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Mark Frank poses an interesting thought experiment on free will

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In a comment on kairosfocus’ latest excellent post, Does ID ASSUME “contra-causal free will” and “intelligence” (and so injects questionable “assumptions”)?, Mark Frank proposes a thought experiment in support of his view that determinism is fully compatible with free will. It goes as follows:

Start with a dog. Dogs make choices in the sense that they may accept or reject a treat, may obey or disobey an order, may chase a rabbit or not. Suppose we advance our understanding of dogs’ brains and thought processes so that a genius vet can predict with 100% accuracy how a dog will choose in any given situation given its past history and current circumstances. Surely this is conceivable? If we manage this do we now say that dogs are making real choices? If it they are real choices then this is compatibilism in action. So I guess, in these circumstances, you would say that we have shown they do not really have free will.

Now extend it to infants – say two year olds. They make choices – eat or don’t eat, cry or don’t cry, hug or don’t hug. So let’s imagine we repeat the process with them. A genius paediatrician in this case (maybe you one day!). Are the infants also lacking free will? Either compatabilism is true or they haven’t got free will.

OK. Now apply it to an adult human. If it is conceivable for a dog and an infant then surely it is conceivable for an adult. A genius psychologist observes an adult and is able to predict all their decisions and explain why – exactly how each decision is determined by their genetics, personal history and current environment (it doesn’t have to be a materialist explanation). Has that adult got free will? Either compatabilism is true or they haven’t got free will.

And finally apply to yourself. Suppose it turns out a genius psychologist has been monitoring you all your life and has been able to correctly predict all your decisions and also how the decision making process worked in detail – how your different motivations were balanced and interacted with your perceptions and memories resulting in each decision (including any dithering and worrying about whether you got it right). Would that mean you thought you had free will but actually didn’t? Either compatabilism is true or you haven’t got free will.

As my computer is currently kaput, this will be a very short post. I’d like to suggest that what Mark Frank has left out of the equation is language, the capacity for which is what differentiates us from other animals. (Human infants possess this capacity but do not yet exercise it, partly because their brains, when they are newborn, are still too immature for language production, and also because they have yet to build up a linguistic databank that would enable them to express what they want to get across.)

Language is central to human rationality because rationality is not just a matter of selecting the appropriate means to realize a desired end: it is also a critical activity, in which agents are expected to be able to justify their choices and respond to questions like “Why did you do that?” People don’t just act rationally; they give reasons for their actions. In order to do that, you need a language in which you can generate an indefinitely large number of sentences, as the range of possible situations in which you might find yourself is potentially infinite – particularly when we factor in the little complicating circumstances that may arise.

What is distinctive about human language, as opposed to animal “language,” is precisely this ability to generate an infinite number of sentences. This uniquely human ability was the subject of a recent article in the Washington Post titled, Chirps, whistles, clicks: Do any animals have a true ‘language’?, which was discussed in a recent post by News (emphases are mine – VJT):

A new study on animal calls has found that the patterns of barks, whistles, and clicks from seven different species appear to be more complex than previously thought. The researchers used mathematical tests to see how well the sequences of sounds fit to models ranging in complexity…

“We’re still a very, very long way from understanding this transition from animal communication to human language, and it’s a huge mystery at the moment,” said study author and zoologist Arik Kershenbaum, who did the work at the National Institute for Mathematical and Biological Synthesis…

“What makes human language special is that there’s no finite limit as to what comes next,” he said….

But what separates language from communication? Why can’t we assume that whales, with their elaborate songs, are simply speaking “whale-ese”?

To be considered a true language, there are a few elements that are usually considered to be essential, says Kershenbaum. For one, it must be learned rather than instinctive — both whales and birds have this piece covered. For instance, killer whale calves learn a repertoire of calls from their mothers, and the sounds gradually evolve from erratic screams to adult-like pulsed calls and whistles.

