In my last post, I cited 31 great scientists who made scientific arguments for the supernatural, and in so doing, flouted the tenets of methodological naturalism. One of these was the Scottish physicist, James Clerk Maxwell, who propounded the theory of electromagnetism.
I was surprised that Maxwell’s violation of methodological naturalism generated so little comment among commenters on my last post, so I have decided to re-post it. The interesting thing is that Maxwell himself had a firm conception of the kinds of questions that science should and shouldn’t concern itself with – only his conception was quite different from ours. And the bright line he drew between science and non-science didn’t rule out talk of a Creator; it merely ruled out discussion of his modus operandi. Let me hasten to add that Maxwell was no Darwin-dissenter: he never criticized Darwin’s theory of evolution, and his article, “Atom,” for the 9th edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica (Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 1875, Vol. III, p 48) indicates that he was probably an evolutionist, for after observing that each individual “either survives and propagates its species, or dies early, accordingly as it is more or less adapted to the circumstances of its environment,” Maxwell remarks that “it has been found possible to frame a theory of the distribution of organisms into species by means of generation, variation, and discriminative destruction” (the latter being a clear reference to natural selection). Readers who are curious about Maxwell’s views might like to peruse Ian Hutchinson’s highly engaging article, James Maxwell and the Christian Proposition.
James Clerk Maxwell and the supernatural
Who was Maxwell, and what was he famous for?
James Clerk Maxwell FRS FRSE, was a Scottish physicist and mathematician, whose greatest achievement was the formulation of classical electromagnetic theory, which united all observations, experiments and equations of electricity, magnetism and optics into a single, consistent theory. Maxwell’s equations explained how electricity, magnetism and light could all be understood as manifestations of the same phenomenon, namely the electromagnetic field.
How did Maxwell violate the principle of methodological naturalism, in his writings?
He argued that the matter of the universe must have been created, and that the hydrogen molecules we find in stars must have had a supernatural cause.
Where’s the evidence?
Maxwell argued that while science cannot tell us about the creation of matter out of nothing, science can tell us that molecules of matter were made, and that they were not made by a natural process.
(a) Maxwell’s scientific argument for the existence of a supernatural Creator
Maxwell put forward a scientific argument for the existence of a supernatural Creator in the concluding paragraphs of his famous Discourse on Molecules, delivered before the British Association at Bradford in September 1873:
But in the heavens we discover by their light, and by their light alone, stars so distant from each other that no material thing can ever have passed from one to another; and yet this light, which is to us the sole evidence of the existence of these distant worlds, tells us also that each of them is built up of molecules of the same kinds as those which we find on earth. A molecule of hydrogen, for example, whether in Sirius or in Arcturus, executes its vibrations in precisely the same time.
Each molecule therefore throughout the universe bears impressed upon it the stamp of a metric system as distinctly as does the metre of the Archives at Paris, or the double royal cubit of the temple of Karnac.
No theory of evolution can be formed to account for the similarity of molecules [here Maxwell is talking about molecular evolution, not Darwinian evolution – VJT], for evolution necessarily implies continuous change, and the molecule is incapable of growth or decay, of generation or destruction.
None of the processes of Nature, since the time when Nature began, have produced the slightest difference in the properties of any molecule. We are therefore unable to ascribe either the existence of the molecules or the identity of their properties to any of the causes which we call natural.
On the other hand, the exact equality of each molecule to all others of the same kind gives it, as Sir John Herschel has well said, the essential character of a manufactured article, and precludes the idea of its being eternal and self-existent.
Thus we have been led, along a strictly scientific path, very near to the point at which Science must stop, – not that Science is debarred from studying the internal mechanism of a molecule which she cannot take to pieces, any more than from investigating an organism which she cannot put together. But in tracing back the history of matter, Science is arrested when she assures herself, on the one hand, that the molecule has been made, and, on the other, that it has not been made by any of the processes we call natural.
Science is incompetent to reason upon the creation of matter itself out of nothing. We have reached the utmost limits of our thinking faculties when we have admitted that because matter cannot be eternal and self-existent it must have been created. It is only when we contemplate, not matter in itself, but the form in which it actually exists, that our mind finds something on which it can lay hold. (Emphases mine – VJT.)
What Maxwell is proposing here is an interesting design argument for a Creator, on scientific grounds: the fact that molecules are perfectly identical to one another suggests that they were manufactured according to an intelligent plan. What he had in mind was a “uniformity intended and accomplished by the same wisdom and power of which uniformity, accuracy, symmetry, consistency, and continuity of plan are … important attributes…” as he wrote in a letter to a friend. (See E.Garber, S.G.Brush, and C.W.F.Everitt, (Eds) Maxwell on Molecules and Gases, 1986, MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, p. 242.)
