Materialist Hypocrisy
| December 17, 2008 | Posted by Barry Arrington under Intelligent Design |
Many materialists argue out of both sides of their mouth when it comes to consciousness.
On the one hand, they argue that consciousness is the key to dignity and the right to life. See, for example, the arguments of Peter Singer, who argues specifically that there is no ethical problem in killing an unborn baby because the baby at that stage of development is not self-conscious.
But then materialists turn right around and argue that consciousness is ontologically meaningless, asserting that it is nothing but an epiphenomenon of the electro-chemical activity of the brain.
Well, which is it? Is consciousness absolutely crucial, literally a matter of life and death, or is it the essentially meaningless byproduct of chance and necessity?
79 Responses to Materialist Hypocrisy
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Mark Frank @ #56
I don’t know where you get your information from.
If his writing is any indication of his belief, he has no problem with babies (or toddlers, or adults) being killed, provided of course they are disabled enough.
There is, conveniently, a German term for that. Nice of those fellows to sum up all of Singer’s blatherings into a couple of words… even before Singer was born.
It is contradictory and/or hypocritical, unless you happen to believe in something silly like qualia. Dennett and Dawkins don’t believe in such silliness, why should you?
Re #61
It is contradictory and/or hypocritical, unless you happen to believe in something silly like qualia. Dennett and Dawkins don’t believe in such silliness, why should you?
I am sorry. I cannot see where the contradiction lies. The two sentences:
(A) Peter Singer says babies have less right to life because they don’t have as much X as toddlers or adults do.
and
(B) X is a consequence of our electromechanical meat-computers and increases as those computers grow.
Are logically compatible. So there has to be some additional reason why they are contradictory.
I am afraid I am also unable to see what qualia have got to do with it. Although I agree it is a very dubious concept invented by philosophers for philosophers.
“Fear is the mind killer.”
Claptrap. As fear can only be a product of mind/brain, material or otherwise.
Thus continuing the material apologist’s confusion about mind/brain problems.
The question of “how do you feel” only further degrades the conversation into nihilism, and subjectivity.
Mark Frank and MikeKratch:
We have discussed in great detail, and I have personally posted many times, about the problems of strong AI as a scientific theory. I don’t want to repeat it all here.
Just a brief thought about the relationship between a non materialist theory of consciousness and moral problems.
It’s very simple. Strong AI, and all purely materialist theories of consciousness, believe that consciousness is a product of the physical processes in the brain. In my opinion, that is no explanation of the subjective nature of consciousness, never has been, and never will.
But OK, let’s play your game, and say that consciousness “is” a product of the physical processes in the brain. Some materialists will arrive to the extreme of denying that consciousness really exists, saying it is just an “illusion”. Probably you are not in that group.
So, let’s say that you agree that consciousness is something, that it is precious and important just the same, even if it arises from naterial deterministic (or, at quantum level, random) processes. That’s your point, I believe.
Well, let’s concede all that, for the moment. But what about free will? A materialistic theory can admit a real consciousness, but how can it admit a “real” free will? In other words, one that has real meaning, and is not only an illusion?
And how can you argue for a “real” (not illusory) moral context, if there is no free will? Even Dawkins uses to be evasive when asked that question.
So, to sum up: you are a materialist and a supporter of a materialist theory of consciousness, like strong AI. You can choose between two:
a) Both consciousness and free will are subjective illusions. And then, Barry’s observations are perfectly valid.
b) Consciousness has some objective reality, although as a product of the brain, and it is precious just the same, and so on. But free will does not really exist as an objective property. It is just a subjective illusion, created by necessary, or random, processes. Then, Barry’s point remain valid at least for the moral field.
Or, as a last alternative, you may try to begin to explain how necessary or random processes can give birth to objective free will. Woe shall we call that? Strong Artificial Free Will Theory?
So one materialist (or devil’s advocate) glories over the equality that has developed over the 20th century, and then another defends Singer on his distribution of rights by inequality, suggesting that there is at least a more reasonable case for assigning an inequality of rights.
Mike also evokes the question “would your life become any less meaningful?” When that worldview is closer to what Hitler describes in Mein Kampf than my own worldview, and he found ample meaning in the idea of exterminating people he thought of as the enemies of Nature. In a rather nihilistic tilt, he wrote in Chapter 6 of MK:
He basically attributes them as great works of the the great civilizations, like the German nation. And because these are the product of the great societies, when one great society is under attack for existence, it is proper for it to set them aside.