What holds whales and other animals back from language is that there is a limit to what they can express. There are only so many calls that each may convey different emotions, but only we have an unlimited ability to express abstract ideas.

The problem for scientists is that no one knows how language evolved. Oddly enough, there don’t seem to be any transitional proto-languages between whale and bird songs — said to be the most sophisticated animal calls — and our own speech.

There are two conflicting theories of how language evolved in humans. The first is that human language evolved slowly and gradually, just as most traits evolved in the animal world. So perhaps it started with gestures, and then words and sentences. Or language may have started out more like bird song — with complex but meaningless sounds — and the last stage was attaching meaning to these sounds.

Reading the last paragraph in the passage quoted above brings to mind Nobel Laureate John Eccles’ derisive remarks about “promissory materialism.” The fact is that scientists haven’t got a clue how language evolved – and for a very good reason. The gap between the law-governed deterministic processes we observe in Nature and the infinite flexibility of human language is an unbridgeable one.

That is why no psychologist could ever, even in principle, predict everything that a rational adult human being will think, say and do. Language, which is fundamentally unpredictable, is part of the warp-and-woof of human life. Hence the antecedent in Mark Frank’s thought experiment – “What if a psychologist could predict every decision that you make?” – is impossible, by definition.

Back in 1957, behaviorist B. F. Skinner wrote a best-selling book with the amusing title, Verbal Behavior. I hope readers can see now why language is much more than mere behavior.

Thoughts?