(b) Maxwell on the dividing line between science and religion
Note that the dividing line between science and religion is quite different for Maxwell than it is for modern scientists. For Maxwell, science could not explain the modus operandi of the Creator (especially the creation of matter out of nothing). But Maxwell felt quite confident in pronouncing, as a scientist, that certain entities (hydrogen atoms) did not have a natural origin. Today, proponents of the cosmological version of Intelligent Design have refined Maxwell’s position somewhat: they would argue that the laws of nature describing the behavior of hydrogen atoms do not have a natural origin.
How did readers respond to Maxwell’s argument for a supernatural Creator, in my last post?
The most substantive response to Maxwell’s scientific argument for a supernatural Creator came from Professor Joshua Swamidass, who recently interviewed Professor Ted Davis on the subject of methodological naturalism. He wrote:
We [i.e. Professor Ted Davis and I – VJT] would also emphasize that many scientists agree with you (and for example Lord Kelvin) in making an inference to design in our philosophical reflections of science, even today. Maxwell’s argument is a great example. I can, in principle, agree with him (it is a type of fine tuning argument), and I can see why he makes it to his colleagues. However, it reads to me as a “science inspired” argument not a “science” argument. He appears to be philosophically reflecting on meaning of scientific discoveries, not doing science per se. Similarly, Polkinghorne, Owen Gingerich, and myself are all critics of the ID movement, but make design inferences regularly outside of science in the same way. None of us are violating methodological naturalism (and neither is Maxwell in your quote).
In short: Professor Swamidass argues that Maxwell wasn’t putting forward a scientific argument in his 1873 Discourse on Molecules; he was simply engaging in philosophical reflections on the science of his day. I have to say I don’t buy that. Let’s have a closer look at Maxwell’s words:
None of the processes of Nature, since the time when Nature began, have produced the slightest difference in the properties of any molecule. We are therefore unable to ascribe either the existence of the molecules or the identity of their properties to any of the causes which we call natural.
That sure sounds like a scientific argument to me. I can find no mention of philosophy in this passage, and while it is true that Maxwell alludes to the atomic theories of certain Greek philosophers earlier on in his discourse, he firmly sets aside philosophical speculation regarding the nature of matter when he adds: “Our business this evening is to describe some researches in molecular science, and in particular to place before you any definite information which has been obtained respecting the molecules themselves.” In addition, the magisterial language Maxwell uses in the above paragraph (“We are therefore unable…”) suggests that in this discourse, he is speaking on behalf of a group of eminent people. Since Maxwell never wrote any books on philosophy, but published quite a lot on the subject of science, I am forced to conclude that he must have been speaking as a scientist, and not as a philosopher.
Later on, Maxwell adds:
Thus we have been led, along a strictly scientific path, very near to the point at which Science must stop, – not that Science is debarred from studying the internal mechanism of a molecule which she cannot take to pieces, any more than from investigating an organism which she cannot put together. But in tracing back the history of matter, Science is arrested when she assures herself, on the one hand, that the molecule has been made, and, on the other, that it has not been made by any of the processes we call natural.
Again, no mention of philosophy here. On the contrary, Maxwell explicitly declares that he has been led “along a strictly scientific path.” He then discusses how far science can go, and it is worth noting that Maxwell thinks scientists may legitimately conclude that molecules were made, but not by any natural process. In other words, science can take us to a supernatural Creator. Although he does not use the word “Creator” in his discourse, Maxwell must have believed in the existence of such a Being, for he adds: “Science is incompetent to reason upon the creation of matter itself out of nothing.” By definition, creation implies a Creator.
Another commenter, named Seversky, argued that Maxwell’s argument for a supernatural Creator did not violate methodological naturalism [MN], because the Creator didn’t figure in any of his scientific hypotheses:
James Clerk Maxwell was by all accounts a devout evangelical Presbyterian. He believed the universe was created by God. But unless his equations include a term for divine intervention then there is no violation of MN. Scientists can believe whatever they like about the origins of life, the universe and everything but, as long as their hypotheses and theories don’t include explanatory gaps labelled “Here there be Miracles” then there is no violation of MN.
The trouble with this argument is that it either proves too much or too little. For that matter, Intelligent Design researchers don’t include “a term for divine intervention” in their equations. Would Seversky claim that ID proponents adhere to the tenets of methodological naturalism? Very interesting!
If, on the other hand, it is the presence of an “explanatory gap” that constitutes an infraction of the cardinal principle of methodological naturalism, and if ID proponents are charged with violating this principle when they conclude that unguided natural processes are incapable of explaining life, in all its rich variety, then how is that different from Maxwell concluding that no natural process can explain the origin of molecules? If the former is an “explanatory gap,” then so is the latter.
Professor Swamidass and Seversky were the only commenters on my last post who addressed Maxwell’s argument for the supernatural. What do other readers have to say?
Two topics for discussion:
Is Maxwell’s “bright line” between science and religion more rationally defensible than the one invoked by today’s methodological naturalists?
When was Maxwell’s “bright line” replaced by the one we use today, and why? Are there any historians of science who can answer this question?
And now, over to you.