Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

Medical Practice, Biological Science, and the Power of a “Differential Diagnosis”

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Because science is a search for causes, its practitioners are ethically bound to keep an open mind about the nature of those causes. The whole point of investigating any given phenomenon is to find a reasonable answer to the question, “why is this happening?” or “why did it happen?” In that spirit, the researcher develops a rigorous methodology that will address a narrowly-focused problem and facilitate the process of finding the most plausible solution, regardless of whose interests might be served. This is just as true for the practice of medicine as it is for the study of life’s origins.

If, for example, a physician is about to decide on the appropriate therapy for his patient, he will, if he is competent, perform what is known as a differential diagnosis. The strategy is to identify at least two possible causes of a given medical problem, weigh the evidence for each against the other, and choose the one which best explains the data. In other words, the diagnosis determines the therapeutic response. When this process is reversed, that is, when available therapies or technologies determine the diagnosis, personal agendas override the scientific method. If any form of institutional bias prompts the physician to ignore a potential cause, the practice of medicine has been fatally compromised.

Consider the fashionable problem of carpal tunnel syndrome. Medical professionals understand that this condition is the result of dysfunction in the median nerve at the wrist. The appropriate question from a diagnostic standpoint is, therefore, “what is troubling this nerve?” According to conventional wisdom, the nerve is compressed as it passes under a ligament at the wrist, which would indicate a physical or structural problem. Not so fast. Dr. John Sarno, professor of rehabilitative medicine, insists that CTS is a mind/body (psychosomatic) problem caused by stress. Negative emotions in the unconscious mind produce the symptoms to distract the sufferer from one or more intolerable psychological conflicts. If CTS was truly a structural problem, Sarno reasonably asks, “Why is it that millions of men and women who pounded typewriters since the beginning of the twentieth century never developed it?” Or again, if the body is producing the symptoms, why have countless sufferers been cured of the malady by recognizing the mind as its source and acting on that information through a step-by-step process of self-analysis?

Most physicians, by virtue of their training as “body mechanics,” are not professionally equipped to perform a differential diagnosis for this kind of condition. They either do not understand or refuse to accept the reality: The mind can be, and often is, the source of a physical symptom. To press the point even further, disharmonious domestic relationships or competitive professional environments are often responsible for a cluster of symptoms known as “fibromyalgia.” Sadly, mind/body disorders are seldom treated properly because the medical establishment no longer takes mind/body medicine seriously, assuming that all problems are structural problems. As a result, they don’t ask the critical question: Structural pain or psychosomatic pain? In many cases, patients are doing physical therapy for a perceived mechanical problem when the time would be more profitably spent dealing with their emotional conflicts.

Just as millions must endure unnecessary physical suffering because scientists do not always apply a differential diagnosis in the medical arena, millions more must endure mental suffering because Darwinist ideologues, and their Christian Darwinist lapdogs, refuse to conduct a differential diagnosis in the biological realm. The problem is how to best explain the origin and variety of life on our planet? The question for the differential diagnosis is clear: Undirected Natural Processes or Directed Intelligent Design? While ID scientists consider the strength for both arguments and draw an inference to design, anti-ID partisans resort to methodological naturalism, an arbitrary rule of science that bans design arguments from the arena of competitive ideas. It is very easy to win a contest when you are the only competitor. Similarly, it is very easy to diagnose a cause when only one cause is eligible for consideration.

But this reluctance to keep an open mind about alternative possibilities strikes at the very foundation of the scientific enterprise. To investigate nature rightly is to sit humbly at her feet so that she can reveal her secrets—recognizing that she is the teacher and we are the students–delegating to her the task of scrutinizing our intellectual convictions so that they may be tested, sifted, or fine-tuned—-asking about the truth rather than indulging in the illusion that we have already attained it.

“Go to the pine if you want to learn about the pine, or to the bamboo if you want to learn about the bamboo. And in doing so, you must leave your subjective preoccupation with yourself. Otherwise you impose yourself on the object and do not learn.— Matsuo Basho

ID scientists engage Darwinists and TEs with a similar challenge: Go to the DNA molecule if you want to learn about the DNA molecule. Observe its behavior and ask yourself, “Why is this happening?” Test your atheistic doubts or your religious presumptions against the facts in evidence. Study those facts, submit to the data, and conduct a differential diagnosis. Build your theories on the evidence. Don’t try to squeeze, pound, jam, or hammer out the evidence into your rigid theoretical mold and cry out in futility, “fit, damn you, fit.”

Clearly, institutional bias can cloud judgment in any area or specialty. Like the structuralist physicians who ignore scientific evidence that points to the mind as a cause for physical symptoms, materialist Darwinists (and Christian Darwinists) ignore scientific evidence that points to the mind as a cause for biological design. In both cases, the analyst subordinates truth to convention, which is the hallmark of anti-intellectual partisanship.

Still, there is a difference. To ignore evidence is irresponsible, but to forbid its expression is evil. In the latter case, anti-ID zealots have, by virtue of their exclusionary rule, decided that nature should not be allowed to reveal all her secrets. Methodological naturalism, the surrogate enforcer of intellectual tyranny, declares that nature’s testimony, because of its possible religious implications, is inadmissible and may not be heard. As Basho might put it, devotees of evolutionary biology are imposing themselves and their subjective preoccuptations on the object. Insofar as they arrogantly and presumptuously assume the role of teacher and reduce nature to the role of student, they render themselves and everyone under their influence, uneducable.