Comments
gpuccio
To be clear, I don’t believe that free choice can be demonstrated scientifically. On the other hand, it is equally impossible to falsify it scientifically. In that sense, it is not a purely scientific issue (in that, it is completely different from design).
That makes sense. :)Dionisio
September 9, 2014
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gpuccio
I have never thought that free choice means that nothing is pre-determined. A lot of things are probably pre-determined,...
Agree. For example, I don't recall choosing my parents, or the place I was born in, or the first language I spoke, or the first toys I played with, or the first school I was sent to, or the neighborhood I grew up in,... :)Dionisio
September 9, 2014
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Graham2: Please, try to understand that I was answering a specific question by Phineas. Be fair, and look at my whole discourse. To be clear, I don't believe that free choice can be demonstrated scientifically. O=n the other hand, it is equally impossible to falsify it scientifically. In that sense, it is not a purely scientific issue (in that, it is completely different from design). I believe that both determinism (including compatibilism) and libertarian free will are philosophical views with scientific implications. They are not purely scientific issues. The point is that libertarian free will is perfectly compatible with empirical facts and with our inner intuitions about ourselves and reality, while determinism is perfectly compatible with empirical facts but it denies our fundamental inner intuitions about ourselves and reality (free choice, responsibility, possibility of modifying our personal destiny). Accepting one philosophy or the other is a free choice.gpuccio
September 9, 2014
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Phinehas: Thank you for the kind words. I think that what you call "pre-remembering" would happen "out of time", in a sense. Our usual map of reality assumes that the cause effect relationship implies that the cause precedes the effect. Maybe that QM or other future views could challenge that simple principle, but for the moment I would stick to it. Regarding theological implications (prophecy, and so on), I certainly don't want to debate those aspects in detail. However, I will only say, again: a) A knowledge from "out of time" is perfectly compatible with free choice, IMO. b) A manifestation of that knowledge in time, "in advance" of the effect, could be more of a problem. That is a common "scenario" in science fiction, for example. But again, it's perfectly possible that some general trends of events are strongly determined, and that still free choice is not denied. I have never thought that free choice means that nothing is pre-determined. A lot of things are probably pre-determined, and still we can be free in what can still be changed by ourselves. Free choice is not omnipotence.gpuccio
September 9, 2014
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Graham2:
Why cant our brain do all that stuff ?
What our? Graham2:
Why cant our brain do all that stuff ?
Good point. Take your brain out of your body and you'd be amazed at the things it can do without you!Mung
September 8, 2014
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GP: Thanks for the clarification. I really enjoy reading your posts in this and other discussions. I find your arguments insightful and utterly convincing. However, I have to say that I'm not convinced that foreknowledge would definitely preclude free choice any more than post-knowledge does. (Nor am I convinced to the contrary, I should add.) Choice only happens at T0. Looking back from T0, the (remembered) past is determined and immutable, but that doesn't mean that free choice was not possible at T-60. I don't see why, in principle, looking forward in time (if we could do such a thing) could not function the same way. Looking forward from T0, the (pre-membered) future is determined and immutable, but that doesn't mean that free choice will not be possible at T+60. But perhaps this has more to do with Quantum Mechanics and the collapse of wave functions, for which I have only a layman's fascination.
It is possible that a “knowledge from out of time” may exist. That would not preclude free choice. For example, if one believes in a god who is beyond time and space, that god could well know all the choices that will ever exist, and in no way that precludes the freedom of those choices...
Sure, but if you throw in Revelation as a transfer of knowledge from out of time to inside time, and combine that with Prophecy, then is free will overruled? (We probably don't want to go too far down the sovereignty vs. free will debate, so it is OK if you don't go into a lot of detail with your answer. I'm just curious about your views.) Again, if you wish to stay away from getting too theological with the discussion, I will understand, but I have always been intrigued by the following Bible passage and its implications for foreknowledge and free choice.
1 Samuel 23:10-13 (ESV) 10 Then David said, “O Lord, the God of Israel, your servant has surely heard that Saul seeks to come to Keilah, to destroy the city on my account. 11 Will the men of Keilah surrender me into his hand? Will Saul come down, as your servant has heard? O Lord, the God of Israel, please tell your servant.” And the Lord said, “He will come down.” 12 Then David said, “Will the men of Keilah surrender me and my men into the hand of Saul?” And the Lord said, “They will surrender you.” 13 Then David and his men, who were about six hundred, arose and departed from Keilah, and they went wherever they could go. When Saul was told that David had escaped from Keilah, he gave up the expedition.
