Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

ID Foundations, 17a: Footnotes on Conservation of Information, search across a space of possibilities, Active Information, Universal Plausibility/ Probability Bounds, guided search, drifting/ growing target zones/ islands of function, Kolmogorov complexity, etc.

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(previous, here)

There has been a recent flurry of web commentary on design theory concepts linked to the concept of functionally specific, complex organisation and/or associated information (FSCO/I) introduced across the 1970’s into the 1980’s  by Orgel and Wicken et al. (As is documented here.)

This flurry seems to be connected to the announcement of an upcoming book by Meyer — it looks like attempts are being made to dismiss it before it comes out, through what has recently been tagged, “noviews.” (Criticising, usually harshly, what one has not read, by way of a substitute for a genuine book review.)

It will help to focus for a moment on the just linked ENV article, in which ID thinker William Dembski responds to such critics, in part:

[L]et me respond, making clear why criticisms by Felsenstein, Shallit, et al. don’t hold water.

There are two ways to see this. One would be for me to review my work on complex specified information (CSI), show why the concept is in fact coherent despite the criticisms by Felsenstein and others, indicate how this concept has since been strengthened by being formulated as a precise information measure, argue yet again why it is a reliable indicator of intelligence, show why natural selection faces certain probabilistic hurdles that impose serious limits on its creative potential for actual biological systems (e.g., protein folds, as in the research of Douglas Axe [Link added]), justify the probability bounds and the Fisherian model of statistical rationality that I use for design inferences, show how CSI as a criterion for detecting design is conceptually equivalent to information in the dual senses of Shannon and Kolmogorov, and finally characterize conservation of information within a standard information-theoretic framework. Much of this I have done in a paper titled “Specification: The Pattern That Signifies Intelligence” (2005) [link added] and in the final chapters of The Design of Life (2008).

But let’s leave aside this direct response to Felsenstein (to which neither he nor Shallit ever replied). The fact is that conservation of information has since been reconceptualized and significantly expanded in its scope and power through my subsequent joint work with Baylor engineer Robert Marks. Conservation of information, in the form that Felsenstein is still dealing with, is taken from my 2002 book No Free Lunch . . . .

[W]hat is the difference between the earlier work on conservation of information and the later? The earlier work on conservation of information focused on particular events that matched particular patterns (specifications) and that could be assigned probabilities below certain cutoffs. Conservation of information in this sense was logically equivalent to the design detection apparatus that I had first laid out in my book The Design Inference(Cambridge, 1998).

In the newer approach to conservation of information, the focus is not on drawing design inferences but on understanding search in general and how information facilitates successful search. The focus is therefore not so much on individual probabilities as on probability distributions and how they change as searches incorporate information. My universal probability bound of 1 in 10^150 (a perennial sticking point for Shallit and Felsenstein) therefore becomes irrelevant in the new form of conservation of information whereas in the earlier it was essential because there a certain probability threshold had to be attained before conservation of information could be said to apply. The new form is more powerful and conceptually elegant. Rather than lead to a design inference, it shows that accounting for the information required for successful search leads to a regress that only intensifies as one backtracks. It therefore suggests an ultimate source of information, which it can reasonably be argued is a designer. I explain all this in a nontechnical way in an article I posted at ENV a few months back titled “Conservation of Information Made Simple” (go here).

A lot of this pivots on conservation of information and the idea of search in a space of possibilities, so let us also excerpt the second ENV article as well:

Conservation of information is a term with a short history. Biologist Peter Medawar used it in the 1980s to refer to mathematical and computational systems that are limited to producing logical consequences from a given set of axioms or starting points, and thus can create no novel information (everything in the consequences is already implicit in the starting points). His use of the term is the first that I know, though the idea he captured with it is much older. Note that he called it the “Law of Conservation of Information” (see his The Limits of Science, 1984).

Computer scientist Tom English, in a 1996 paper, also used the term conservation of information, though synonymously with the then recently proved results by Wolpert and Macready about No Free Lunch (NFL). In English’s version of NFL, “the information an optimizer gains about unobserved values is ultimately due to its prior information of value distributions.” As with Medawar’s form of conservation of information, information for English is not created from scratch but rather redistributed from existing sources.

Conservation of information, as the idea is being developed and gaining currency in the intelligent design community, is principally the work of Bob Marks and myself, along with several of Bob’s students at Baylor (see the publications page at www.evoinfo.org). Conservation of information, as we use the term, applies to search. Now search may seem like a fairly restricted topic. Unlike conservation of energy, which applies at all scales and dimensions of the universe, conservation of information, in focusing on search, may seem to have only limited physical significance. But in fact, conservation of information is deeply embedded in the fabric of nature, and the term does not misrepresent its own importance . . . .

Humans search for keys, and humans search for uncharted lands. But, as it turns out, nature is also quite capable of search. Go to Google and search on the term “evolutionary search,” and you’ll get quite a few hits. Evolution, according to some theoretical biologists, such as Stuart Kauffman, may properly be conceived as a search (see his book Investigations). Kauffman is not an ID guy, so there’s no human or human-like intelligence behind evolutionary search as far as he’s concerned. Nonetheless, for Kauffman, nature, in powering the evolutionary process, is engaged in a search through biological configuration space, searching for and finding ever-increasing orders of biological complexity and diversity . . . .

Evolutionary search is not confined to biology but also takes place inside computers. The field of evolutionary computing (which includes genetic algorithms) falls broadly under that area of mathematics known as operations research, whose principal focus is mathematical optimization. Mathematical optimization is about finding solutions to problems where the solutions admit varying and measurable degrees of goodness (optimality). Evolutionary computing fits this mold, seeking items in a search space that achieve a certain level of fitness. These are the optimal solutions. (By the way, the irony of doing a Google “search” on the target phrase “evolutionary search,” described in the previous paragraph, did not escape me. Google’s entire business is predicated on performing optimal searches, where optimality is gauged in terms of the link structure of the web. We live in an age of search!)

If the possibilities connected with search now seem greater to you than they have in the past, extending beyond humans to computers and biology in general, they may still seem limited in that physics appears to know nothing of search. But is this true? The physical world is life-permitting — its structure and laws allow (though they are far from necessitating) the existence of not just cellular life but also intelligent multicellular life. For the physical world to be life-permitting in this way, its laws and fundamental constants need to be configured in very precise ways. Moreover, it seems far from mandatory that those laws and constants had to take the precise form that they do. The universe itself, therefore, can be viewed as the solution to the problem of making life possible. But problem solving itself is a form of search, namely, finding the solution (among a range of candidates) to the problem . . . .

The fine-tuning of nature’s laws and constants that permits life to exist at all is not like this. It is a remarkable pattern and may properly be regarded as the solution to a search problem as well as a fundamental feature of nature, or what philosophers would call a natural kind, and not merely a human construct. Whether an intelligence is responsible for the success of this search is a separate question. The standard materialist line in response to such cosmological fine-tuning is to invoke multiple universes and view the success of this search as a selection effect: most searches ended without a life-permitting universe, but we happened to get lucky and live in a universe hospitable to life.

In any case, it’s possible to characterize search in a way that leaves the role of teleology and intelligence open without either presupposing them or deciding against them in advance. Mathematically speaking, search always occurs against a backdrop of possibilities (the search space), with the search being for a subset within this backdrop of possibilities (known as the target). Success and failure of search are then characterized in terms of a probability distribution over this backdrop of possibilities, the probability of success increasing to the degree that the probability of locating the target increases . . . .

[T]he important issue, from a scientific vantage, is not how the search ended but the probability distribution under which the search was conducted.

So, we see the issue of search in a space of possibilities can be pivotal for looking at a fairly broad range of subjects, bridging from the world of Easter egg hunts, to that of computing to the world of life forms, and onwards to the evident fine tuning of the observed cosmos and its potential invitation of a cosmological design inference.

That’s a pretty wide swath of issues.

However, the pivot of current debates is on the design theory controversy linked to the world of life. Accordingly Dembski focuses there, and it is worth pausing for a further clip so that we can see his logic (and not the too often irresponsible caricatures of it that so often are frequently used to swarm down what he has had to say):

[I]nformation is usually characterized as the negative logarithm to the base two of a probability (or some logarithmic average of probabilities, often referred to as entropy). This has the effect of transforming probabilities into bits and of allowing them to be added (like money) rather than multiplied (like probabilities). Thus, a probability of one-eighths, which corresponds to tossing three heads in a row with a fair coin, corresponds to three bits, which is the negative logarithm to the base two of one-eighths.

Such a logarithmic transformation of probabilities is useful in communication theory, where what gets moved across communication channels is bits rather than probabilities and the drain on bandwidth is determined additively in terms of number of bits. Yet, for the purposes of this “Made Simple” paper, we can characterize information, as it relates to search, solely in terms of probabilities, also cashing out conservation of information purely probabilistically.

Probabilities, treated as information used to facilitate search, can be thought of in financial terms as a cost — an information cost. Think of it this way. Suppose there’s some event you want to have happen. If it’s certain to happen (i.e., has probability 1), then you own that event — it costs you nothing to make it happen. But suppose instead its probability of occurring is less than 1, let’s say some probability p. This probability then measures a cost to you of making the event happen. The more improbable the event (i.e., the smaller p), the greater the cost. Sometimes you can’t increase the probability of making the event occur all the way to 1, which would make it certain. Instead, you may have to settle for increasing the probability to q where q is less than 1 but greater than p. That increase, however, must also be paid for . . . . [However,] just as increasing your chances of winning a lottery by buying more tickets offers no real gain (it is not a long-term strategy for increasing the money in your pocket), so conservation of information says that increasing the probability of successful search requires additional informational resources that, once the cost of locating them is factored in, do nothing to make the original search easier . . . .

Conservation of information says that . . .  when we try to increase the probability of success of a search . . .   instead of becoming easier, [the search] remains as difficult as before or may even . . . become more difficult once additional underlying information costs, associated with improving the search and [which are] often hidden . . .  are factored in . . . .