So with “knowing” that things don’t hang in the ether, and that these principles were made out the imaginations of men, he still found meaning for his life. If he can, we can too–but that wasn’t your point was it?
gpuccio #64
First I want to say that I think you are the best contributor on the ID side that I have read over the last few weeks. I disagree with you; but your comments are comprehensible, logical, polite, to the point, and as concise as they reasonably can be. I understand that English is not your native language and this makes it even more impressive.
Now to respond
Are you not aware that there is a very respectable school of thought that free will and determinism are compatible? Daniel Dennett is a leading exponent. If you are a compatabilist then I think there is no problem combining free will with a materialist theory of mind. I don’t know Peter Singer’s views on free will but I suspect he may also be a compatabilist.
If you want to know more about compatabilism then, as usual, the Stanford Encyclopedia is a good place to start.
Mark Frank:
thank you for the kind words, they are certainly appreciated. I really love confrontation with people who think differently, when they are sincerely interested in a fair discussion. The purpose is never to convince anyone, but to understand and compare each other’s view as well as possible, so that anybody may decide for himself what to think.
Thank you for your link about compatibilism. I will read it carefully, and give you feedback as soon as possible. It is obviously a philosophical position, but I hope it can give us hints for further discussion about the scientific models of consciousness, which I think is more the point here.
Mark Frank:
I have read the Stanford page about compatibilism (indeed, most of it; I stopped after the Dennett part, believing I had enough of it). And, as promised, here are my personal thoughts.
First of all, it would be useful to know if you are a compatibilist, and if you are a Dennett type compatibilist. That would make the discussion easier.
For now, I will assume that you are, and reason consequently.
For those who are reading this discussion, I will sum up briefly the premises: compatibilism is a generic name given to philosophical positions arguing that determinism and free will are in some way compatible.
I will not speak of historical compatibilism (Hobbes), because it really seems useless in our context. The Stanford summary then relates about three important contributions in the sixties, one against compatibilism (Ginet), and two in favor of it (Frankfurt, Strawson). Then it gives a review of modern compatibilist positions, including Dennett’s.
Well, I am not a philosopher (luckily), and I will not go into the details (the link is there for all who want to know them). I will just do two things: I will give my own perspective on the problem, and then quote some of Dennett’s positions.
1) I will try to stay simple, and to stick to a scientific point of view as far as it is possible. Determinism has many flavors, but the determinism we usually deal with here is the one of the laws of physics. Physical systems, in classical physics, are completely determined: systems evolve according to mathemathical laws, and cannot do otherwise. Even systems where small differences in the initial conditions are quickly amplified, making predictions almost impossible (chaotic systems) do not really contradict that principle: the behaviour of the system is intrinsically deterministic, but it is practically impossible for us to predict it.
That is no more true if we consider quantum mechanics. Quantum systems evolve deterministically, but “precipitate” probabilistically when measurements are made (the so called collapse of the wave function). So, they are both deterministic and truly random, in different “moments” (or modalities) of their existence.
Well, let’s go to the problem of consciousness and free will. The materialist view (strong AI) is that consciousness, and all its functions, are products of the brain. The brain, moreover, is conceived by the materialist as some very sophisticated physical machine, probably in some way akin to the computer.
That’s the materialist’s point of view, isn’t it? Do we agree on that?
Well, then, unless our knowledge of physical laws is completely wrong, the working of the brain obeys physical laws, and is completely determined by necessity (if quantum effects are negligible), or by necessity and true randomness (if, as I believe, quantum effects are very important). OK, and free will?
Free will has no room there. And all the philosophical arguments of compatibilism have no relevance here. Why? Because they are philosophical arguments about how we consider responsibility, reason, the reaction of consciousness, and many other things which have no meaning in the context we have just described. Because, in that context, “anything” which happens in our consciousness, even philosophy itself, is the product of the brain, and the brain works according to necessity or true randomness. You see, the problem is not only if we are free to “act”, or to “react”. The problem is that we are not even free to “think”, or to “reason”, or to “feel”, or to “perceive”. All those states are states of the brain, and the brain is a machine. If those states are not necessary, they are random, or they are both things. Intention, choice, reaction, feeling, conception, creativity, and all those kinds of things are void words created by the brain and necessarily (or randomly) assigned to brain states.
So, it is really not important to know if we can act or if we have alternative possibilities. In necessity, there are not alternative possibilities. In randomness, there are, but they are not controlled by anyone.
How can we get out of that? We simply cannot. Either we are not free in any aspect of our existence, or the premises are wrong. You can choose: consciousness is not the product of the brain; or, our understanding of the laws of physics is completely wrong. I have made my choice a long time ago.