Phinehas
September 8, 2014
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gpc: cause and effect chains up to time 0 You got it in one, the point I have been trying to make all along. But then you spoil it by: if a free choice is performed You have already decided free choice (whatever that is) must be involved. You have the answer you want, then start looking for a justification. Sigh.Graham2
September 8, 2014
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Phineas: I would definitely say that "being able to predict in terms of cause-and-effect chains and outcomes" precludes free choice. The essence of free choice is exactly that: cause and effect chains up to time 0 cannot entirely explain what happens at time 0, if a free choice is performed at that time. To avoid violations of the physical laws of cause and effect, we can hypothesize that the free choice is instantiated at quantum level, at the consciousness brain interface. The question if "foreknowledge would preclude free choice" is more complex. Maybe it depends on what kind of foreknowledge. We can certainly have some foreknowledge of the chains of cause and effect which constrain a free choice. That is some foreknowledge, but no complete foreknowledge. In no way can we know in advance the free component. So, I would say that a complete foreknowledge "in the chain of time" would definitely preclude free choice. It is possible that a "knowledge from out of time" may exist. That would not preclude free choice. For example, if one believes in a god who is beyond time and space, that god could well know all the choices that will ever exist, and in no way that precludes the freedom of those choices, in the same way that our knowledge of the choices "after" they have been made does not interfere with their freedom.gpuccio
September 8, 2014
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Graham2 Have you ever wondered: "I am going to teach myself". Huh? Who is the teacher and who is the student? They're both your brain? When you "take care of yourself" - why do you need two parties involved in that?Silver Asiatic
September 8, 2014
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GP:
We both know that random has many meanings. If you just mean “unpredictable”, well I can accept that. But that does not mean anything relevant, just that nobody can predict what the free choice will be (that’s why we call it free).
Perhaps you are using "predict" with a very specific or narrow meaning here. To be clear, are you saying that foreknowledge would preclude free choice? Or only that being able to predict in terms of cause-and-effect chains and outcomes (i.e. determined outcomes) would preclude free choice?Phinehas
September 8, 2014
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G2: "Why cant our brain do all that stuff?" In other words, what hard problem of consciousness?Phinehas
September 8, 2014
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Why cant our brain do all that stuff ?Graham2
September 7, 2014
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Graham2
The agent making the decision is constantly being pushed back to the soul, the ‘I’, free will, etc etc. My point (and I think MF) is: How does this agent contribute to the decision?
I think a more central question you're asking is if there is an agent at all. You're saying there is no "self" or "I" - right? What is the "thing" that researches, weighs options, carrys on an internal dialogue and then chooses? That's what we generally call "self" or "I". But you're denying this - right? Does none of that inner discussion and consciousness of what to choose and evalution of choice exist? There is no agent?
Why do I decide: Not really a sensible question. There is no ‘why’. What is the ‘I’: This is your problem, not mine.
You're conceding this entire topic to us. You don't think that we can ask why you decided? That's meaningless? Yes, "what is the I"? Does it exist? You could use science to answer that if you want. But to hand this kind of research over to the ID community (or "religious people") would be quite significant, I'd think. There's quite a lot of academic work done to try to determine what the "I" is.Silver Asiatic
September 7, 2014
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#233 Mung I should perhaps have written that I am not convinced that real chaotic systems are deterministic. Theoretical ones are indeed both unpredictable and deterministic but as it says further down the same article you quoted:
It can be difficult to tell from data whether a physical or other observed process is random or chaotic, because in practice no time series consists of a pure "signal". There will always be some form of corrupting noise, even if it is present as round-off or truncation error. Thus any real time series, even if mostly deterministic, will contain some randomness
Mark Frank
September 6, 2014
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It's my contention that chaos is deterministic only in principle, but not in practice. To demonstrate this, pick any point on a number line at random. The odds are that it's an irrational number. Let's say that the number is exactly Pi. What are the odds that you can pick Pi again? Exactly. To an infinite number of places. Not gonna happen! Chaos is somewhere between deterministic and random. Chaos is a nice place where you can hide free will, God, and external intervention to events, making them undetectable. -QQuerius
September 6, 2014
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Chaos theory & fractals (YouTube) lolMung
September 6, 2014