The reason it’s called “conservation” of information is that the best we can do is break even, rendering the search no more difficult than before. In that case, information is actually conserved. Yet often, as in this example, we may actually do worse by trying to improve the probability of a successful search. Thus, we may introduce an alternative search that seems to improve on the original search but that, once the costs of obtaining this search are themselves factored in, in fact exacerbate the original search problem.

So, where does all of this leave us?

A useful way is to do an imaginary exchange based on many real exchanges of comments in and around UD, here by clipping a recent addition to the IOSE Intro-Summary (which is also structured to capture an unfortunate attitude that is too common in exchanges on this subject):

__________

>>Q1: How then do search algorithms — such as genetic ones — so often succeed?

A1: Generally, by intelligently directed injection of active information. That is, information that enables searching guided by an understanding of the search space or the general or specific location of a target. (Also, cf. here. A so-called fitness function which more or less smoothly and reliably points uphill to superior performance, mapped unto a configuration space, implies just such guiding information and allows warmer/colder signals to guide hill-climbing. This or the equivalent, appears in many guises in the field of so-called evolutionary computing. As a rule of thumb, if you see a “blind” search that seemingly delivers an informational free lunch, look for an inadvertent or overlooked injection of active information. [[Cf. here, here.& here.]) In a simple example, the children’s party game, “treasure hunt,” would be next to impossible without a guidance, warmer/colder . . . hot . . . red hot. (Something that gives some sort of warmer/colder message on receiving a query, is an oracle.) The effect of such sets of successive warmer/colder oracular messages or similar devices, is to dramatically reduce the scope of search in a space of possibilities. Intelligently guided, constrained search, in short, can be quite effective. But this is designed, insight guided search, not blind search. From such, we can actually quantify the amount of active information injected, by comparing the reduction in degree of difficulty relative to a truly blind random search as a yardstick. And, we will see the remaining importance of the universal or solar system level probability or plausibility bound [[cf. Dembski and Abel, also discussion at ENV] which in this course will for practical purposes be 500 – 1,000 bits of information — as we saw above, i.e. these give us thresholds where the search is hard enough that design is a more reasonable approach or explanation. Of course, we need not do so explicitly, we may just look at the amount of active information involved.

Q2: But, once we have a fitness function, all that is needed is to start anywhere and then proceed up the slope of the hill to a peak, no need to consider all of those outlying possibilities all over the place. So, you are making a mountain out of a mole-hill: why all the fuss and feathers over “active information,” “oracles” and “guided, constrained search”?

A2: Fitness functions, of course, are a means of guided search, by providing an oracle that points — generally — uphill. In addition, they are exactly an example of constrained search: there is function present everywhere in the zone of interest, and it follows a generally well-behaved uphill-pointing pattern. In short, from the start you are constraining the search to an island of function, T, in which neighbouring or nearby locations: Ei, Ej, Ek, etc . . .  — which can be chosen by tossing out a ring of “nearby” random tries — are apt to go uphill, or get you to another local slope pointing uphill. Also, if you are on the shoreline of function, tosses that have no function will eliminate themselves by being obviously downhill; which means it is going to be hard to island hop from one fairly isolated zone of function to the next.  In short, a theory that may explain micro-evolutionary change within an island or cluster of nearby islands, is not simply to be extrapolated to one that needs to account for major differences that have to bridge large differences in configuration and function. This is not going to be materially different if the islands of function and their slopes and peaks of function grow or shrink a bit across time or even move bodily like glorified sand pile barrier islands are wont to, so long as such island of function drifting is gradual. Catastrophic disappearance of such islands, of course, would reflect something like a mass extinction event due to an asteroid impact or the like. Mass extinctions simply do not create new functional body plans, they sweep the life forms exhibiting existing body plans away, wiping the table almost wholly clean, if we are to believe the reports.  Where also, the observable islands of function effect starts at the level of the many isolated protein families, that are estimated to be as 1 in 10^64 to 1 in 10^77 or so of the space of Amino Acid sequences. As ID researcher Douglas Axe noted in a 2004 technical paper: “one in 10^64 signature-consistent sequences forms a working domain . . . the overall prevalence of sequences performing a specific function by any domain-sized fold may be as low as 1 in 10^77, adding to the body of evidence that functional folds require highly extraordinary sequences.” So, what has to be reckoned with, is  that in general for a sufficiently complex situation to be relevant to FSCO/I [[500 – 1,000 or more structured yes/no questions, to specify configurations, En . . . ], the configuration space of possibilities, W, is as a rule dominated by seas of non-functional gibberish configurations, so that the envisioned easy climb up Mt Improbable is dominated by the prior problem of finding a shoreline of Island Improbable.

Q3: Nonsense! The Tree of Life diagram we all saw in our Biology classes proves that there is a smooth path from the last universal common ancestor [LUCA] to the different body plans and forms, from microbes to Mozart. Where did you get such nonsense from?

A3: Indeed, the tree of life was the only diagram in Darwin’s Origin of Species. However, it should be noted that it was a speculative diagram, not one based on a well-documented, observed pattern of gradual, incremental improvements. He hoped that in future decades, investigations of fossils over the world would flesh it out, and that is indeed the impression given in too many Biology textbooks and popular headlines about found “missing links.” But, in fact, the typical tree of life imagery:

Fig. G.11c, anticipated: A typical, popular level tree of life model/illustration. (Source.)

. . . is too often presented in a misleading way. First, notice the skipping over of the basic problem that without a root, neither trunks nor branches and twigs are possible. And, getting to a first, self-replicating unicellular life form — the first universal common ancestor, FUCA — that uses proteins, DNA, etc through the undirected physics and chemistry of Darwin’s warm little electrified pond full of a prebiotic soup or the like, continues to be a major and unsolved problem for evolutionary materialist theorising. Similarly, once we reckon with claims about “convergent evolution” of eyes, flight, whale/bat echolocation “sonar” systems, etc. etc., we begin to see that “everything branches, save when it doesn’t.” Indeed, we have to reckon with a case where on examining the genome of a kangaroo (the tammar wallaby), it was discovered that “In fact there are great chunks of the [[human] genome sitting right there in the kangaroo genome.” The kangaroos are marsupials, not placental mammals, and the fork between the two is held to be 150 million years old. So, Carl Wieland of Creation Ministries incorporated, was fully in his rights to say: “unlike chimps, kangaroos are not supposed to be our ‘close relatives’ . . . . Evolutionists have long proclaimed that apes and people share a high percentage of DNA. Hence their surprise  at these findings that ‘Skippy’ has a genetic makeup similar to ours.”  Next, so soon as one looks at molecular similarities — technically, homologies (and yes, this is an argument from similarity, i.e analogy in the end) — instead of those of gross anatomy, we run into many, mutually conflicting “trees.” Being allegedly 95 – 98+% Chimp in genetics is one thing, being what, ~ 80% kangaroo or ~ 50% banana or the like, is quite another. That is, we need to look seriously at the obvious alternative from the world of software design: code reuse and adaptation from a software library for the genome. Worse, in fact the consistent record from the field (which is now “almost unmanageably rich” with over 250,000 fossil species, millions of specimens in museums and billions in the known fossil beds), is that we do NOT observe any dominant pattern of origin of body plans by smooth incremental variations of successive fossils. Instead, as Steven Jay Gould famously observed, there are systematic gaps, right from the major categories on down. Indeed, if one looks carefully at the tree illustration above, one will see where the example life forms are: on twigs at the end of branches, not the trunk or where the main branches start. No prizes for guessing why. That is why we should carefully note the following remark made in 2006 by W. Ford Doolittle and Eric Bapteste:

Darwin claimed that a unique inclusively hierarchical pattern of relationships between all organisms based on their similarities and differences [the Tree of Life (TOL)] was a fact of nature, for which evolution, and in particular a branching process of descent with modification, was the explanation. However, there is no independent evidence that the natural order is an inclusive hierarchy, and incorporation of prokaryotes into the TOL is especially problematic. The only data sets from which we might construct a universal hierarchy including prokaryotes, the sequences of genes, often disagree and can seldom be proven to agree. Hierarchical structure can always be imposed on or extracted from such data sets by algorithms designed to do so, but at its base the universal TOL rests on an unproven assumption about pattern that, given what we know about process, is unlikely to be broadly true. This is not to say that similarities and differences between organisms are not to be accounted for by evolutionary mechanisms, but descent with modification is only one of these mechanisms, and a single tree-like pattern is not the necessary (or expected) result of their collective operation . . . [[Abstract, “Pattern pluralism and the Tree of Life hypothesis,” PNAS February 13, 2007 vol. 104 no. 7 2043-2049.]

Q4: But, the evidence shows that natural selection is a capable designer and can create specified complexity. Isn’t that what Wicken said to begin with in 1979 when he said that “Organization, then, is functional complexity and carries information. It is non-random by design or by selection, rather than by the a priori necessity of crystallographic ‘order’ . . .”?

A4: We need to be clear about what natural selection is and does. First, you need a reproducing population, which has inheritable chance variations [[ICV], and some sort of pressure on it from the environment, leading to gradual changes in the populations because of differences in reproductive success [[DRS] . . . i.e. natural selection [[NS] . . . among varieties; achieving descent with modification [[DWM]. Thus, different varieties will have different degrees of success in reproduction: ICV + DRS/NS –> DWM. However, there is a subtlety: while there is a tendency to summarise this process as “natural selection, “this is not accurate. For the NS component actually does not actually ADD anything, it is a short hand way of saying that less “favoured” varieties (Darwin spoke in terms of “races”) die off, leaving no descendants. “Selection” is not the real candidate designer. What is being appealed to is that chance variations create new varieties. So, this is the actual supposed source of innovation — the real candidate designer, not the dying off part. That puts us right back at the problem of finding the shoreline of Island Improbable, by crossing a “sea of non-functional configurations” in which — as there is no function, there is no basis to choose from. So, we cannot simply extrapolate a theory that may relate to incremental changes within an island of function, to the wider situation of origin of functions. Macroevolution is not simply accumulated micro evolution, not in a world of complex, configuration-specific function. (NB: The suggested “edge” of evolution by such mechanisms is often held to be about the level of a taxonomic family, like the cats or the dogs and wolves.)