The problem of institutional bias is an old one, but it has become manifest once again. According to the National Academy of Science, the Kansas Board of Education, and a number of other institutions, the job of science “is to provide plausible natural explanations for natural phenomena.” Even a Pennsylvania judge weighed in on the matter, issuing the mindless verdict that non-natural explanations are impermissible for science. For the secular minded, there will be no differential diagnosis because the differential component has been taken off the table.

At this point, nature objects to this reversal of roles and reasserts her rightful place as a teacher. The “stones cry out” by asking a few questions: What are we to make of the fact that these same rule makers who limit science to the study of “natural causes” have no problem with Big bang cosmology, which also has religious implications and also hints at a non-natural cause? Why is the differential diagnosis acceptable in the cosmological sphere and unacceptable in the biological sphere? If cosmological fine-tuning is acceptable as a scientific concept, why is biological fine-tuning not acceptable as a scientific concept?

Indeed, if one is to rule out a differential diagnosis on the grounds that science is limited to “natural causes,” he should at least be able to explain this exclusion in a rational way. How do we define nature and what is a natural cause? Darwinists (and the TEs that follow them) say, apparently without embarrassment, that a natural cause is one that occurs or can be found “in nature.” In that case, how do we distinguish bombs from earthquakes—or burglars from tornados–or the humanly-produced artifacts found in ancient Pompei from the unhuman volcano that buried them? If all these causes are of the same kind, then there is no way to discern one from the other. On the other hand, if we finally confess the difference between the intelligent causes and natural causes indicated, how can we call then “natural” as if they were all of the same kind? The intellectual dictators who crafted this cuckoo formula have no answers. How can they presume to enforce a standard that they can’t even define?

It is an interesting social phenomenon that Darwinists and most TEs suffer from what C.S. Lewis once called “the horror and neglect of the obvious.” In fact, biological design really is obvious, which explains why evolutionary biologists feel the need to remind themselves to forget it. This is a violation of the scientific method and the legitimate exercise of reason. One cannot search for a cause and, at the same time, disdain the object of the search. To sincerely ask about the “why” from a scientific perspective is to honestly weigh the alternative explanations to find the most plausible solution, regardless of whose interests might be served.