2) Let’s go to Dennett. I will just paste some of the points attributed to him in the Stanford page:
“According to Dennett, even a thermostat can be interpreted as a very limited intentional system since its behavior can usefully be predicted by attributing to it adequate beliefs and desires to display it as acting rationally within some limited domain. For example, the thermostat desires that the room’s temperature (or the engine’s internal temperature) not go above or below a certain range. If it believes that it is out of the requisite range, the thermostat will respond appropriately to achieve its desired results.”
Well, everybody is entitled to his own opinions. As for me, I believe that conscious events are definitely empirical facts: they are there or they are not there. If Dennett wants to argue for the existence of desires in a thermostat he is free to do that (after all, I do beleive in free will). But I will not certainly have greater esteem of him for that.
“Just as the decision to adopt towards a system the intentional stance is a pragmatic one, so too is it a pragmatic decision to adopt towards a system the stance that it is a morally responsible person.”
I understand that it is certainly a pragmatic, and very personal, decision for some philosophers to state whatever they state.
“Such systems are morally responsible agents if interpreting them according to the personal stance pays off”
I don’t know if it pays off for Dennett. Not for me, anyway.
“Furthermore, just as he treats the intentional stance, Dennett argues that, due to the complexity of such systems, it is practically impossible to interpret and predict the system purely from the physical (deterministic) stance. Hence, the physical stance will never supplant the personal stance.”
But then, why insist so stubbornly that the system is purely physical? Why is my personal stance that consciousness is not physical so out of fashion?
“We persons involved in the everyday commerce of interacting with each other need the personal stance; it is not threatened by the specter of determinism.”
What does that mean? That determinism is true, but we can ignore that in our “everyday commerce”? That determinism is not true? That philosophy and everyday life have nothing in common?
“What is free will on Dennett’s account? Dennett explicitly rejects regulative control (1984a, 1984b), arguing for a point that he shares with Frankfurt (1969), namely, that the ability or inability to do otherwise is irrelevant to the control pertinent to moral responsibility.”
Is that true also of the ability to “think” otherwise, to “believe” otherwise, to “feel” otherwise, to “react” otherwise? Is Dennett free to think what he thinks? Is he responsible for what he says?
“For Dennett, free will consists in the ability of a person to control her conduct on the basis of rational considerations through means that arise from, or are subject to, critical self-evaluation, self-adjusting and self-monitoring.”
And what are rational considerations, critical self-evaluation, etc.? Necessary/random states of the brain?
“That is, free will involves responsiveness to reason”
Isn’t the brain machine the one which reasons? Isn’t the brain machine the one which reacts? What reacts to what? And where is free will? Could the brain react to the brain in any different, or non randomly different, way?
“Dennett certainly has many useful observations about how this sort of control might have naturally arisen from less sophisticated sorts of creatures through a process of evolution”
Why am I not surprised?
“By appealing to views on intentionality, rational action, agency, and personhood, Dennett offers a suggestive account of how it is that an agent can be an authentic source of her action ”
Well, if the purpose was to show how, in a materialist scenario, we are an authentic source of our action as much as a thermostat is, I think Dennet has scored an important point.
But I will not give any more time to Dennett. Frankly, I don’t think it’s worthwhile. Maybe I should have stuck to Hobbes.
What a coincidence, I’ve been just talking about Dennet.
gpuccio, great post. I’ll add a couple of comments on DD (quotes from wikipedia review of “Elbow Room”:
the power to be active agents, biological devices that respond to our environment with rational, desirable courses of action.
Yes, we’re better, more universal robots, definitely upgrade to wasps thanks to rationality. But no free will.
If our hypothetically mechanical brains are in control of our behavior and our brains produce good behaviors for us, then do we really need such choice?
We don’t need to be able to make a choice. Again, no free will.
Dennett argues that choice exists in a general sense: that because we base our decisions on context, we limit our options as the situation becomes more specific. In the most specific circumstance (actual events), he suggests there is only one option left to us.
Finally we have free will – we can make a choice, but we always have only one option to choose. Gosh.
I think we are free do decide what we want. To shape our will. To choose what we belive. To do something because we believe it’s right thing to do or despite of it. Sometimes we regret wrong choice and that means we feel we were free to do the right thing.
In my opinion freedom of will, objectivie existence of reality and moral law in our minds is what anyone feels to be true at least at some point of his/her life. Any philosophy that denies that knowledge, those three pillars of common sense, is a lie.
What is the point of doing such an esoteric dance to avoid non-material free will and non-material mind?
Why is it that materialists require there to only be a material world, regardless of evidence, logical argument, and presonal experience (free will, consciousness) to the contrary?