Q5: The notion of “islands of function” is Creationist nonsense, and so is that of “active information.” Why are you trying to inject religion and “God of the gaps” into science?

A5: Unfortunately, this is not a caricature: there is an unfortunate  tendency of Darwinist objectors to design theory to appeal to prejudice against theistic worldviews, and to suggest questionable motives, that are used to cloud issues and poison or polarise discussion. But, I am sure that if I were to point out that such Darwinists often have their own anti-theistic ideological agendas and have sought to question-beggingly redefine science as in effect applied atheism or the like, that would often be regarded as out of place. Let us instead stick to the actual merits. Such as, that since intelligent designers are an observed fact of life, to explain that design is a credible or best causal explanation in light of tested reliable signs that are characteristic of design, such as FSCO/I, is not an appeal to gaps. Similarly, to point to ART-ifical causes that leave characteristic traces by contrast with those of chance and/or mechanical necessity, is not to appeal to “the supernatural,” but to the action of intelligence on signs that are tested and found to reliably point to it. Nor, is design theory to be equated to Creationism, which can be seen as an attempt to interpret origins evidence in light of what are viewed as accurate record of the Creator. The design inference works back from inductive study of signs of chance, necessity and art, to cases where we did not observe the deep past, but see traces that are closely similar to what we know that the only adequate, observed cause is design. So also, once we see that complex function dependent on many parts that have to be properly arranged and coupled together, sharply constrains the set of functional as opposed to non-functional configurations, the image of “islands of function” is not an unreasonable way to describe the challenge. Where also, we can summarise a specification as a structured list of YES/NO questions that give us a sufficient description of the working configuration. Which in turn gives us a way to understand Kolmogorov-Chaitin complexity or descriptive complexity of a bit-string x, in simple terms: “the length of the shortest program that computes x and halts.” This can be turned into a description of zones of interest T that are specified in large spaces of possible configurations, W. If there is a “simple” and relatively short description, D, that allows us to specify T without in effect needing to list and state the configs that are in T, E1, E2, . . En, then T is specific. Where also, if T is such that D describes a configuration-dependent function, T is functionally specific, e.g. strings of ASCII characters in this page form English sentences, and address the theme of origins science in light of intelligent design issues. In the — huge! — space of possible ASCII strings of comparable length to this page (or even this paragraph), such clusters of sentences are a vanishingly minute fraction relative to the bulk that will be gibberish. So also, in a world where we often use maps or follow warmer/colder cues to find targets, and where if we were to blindly select a search procedure and match it at random to a space of possibilities, we would be at least as likely to worsen as to improve odds of success relative to a simple blind at-random search of the original space of possibilities, active information that gives us an enhanced chance of success in getting to an island of function is in fact a viable concept.>>

__________

So, it seems that in the defined sense, conservation of information, search, active information, Kolmogorov complexity speaking to narrow zones of specific function T in wide config spaces W,  the viability of these concepts in the face of drift, etc. are coherent, relevant to the scientific phenomena under study, and important. Where, the pivotal challenge is that for complex, functionally specific organisation and associated or implied information, there is but one empirically — and routinely — known source: intelligence. Let us see if further discussion of same will now proceed on reasonable terms. END

PS: Since we are going to pause and markup JoeF’s article JoeG makes reference to in comment no 1, let me give a free plug to the ARN tee shirt (and calendar and prints), highlighting the artwork, under the doctrine of fair use (as it has become material to an exchange):

The ad blurb in part reads:

A recent book attacking intelligent design (Intelligent Thought: Science vs. the Intelligent Design Movement, ed. John Brockman, Vintage Press, May 2006), , has chapters by most of the big names in evolutionary thought: Daniel Dennett, Richard Dawkins, Jerry Coyne, Steven Pinker, Lee Smolin, Stuart A. Kauffman and others. In the introduction Brockman summarizes the situation from his perspective: materialistic Darwinism is the only scientific approach to origins, and the “bizarre” claims of “fundamentalists” with “beliefs consistent with those of the Middle Ages” must be opposed. “The Visigoths are at the gates” of science, chanting that schools must teach the controversy, “when in actuality there is no debate, no controversy.”

While Brockman intended the “Visigoths” reference as an insult equating those who do not embrace materialistic Darwinism to uneducated barbarians, he has actually created an interesting analogy of the situation, and perhaps a prophetic look at the future. For it was the Visigoths of the 3rd and 4th centuries that were waiting at the gates of the Roman Empire when it collapsed under its own weight. For years the Darwinists in power have pretended all is well in the land of random mutation and natural selection and that intelligent design should be ignored. With this book (and several others like it), they are attempting to both laugh and fight back at the ID movement. Mahatma Gandhi summarized the situation well with his quote about the passive resistive movement: “First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win.”

Worth thinking about.