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Mark Frank:
I am not convinced chaotic systems are deterministic.
As kf likes to say, quoting Wikipedia against interest:
This happens even though these systems are deterministic, meaning that their future behavior is fully determined by their initial conditions, with no random elements involved. - Chaos Theory
Does that meet your definition of deterministic, Mark?Mung
September 6, 2014
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Hi Mark, Have you ever observed a fractal generation program in operation? Do you have an opinion as to whether it's deterministic, or not? Chaos & FractalsMung
September 6, 2014
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Graham2 said:
You actually think certain things have to exist because they are morally required.
I think a better way to say it is that it we theists consider it wiser to hold a premise (objective morality) true than not if one must abandon reason and ignore their own daily experience to deny the premise - especially for no reason other than to hold on to an ideological fancy. The same can be said for other such premises, like libertarian free will, for example. If one faces a choice between a sound thought system with a good premise that matches experience and one that must deny our own sense of conscience and free will into self-refuting absurdity, there really is only one good option.
Its a funny way to think, but there you are.
If by "funny" you mean "a commitment to a hold premises that are rationally reconcilable with how we actually must behave and think", then yes.William J Murray
September 6, 2014
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G2: The issue is responsible freedom, and you betcha that it is morally freighted . . . starting with, we got rights and responsibilities to respect rights. Like unto that, we got minds that can choose or refuse to follow evidence and meaningful, reasoned insights on such that warrants -- yet another morally freighted concept . . . that we accept certain conclusions as true. Where truth -- often, "light" -- and our duty to seek, respect and live by it are as paramount as it gets. And, if that had not registered long, long, long since, it is because you have been reading with blinkers. And, have been ignoring the longstanding point made by Plato in The Laws, Bk X on the implications and social consequences of spreading evolutionary materialism. Here is Wm B Provine of Cornell [IIRC] inadvertently exposing the vital holes in evo mat views relative to exactly these concerns, in his 1998 U Tenn Darwin Day keynote . . . which has been cited any number of times and has been headlined including by BA:
Naturalistic evolution has clear consequences that Charles Darwin understood perfectly. 1) No gods worth having exist; 2) no life after death exists; 3) no ultimate foundation for ethics exists; 4) no ultimate meaning in life exists; and 5) human free will is nonexistent . . . . The first 4 implications are so obvious to modern naturalistic evolutionists that I will spend little time defending them. Human free will, however, is another matter. Even evolutionists have trouble swallowing that implication. I will argue that humans are locally determined systems that make choices. They have, however, no free will . . .
Without responsible freedom, we can neither be moral nor rational, we would be playthings of unconscious forces that shape and control the electrochemistry of the CNS, partly through genetics, partly through whatever wiring obtains, partly through noisiness in the telecomms sense, partly through psychosocial programming and accidents of whatever has happened to a given individual. That is the context where Crick stated in his 1994 The Astonishing Hypothesis:
. . . that "You", your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules. As Lewis Carroll's Alice might have phrased: "You're nothing but a pack of neurons." This hypothesis is so alien to the ideas of most people today that it can truly be called astonishing.
Plainly, if Sir Francis is included, this dramatically undermines his own thought. This is why ID thinker Phillip Johnson responded that Dr Crick should therefore be willing to preface his books: “I, Francis Crick, my opinions and my science, and even the thoughts expressed in this book, consist of nothing more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules.” (In short, as Prof Johnson then went on to say: “[[t]he plausibility of materialistic determinism requires that an implicit exception be made for the theorist.” [[In Reason in the Balance, 1995.]) Going on, Haldane put the matter of undermining reason on the table at the turn of the 1930's, as has also been highlighted any number of times:
"It seems to me immensely unlikely that mind is a mere by-product of matter. For if my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically. And hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms. In order to escape from this necessity of sawing away the branch on which I am sitting, so to speak, I am compelled to believe that mind is not wholly conditioned by matter.” [["When I am dead," in Possible Worlds: And Other Essays [1927], Chatto and Windus: London, 1932, reprint, p.209.]