Comments
What do we get from Plantinga? Just was you would expect. "Instead the crucial question is this: which properties are the ones a properly functioning adult human being in our circumstance will in fact project? Here I shall only gesture toward the truth, rather than develop an articulated theory; but the broad outline of the answer, in so far as the properties Goodman considers, is not hard to see. Property functioning..." For Plantinga, this is par for the course. Apparently, human beings can make progress because God made us in just the right way so that we could. We can boil this down to we can make progress because "that's just what God must have wanted". Again, to summarize Popper,
... it ends up that induction is not only impossible in the case of certainty, but is unreliable regards to probability except in very specific, well defined applications. But this is does not represent an insurmountable problem reason and progress, in practice, as deduction does offer us certainty in modus tollens.
Plantina later goes on to describe what is essentially indistinguishable from CR in the form of developing "concepts", "getting the idea" that read red refers to the color of a ball, which is conjecture, etc. He just calls it induction and glosses over the issue. From an earlier comment,
Furthermore, you have yet to provide the missing step which induction would need to provide guidance before we could actually reliably employ it, in practice. In the absence of this step, it’s unclear how we could identify if induction is actually being used. This doesn’t mean that induction wouldn’t have an identity, in reality, but you have failed to define it in a way that it can be identified using enumerative induction.
What identifiable, reliable step does Plantinga provide that provides guidance based on observations at this point? He basically says "whatever properly functioning properly functioning people do". If this is induction, then apparently anything is properly human beings do is induction. It's magic. In other words, "What property functioning people do" is a whole so big you can drive critical rationalism right through it without a scratch. IOW, this sort of retreat doesn't actually address the issue.critical rationalist
October 7, 2012
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Critical Rationalist, you are operating with an incomplete set of facts. If you will not read "Little Errors in the Beginning," by Adler, then Google "The Old Riddle of Induction, -- Warrant and Proper Function," by Alvin Plantinga. Right around p. 124 he deals with both Hume's error and Goodman's derivative error.StephenB
October 5, 2012
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What could be more entertaining than this?– a skeptic citing philosophers who try to use inductive reasoning as a means for invalidating inductive reasoning? You have to love it.
What's more entertaining? The fact that you are either incapable or unwilling to define inductive reasoning to the extent that you can reliably identify when you, or anyone else, are actually using it. This is just such an example, as I'm using deduction. Optical illusions refute the idea that our subjective experiences are always correct. One example is Shepard’s Tables. The vertical table looks longer than the horizontal, but when you superimpose a line of equal length over both tables, as a form of criticism, our subjective experience fails that criticism. Yet when you take away the superimposed measurement lines, our subjective experience that the vertical table is longer returns. And it does so even though we *know* it's wrong. IOW, even though might think subjective experience provides positive support that inductive reasoning is a rational explanation for the growth of knowledge, this does not survive rational criticism. Explanations for the growth of human knowledge are ideas. And our current, best explanation is critical rationalism. LIke all other ideas, It contains errors to some degree and is incomplete. And like all other ideas, we can make progress by using deduction to find those errors. It is not static. Nor is it based on justificationism Problems are solvable. Problems are inevitable. Our theory of the grown in human knowledge is no exception. As such, the above examples are observations that are incompatible with inductivism, rather than positively support critical rationalism. But, by all means, feel free to actually address the above criticisms. However, "Idea x is not justified" is a bad criticism as it can be applied equally to all ideas. So, again, If you think the question of whether it is even possible to use induction or that we actually use induction in any reliable, identifiable sense on a case by case basis is irrelevant, then there is nothing more to say.critical rationalist
October 5, 2012
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What could be more entertaining than this?-- a skeptic citing philosophers who try to use inductive reasoning as a means for invalidating inductive reasoning? You have to love it.StephenB
October 4, 2012
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CR: “All this is irrelevant.” does not actually address my points. You have simply stopped responding to rational criticism. Until such time, future discussion will likely be unproductive.
Mung: Considering your marked inability to follow an argument, and your refusal to subject your ideas to empirical criticism, you’re probably correct.
Are you denying there are different kinds of unknowability? Neither of you have addressed this. Are you denying that Goodman's new riddle of induction is relevant in regard to the law of identity? Both of you keep ignoring it as well. Are you denying that my argument isn't about discarding empirical criticism, but the specific point in the process where empirical criticism is employed, in practice? Are you denying these are observed instances where criticism has gone unaddressed? IOW, you seem to be denying something, yet you haven't come out and explicitly said what it is, exactly, you are denying.critical rationalist
October 4, 2012
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SB: Further, I asked you to take a position on the subject: Does the legitimacy of inductive reasoning depend on observation, as Hume (and, by extension, Popper) falsely claimed, or does it depend on the Law of Identity, as I explained?
This is a false dilemma. That things have identities, in reality, would be necessary for induction to work. However, Hume and Popper do not claim otherwise. Nor does A=A fill in the missing step in induction, providing the guidance required for induction to be employed reliably. In the absence of this step, it's unclear how induction can actually be applied, in practice. Again, Critical Rationalism is a universal explanatory theory for the growth of knowledge. It's unclear how Law of Identity actually solves the problem of induction in this context. Nor have you responded to Goodman's New riddle of Induction as outlined above, which is relevant to your response.critical rationalist
October 4, 2012
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StephanB, Is there something about the following that you do not understand?
By saying, “It is not possible to exist without being something, and a thing can only be what it is: A is A,”Dykes is missing out on the fact that universals may have identities that vary over time: Acorns grow into oak trees; eggs hatch into chickens; caterpillars turn into butterflies; children grow into adults; electrons switch immediately from ‘up spin’ to ‘down spin.’ There is change in the universe, and at times it is quite difficult to demarcate between two different identities, or learn if they are in fact an identity, while at other times the switch is drastic and unpredictable.