Comments
It strikes me that it might be useful to be a theistic naturalist, where "useful" is measured in terms of having a philosophy that is flexible enough to allow me to believe whatever I want while at the same time enabling me to slip away from potentially hairy philosophical challenges. (Having my cake and eating it too?) If anyone tries to pin me down with the problems inherent in a naturalistic worldview, I can explain that I'm not that kind of naturalist. Objective morality? Not a problem. You see, I'm a theistic naturalist. I've got morality covered. The problem of evil? Well, I don't really need a theodicy, since I'm not that kind of theist. After all, I'm a naturalist, you know?Phinehas
April 15, 2013
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One interesting question here is, just where is the relevant line to be drawn? John McDowell, for example, draws a distinction between "the realm of law" and "the space of reasons" (taking his cue from Sellars there). And McDowell insists that "the space of reasons" is sui generis with regard to "the realm of law." But he doesn't want to treat this as a metaphysical distinction -- he wants to be a relaxed, liberal naturalist, and it is crucial to his project that the space of reasons be natural. So he has to insist the realm of law is not the whole truth about nature. McDowell's work is pretty complicated, and I have some complicated attitudes towards it, but I'm willing to go this far, at any rate: (1) the basic distinction between "the realm of law" and "the space of reasons" is a very important distinction -- though McDowell might be wrong in thinking that just making this distinction is adequate; (2) insisting on this distinction means that one isn't a naturalist, unless one is already committed to the view that the causal-mechanical conception of nature-as-law just is the whole truth about nature. And why should one be?Kantian Naturalist
April 15, 2013
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There are different ways of responding to the causal-mechanistic conception of nature, and I haven't figured out which one I want to align myself with the most. For example, Kaufman proposes a "fourth law of thermodynamics" to explain how teleological systems, such as living things, arise from non-teleological systems, such as geochemical cycles (or whatever). It's tempting. As a non-scientist with a interest in popularizations of science, I don't feel competent to judge it on its empirical or theoretical merit. But speaking philosophically, I can only say that something like that has to be right, if we are to attain a satisfying metaphysical picture that unifies the sciences of the non-living and the sciences of the living. I'm not (yet) suggesting to replace the causal-mechanistic conception of nature with anything else, but just to supplement it -- that the causal-mechanistic conception of nature is not the whole truth about nature. So one need not go to anything 'beyond' the natural in order to contest the dominance of that conception. The Romantics, it seems to me, thought that they had to contest "science" itself because, in their conception, science itself was Newtonian: reductionistic, quantitative, life-less and life-denying. But our science today is not wedded to the Newtonian vision, in large part because we know how to play with much more complex systems than Newton did. And because of work by people like Varela and Kaufman, acknowledging the reality of teleology is not obviously "un-scientific". More on this later -- off to work!Kantian Naturalist
April 15, 2013
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Kantian Naturalist #87: For the purposes of our discussion here, if “naturalism” means “accepting the causal-mechanistic conception of nature (…) ”, then no, I’m not a naturalist.
You have made this statement many times. Maybe it’s time to get more clarity on this issue. Allow me some questions and remarks. To be clear, do you contest the (causal-mechanistic) laws of nature in any way? And secondly, are you proposing a substitution for a causal-mechanistic conception of nature?
Kantian Naturalist #87: On the other hand, if one can be a “naturalist” by virtue of accepting a more Romantic conception of nature (Schelling, Hegel, Dewey, Merleau-Ponty), then I am naturalist (…)
Those romantic guys had a real beef with science:
Wiki: In contrast to Enlightenment mechanistic natural philosophy, European scientists of the Romantic period held that observing nature implied understanding the self, and that knowledge of nature "should not be obtained by force." They felt that the Enlightenment had encouraged the abuse of the sciences, (…)
About the whole and its parts … :
Wiki: Romanticism advanced a number of themes: it promoted anti-reductionism (the whole was more valuable than the parts alone) (…). It was also in this way that Romanticism was very anti-reductionist: they did not believe that inorganic sciences were at the top of the hierarchy but at the bottom, with life sciences next and psychology placed even higher. This hierarchy reflected Romantic ideals of science because the whole organism takes more precedence over inorganic matter, and the intricacies of the human mind take even more precedence since the human intellect was sacred and necessary to understanding nature around it and reuniting with it.
What strikes me is that Romanticism seems to conflate dead and living nature. All of nature, including us, should be regarded as a whole. This non-distinction is essential; there are wholes in living nature in contrast with the absence of wholes in dead nature. A distinction that KN also rejects.
Kantian Naturalist #87: (...) especially since I think that recent work in dynamical systems theory puts the Romantic conception of nature on an empirical basis. (If I had to put a label on what I really think, I’d probably go with “evolutionary pantheism”.)
Why do you believe that dynamical systems theory puts the Romantic conception of nature on an empirical basis?Box
April 14, 2013
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Nullasalus -- let's not forget about the secret handshake. And the secrets of all worldly power when I'm initiated into the 33rd Degree of the Order of Naturalistic Metaphysicians. As I said above, being a "naturalist" is not all that important to me -- I want to figure out what the most plausible view is, and then worry about what label I want to attach to it. If it turns out to be a sub-variety of naturalism, fine; if not, that's fine, too. William, it seems to me that you're raising a slightly different issue here -- a question of whether a wholly naturalistic world-view can satisfy our need for existential significance and orientation. That's an important question, of course -- perhaps more important than the narrowly epistemological questions at stake in the Plantinga-Churchland debate! -- but it's also a different question.Kantian Naturalist
April 14, 2013
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The point of this brief excursion into Cognitive Neurobiology is that, if we broaden our conception of representational activity, in biological nervous systems, to embrace the synaptically embodied feature-space map, then we can find a perspective from which the reproductively-focused selection pressures on the creatures that develop them will exert at least an indirect pressure in favor of the capacity for generating accurate cognitive maps, for it is precisely those maps that subsequently govern the creature’s practical behaviors, including its reproductive behaviors. On the whole, good maps will serve the creature better than will poor ones. Accordingly, Evolutionary Naturalism suggests that there will be a strong tendency for living creatures to develop cognitive feature-maps that are at least roughly accurate partial portrayals of the practical environment in which the creature must make its way. This presumption falls well short of heralding Truth for such representations. But it does serve to explain how pre-human creatures can achieve penetrating internal representations of remarkable intricacy and accuracy, at least on some accountings of accuracy, all within a purely naturalistic universe.
No, it doesn't. All of the above is nothing more than a convenient narrative in support of the conclusion, lacking any significant historical evidence. Even if one assumes generally common local accuracy, there is no reason to believe that successful, broader metaphysics will be anything approaching true representations. This is similar to the misguided Darwinian idea that accumulations of microevolution can build successful macroevolutionary features. It is historically true that anti-naturalism metaphysics have generated the most success in the world when it comes to reproduction and long-lasting cultures. While base local interaction may be enough for non-conceptual brutes under your view, when a being becomes capable of generating coherent meta-maps and explanations, there is more going on than just the brute meeting of practical needs, because practical needs have expanded beyond the physical for such organisms to be viable. Such beings as humans would require a whole host of psychological (if not spiritual) support from their broader belief system that give them reasons to live, to pursue goals, to maintain a sense of worth. For such beings, life usually must mean something - give them a purpose and quite often, faith even in what appears to be highly unlikely or even impossible. And so, under naturalism, it may be more likely that, in order for humans to survive, false metaphysical beliefs are required to satisfy their emotional/psychological needs to keep working, to keep trying, to bond together and feel that their existence has true worth and deep meaning, and that naturalist explanations are just not up to this task. Strip away the self-serving narrative, and there is simply no good reason to think that naturalism (which, under your argument, is the "true" map) is a map that humans need to survive, and there is plenty of historical evidence that theism (or some form of supernaturalism) is the better metaphysical mapping system, providing as good local, physical cognition as any other, but also providing for the psychological and emotional needs higher-sentient beings require to persevere in what is often a terribly harsh world. Unlike plants and microbes, humans don't just require a good map; they require a good reason to use the map to accomplish anything - even their own survival.William J Murray
April 14, 2013
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For the purposes of our discussion here, if “naturalism” means “accepting the causal-mechanistic conception of nature that began with Epicurean metaphysics and achieved cultural-political dominance through the Scientific Revolution”, then no, I’m not a naturalist.
Great. So why not abandon naturalism? You know there's a content problem. You seem to recognize that naturalism has been tied to the mechanistic view of nature. Again, you say you want to have your cake and eat it too. What in the world is the cake here? Some vague sense of camaraderie with other people calling themselves naturalists?
The “low or inscrutable” claim only kicks in if we cannot tell whether or not the actual world is like that. But we can — not a priori, of course, but a posteriori, by trying to figure out exactly how brains represent their environments.
No, the 'low or inscrutable' claim is going to hold on the basis of the argument, if counterarguments on the same terms don't succeed. Plantinga's EAAN is arguing that E&N undermines one's rationality claims before any a posteriori considerations get under way - it's calling into question the capability of properly assessing those a posteriori claims to begin with. What's more, the EAAN doesn't really concern itself with 'how brains represent their environments' - any way it can represent the environment will also be a way it can be wrong. This is one reason why I keep wondering if you're not having a completely different argument than Plantinga is.
(3) There are lots of cultures that have held worldviews which are false (by our lights), but of course those people had all sorts of practical knowledge that was perfectly true
The practical knowledge is irrelevant. It's enough to show that having false, incorrect views was still correlated with survival-promoting behavior on the population. And even there, we don't need the historical examples - hypothetical ones will do fine. In this discussion it's just easier to point at such.
whereas the scientific worldview has a better claim on truth because
There is no 'scientific worldview', full stop. Any given worldview is going to rely, explicitly or implicitly, on metaphysics and 'narratives'. This gets worse when you look at the actual history of science. It's one long list of very confident proclamations based on contemporary interpretations of the data, often with observations at the time 'amplified by technology' (a very low bar to jump), that got discarded later on. What's more, talking about the 'scientific worldview' when you reject a key component (the mechanistic concept of nature) embraced by most of the people who try to take up that imaginary mantle - is just bizarre. I asked it earlier in this comment, but again I ask - what exactly is the cake you're after here?nullasalus
April 13, 2013
