method of inquiry….The Methodological Naturalist does not make a commitment directly to a picture of what exists in the world, but rather to a set of methods as a reliable way to find out about the world - typically the methods of the natural sciences, and perhaps extensions that are continuous with them - and indirectly to what those methods discover. An important feature of science is that its conclusions are defeasible on the basis of new evidence, so whatever tentative claims a Methodological Naturalist makes are always open to revision or abandonment on the basis of new, countervailing evidence.
As I read the above, the term "natural" resolves to the non-negotiable methodological constraint (absolute presupposition, if you like) that both defines and makes possible contemporary science, namely that one limit one's explanatory entities and relationships to those that have necessary empirical consequences. One needn't become bogged down with a formal demarcation between the "natural" and the "supernatural," although many entities colloquially understood to be "supernatural" (e.g. an omnipotent deity) will be excluded. Hewing to the constraint I describe above is enough.
If your presupposition does not fall into circularity, then it allows for a design inference and there should be no problem. Does it?
Well, let's see. Would you describe an application of the design inference that specifies necessary empirical consequences? Better yet, identify an empirical investigation motivated thereby, its findings, and questions raised for future research suggested by those findings?Zolar Czakl
May 18, 2010
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dawkins' definition sounds so circular and arbitrary it's laughable. Let's play with it: Original formulation - Biology is the study of organisms that appear to be designed but are not Parody 1 - Biology is the study of organisms that appear to be designed but are not but in fact are actually are designed Parody 2 - Biology is the study of organisms that appear to be designed but are not but in fact they actually are designed... but truly they are not Parody 3 - Biology is the study of organisms that appear to be designed but are not but in fact they actually are designed... but truly they are not... even though they are designed (seriously this time) Ad infinitum.above
May 18, 2010
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---“Evolutionary biology certainly chooses to hold to the quite basic standard I articulate above. I for one can’t see how anything resembling science can be accomplished by means of theoretical entities that can make no empirical difference.” The language you use differs from the terms found in the official documents offered by the Kansas science standards and by such Darwinist luminaries such as Eugenie Scott, Francis Ayala, Ken Miller, and a good number of others. They all have different ways of expressing the same point. For them, the scientist must study nature as if nature is all there is. It is not necessary to use your exact formulation, especially since it is, from my perspective, unnecessarily abstruse. Even if it resonates among a small group of evolutionary biologists, though I have no reason to believe that it does, it would not be relevant to the discussion on methodological naturalism because it is not the formulation used to discredit intelligent design. ---“The requirement that one’s Explanatory entities/processes/relationships have necessary empirical consequences makes no reference to a definition of “the natural” (nor to Robert Redford).” In each case that I alluded to (I can provide dozens more if you like), the word natural is absolutely essential. The reason for this should be clear. In order to discredit the design inference, the Darwinist academy must associate it with the “supernatural,” and exempt itself from the same charge by associating itself exclusively with the “natural,” which, of course, they cannot define. Your account is worth considering as a singular example, to be sure, but its legitimacy must be weighed against all the other examples which resound with consistent clarity. ---“The presupposition I describe doesn’t concern itself with definitions of either “natural” or “supernatural,” and is therefore guilty of neither this circularity nor its associated irony.” If your presupposition does not fall into circularity, then it allows for a design inference and there should be no problem. Does it? In fact, Darwinism as an approach to science, is circular by virtue of the fact that is assumes its conclusion prior to examining the evidence. It decides, in advance, which evidence it will accept or reject. We know, for example, that Darwinism simply rejects all evidence for design apriori. Dawkins defines biology as the study of organisms that appear to be designed but are not. That definition rules out all counter evidence, which makes it unscientific.StephenB
May 18, 2010
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StephenB:
You will not be surprised to learn that I prefer my account.
Of course. Nevertheless, science generally and evolutionary biology specifically take the standard I articulate as their Collingwoodsian starting points. As you have often said, scientists themselves should be left to select the presuppositions and hence the methodologies appropriate to their discipline. Evolutionary biology certainly chooses to hold to the quite basic standard I articulate above. I for one can't see how anything resembling science can be accomplished by means of theoretical entities that can make no empirical difference.
Debatable definitions of the word “natural” is, indeed, one of the problems with methodological naturalism. Its proponents insist that a scientist may not study anything other than natural causes even thought they cannot define the word “natural.”
The requirement that one's Explanatory entities/processes/relationships have necessary empirical consequences makes no reference to a definition of "the natural" (nor to Robert Redford).
On the other hand, the Darwinist approach is indeed circular. Through the principle of methodological naturalism, the stultified scientist rules out design patterns in nature on the grounds that they may indicate “supernatural entities" (also undefined). Then, in the next breath, he declares that he can find no evidence for design.
The presupposition I describe doesn't concern itself with definitions of either "natural" or "supernatural," and is therefore guilty of neither this circularity nor its associated irony.Zolar Czakl
May 18, 2010
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---Zolar Czakl: “That isn’t a wholly accurate restatement of this particular presupposition. Rather, what is presupposed is that that explanatory entities that have no necessary empirical consequences are scientifically useless. Evidence can neither be inconsistent nor meaningfully consistent with an explanatory entity/process/relationship that leaves no necessary empirical footprint at all. Therefore your statement of the principle is too weak.” You will not be surprised to learn that I prefer my account. At any rate, neither your interpretation of methodological naturalism nor my interpretation of methodological naturalism defines science. Methodological naturalism is anti-science by anyone’s definition. Debatable definitions of the word “natural” is, indeed, one of the problems with methodological naturalism. Its proponents insist that a scientist may not study anything other than natural causes even thought they cannot define the word “natural.” That is a bizarre set of circumstances to say the least. The historical facts are easy to verify. Darwinist bureaucrats conceived an arbitrary rule called "Methodological Naturalism" in order to discredit any evidence that would threaten their crumbling paradigm. On Collingswood, I haven’t read the work in question nor do I have easy access to it, so I will happily accept your account for his take on metaphysics. At this point, I would rather argue on my own behalf rather than defend Collingswood, who, from what I have read recently, is not someone I would care to defend in any case, or Mr. Russell, at least until he reappeareds to explain his examples. ---"Study any pattern you please to your heart’s content. However, if the explanatory entities you invoke to explain those patterns predict no further unique empirical footprint, your explanation will remain scientifically hollow. That is because it is circular to infer your explanatory entity from the observed phenomenon, then explain the phenomenon in terms of that inferred entity.” Your description fails to capture the reality of a design inference. An inference to the best explanation, or “abduction,” is not circular by any stretch of the imagination. Once we leave the world of abstract descriptions and apply the concrete ID paradigms, the point becomes evident. On the other hand, the Darwinist approach is indeed circular. Through the principle of methodological naturalism, the stultified scientist rules out design patterns in nature on the grounds that they may indicate “supernatural entities (also undefined). Then, in the next breath, he declares that he can find no evidence for design. That’s quite an irony.StephenB
May 17, 2010
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Zolar Czakl @52,
That is because it is circular to infer your explanatory entity from the observed phenomenon, then explain the phenomenon in terms of that inferred entity.
That was very nicely stated.Toronto
May 17, 2010
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