In short, evo mat is self referentially absurd. Going on, there are self evident moral truths that are knowable and known, such as that we are morally bound to respect core rights such as life. Hence the moral yardstick I have underscored: it is self-evidently wrong, wicked, evil to for pleasure kidnap, torture, rape and murder a child. (Which, I base on an actual case with an actual child I knew who was fatally subjected to just this horror -- this is not a hypothetical, and if you doubt me try to explain yourself to the still grieving father.) You cannot reasonably deny that we are under the moral government of OUGHT. Which means that we face the IS-OUGHT gap and the implication (given the need for grounding) that there is but one place where we may find an IS capable of grounding OUGHT. The foundations or roots of reality. As I have repeatedly underscored, since Plato, it has been well known by leading thinkers that evo mat cannot provide such an is. There is, and has been for centuries, just one serious candidate: the inherently good creator God who is a maximally great and necessary being, the root of reality. And so, let us see what other candidates can be brought to the table of comparative difficulties. Where, no, this is not "a funny way to think," it is highlighting a cluster of absolutely crucial issues. But in the meanwhile, here is Locke citing Hooker at the point where he set out to ground rights and justice in state and community in Ch 2 of the 2nd treatise on civil govt:
. . . if I cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man's hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire which is undoubtedly in other men . . . my desire, therefore, to be loved of my equals in Nature, as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to themward fully the like affection. From which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn for direction of life no man is ignorant . . . [[Hooker then continues, citing Aristotle in The Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 8:] as namely, That because we would take no harm, we must therefore do none; That since we would not be in any thing extremely dealt with, we must ourselves avoid all extremity in our dealings; That from all violence and wrong we are utterly to abstain, with such-like . . . ] [[Eccl. Polity,preface, Bk I, "ch." 8, p.80]
Back to the local battlefronts . . . KFkairosfocus
September 6, 2014
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I find all that completely incoherent, but when trying to understand how you religious people think, I consistently underestimate the importance of morality. You actually think certain things have to exist because they are morally required. Its a funny way to think, but there you are. If VJT had made this clearer, it would have saved MF & I a lot of time.Graham2
September 5, 2014
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Graham2: The point is that free will is technically relevant because it has a moral meaning. You cannot separate the two aspects. The intuition of free will give sense and consistency to our whole behavioral reality, exactly as the intuition of meaning gives sense and consistency to our whole cognitive reality. Meaning, feeling, purpose and free will are all conscious subjective experiences. They cannot be understood or even defined in purely objective terms. They are intuitive, all of them.gpuccio
September 5, 2014
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Its slowly dawning on me that the religious people here see free will as a moral issue. The remarks of VJT,GP, etc keep returning to this. I approach it as a purely technical problem (and maybe MF as well) but all along, its seen as a moral question. Free will is somehow required for moral reasons. I wish they could just say it.Graham2
September 5, 2014
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MF: Chaos is a popular word for certain classical nonlinear dynamical systems exhibiting sensitive dependence on initial conditions. They are strictly deterministic but because of that dependence will cause large and effectively unpredictable divergence between close initial points, across time. Such butterfly effect divergence is NOT a shift from blind mechanical necessity and/or noise. Chaos is not a gateway to genuine responsible freedom. KFkairosfocus
September 5, 2014
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Mark: As far as I can understand, chaotic systems are special system where small differences in the initial conditions can generate huge differences in the evolution of the system, because of the special mathematics involved. OK, I have read, as have probably you, that in such a system, in principle, even a quantum uncertainty could be so amplified as to become a completely different outcome (some extreme form of the butterfly effect), but I doubt that in practice that is really a model for real observations. More likely, the uncertainty in our knowledge of the initial conditions is linked to the implicit errors in any form of measurement, or to limitations in our understanding of the variables implied. However, the system in itself id considered deterministic (it's exactly the special form of the mathematics that confers to the system its unpredictability, a beautiful example of unpredictability by necessity). QM is different. From what you say, I am not sure that you understand correctly the main concept in it (well, I am not sure that I understand it correctly, too, with QM you never know! :) ). However, as far as I understand, in QM the wave function is completely deterministic in its evolution, and that's what makes QM one of the most precise theories in the history of physics. But, when the wave function "collapses" (for example, because of some experimental setting), the observed effects are not predictable. But they certainly follow a probability distribution: the probability distribution is the wave function itself (or more precisely, it is derived from it). So, quantum events must necessarily obey a probability distribution, because the wave function itself, the central concept in QM, is their probability distribution. From Wikipedia: "In most treatments of quantum mechanics, the wavefunction is complex-valued. In one important interpretation of quantum mechanics called the Copenhagen interpretation, the modulus squared of the wavefunction, |?