Neither, Hume or Popper are denying things have specific identities. The question is, how do we know gain knowledge about those identities using merely observations given these changes? How does this work, in practice? Example? I've already provided you one, which you've completely ignored.
Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction Definition: Object x is grue at time t if and only if x is green at time t and t 2100. The following inference both follow the pattern of simple enumerative induction: - All emeralds observed to date have been green. Therefore, all emeralds are green (at all times). - All emeralds observed to date have been grue. Therefore, all emeralds are grue (at all times). Note: The conclusion of these arguments cannot both be true. The second predicts that any emerald observed after the year 2100 will be blue at that time, while the green hypothesis predicts that they will be green at that time. One of these predictions will be false. Remark: The idea that Newton’s theory of motion may be true when stated in French, but false when stated in English is absurd. However, we don’t have this kind of language dependence in the grue example, for each hypothesis says the same thing in the color and the grolor languages. It is the language dependence of inductive inference that is at issue, although this dependence is equally unacceptable. Argument: The inference is reliable in the first instance, but not in the second. There are as many inferences like the second as there are the first. Therefore, simple enumerative induction is unreliable in most cases.
You are conflating the idea that things do not have identities with our ably to obtain knowledge about those identities or determine when they are at work, in comparison to some other identify, in a reliable way using observations alone. Emeralds have identities. Yet, no number of past observations can tell us if Emeralds are green or grue until 2015. And that's just one example. This is the same sort of argument you made regarding Hume and causes. Neither of which are *necessarily* implied by the problem of induction itself. Furthermore, you have yet to provide the missing step which induction would need to provide guidance before we could actually reliably employ it, in practice. In the absence of this step, it's unclear how we could identify if induction is actually being used. This doesn't mean that induction wouldn't have an identity, in reality, but you have failed to define it in a way that it can be identified using enumerative induction. For example, what our experience that that the sun rises every 24 hours as long as humans have been around to experience it. Therefore we should expect it to do so again tomorrow. Let's ignore observations that the sun doesn't always rise every 24 hours at the poles and may rise as often as every 40 minutes or not at all if you are in orbit around the earth. Stars have identities. Some will turn into red giants or go supernova, in reality. The question is how do we know what kind of star our sun is? Currently, our explanation for how the sun works is that it's a giant fusion reactor that converts hydrogen to helium. Given it's size and consumption rate, we expect it to eventually turn into a red giant and boil away the oceans in about a billion years. A few billion years later, it may even expand to the point where it will consume the earth completely. This is all based on the explanation of how our sun works, not based on past observations. We have "seen" red giants and even stars in transitional forms of becoming one, which collaborate our explanation of how stars work, but no one has observed a star of the class of our sun actually become a red giant. This is because human beings haven't existed long enough to make those observations. We've seen what are the remains of supernovas and even stars going supernova. But our current assumption that our sun will not go supernova tomorrow, and therefore not rise, is based on our explanation of how stars work, not a number of repeated singular observations. If our theory is wrong, then the sun might not rise tomorrow. If the sun actually worked based on some other explanation, such as it contained X amount of fuel Y and burns it at rate Z, which would cause it to wink out in 4.57 billion years, we wouldn't expect the sun to rise tomorrow. This is because we think it's already been around for roughly 4.57 billion years. Again, this would not be based merely on a succession of singular observations of it having done so in the past, but on a different theory about how stars work, which would also be compatible with the same limited window of observations we've made so far.critical rationalist
October 4, 2012
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--CR:
“All this is irrelevant.” does not actually address my points. You have simply stopped responding to rational criticism."
That is a demonstrably false statement. I explained WHY the comments about change were irrelevant and followed up with a question to you. You simply read the phrase "All this is irrelevant," and ignored the reasons for my saying so in a futile attempt to escape refutation. The Law of Identity, on which the principle of induction is based, allows for changes if those changes are part of a things nature, which means that past observations can still be used to give us information about future events, which, in turn, allow us to draw inferences. If it is part of an acorns nature to morph into a tree, then past observations of acorns morphing can be used to predict future acorns morphing, just as past observations of an apple tree producing apples can be used to predict future apple trees producing apples. Further, I asked you to take a position on the subject: Does the legitimacy of inductive reasoning depend on observation, as Hume (and, by extension, Popper) falsely claimed, or does it depend on the Law of Identity, as I explained? You evaded that question because you must either concede my point or admit that you believe that the validity of inductive reasoning is based on observation, a claim that I can easily refute. So, you avoid the question entirely--just as you avoid my question about gambling and "justification"--just as you avoid my question about why you don't apply critical rationalism to challenge the claims of Darwinism--just as you avoid the question about why you don't apply critical rationalism to challenge the claims of critical rationalism. It is quite odd that someone who purports to believe in the principle of rational scrutiny would so strenously avoid rational scrutiny.StephenB
October 2, 2012
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Until such time, future discussion will likely be unproductive.
CR, Considering your marked inability to follow an argument, and your refusal to subject your ideas to empirical criticism, you're probably correct.Mung
October 2, 2012
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SB: All this is irrelevant.
"All this is irrelevant." does not actually address my points. You have simply stopped responding to rational criticism. Until such time, future discussion will likely be unproductive.
I am amazed that you would allow your ideology of critical rationalism to so cloud your judgment that you would deny the logical validity of this conclusion. There is really nothing else to say.
Which, again, ignores the different kinds of unknowability. Again, are you hoping that others, such as Mung, will not notice the difference between the two, as I've outlined, in detail? If you think the question of whether we can or have actually used induction in any reliable, identifiable sense is irrelevant, then there is nothing more to say.critical rationalist
October 2, 2012