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A few minor comments on the above: (1) Yes, there's a real "content problem" with naturalism. (I once wrote a paper on this, but after it was rejected from two journals, it dawned on me that the paper is not really that good.) For the purposes of our discussion here, if "naturalism" means "accepting the causal-mechanistic conception of nature that began with Epicurean metaphysics and achieved cultural-political dominance through the Scientific Revolution", then no, I'm not a naturalist. On the other hand, if one can be a "naturalist" by virtue of accepting a more Romantic conception of nature (Schelling, Hegel, Dewey, Merleau-Ponty), then I am naturalist -- especially since I think that recent work in dynamical systems theory puts the Romantic conception of nature on an empirical basis. (If I had to put a label on what I really think, I'd probably go with "evolutionary pantheism".) (2) If Plantinga's argument is a priori, that weakens it considerably -- especially if one thinks that everything a priori is analytic, and only those wacky Kantians think otherwise. So a priori claims hold across all possible worlds (if they are necessary) or none (if they are impossible). But evolutionary naturalism, as construed here, isn't a claim about what holds in all logically possible worlds -- it's a claim about what holds in this world. So we can conceive of a world in which animals have reliable cognitive processes and yet have false beliefs -- so what? The "low or inscrutable" claim only kicks in if we cannot tell whether or not the actual world is like that. But we can -- not a priori, of course, but a posteriori, by trying to figure out exactly how brains represent their environments. (3) There are lots of cultures that have held worldviews which are false (by our lights), but of course those people had all sorts of practical knowledge that was perfectly true -- beliefs about how to build shelters, about what sorts of plants and animals were safe to eat, about which plants could be used for medicines or psychotropic drugs, about human psychology, etc. I can see the point that having a worldview contributes to inclusive fitness, if the worldview is manifested through behaviors that promote, say, group cohesion ("we are the Wolf Tribe") -- whereas the scientific worldview has a better claim on truth because technology amplifies our practical cognitive capacities, which are reality-tracking in ways that our narratives are not.Kantian Naturalist
April 13, 2013
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In re: 83, the fact that most human cultures have had false beliefs is no objection to evolutionary naturalism — quite the opposite, since evolutionary naturalism actually explains why that is so:
'Evolutionary naturalism' can explain anything. So can theism. But more than that - if you believe religions are all false, yet also believe that following a religion can be adaptive, well... you wanted more examples of false belief contributing to fitness. You've just gotten some.nullasalus
April 13, 2013
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So, sure, a false belief can contribute to inclusive fitness — but only in the thinnest and most uninteresting sense of “can.” Better?
Not really. Still amazed. Paul the Hominid is a pretty fun example, but at the end of the day we're just talking about a false belief linked to beneficial behavior. "Smoking tobacco is an offense to the aliens who live on Mars, and they will wreak retribution on those who engage in this practice." I want to clarify further. Are you suggesting that Plantinga is the one who thought up the idea that false beliefs can be linked to beneficial behavior? I mean, you're aware that this isn't something novel on his part, right?
And what I’ve been denying is that the two levels can be completely divorced from one another, such that an animal could have practically reliable cognitive mappings of its environment, and yet also have systematically false beliefs. This denial isn’t based on logical considerations; rather, I think that, on the best theory we presently of what semantic content looks like in rerum natura, that’s just not how it works. Maybe elsewhere in the universe, or in some possible world, but not here on Earth.
Well, then there's more problems here. One is that I understand Plantinga's argument to be an priori argument, not a posteriori. The giveaway is that it's not just an argument about humans, but about organisms given E&N generally. In that sense, I don't think a reply to Plantinga based on what you consider to be an at-present tendentiously held a posteriori theory of humanity specifically is really a valid reply. Second, you say 'systematically false'. But Plantinga's argument doesn't require 'systematically false'. It just requires low or inscrutable. So that reply doesn't seem to work either, since it seems to require Plantinga deny organisms can EVER have, one way or another, a true belief. That's not required.
That’s an interesting suggestion. What do you have in mind? I don’t accept the EAAN because I reject Plantinga’s conceptualization of “reliable cognition.” If I accepted his way of framing the problem, then I’d find the EAAN far more compelling. Rejecting his conceptualization of “reliable cognition” in favor of Churchland’s neurosemantics allows for a much tighter connection between behaviors and beliefs than what Plantinga is willing to allow on a priori grounds alone.
You keep going back to Churchland, but Churchland is eliminative about beliefs altogether. Meanwhile Churchland's neurosemantics, while obscuring the question a bit, still doesn't really reply to the 'low or inscrutable' charge. What he tries to do is make that entire line of questioning invalid by denying 'beliefs' to begin with. But once you're accepting 'belief' talk, you don't even get the benefit of Churchland's attempt at a dodge - and you still have the difficulties I mention. I keep saying I think you're raising this as a reply to a question Plantinga doesn't care about, and I stick by that. As for the suggestion - this isn't something Plantinga himself said, but it's something I think falls out in an interesting way from his argument. I think ultimately, anyone attempting to defend themselves against the EAAN is ultimately going to either have to make the hyper-skeptical but pragmatic move ('Yes, we can't trust our beliefs, yes, we should be skeptical of everything - let's sacrifice either E or N, or try to cook up some pragmatic ad hoc reason to still function in daily life.'), or - in the process of arguing that R given E&N is great - commit themselves to so much teleology in the evolutionary process that they're pretty well sacrificing their naturalism anyway. At that point, on their own account, minds are incredible special in the universe. Not just our particular universe (remember, Plantinga's argument is an a priori argument), but in universes generally, minds are such that the moment they start being capable of forming beliefs, the system is fundamentally geared towards truth and reliable cognition. Suddenly nature doesn't seem to care just about 'fitness' but also about 'truth', and in turn about minds and the mental. Now, that fits nicely with the Logos or any other number of non-naturalistic conceptions of the world. Traditional naturalism? Not so much.
Well, I’m a scientific realist, and I think that a scientific metaphysics is clearly the right way to go.
Sounds like a contradiction in terms - science is limited in ways metaphysics simply isn't. It's especially funny you should say that since you keep bringing up Churchland, yet it's pretty hard to square scientific realism with eliminative materialism. (It's hard to square many things with it, but SR is among the number.) Likewise, scientific realism isn't a problem on non-naturalism anyway. This goes double when you start talking about speculative 'how will the future turn out' science, because just about everything is up for grabs when it comes to science - and science itself has radically changed its fundamental commitments more than once. So, why not switch? You can ditch naturalism, have scientific realism, and no longer feel any constraints with regards to moral agency, etc. Especially when you say this:
The really important thing to do here would be liberate our concept of “nature” from the tyranny of the causal-mechanistic conception of nature, from Epicureanism.
By many views, rejecting the mechanistic conception of nature is to reject naturalism on the spot. It doesn't make you a theist. But a naturalist? Is the word really THAT meaningless now?nullasalus
April 13, 2013
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In re: 83, the fact that most human cultures have had false beliefs is no objection to evolutionary naturalism -- quite the opposite, since evolutionary naturalism actually explains why that is so:
this justly deflationary estimation of our human cognitive credentials leads us to predict that typical human theories -- about the origins of mankind, about the structure of the heavens, about the origins of the universe, about the nature of disease, about the causes of motion, and about the nature of life —- will be hopelessly parochial, culturally various, and strictly false. And so they have been. The compulsive Animism that dominated primitive human cultures; the celebrated Seven Days of Creation at the hands of a Great God embraced by a more recent culture; the Garden-of-Eden account of human origins; the flat, immobile earth enclosed in a Star-flecked Sphere that rotates daily; the Invading-Demon theory of disease; the Eternal Reward/Punishment account of the authority of moral imperatives; the Vital Spirit theory of Living Creatures; all of these, and countless other cognitive embarrassments, typically advanced by and celebrated in the world’s popular religions, are just the sorts of benighted stories that you would expect of brains originally selected primarily for their capacity to engage in reproductively successful behaviors within their enveloping environmental niche. So far then, the predictions of Evolutionary Naturalism are nicely in accord with the (often embarrassing) facts of historical human cognition. There is no conflict with the empirical facts here. Just the reverse. And yet, there is an upside to the evolutionary story as well, whose outline will serve to bring this essay to a close. I begin by inviting the reader to consider a broader conception of representation, and of successful representation, than that embodied in the familiar framework of broadly sentence-like representations, and of their truth. There are many motives for broadening our conception here, but the most immediately relevant in the present context is that the vast majority of biological creatures throughout the long history of life on Earth have had no capacity whatever for expressing or manipulating representational vehicles even remotely like sentences, and hence no capacity for ever achieving the peculiarly sentential virtue of truth. They have been using other representational schemes entirely, schemes that display dimensions of success and failure quite different from the familiar dichotomy of truth vs. falsity. Cognitive Neurobiology has already given us an opening grip on what those more primitive, pre-linguaformal schemes of representation consist in, and of how they can embody information about any creature’s immediate sensory and practical environment. The suggestion, currently under vigorous development, is that, in response to the ongoing statistical profiles of their complex sensory inputs, nervous systems (even very simple ones) typically develop a high-dimensional map of the difference-and-similarity structure of the abstract features typically instanced in and encountered in their sensory environments. The development of such maps is typically achieved by post-natal processes such as Hebbian learning, which has long been known to sculpt any creature’s synaptic connections, and hence its acquired internal maps of feature-spaces, in accordance with the finegrained statistical structures of the creature’s sensory inputs. The take-home point for the present discussion is that the dominant scheme of representation in biological creatures generally, from the Ordovician to the present, is the internal map of a range of possible types of sensorily accessible environmental features. Not a sentence, or a system of them, but a map. Now a map, of course, achieves its representational successes by displaying some sort of homomorphism between its own internal structure and the structure of the objective domain that it purports to portray. And unlike the strictly binary nature of sentential success (a sentence is either truth or it’s false), maps can display many different degrees of success and failure, and can do so in many distinct dimensions of possible ‘faithfulness,’ some of which will be relevant to the creature’s practical (and reproductive) success, and many of which will not. The point of this brief excursion into Cognitive Neurobiology is that, if we broaden our conception of representational activity, in biological nervous systems, to embrace the synaptically embodied feature-space map, then we can find a perspective from which the reproductively-focused selection pressures on the creatures that develop them will exert at least an indirect pressure in favor of the capacity for generating accurate cognitive maps, for it is precisely those maps that subsequently govern the creature’s practical behaviors, including its reproductive behaviors. On the whole, good maps will serve the creature better than will poor ones. Accordingly, Evolutionary Naturalism suggests that there will be a strong tendency for living creatures to develop cognitive feature-maps that are at least roughly accurate partial portrayals of the practical environment in which the creature must make its way. This presumption falls well short of heralding Truth for such representations. But it does serve to explain how pre-human creatures can achieve penetrating internal representations of remarkable intricacy and accuracy, at least on some accountings of accuracy, all within a purely naturalistic universe. It may also explain how humans, too, mostly manage to do it, for the great bulk of human cognition is sublinguaformal as well. And on the negative side, it may also explain why our theories about domains that are far removed from our immediate practical experience and control are typically so benighted. The explanation is that, in such domains, our native cognitive mechanisms are plainly “in over their heads.” To achieve cognitive success in those more rarefied domains, we need the additional armamentarium of the institutions of modern science, and most especially, their vital means for transcending our native sensory and manipulative limitations. Only then will we have a reasonable chance at cognitive success of any sort, whether accurate maps or true theories. (Churchland, "Is Evolutionary Naturalism Self-Defeating?" Philo 12(2), 2009, pp. 139-40. All emphasis original.)