|2, is a real number interpreted as the probability density of finding a particle in a given place at a given time, if the particle's position is to be measured. Since the wavefunction is complex valued, only its relative phase and relative magnitude can be measured. It does not directly tell anything about the magnitudes or directions of measurable observables, one has to apply quantum operators to the wave function ? and find the eigenvalues which correspond to sets of possible results of measurement." (Emphasis mine) Finally, I agree that we agree on some things, and certainly not on others. In the end, it does not really matter very much. I think that your true feelings about free will are those of a libertarian, and not of a strict determinist. That's probably why you are a compatibilist. I am sure that you are a very moral person, and that I would agree with you on many things. However, worldview confrontation has its merits. With our worldviews (or even more restricted beliefs) we offer ourselves to others, and that is a beautiful experience of great value.gpuccio
September 5, 2014
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GP I am not convinced chaotic systems are deterministic. It seems to me that it only needs a component that is as unpredictable as a QM wave function and they will be inherently unpredictable not just hard to predict in practice.  However, there is a deeper philosophical point.  It may be that in practice QM wave functions conform to pdfs (I am no expert) but there is no reason in principle why a QM effect should not be found which does not conform to any pdf. i.e. it is unpredictable in essence as a chaotic system is unpredictable in practice. What would you call such an effect? I would like to call random or chaotic but if you prefer to reserve those terms, I can only call it unpredictable or undetermined.  What I am getting at is that you cannot differentiate the predictability of choice from the predictability of other undetermined events simply on the basis of that the others conform to a pdf.
Do you agree that the moral significance is due to which choice we make among different ones that we can really make? And that this simple fact sets the basis for our responsibility?
I agree that you can only be held morally responsible for doing something if it was possible to do something different.  I think we might differ over the interpretation of “possible”.
IOWs, do you agree that at time T0 our destiny can really go in different ways, and that all the deterministic and random and chaotic and QM variables that act on us at time T0 would cause some course (let’s call it C1), and that only some free choice from us at time T0 can change that course, making it become C2, and that C2 can be morally better (or worse) than C1, and that we are therefore fully responsible for acting and causing C2, or not acting and letting C1 happen?
Not quite. We don’t agree totally. You want to insist that free choice is somehow distinct from random and chaotic and QM.   But we both agree that choices (a ) may well be undetermined (b ) do not necessarily correspond to a pdf (c ) are morally significant – that is a lot of agreement. Does it really matter so much whether or not choices have another characteristic – one you can apparently intuit and I cannot?Mark Frank
September 5, 2014
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Mark: Well, this discussion is interesting. Chaotic systems are deterministic, they only require special mathematical treatments that render them completely unpredictable, because of a very high dependence on initial variable values. OK, I have no idea if chaotic systems obey some probabilistic function or not. You say that that is still unsolved, and that's fine for me. So, we could say that we have three kinds of system of events: necessary, probabilistic and chaotic. All three are still completely deterministic, we make the distinction only according to how we can describe them and predict their evolution. Then we have a fourth type, QM collapses, which (probably) is not deterministic at all, but still obeys some probability distribution. And the, in my model, we have a fifth type, free choices, which are modifications of the necessary flow of events initiated by a conscious agent, which are not determined at all, and possible do not obey any probabilistic distribution. So, they are different from both chaotic systems, which are determined, and QM collapses, which obey their probability distribution and are not connected to a conscious choice of an agent. Indeed, according to the model I have proposed, free choice could be exactly that: modification of the QM behavior in the brain because of the intervention of the conscious I which is linked to the brain interface. You say:
I pretty much agree with all of this last paragraph – here is my version. Free choices may well not be deterministic. We have no idea if they obey any probabilistic distribution. They are characterized by a moral significance which is intrinsic to the choice and has an effect on ourselves. (because making good or bad choices has an effect on the person who makes them). What is striking is how similar our beliefs are! The differences would appear to be relatively unimportant. Yet mine is compatibilism which disturbs you so much.