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CR: So, the flaw in your thinking here is that I wouldn’t take the bet because I think induction is false. Rather, it’s precisely because I think induction is false that I *would* take the bet. Mung: If I draw out 25 cans in a row of PBR, I am willing to put a significant wager on what the 26th can will be. Are you? As we see, when it comes to putting your claims to an empirical test, you shy away.
Mung, I fear you're unable to grasp the issue here and that no further discussion will be useful. Again, a can being a PBR or not-PBR with known random stocking and known random picking is gambling. This represents one valid form of probability because the system is random all of the options (how many cans, PBR not-PBR, etc) are known. This is the first kind if unknowability, in which probability is valid. I've already defined this, in detail.
An example of this is Russian Roulette. As long as you know all of the possible outcomes, we can use probability to make choices about it. For example, if for some horrible reason, one had to choose between different versions of Russian Roulette with specific yet variable number of chambers, bullets and trigger pulls, one could use game theory to determine which variation would be most favorable.
Probability in this case means determining which bet is better between other potential bets, such as having picked 20 PBRs at random and all 10 remaining cans being PBRs as well, or having picked 10 PBRs at random, and all 20 remaining cans being PBRs as well, etc. This is they first kind of unknowability in which probability is valid. But, again, an inductive argument is only reliable if it yields approximately true conclusions most of the time. Why do you think continually selecting the 26th can at randomly from a randomly stocked cooler would actually return a PBR most of the time? This is not the same as using probability to determine which bet, among others, are better. You are confusing the two.critical rationalist
October 2, 2012
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CR: So, the flaw in your thinking here is that I wouldn’t take the bet because I think induction is false. Rather, it’s precisely because I think induction is false that I *would* take the bet. Mung: If I draw out 25 cans in a row of PBR, I am willing to put a significant wager on what the 26th can will be. Are you? As we see, when it comes to putting your claims to an empirical test, you shy away.
Mung, I fear you're unable to grasp the issue here and that no further discussion will be useful. Again, a can being a PBR or not-PBR with known random stocking and known random picking is gambling. This represents one valid form of probability because the system is random all of the options (how many cans, PBR not-PBR, etc) are known. This is the first kind if unknowability, in which probability is valid. I've already defined this, in detail.
An example of this is Russian Roulette. As long as you know all of the possible outcomes, we can use probability to make choices about it. For example, if for some horrible reason, one had to choose between different versions of Russian Roulette with specific yet variable number of chambers, bullets and trigger pulls, one could use game theory to determine which variation would be most favorable.
Probability in this case means determining which bet is better between other potential bets, such as having picked 20 PBRs at random and all 10 remaining cans being PBRs as well, or having picked 10 PBRs at random, and all 20 remaining cans being PBRs as well, etc. This is they first kind of unknowability in which probability is valid. But, again, an inductive argument is only reliable if it yields approximately true conclusions most of the time. Why do you think continually selecting the 26th can at randomly from a randomly stocked cooler would actually return a PBR most of the time? This is not the same as using probability to determine which bet, among others, are better. You are confusing the two.critical rationalist
October 2, 2012
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The argument….. [a] This cooler contains 30 cans. [b] 25 cans selected at random were found to be Pabst Blue Ribbon (PBR). [c] Probably all the cans are PBR. CR:
Before you could have calculated a probability, you would have had to *first* have a specific theory in mind, such as one person bought all of the beer and, in doing so, bought all of the same kind. This is not present in observations from [b] alone. In the absence of such a theory, no such probability calculus could be made. So, you merely thought you were using induction. This is the psychological problem of induction.
I am amazed that you would allow your ideology of critical rationalism to so cloud your judgment that you would deny the logical validity of this conclusion. There is really nothing else to say.StephenB
October 2, 2012
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Mortimer J. Adler ah yesMung
October 2, 2012
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--CR;
'The possibility remains that, like oak trees and good wine, emeralds may ‘biologically’ age quite gracefully over time, or have a chemical switch triggered by some radioactive decay, thereby developing a nice blue sheen on December 5th, 2015 (or any other date for that matter)."
All this is irrelevant. What matters for the Law of Identity is that a thing's nature produces predictable effects, which means that we can, in that context, have valid knowledge about the future based on past observations and experiences, refuting Hume and legitimizing inferential reasoning. All your other references follow Hume's mistakes. What matters is that the validity inductive reasoning is based on the Law of Identity and is not based on observations. You show no evidence of grasping this point or even being willing to address it. What is your position on this matter? Please be precise. Also, Dykes is, by no stretch of the imagination, the only one who recognized Hume's mistakes. Google "Little Errors in the Beginning," by Mortimer J. Adler. CR:
"Gambling is just one such well defined application as the outcome is completely random and all possible outcomes are known. I clearly pointed this out. However, the means by which beer coolers are stocked, in practice, is not random, as I’ve illustrated."
Are you saying that, for the statistics used in gambling scenarios, or for the Pew Research Center there is no "problem of induction," and that we may "justify" our conclusions using that method, but with the example of the beer cans, we may not, in the same way, use statistics with the same confidence or justify our conclusions? Please be precise and forthcoming, answering the questions as asked. Also, I ask you again (the sixth time?) Why do you subject Intelligent Design Theory to the scrutiny of Critical Rationalism and exempt Darwinism from that same standard? If you have, indeed, subjected Darwinism to that standard, tell me how and when you did it?StephenB
October 2, 2012
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cr, I only need one case in which induction works. If you give the right odds to a gambler they will take the bet every time. Why is that?Mung
October 2, 2012
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critical rationalist:
However, the means by which beer coolers are stocked, in practice, is not random, as I’ve illustrated.
I said I'd allow you to stock the cooler. Stock it in a random manner, a non-random manner, it really doesn't matter. It doesn't change the probabilities unless it interferes with my ability to draw a random sample. Are you willing to put your money where your mouth is? We'll specify the size of the cooler and add ice and water and your choice of 30 cans. If I draw out 25 cans in a row of PBR, I am willing to put a significant wager on what the 26th can will be. Are you? As we see, when it comes to putting your claims to an empirical test, you shy away.Mung