Kantian Naturalist
April 13, 2013
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One wonders, if the "inclusivity fitness" of a belief mattered in relationship to whether or not it was true, why have most humans believed false things throughout their history? False, when one considers that humans believe and have believed many mutually exclusive things. One might argue that the "farther out" one's beliefs stray form their immediate range of physical interaction, the less fit such beliefs need be. Thus, while almost everyone believes that a fall from a great height will likely kill you, you have fundamental, mutually exclusive disagreements about whether or not there is a god, and whether or not morality is objective or just some sort of social arrangement. Apparently, the more esoteric (far away from physical action and response) thoughts stray, the more likely it is that such beliefs are erroneous - because they have no clear effect one way or the other on the immediate-response beliefs. So, all one could look to are the distribution of populations in the world; what esoteric, or "farther away" beliefs are dominant in the world? Since that is all we really have to go on, it is clear that belief in god and objective morality have won the day to date. It is interesting that KN keeps championing a view that has virtually no inherent value in his "fitness" (or "usefulness") landscape. It's not like there are more than a handful of people holding such a view. Obviously, it's an evolutionary dead end - untrue, by any naturalist meaning of the concept of what "true" means. Why bother espousing it?William J Murray
April 13, 2013
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At present I see no reason to believe that scientific approach to metaphysics yields metaphysical naturalism.
Whoops!! That should have read,
At present I see no reason not to believe that a scientific approach to metaphysics yields metaphysical naturalism.
(I suppose my saying so will elicit the usual response from BornAgain77.)Kantian Naturalist
April 13, 2013
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As a matter of mere logical possibility, I suppose that a false belief could contribute to inclusive fitness -- Plantinga's "Paul the Hominid" example -- but I would need an account of just how it is that the false belief contributes to overall fitness before I regarded this as more than a mere logical possibility. So, sure, a false belief can contribute to inclusive fitness -- but only in the thinnest and most uninteresting sense of "can." Better?
The problem becomes bigger for a few reasons. First, because it drives home the point that the same live situation at work with the non-sapient organisms is at work with the sapient ones. For some reason you’re saying you’re supremely skeptical that it’s even possible for a false belief to be beneficial to an organism, but you’re granting that organisms which totally lack beliefs can engage in beneficial behaviors. Okay, but hybrid possibilities are live too – you can have an organism whose behaviors are partly mediated by beliefs, partly mediated by those subconscious/nonconscious processes – and said processes can also seep in and affect the conscious ones.
In the Brandom-influenced discourse I'm using, I've been using "sapient" to mean "being able to play the game of giving and asking for reasons; responsiveness to reasons as such". Is that how you're using "sapient" here? I want to make sure we at least have the same basic vocabulary before commenting further. Another point, though, to clarify further what I'm trying to do here. I embrace both semantic and epistemic holism -- though I'm aware that there are criticisms of those views that I haven't really worked through in much detail, so one might think that I'm not really entitled to hold those views. Be that as it may -- the view that I'm interested in defending is a two-tiered (or maybe "dual-aspect"?) model of epistemic/semantic holism: there's the level of the holistically interconnected synaptically-encoded domain-space mappings, and then there's the level of the holistically interconnected beliefs, thoughts, desires, and so forth. And what I've been denying is that the two levels can be completely divorced from one another, such that an animal could have practically reliable cognitive mappings of its environment, and yet also have systematically false beliefs. This denial isn't based on logical considerations; rather, I think that, on the best theory we presently of what semantic content looks like in rerum natura, that's just not how it works. Maybe elsewhere in the universe, or in some possible world, but not here on Earth.
I actually think arguing that it IS a priori unlikely is even more damaging to naturalism than just accepting the EAAN, biting the bullet, and trying to straddle some kind of super skeptical/pragmatic compromise.
That's an interesting suggestion. What do you have in mind? I don't accept the EAAN because I reject Plantinga's conceptualization of "reliable cognition." If I accepted his way of framing the problem, then I'd find the EAAN far more compelling. Rejecting his conceptualization of "reliable cognition" in favor of Churchland's neurosemantics allows for a much tighter connection between behaviors and beliefs than what Plantinga is willing to allow on a priori grounds alone.
Why? What’s the cake there? What’s so important about thinking of yourself as a naturalist anyway?
Well, I'm a scientific realist, and I think that a scientific metaphysics is clearly the right way to go. At present I see no reason to believe that scientific approach to metaphysics yields metaphysical naturalism. For me, the interesting question is how to be both a scientific realist and a moral realist. It's commonly assumed that moral realism has anti-naturalist presuppositions or implications, such that scientific realism and moral realism are incompatible if SR commits us to metaphysical naturalism. But I think that assumption is mistaken; I think that ethical norms, though sui generis in a sense, are nevertheless grounded in biological norms. For that matter, I have no problems at all in saying that some animals are themselves moral agents -- as argued here -- and not just as moral patients. The really important thing to do here would be liberate our concept of "nature" from the tyranny of the causal-mechanistic conception of nature, from Epicureanism.Kantian Naturalist
April 13, 2013
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semi related to KN's rut with naturalism:,, even though the researchers in this following study found evidence directly contradicting what they had expected to find, they were/are so wedded to the materialistic/naturalistic view of reality,, the view of "I' am my body",, that it seems sadly impossible for them to even conceive of the fact that they may be wrong in their naturalistic presuppositions, and to even admit to the possibility of the reality/truth of the soul, i.e. of the "I' am a soul distinct from my body" view of reality. 'Afterlife' feels 'even more real than real,' researcher says By Ben Brumfield, CNN - Wed April 10, 2013 Excerpt: "If you use this questionnaire ... if the memory is real, it's richer, and if the memory is recent, it's richer," he said. The coma scientists weren't expecting what the tests revealed. "To our surprise, NDEs were much richer than any imagined event or any real event of these coma survivors," Laureys reported. The memories of these experiences beat all other memories, hands down, for their vivid sense of reality. "The difference was so vast," he said with a sense of astonishment. Even if the patient had the experience a long time ago, its memory was as rich "as though it was yesterday," Laureys said. http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/09/health/belgium-near-death-experiences/bornagain77
April 13, 2013
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KN,
I granted the first point, but not the second.
You're going to deny that a false belief can contribute to fitness? This seems so obvious that I'm not sure you're really saying it.
I would answer “yes” to the first two questions, and “I don’t know” to the third. In what ways did the problem become bigger?
Again, I'm pretty surprised it's number three that's making you hesitant. Really? The problem becomes bigger for a few reasons. First, because it drives home the point that the same live situation at work with the non-sapient organisms is at work with the sapient ones. For some reason you're saying you're supremely skeptical that it's even possible for a false belief to be beneficial to an organism, but you're granting that organisms which totally lack beliefs can engage in beneficial behaviors. Okay, but hybrid possibilities are live too - you can have an organism whose behaviors are partly mediated by beliefs, partly mediated by those subconscious/nonconscious processes - and said processes can also seep in and affect the conscious ones.
The mere possibility isn’t terribly interesting here, because showing that P is possible only shows us that it is not necessary that ~P.
I think it's more damaging in this context unless an argument can be made that it's a priori unlikely. I actually think arguing that it IS a priori unlikely is even more damaging to naturalism than just accepting the EAAN, biting the bullet, and trying to straddle some kind of super skeptical/pragmatic compromise.
Quite possibly, yes. And if I were fully convinced of that, then I’d happily cease regarding myself as a naturalist. The reality of moral agency is much more important to me than writing a blank check made out to scientific realism. Still, I’d like to have my cake and eat it, too, if I can. (Don’t we all?)
Why? What's the cake there? What's so important about thinking of yourself as a naturalist anyway?nullasalus
April 13, 2013
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You’ve already granted that having absolutely no cognitive mapping is still compatible with processes that contribute to inclusive fitness. You’ve likewise granted that false beliefs can contribute to inclusive fitness. So where are you getting this?
I granted the first point, but not the second. In saying that "having absolutely no cognitive mapping is still compatible with processes that contribute to inclusive fitness", I had in mind those living things that don't carry out any cognitive processes at all -- like plants, fungi, prokaryotes, single-celled eukaryotes, and so on. In my conception of things, cognition kicks in only once there's a layer of neurons between sensory neurons and motor neurons. In other words, if an organism has some neurons mediating between its sensory neurons and motor neurons, then it counts as a very rudimentary cognizer. And it could, for all that, lack consciousness. I have no firm or settled opinions about what generates consciousness or when it arose. I have a slightly firmer grasp on what I think generates rationality and when that arose.
Can a sentient organism have subconscious or non-conscious neurobiological processes? Can these impact behavior? Can these be positive in terms of selection? If so, well, then the problem just got a whole lot bigger.
I would answer "yes" to the first two questions, and "I don't know" to the third. In what ways did the problem become bigger?
Plantinga has given counterexamples of beliefs that are false yet are nevertheless adaptive – and really, that’s not some novel contribution on his part. Plenty of people recognize that possibility. Speaking in terms of E&N, the ‘unreliability’ of the cognitive process – the lack of its truth-tracking – will only cause harm if it results in negative actions… but that’s not necessarily the case.
The mere possibility isn't terribly interesting here, because showing that P is possible only shows us that it is not necessary that ~P. So, supposing it is logically possible that an organism could have reliable cognitive mapping and yet also have false beliefs -- well, OK, I'm not really sure if this is possible or not, but I'll grant that it's not obviously impossible, the way "square circle" is. That means that the relation between "having reliable cognitive processes" and "having (mostly) true beliefs" is not analytic, doesn't hold across all possible worlds, etc. But that's OK -- it's still an attractive candidate for a good theory about what true beliefs look like in rerum natura. (But, I must immediately add, how things are in rerum natura is not the only conceptual framework we have, and for many purposes, not even the most important one.)
I’m not so sure about the rejection of a priori knowledge, but a transcendental presupposition of moral agency and subjectivity may seal the deal.
Quite possibly, yes. And if I were fully convinced of that, then I'd happily cease regarding myself as a naturalist. The reality of moral agency is much more important to me than writing a blank check made out to scientific realism. Still, I'd like to have my cake and eat it, too, if I can. (Don't we all?)Kantian Naturalist
April 12, 2013
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It’s true that if an adaptation doesn’t contribute to inclusive fitness, then that adaptation will tend to be lost, but it seems clear to me that better cognitive mapping does and would contribute to inclusive fitness.
On what grounds? Vague intuition? You've already granted that having absolutely no cognitive mapping is still compatible with processes that contribute to inclusive fitness. You've likewise granted that false beliefs can contribute to inclusive fitness. So where are you getting this? If at the end of the day what you have is a feeling, alright. But then all this talk about Churchland and alternative schemas for belief is a sideshow - it's not really doing any work, because the same problems obtain. The intuition does the work.