OK, let's understand each other well. Would you agree to say: "Free choices may well not be deterministic, nor random, nor chaotic." Unpredictable is fine. Do you agree that the moral significance is due to which choice we make among different ones that we can really make? And that this simple fact sets the basis for our responsibility? IOWs, do you agree that at time T0 our destiny can really go in different ways, and that all the deterministic and random and chaotic and QM variables that act on us at time T0 would cause some course (let's call it C1), and that only some free choice from us at time T0 can change that course, making it become C2, and that C2 can be morally better (or worse) than C1, and that we are therefore fully responsible for acting and causing C2, or not acting and letting C1 happen? And if you agree to those things, in what sense are you a determinist (or, if you prefer, a compatibilist)?gpuccio
September 5, 2014
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Graham2: I agree that we can leave involuntary actions out of the discussion. Among conscious actions, while I obviously have no way to "measure" how free they are (I have clearly said that it is impossible to know that), I can hypothesize. For example, conscious actions are performed with different degrees of attention, intensity, emotional participation, subconscious influences, and so on. Let's consider attention. Many acts in daily life are performed out of well established habits. That requires less attention, and it is likely that actions performed automatically or semi-automatically by habit imply no special use of free will (they are the necessary consequence of the free choices made when we established the habit). Your example of eating a sandwich could well belong there. The opposite would be true when we are trying to fight a negative habit, and have to exercise all our attention and will if we want to succeed. Here, free choice is probably very active: it can initiate the change in behavior or renounce to do that. There is a clear conflict between desires, and that is the best context for free choice to intervene. The choice of not eating a desired sandwich when we know that it is harmful for our health is a good scenario. But the best scenario for free will, IMO, is when we can remain loyal to something or someone that we love, or simply betray it or him or her for some personal gain. This is the essence of the problem, because IMO free will is first of all a matter of love, of loyalty to our deepest loves in spite of contrasting forces and desires.gpuccio
September 5, 2014
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GP
It is unpredictable, but that does not mean that it is random. It is a “third way”: a conscious free choice.
It occurs to me that another to get at this is instead of asking you what you mean by conscious free choice is to pursue what you mean by random. For me random means inherently unpredictable so there is no third way. You wrote:
Random means many things: a) Events which are fully deterministic, but that we cannot describe in a deterministic model, because we don’t know all the variables or because it is too complex. “Random” means that we can describe them by a probability distribution of some kind. b) Events which (probably) obey only a probability distribution, but are not fully determined (like wave function collapse in QM). However, “random” always describes a pattern by which we describe the events: a probabilistic distribution. Choices can probably be described, on big numbers, by a probabilistic distribution. But I believe that this fact is explained by the many deterministic variables which influence them. IOWs they are like a), but with an error factor which can well not obey any deterministic or probabilistic rule (the free choice).
I am surprised you use obeying a probability distribution as a criterion for random.  Chaotic systems (of which there are many) are unpredictable but conform to no probability distributions as far as we know (this is the subject of research – but the experts are not saying they must conform to a pdf but we don’t know what it is – they are saying we are trying to discover if there is a pdf). I would still call such systems random but if you do not want to extend the term random to these systems let’s just call them chaotic. What do you mean by random/chaotic other than unpredictable?
Free choices, if they exist, would share with b) the fact that they are not deterministic. We have no idea if they obey any probabilistic distribution, because we cannot really observe the free choice itself. In a context of libertarian free will, they are characterized by a moral significance which is intrinsic to the choice and determines its effect on ourselves. (because making good or bad choices has different effect on the person who makes them).
I pretty much agree with all of this last paragraph – here is my version.
Free choices may well not be deterministic. We have no idea if they obey any probabilistic distribution. They are characterized by a moral significance which is intrinsic to the choice and has an effect on ourselves. (because making good or bad choices has an effect on the person who makes them).
What is striking is how similar our beliefs are!  The differences would appear to be relatively unimportant. Yet mine is compatibilism which disturbs you so much.Mark Frank
September 5, 2014
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gp: Could you give an example of an 'output not controlled by free will'. To save time, we are talking all the time here of conscious decisions. Some things we do are truly involuntary (heartbeat etc) but these are not relevant to the discussion. So, could you give an example ?Graham2
September 5, 2014
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