October 2, 2012
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Mung, If you think all we can do is appeal to statistics in the case of the contents of beer coolers, then you are ignoring the fact that beer coolers are not stocked at random, in practice. In doing so, you leaving valuable theoretical information the table, that we can use to make progress, in practice. This is why casino's make every effort to ensure cards are randomly shuffled and counting is prohibited, dice are perfectly weighted, playing surfaces are as uniform as possible, etc. Players that could identify some consistently applied non-randomly details in the above could use it to calculate significantly better odds in their favor than those who could not. And they could do it reliably, as described above. Or they could conjecture some theory about a non-random flaw in how a game works, then test it to via observations by trying to exploit it. So, the flaw in your thinking here is that I wouldn't take the bet because I think induction is false. Rather, it's precisely because I think induction is false that I *would* take the bet. We have non-random theories of how beer coolers are stocked, in practice, which lead us to conclude it would be a good bet to take. However, if the cooler was filled randomly, then it would be a form of gambling. Unless you observed the cooler being stocked, at which point you would know it's contents, then any assumption on your part on how the cooler was stocked is part of a theory you used to calculate any sort of probability. Are you at a party? Are you at a casino? Etc. IOW, you're appealing to the outcome, rather than the explanation for the outcome. You're assuming that because you've observed induction working "here" then it should work "there". However, this does not survive rational criticism.critical rationalist
October 2, 2012
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CR: You’re not actually addressing the substance of my comments. SB: I address them, follow up on them, and continue to clarify them as you pose objections. I will follow up again:
Then what of this reply ….
SB: You really ought to take a course in statistical inference, you really should. If you tried to sell you misguided ideas about the “problem of induction” to any professional gambler, or to any casino owner, or to the Pew Research Group, or to any organization that studies trends, they would laugh you out of the house.
… when I've already addressed these scenarios?
CR: There are two kinds of unknowability. The first kind of unknowability are scenarios where the outcome is completely random and all possible outcomes are known. An example of this is Russian Roulette. As long as you know all of the possible outcomes, we can use probability to make choices about it. For example, if for some horrible reason, one had to choose between different versions of Russian Roulette with specific yet variable number of chambers, bullets and trigger pulls, one could use game theory to determine which variation would be most favorable. This is a valid use of probability in that it yields approximately true conclusions most of the time. […] CR: To summarize, it ends up that induction is not only impossible in the case of certainty, but is unreliable regards to probability except in very specific, well defined applications. But this is does not represent an insurmountable problem reason and progress, in practice, as deduction does offer us certainty in modus tollens.
Gambling is just one such well defined application as the outcome is completely random and all possible outcomes are known. I clearly pointed this out. However, the means by which beer coolers are stocked, in practice, is not random, as I've illustrated. Are you hoping that others, such as Mung, will not notice I've addressed this difference, in detail? Or perhaps you're assuming induction should be reliable in all scenarios because it you've merely observed it being reliable in specific scenarios, or you merely think you've been using it reliably, when you have not. But this would be assuming the future should resemble the past. So, again, it seems that you are not genuinely interested in addressing the substance of my comments, or you have fallen prey to the very issue we're discussing.critical rationalist
October 2, 2012
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SB: As I explained to you, though, this assumption is illogical because it violates the logical Law of Identity, which states that a thing is what it is and nothing else.
Again, see Goodman's new Riddle of induction, which was included in the above reference on Hume and Popper. If you're having difficulty undersigning the relevance, here's a excerpt from the first of a series of posts debunking Dykes' supposed "debunking" of Popper.
The problem of induction a problem that’s been covered from every conceivable angle ad nauseam from both the psychological and logical ends, and most epistemologists either have put the problem aside to work on other problems (‘what, exactly, is the nature of this inductive method?’) or accepted that induction just doesn’t work. Dykes, however, asserts that “Induction does not depend for its validity on observation, but on the Law of Identity” and then goes on to explain by use of quoting H.W.B. Joseph that
A thing, to be at all, must be something, and can only be what it is. To assert a causal connexion between a and x implies that a acts as it does because it is what it is; because, in fact, it is a. So long therefore as it is a, it must act thus; and to assert that it may act otherwise on a subsequent occasion is to assert that what is a is something else than the a which it is declared to be.
The language is a bit arcane for my tastes, so please forgive me if I attempt to simplify what Joseph says:
In order for a thing to be it must be what it is. Asserting a causal connection between a and x implies that a acts as it does because it is a. If it is a, it must act as a; and to assert that it may act not as a is to assert that a is not a.
Dykes says that “Existence implies identity” Take this as a given. What follows from that? If, for instance, all emeralds were grue (to use one of the most infamous examples), then all emeralds would be, in fact, grue. ‘Grue’ simply means that “Green before December 5th, 2015, blue after December 5th, 2015.” By saying, “It is not possible to exist without being something, and a thing can only be what it is: A is A,”Dykes is missing out on the fact that universals may have identities that vary over time: Acorns grow into oak trees; eggs hatch into chickens; caterpillars turn into butterflies; children grow into adults; electrons switch immediately from ‘up spin’ to ‘down spin.’ There is change in the universe, and at times it is quite difficult to demarcate between two different identities, or learn if they are in fact an identity, while at other times the switch is drastic and unpredictable. The possibility remains that, like oak trees and good wine, emeralds may ‘biologically’ age quite gracefully over time, or have a chemical switch triggered by some radioactive decay, thereby developing a nice blue sheen on December 5th, 2015 (or any other date for that matter). This possibility should instill a major doubt of any sort of inductive method. Once one admits that possibility, as the possibilities that the emerald may be ‘grorange,’ or ‘grack,’ or ‘grown,’ then any certainties we may have had by accumulating instances that corroborate the theory that all emeralds are green will be for naught: we have also corroborated an infinite number of unintuitive theories that may also be true. Therefore, when Dykes says “Thus to deny any connection between a thing, its actions, and their consequences, is to assert that the thing is not what it is; it is to defy the Law of Identity,” (¶ 10) I am happy to take him at his word: these counterfactuals do not defy the Law of Identity simply because the Law of Identity is a truism: if emeralds were to be grue (or any other Goodman-predicate), then emeralds would in fact be grue. However, we do not know with the limited available evidence whether or not emeralds are grue, green, grack, grown, grorange, … Thus, I feel like a pedant to explain something some obvious to the Randian: You cannot make emeralds green by declaring that A=A.