I don’t get it. It’s like insisting that the subatomic world doesn’t exist, or that life doesn’t exist anywhere else in the universe; I mean, so what if a non-material reality exists? Isn’t that a good thing? Why spend such mental effort and gymnastics avoiding that conclusion?
It immediately “makes sense” of all sorts of empirical phenomena, none of which “makes sense” without a non-material world; so all of that other phenomena gets dismissed, denied, ridiculed, hand-waved.
I mean, come on. At some point one has to realize all they are doing is avoiding the obvious.
William J. Murray wrote:
Because it would allow that dreaded foot in the door.
Because when you allow that aforementioned foot in the door, it puts a crimp in your style.
Oh, and Mark Frank, I’m not avoiding you. I think it’s hilarious you didn’t address how you were wrong about Singer.
And the reason why you don’t see the contradictions in your position is the same reason you don’t see anything wrong with Singer and the phrase “less right to life”.
Let’s just chalk it up to your meat-computer configuration. You can’t help it because your brain is wired that way and you can’t think any differently. It’s not like you have free will to believe anything else.
angryoldfatman
Re #72.
I stopped addressing the “does Singer approve of killing babies?” question because to prove my point would require extracting quotes and then degenerate into “it all depends what you mean by”. I don’t have the time and energy. Anyone who is interested can read the piece you referred to and make up their own mind.
gpuccio
#68
This took quite a time to read! I am going to leave the second half on Dennett. I think he is pretty much right but it would just take too long to go into it.
Your argument in the first half seems to hinge on this sentence:
Because they are philosophical arguments about how we consider responsibility, reason, the reaction of consciousness, and many other things which have no meaning in the context we have just described.
It seems to me that you are assuming that materialism is false. As a materialist I believe that all these mental acts and states are different ways of looking at the same thing as a state of the brain (actually it is bit more complicated – they describe brain state + context). And again I need to keep coming back to the point. The objective is not to prove materialism true. It is just to show that it is not hypocritical. So to argue on the assumption that it is false doesn’t crack it.
I am trying to write a fuller response, but it will be too long to be a comment and I am not sure if I will complete it. If I do I will post a link to it here.
Mark:
There is a new thread open on compatibilism. I would appreciate your comments (or a link to them) there. The subject certainly deserves a detailed discussion, even beyond the problem of hypocrisy.
Moreover, my point was not so much to affirm that materialism iswrong, but that, is materialism is right, compatibilism is wrong. In other words, my reasoning was: “responsibility, reason, the reaction of consciousness, and many other things” are all things which, in a materialist context, arise from necessity, chance, or a mix of the two. Brain states arise form those causal factors (in a materialistic context). Context too arises from thsoe causal factors. Therefore, none of those concepts is relevant to affirm any free will, alwys in a materialistic context.
In other words, Dennett cannot affirm that “intentionality, rational action, agency, and personhood” are in some way a manifestation, or a tool, of free will, if those same things are the result of necessity and chance. However you put it, if necessity and chance are the only rules, there is no room for true free will: one can only, as Dennett does, redefine the appearance of free will as true free will, but that is only playing with words.
Re #75
gpuccio – see my response to Barry on the new thread. I think the key to understanding (if not agreeing) with compatabilism is probably really realising that being able to predict a choice does not stop it being a choice.
“Anyone who is interested can read the piece you referred to and make up their own mind.”
Except, apparently, Barry.
Dear Barry: Your OP exposing Materialist hypocrisy can also be described as Materialist senselessness.
When we remember that Materialists are Atheists and that all Atheists are Darwinists the senselessness is suddenly explained.
Could we expect persons who believe that apes morphed into men over the course of millions of years to make sense or not engage in hypocrisy since Materialism-Darwinism makes no sense to begin with, having zero correspondence to reality?
Ray
In the sort of blase skeptic sort of way that we have observed that we could find a sort of meaning where life to be determined, we can observe that things might still happen, whether or not they were determined. Determinism then, is an unnecessary projection from the observance of things that we have determined to be determinable to everything else.
As long as compatibilism is mainly a skepticism against the necessary conflict between determinism and free will (and little more), it does nothing more than leverage their confidence that everything is “natural”, “mechanical”, “material”, or “deterministic”.
However, one of the new emerging popular conjectures, the Multiverse, never even hints at explaining why the cosmic constants are what they are in this universe. It just suggests a distribution of various levels, without a hint that those levels were determined.
However much we might want “free will” to be precisely understood, it’s not. But that everything is determined is not that well understood either. One just sounds more scientific than the other, because job of Science is to determine outcomes.
Although is is possible to argue morality from deterministic perspective leveraging “what we someday may know”, it is has not been successful in arguing it by overlapping the two ideas as currently understood. Hence the confusion.