What doesn’t make sense to me is the thought that an organism could survive and flourish even if its cognitive mappings of its environment were utterly unreliable. And what I’m denying, really, is that “tending to produce true beliefs” is the right way to think about what “reliable cognition” really amounts to.
Again, you have no problem with the idea of an organism surviving and flourishing with zero cognizance. If you want to get technical, even Plantinga doesn't argue that every single belief of an organism must be utterly wrong given E&N. 'Low or inscrutable.' In fact, I can bulk this up more. Can a sentient organism have subconscious or non-conscious neurobiological processes? Can these impact behavior? Can these be positive in terms of selection? If so, well, then the problem just got a whole lot bigger.
Hence my conditional: if a living thing carries out cognitive processes, then those processes will tend to be reliable, because unreliable cognitive processes prevent organisms from correlating their perceptual input and motor output in ways that are necessary for accomplishing the organism’s practical goals — including reproduction.
That's not logically required by your own admission. Plantinga has given counterexamples of beliefs that are false yet are nevertheless adaptive - and really, that's not some novel contribution on his part. Plenty of people recognize that possibility. Speaking in terms of E&N, the 'unreliability' of the cognitive process - the lack of its truth-tracking - will only cause harm if it results in negative actions... but that's not necessarily the case. There's that Churchland quote again: 'Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing [the world] is advantageous so long as it is geared to the organism’s way of life and enhances the organism’s chances of survival. Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost.'
It is true that I’m not so much trying to respond to the EAAN from within, but rather reject the EAAN because it rests upon an inadequate notion of what counts as “reliable cognition.”
And I've pointed out how the problem is still going to be present even if you start talking about maps instead of beliefs. I also don't think you can reject the EAAN (due to Churchland's suggestion) and still talk about beliefs.
That said, I do accept the point above that Churchland is an eliminativist about beliefs. I am not. Where I disagree with Churchland is that I don’t think that “folk psychology” (as he calls it) is an empirical theory to begin with. I think it’s a transcendental presupposition of discursive subjectivity and moral agency.
The Churchlands aren't all that crazy about subjectivity either.
So if by ‘naturalism’ one means ‘the rejection of a priori knowledge’, then I am not a naturalist.
I'm not so sure about the rejection of a priori knowledge, but a transcendantal presupposition of moral agency and subjectivity may seal the deal.nullasalus
April 12, 2013
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It's true that if an adaptation doesn't contribute to inclusive fitness, then that adaptation will tend to be lost, but it seems clear to me that better cognitive mapping does and would contribute to inclusive fitness. What doesn't make sense to me is the thought that an organism could survive and flourish even if its cognitive mappings of its environment were utterly unreliable. And what I'm denying, really, is that "tending to produce true beliefs" is the right way to think about what "reliable cognition" really amounts to. Hence my conditional: if a living thing carries out cognitive processes, then those processes will tend to be reliable, because unreliable cognitive processes prevent organisms from correlating their perceptual input and motor output in ways that are necessary for accomplishing the organism's practical goals -- including reproduction. It is true that I'm not so much trying to respond to the EAAN from within, but rather reject the EAAN because it rests upon an inadequate notion of what counts as "reliable cognition." That said, I do accept the point above that Churchland is an eliminativist about beliefs. I am not. Where I disagree with Churchland is that I don't think that "folk psychology" (as he calls it) is an empirical theory to begin with. I think it's a transcendental presupposition of discursive subjectivity and moral agency. (Note: Churchland doesn't like the transcendental/empirical distinction because he thinks that Quine's rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction dispenses with it, whereas I think that Quine's rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction is thoroughly mistaken. For that matter, I think that the a priori/a posteriori distinction is of paramount importance. So if by 'naturalism' one means 'the rejection of a priori knowledge', then I am not a naturalist.)Kantian Naturalist
April 12, 2013
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KN,
But the accuracy isn’t defined in terms of net benefit to survival — the accuracy is defined in terms of how strong or weak the homomorphic relation is.
And natural selection does not select for stronger homomorphic relations, but for benefit to survival. Meanwhile, there can be some amount of homomorphic relation (since it's an issue of degree) even in creatures that utterly lack cognizance - and there can be a creature who is selected for, even though their homomorphic relation is less accurate, or not accurate at all. This is one reason I keep saying that your argument here looks as if it's tackling a completely different problem than Plantinga is raising. You seem to want to make this an argument about what constitutes a belief on the neurological level, but that really isn't something Plantinga cares about unless it's going to impact what the EAAN is advancing about reliability specifically given E&N.
The EAAN construes N&E as a defeater for R because, given N&E, there are four logically possible scenarios in which semantic content relates to behavior, and semantic content is causally related to behavior in only one of those scenarios. So this assigns .25 probability to R.
I think you've misunderstood Plantinga on this point. I'd like to see you quote where he says that there's a .25 probability of R.
Now, Churchland doesn’t quite say that because he construes beliefs as the sorts of things that only discursive animals have
He's eliminative about beliefs.
What is much less clear to me is that any species, the members of which do have beliefs at all, can survive and flourish over the long run and yet also have mostly false beliefs. Plantinga gives us merely logically possible scenarios (e.g. “Paul the Hominid”), which swing free of any theory about what semantic content looks like in rerum natura.
The problem is, again, the evidence seems to support Plantinga here. You're willing to concede that populations can survive and flourish even when they altogether lack beliefs about their environment, or possibly altogether. That's a pretty considerable concession. You don't dispute that they can survive and flourish even if they have false beliefs. But somehow, the moment a population of organisms (or even a single organism?) is capable of belief formation (and again, Churchland is eliminative about beliefs), now they're guaranteed that most of their beliefs are accurate? No, that doesn't wash.
One could say that those theories aren’t about semantic content, but then we’d need an argument as to why, and one would need an argument as to why saying that synaptically-encoded feature-space mapping don’t explain true beliefs isn’t analogous to saying, “but molecular motion can’t explain heat, because ‘molecular motion’ doesn’t mean ‘heat’, and I don’t care about molecular motion — I want to know what heat is!”
The funny thing is, if you don't subtract all the secondary qualities from heat - those things get regarded as all things mental - then no, you haven't explained heat after all. Not completely.nullasalus
April 12, 2013
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But the accuracy isn't defined in terms of net benefit to survival -- the accuracy is defined in terms of how strong or weak the homomorphic relation is. Net benefit to survival is a stable indication that the organism's nervous system instantiates a reliable cognitive mapping, but the net benefit to survival doesn't constitute that reliability. I think that's an important difference between what Churchland is stressing and what Plantinga concedes. More to the point, though, there's this difference as well. The EAAN construes N&E as a defeater for R because, given N&E, there are four logically possible scenarios in which semantic content relates to behavior, and semantic content is causally related to behavior in only one of those scenarios. So this assigns .25 probability to R. But, one can easily construe Churchland as saying, "Plantinga, this scenario relies entirely on one's pre-theoretic intuitions about what semantic content. In light of a good scientific theory about how semantic content is realized in neurobiological processes, the probability of R is much higher." Now, Churchland doesn't quite say that because he construes beliefs as the sorts of things that only discursive animals have -- if an animal doesn't have a language, then it doesn't have beliefs. I find this too restrictive -- I'm more willing to say that non-discursive animals do have beliefs, though of very rudimentary sorts. But, I do think that Churchland makes a good point when he poses the question, in effect, "should we construe R -- the reliability of cognitive capacities -- in terms of 'producing mostly true beliefs' or in terms of 'producing feature-space mappings that homomorphically resemble regions of the organism's environment?" Now, I think it would be a bad answer to Churchland to just say, "but by 'reliable cognition' I don't mean the latter, I mean the former!" And that's because the latter could very well be a much better explanation of "reliable cognition," once we've got a good, workable theory of what reliable cognition really amounts to in rerum natura. (Maybe one doesn't care about how things stand in rerum natura, but then it'll be harder to generate an argument as to how evolutionary naturalism is self-undermining.) Now, I happily concede that many animals can flourish without any beliefs at all, even though they clearly have some sort of very limited cognitive mappings going on in their nervous systems. I confess that I find it only a slight difficulty to attribute beliefs to deer and wolves, considerably more difficult to attribute beliefs to birds and frogs, and I have no idea what it would be to attribute beliefs to oysters or leeches -- yet even oysters and leeches have nervous systems! And of course many living things are able to fare perfectly well without any cognitive activity at all -- unless oak trees and daffodils are cognizing in ways that I am unable to understand. What is much less clear to me is that any species, the members of which do have beliefs at all, can survive and flourish over the long run and yet also have mostly false beliefs. Plantinga gives us merely logically possible scenarios (e.g. "Paul the Hominid"), which swing free of any theory about what semantic content looks like in rerum natura. Take such theories into account -- Churchland's being the one I know best, but also Millikan and Dretske have developed such theories -- and I don't think "Paul the Hominid" has the relevance that Plantinga takes it to have. One could say that those theories aren't about semantic content, but then we'd need an argument as to why, and one would need an argument as to why saying that synaptically-encoded feature-space mapping don't explain true beliefs isn't analogous to saying, "but molecular motion can't explain heat, because 'molecular motion' doesn't mean 'heat', and I don't care about molecular motion -- I want to know what heat is!"Kantian Naturalist
April 12, 2013
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The Churchlands’ claim is that if an organism makes a living by doing any cognitive mapping of its environment, then those maps will tend to be reliable, in that they will be at least roughly accurate maps of parts of its environment — namely, those parts of the environment that the organism needs to be sensitive to in order to survive and flourish.
And how is the accuracy of a 'roughly accurate map' measured? Reading Churchland, it seems to be exactly what the way I said: it's accurate if it's a net benefit to survival. And insofar as that's the case, it happens to be a case that Plantinga already seems willing to grant. The EAAN does not deny the ability of organisms, even complicated organisms, to somehow survive. You say that the organism will 'need to be sensitive' to certain parts of the environment to survive and flourish. I have examples, ones you seem to admit to, of species surviving and flourishing with zero beliefs, no cognitive awareness to speak of. Plantinga and others can easily cite examples of species with wrong beliefs, etc, surviving and flourishing with wrong beliefs. The sort of 'map' Churchland is relying on here is a map that doesn't threaten the EAAN.
Now, I’ve put it forth as a highly speculative claim that what we call “true beliefs” just are the synaptically-encoded feature-domain mappings of the brain of an animal that has acquired a shared language. That might not be right, and it might not be my most considered view after I’ve pondered a bit more, but for the moment I don’t see anything wrong about it.
You'd need a lot more than this, since a synaptically-encoded feature-domain mapping of an animal brain that has acquired a shared language - putting aside all the problems this is going to have for naturalism anyway - doesn't have to be a true belief. It can just be a belief. Are you sure you aren't mixing yourself up here, trying to find some way to envision the way a belief can cohere in the brain, while subconsciously putting the EAAN itself aside?nullasalus
April 11, 2013
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Microbes and oak trees do perfectly well without having any discernible cognitive processes at all.
Evolutionists also seem to do perfectly well without having any discernible cognitive processes at all.Joe