critical rationalist
October 2, 2012
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If you tried to sell you misguided ideas about the “problem of induction” to any professional gambler, or to any casino owner, or to the Pew Research Group, or to any organization that studies trends, they would laugh you out of the house.
I wonder if CR is willing to put his money where his mouth is. We can call it the beer can challenge. 1. He gets to fill the cooler. He gets to choose whether to use 0 to 5 cans of non PBR. Up to him. 2. He pays me anytime I retrieve a can from the cooler that is not PBR up to and including the 25th can. 3. If after the 25th can I pull out a can that is not PBR I pay him. If it is PBR he pays me. Now it's just a matter of seeing how much he's willing to play for.Mung
October 1, 2012
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CR, Do the math. No knowledge of beer purchases required. For all we know the beer could have been donated by PBR.Mung
October 1, 2012
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CR:
By dissolving justificationism itself, the critical rationalist regards knowledge and rationality, reason and science, as neither foundational nor infallible, but nevertheless does not think we must therefore all be relativists. Knowledge and truth still exist, just not in the way we thought.
There is no reason to “dissolve” justificationism because there is no problem with justificationism, just as there is no problem with inductive reasoning.. Rational people “justify” their claims with arguments. Irrational people look for alternatives to rational arguments.
Before you could have calculated a probability, you would have had to *first* have a specific theory in mind, such as one person bought all of the beer and, in doing so, bought all of the same kind.
No, that isn’t true. You really ought to take a course in statistical inference, you really should. If you tried to sell you misguided ideas about the “problem of induction” to any professional gambler, or to any casino owner, or to the Pew Research Group, or to any organization that studies trends, they would laugh you out of the house. Meanwhile, my question for you persists: Why do you subject Intelligent Design Theory to the scrutiny of Critical Rationalim and exempt Darwinism from that same standard? If you have, indeed, subjected Darwinism to that standard, tell me how and when you did it?StephenB
October 1, 2012
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CR:
… which indicates you are no more genuinely interested in addressing the actual substance of my comments now, than you were then, or when you dismissed it from the start as “nonsense”
I addressed all your claims by showing that they are false and why they are false. They are false because they stem from the misguided notion that inferential reasoning is impossible, which, in turn, stems from Hume’s irrational doubts about the connection between causes and effects. Hume’s argument is as follows: Since we derive all our ideas from past experiences, we cannot have any valid ideas about future events. In other words, our observations of the past cannot give us any information about the future. He also denied that there is any NECESSARY connection between cause and effect. In his assessment, we observe only repeated instances, we cannot observe or experience any” power “ that actually causes events to happen. As he puts it, events are merely “loose and separate”—not “joint and connected.” In Hume’s judgment, then, we have no guarantee that a pear tree will continue to produce pears or that an apple tree might not someday produce an ear of corn. As I explained to you, though, this assumption is illogical because it violates the logical Law of Identity, which states that a thing is what it is and nothing else. Further, any actions of that thing form part of its identity. The way it acts is an expression of what it is. Thus, to deny any connection between a thing, its actions, or its consequences, is to assert that the thing is not what it is; it is to deny the law of identity. A pear tree will never produce corn because if it did, it would not be what it is, it would be something else. Thus, Hume’s assumption (and by extension, Popper's assumption) that our observations about past events cannot give us information about future events is false. Further, his assumption that the validity of inductive reasoning depends on observation is false. The validity of inductive reasoning depends on the Law of Identity (and the Law of Non-Contradiction. Critical Rationalism seeks to solve a problem that doesn’t exist and, as a result, creates unnecessary problems of its own.
By dissolving justificationism itself, the critical rationalist regards knowledge and rationality, reason and science, as neither foundational nor infallible, but nevertheless does not think we must therefore all be relativists. Knowledge and truth still exist, just not in the way we thought.</blockquote There is no reason to “dissolve” justificationism because there is no problem with justificationism, just as there is no problem with inductive reasoning.. Rational people “justify” their claims with arguments. Irrational people look for alternatives to rational arguments.
Before you could have calculated a probability, you would have had to *first* have a specific theory in mind, such as one person bought all of the beer and, in doing so, bought all of the same kind.
No, that isn’t true. You really ought to take a course in statistical inference, you really should. If you tried to sell you misguided ideas about the "problem of induction" to any professional gambler, or to any casino owner, or to the Pew Research Group, or to any organization that studies trends, they would laugh you out of the house. Meanwhile, my question for you persists: Why do you subject Intelligent Design Theory to the scrutiny of Critical Rationalim and exempt Darwinism from that same standard? If you have, indeed, subjected Darwinism to that standard, tell me how and when you did it?
StephenB
October 1, 2012
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CR: Before you could have calculated a probability, you would have had to *first* have a specific theory in mind, such as one person bought all of the beer and, in doing so, bought all of the same kind. Mung: This is false.
Language can be so imprecise. It's easy to be confused or misrepresented, especially in areas where we are unfamiliar and/or all too familiar. Before induction can actually be employed in a way that is actually useful, in practice, we need to define it. An inductive argument is reliable if it yields approximately true conclusions most of the time. Would you agree? If so, let's try to apply it
Given the information that there are 30 cans. Given the information that 25 random draws returns a PBR. Assume the remaining 5 cans are not PBR. Given that assumption, we can calculate the probability of drawing 25/30 at random without getting a non PBR.
First, your use of the term "information" in this context is imprecise. Inductivism is about observations and information is not limited to observations. This is part of the physiological problem of induction in that subjective experience of actually employing inductivism does not actually withstand rational criticism. Second, where - in the form of a guiding inductive principle - did the assumption that all the remaining cans would all be PRB come? Did you have it a priori (before) you calculated a probability or a postori (after)? A. Did you have it a priori and from *those* observations alone? If so, your probability calculation didn't actually solve a problem. You already knew the rest of the cans were PBRs. B. Did you have it a priori but selected it at random? If so, then why would you expect employing random selection at this step would yield approximately true conclusions *most* of the time? So, while it might be true that you can calculate "a probability", it's unclear what you have actually accomplished if it is not reliable, in practice. C. Did you have it a priori, but it wasn't selected at random and did not come from *those* observations, then where did it come from? Why you might think otherwise, based on your subjective experience, it comes from some kind of theory. For example, when a human purchaser buys beer to fill a cooler they often buy a six or 12 pack of the same type, rather than a number of individual cans, as it is cheaper and more convenient for the purchaser to cary, etc. Our limitations are part of the theory itself. 30 cans of beer = 5 six-packs. If you have already picked 25 cans, then you only have 5 cans left, which is smaller that the smallest group typically available in my area (a six-pack). As such, you would have already sampled from each of the five hypothetical six-packs, which would be inconclusive with the theory that one of the six-packs could be a different brand. So, even if six different people bought each six pack, they should all still be PBRs. However, if the "person" who put the beer in the cooler was abstract and had no defined limitations, cost and convenience would be irrelevant. The same observations could also be explained by 30 individual people put their favorite brand of beer in the cooler in the form of a single can. How would that effect your probability calculation? Or it could be that there were more or less cans of beer in the cooler at some point earlier in the day, but it just happened to contain 30 at the time you sampled it. How would this effect your probability calculations? Note that the same observations can be explained by different theories, each of which indicates the cooler was stocked in significantly different ways, in reality. Induction doesn't give us the guidance we need to pick one. IOW, with the exception of very specific cases, people may subjectively experience what they think is inductivsm - in practice, but this does not withstand rational criticism. We always approach observations with some sort of theory in mind, which people often confuse with induction. They merely think they are using it to actually solve problems.critical rationalist
October 1, 2012
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critical rationalist:
Before you could have calculated a probability, you would have had to *first* have a specific theory in mind, such as one person bought all of the beer and, in doing so, bought all of the same kind. This is false. Given the information that there are 30 cans. Given the information that 25 random draws returns a PBR. Assume the remaining 5 cans are not PBR. Given that assumption, we can calculate the probability of drawing 25/30 at random without getting a non PBR. Someone else do the math, lol. Assume only 1 can is not PBR. Given that assumption, we can calculate the probability of drawing 25/30 at random without getting the one non-PBR. None of this requires any theory about beer purchasing.
Mung
October 1, 2012
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I wonder if when my cat yowls at me he has some theory of probability that allows him to calculate that he will probably get fed.Mung
October 1, 2012
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SB: For Hume, [the strategy] is to QUESTION causality’s ontological existence–it is to DENY our ability to be certain about it in an epistemological sense–it is to DENY our ability to apprehend it. CR: Again, you are attempting to conflate denying there are specific causes for phenomnia, in reality, and the inability to observe what those specific causes are, though our senses. SB: Obviously, you have trouble following the meaning of verbs.
To be clear, I have no problem with the meaning of verbs. Your ability to construct a syntactically valid sentence containing verbs does not necessitate their meaning actually reflects Hume's position. Specifically, your use of the phrase "the strategy" in brackets suggests you are interpreting Hume's writings based on some underlying theory or goal that is not explicit in any of his quotes provided as of yet. Is this the case? If so, what do you think this underlying goal is and why? Furthermore, are you projecting the same assumption in regards to critical rationalism? If so, why wouldn't this represent an instance of the genetic fallacy? Please be specific.critical rationalist
September 30, 2012
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CR: To summarize, it ends up that induction is not only impossible in the case of certainty, but is unreliable regards to probability except in very specific, well defined applications. But this is does not represent an insurmountable problem reason and progress, in practice, as deduction does offer us certainty in modus tollens.
By dissolving justificationism itself, the critical rationalist regards knowledge and rationality, reason and science, as neither foundational nor infallible, but nevertheless does not think we must therefore all be relativists. Knowledge and truth still exist, just not in the way we thought.
CR: With that cleared up, unless you are genuinely interested in addressing the actual substance of my comments, then I do not think further discussion will be productive. SB: Does this mean that you will never disclose why you think that Darwinism “survives” the severe and ongoing scrutiny of critical rationalism even though there is no evidence to support it?
Your might as well have asked…
Does this mean that you will never disclose why you think that Darwinism “survives” the severe and ongoing scrutiny of critical rationalism even though there is no evidence to [justify] it?
… which indicates you are no more genuinely interested in addressing the actual substance of my comments now, than you were then, or when you dismissed it from the start as "nonsense".critical rationalist
September 30, 2012
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SB: For Hume, [the strategy] is to QUESTION causality’s ontological existence–it is to DENY our ability to be certain about it in an epistemological sense–it is to DENY our ability to apprehend it.
CR: Again, you are attempting to conflate denying there are specific causes for phenomnia, in reality, and the inability to observe what those specific causes are, though our senses.
Obviously, you have trouble following the meaning of verbs. [a] To question the existence of causality is not to deny the existence of causality, [b] To deny our ability to be certain about causality is not to deny the existence of causality, [c] To deny our ability to apprehend causality is not to deny causality. Their is no conflation. This brings us to the destructive consequences of Hume's error: To deny our ability to be certain about causality is sufficient to invalidate the principle of induction. Does this help, or should I use capital letters again?StephenB
September 30, 2012
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