April 11, 2013
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I wouldn't say that evolutionary processes select for survival -- I would say that natural selection tends, over the long term, to eliminate those species that have non-satisficing traits or behaviors. ("Satisficing" is 'good enough' rather than 'perfect' or 'ideal' -- as long as a species is well-adapted enough to avoid extinction, one generation at a time, then it will persist.) But what is selected against depends on how the organism in question makes its living. Microbes and oak trees do perfectly well without having any discernible cognitive processes at all. The Churchlands' claim is that if an organism makes a living by doing any cognitive mapping of its environment, then those maps will tend to be reliable, in that they will be at least roughly accurate maps of parts of its environment -- namely, those parts of the environment that the organism needs to be sensitive to in order to survive and flourish. That much is quite clear. The more difficult questions are, does this kind of representation deserve to be called semantic content? (If it does, then we have a good theory of why semantic content is part of the causal nexus.) And, what is the relation between neurophysiological representations and what we call "beliefs"? Now, I've put it forth as a highly speculative claim that what we call "true beliefs" just are the synaptically-encoded feature-domain mappings of the brain of an animal that has acquired a shared language. That might not be right, and it might not be my most considered view after I've pondered a bit more, but for the moment I don't see anything wrong about it. (Note 1: this is part of an account of true belief -- justification will require a different treatment -- and for that matter I don't think that language can be given a fully satisfactory 'naturalistic' treatment, because I don't think that normative fact can be translated 'without remainder' into a set of naturalistic facts.) (Note 2: for that matter, given that I don't think that organisms themselves can be fully explained in mechanistic terms, it's not really clear to me what counts as "natural" or "naturalistic".)Kantian Naturalist
April 11, 2013
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LOL: Written by Chance? Excerpt: "You might think that someone wrote this article. But of course, you would be mistaken. Articles are not written by people. They are the result of chance. Every intelligent person knows it. There might be some people who want you to think that articles are written by people. But this view is totally unscientific. After all, we cannot see the person who allegedly wrote the article. We cannot detect him or her in any way. The claim that this article has an author cannot be empirically verified, and therefore it must be rejected. All we have is the article itself, and we must find a scientific explanation for its origin. ,,," http://www.youroriginsmatter.com/conversations/view/written-by-chance/142bornagain77
April 11, 2013
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semi related: Young Children Have Grammar and Chimpanzees Don't - Apr. 10, 2013 Excerpt: "When you compare what children should say if they follow grammar against what children do say, you find it to almost indistinguishable," Yang said. "If you simulate the expected diversity when a child is only repeating what adults say, it produces a diversity much lower than what children actually say." As a comparison, Yang applied the same predictive models to the set of Nim Chimpsky's signed phrases, the only data set of spontaneous animal language usage publicly available. He found further evidence for what many scientists, including Nim's own trainers, have contended about Nim: that the sequences of signs Nim put together did not follow from rules like those in human language. Nim's signs show significantly lower diversity than what is expected under a systematic grammar and were similar to the level expected with memorization. This suggests that true language learning is -- so far -- a uniquely human trait, and that it is present very early in development. "The idea that children are only imitating adults' language is very intuitive, so it's seen a revival over the last few years," Yang said. "But this is strong statistical evidence in favor of the idea that children actually know a lot about abstract grammar from an early age." http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/04/130410131327.htmbornagain77
April 11, 2013
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"I" am my body": Kantian Naturalist,
KN: as to man's increase of knowledge, there is interesting 'spiritual' aspect to note:
Alan Turing and Kurt Godel - Incompleteness Theorem and Human Intuition - video (notes in video description) http://www.metacafe.com/watch/8516356/ Are Humans merely Turing Machines? https://docs.google.com/document/d/1cvQeiN7DqBC0Z3PG6wo5N5qbsGGI3YliVBKwf7yJ_RU/edit
In fact,,, Here is what Gregory Chaitin, a world-famous mathematician and computer scientist, said about the limits of the computer program he was trying to develop to prove that material processes could generate information:
At last, a Darwinist mathematician tells the truth about evolution - VJT - November 2011 Excerpt: In Chaitin’s own words, “You’re allowed to ask God or someone to give you the answer to some question where you can’t compute the answer, and the oracle will immediately give you the answer, and you go on ahead.” https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/at-last-a-darwinist-mathematician-tells-the-truth-about-evolution/
Here is the video where, at the 30:00 minute mark, you can hear the preceding quote from Chaitin's own mouth in full context:
Life as Evolving Software, Greg Chaitin at PPGC UFRGS http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RlYS_GiAnK8
In fact the limits for information generation by material processes are much more severe than is indicated by the preceding in that for even that modest gain of information it takes a intelligent, conscious, mind to program the computer in the first place:
"The Search for a Search: Measuring the Information Cost of Higher-Level Search," Journal of Advanced Computational Intelligence and Intelligent Informatics 14(5) (2010): 475-486 "Conservation of Information in Search: Measuring the Cost of Success," IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics A, Systems & Humans, 5(5) (September 2009): 1051-1061 http://www.evoinfo.org/
Put even more simply, It ALWAYS takes a 'mind' to produce information:
"The mechanical brain does not secrete thought "as the liver does bile," as the earlier materialists claimed, nor does it put it out in the form of energy, as the muscle puts out its activity. Information is information, not matter or energy. No materialism which does not admit this can survive at the present day." Norbert Wiener created the modern field of control and communication systems, utilizing concepts like negative feedback. His seminal 1948 book Cybernetics both defined and named the new field. "Our experience-based knowledge of information-flow confirms that systems with large amounts of specified complexity (especially codes and languages) invariably originate from an intelligent source from a mind or personal agent." (Stephen C. Meyer, "The origin of biological information and the higher taxonomic categories," Proceedings of the Biological Society of Washington, 117(2):213-239 (2004).) The story of the Monkey Shakespeare Simulator Project Excerpt: Starting with 100 virtual monkeys typing, and doubling the population every few days, it put together random strings of characters. It then checked them against the archived works of Shakespeare. Before it was scrapped, the site came up with 10^35 number of pages, all typed up. Any matches? Not many. It matched two words, “now faire,” and a partial name from A Midsummer Night’s Dream, and three words and a comma, “Let fame, that,” from Love’s Labour’s Lost. The record, achieved suitably randomly at the beginning of the site’s run in 2004, was 23 characters long, including breaks and spaces. http://io9.com/5809583/the-story-of-the-monkey-shakespeare-simulator-project Book Review - Meyer, Stephen C. Signature in the Cell. New York: HarperCollins, 2009. Excerpt: As early as the 1960s, those who approached the problem of the origin of life from the standpoint of information theory and combinatorics observed that something was terribly amiss. Even if you grant the most generous assumptions: that every elementary particle in the observable universe is a chemical laboratory randomly splicing amino acids into proteins every Planck time for the entire history of the universe, there is a vanishingly small probability that even a single functionally folded protein of 150 amino acids would have been created. Now of course, elementary particles aren't chemical laboratories, nor does peptide synthesis take place where most of the baryonic mass of the universe resides: in stars or interstellar and intergalactic clouds. If you look at the chemistry, it gets even worse—almost indescribably so: the precursor molecules of many of these macromolecular structures cannot form under the same prebiotic conditions—they must be catalysed by enzymes created only by preexisting living cells, and the reactions required to assemble them into the molecules of biology will only go when mediated by other enzymes, assembled in the cell by precisely specified information in the genome. So, it comes down to this: Where did that information come from? The simplest known free living organism (although you may quibble about this, given that it's a parasite) has a genome of 582,970 base pairs, or about one megabit (assuming two bits of information for each nucleotide, of which there are four possibilities). Now, if you go back to the universe of elementary particle Planck time chemical labs and work the numbers, you find that in the finite time our universe has existed, you could have produced about 500 bits of structured, functional information by random search. Yet here we have a minimal information string which is (if you understand combinatorics) so indescribably improbable to have originated by chance that adjectives fail. http://www.fourmilab.ch/documents/reading_list/indices/book_726.html
And KN, here we have you generating far in excess of 500 bits of structured, functional information trying with all your obfuscating might to tell us that material processes can generate functional information and that a conscious intelligent mind is not needed. Do you see the problem here between what you claim and what science is telling us KN? As if the preceding was not bad enough for your preferred atheistic worldview KN, it is now found, through quantum teleportation experiments, that material reduces to quantum 'information':
The 'Top Down' Theistic Structure Of The Universe and Of The Human Body https://docs.google.com/document/d/1NhA4hiQnYiyCTiqG5GelcSJjy69e1DT3OHpqlx6rACs/edit
Thus KN, here we have you insisting against all common sense and empirical evidence that the purely material processes of your body can generate and comprehend information. But honestly KN, what should we believe you or our own eyes? i.e. Your philosophy is 'not even wrong' KN!
"There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, Than are dreamt of in your philosophy." William Shakespeare - Hamlet John 1:1 In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.
As 'the whole is not explained by the parts',
John Michael Talbot & Michael Card - One Faith - music http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AgYguIi7fMI
bornagain77
April 11, 2013
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KN: In brief again, I noted a simple case of a widespread case of belief that is in fact spectacularly false, but which is reinforced by the various social systems and networks. Going back a bit, we can see a very similar pattern with Crick's neuron-network determinism, Marx's Dialectic Materialism, Freud's notions on id, ego and superego [and, as I put it crudely, the role of potty training . . . ], Skinner's rat in an operantly conditioning maze, etc. It is not just that we do not have a perfect grasp of reality, but that we sometimes have individuals AND collectives in mutual reinforcement of error. Where evolutionary materialistic views consistently end in the problems of self referentiality. As a result somewhere along the line, rationality is pulled out of a magician's hat. That is, Plantinga, as I said above, could have named names and taken prisoners on the patterns he playfully decided to cast in terms of a silly hominid-like creature fleeing from a tiger equivalent on some sci fi world out there. The issues he raises have serious merit. In my simple and rough rendering, if our world is wholly material, and is wholly shaped and controlled by forces that are blind forces on matter acted on by chance, necessity and time, then all phenomena must so be explained. This ends up in genetic and social conditioning on chance plus necessity, leading to meltdown of the perceived grounds for reliability or rational capacity of reasoning. Where, the exemplars I gave give cases of appealing to just such forces and factors without spotting the self-referential absurdity involved. I added the current misperception on events c. 1492, to show that the problem persists. Inter-subjective consensus without well grounded warrant and due reckoning with strengths and limitations in the individual as well as the collective -- i.e. naked rationality accepted as its own force -- will predictably end up in deep trouble. KFkairosfocus
April 11, 2013
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I don’t think you can just take Churchland’s talk of ‘maps’ and ‘accuracy’ and then just graft ‘belief’ on to it – do that, and you’re engaged in a radically different project than he is.
Yes. :)Kantian Naturalist
April 10, 2013
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Box @63, Yes, indeed. Understanding is about the whole - not the parts.StephenB
April 10, 2013
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