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Horrid doubt file: Reasons to think your mind is real

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Was Darwin’s horrid doubt just horrid – or a reasonable fear?:

… the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?

I’d say that if his theory was true, horrid was a slam dunk (yes, you are an evolved monkey, no, your thoughts do not mean anything).

But very little in science turned out to be what Darwin or his contemporaries thought.

Non-materialist neuroscientists think that your mind is real and that it helps shape your brain. It is not a mere illusion created by the workings of the brain.

Here are some excerpts from the afternoon panel of the Beyond the Mind-Body Problem symposium (September 11, 2008), sponsored by the Nour Foundation, UN-DESA, and the Université de Montréal. The excerpts feature some interesting exchanges between a number of non-materialist neuroscientists.

Excerpts from the morning panel are here.

Both the morning and afternoon panels were televised and can be viewed here.

Comments
Sigh: 10's - 100's or more of millions of base pairskairosfocus
November 28, 2008
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Onlookers A sense of duuty impels me to reluctantly make a further remark this morning. Specifically: how, apart from in effect "lucky noise," does R propose to span the implied genomic search space to get to islands of function which would then allow for the hill-climbing to optimality that he imagines that NS can fulfill? That is, he has chosen -- sadly, yet again (one hopes inadvertently; perhaps he has never had to seriously and substantially compare alternatives and difficulties on factual adequacy, coherence and explanatory power in the face of serious alternatives) -- to duck issues, beg questions, knock over strawmen and generally bluff; this time on the issue that Natural Selection is not a creative force but (as he is forced to acknowledge) a culling one. We must look elsewhere than natural selection to find the "variations" that environmental selection pressures may cull from. And, since we are dealing with functionally specified, highly complex genomic information among other things, that has to come from causal factors capable of generating high contingency. (In short, mechanical necessity leading to lawlike natural regularities is not a reasonable source of such high contingency.) So, when R says . . .
[NS] becomes capable of innovation when coupled with heritable variation. The variation is the source of the innovation, and selection prevents the useful variations from being swamped by the neutral or deleterious ones . . .
all he has done is to dodge the key issue by changing a term: WHAT is the source of the required "variation," starting from the genome length of about 1 mn base pairs [~ 2 megabits of information storing capacity] to get to minimally functional life? Similarly, what is the source of such "variations" capable of getting the 10's - 100's or even more of of base pairs credibly required to create fundamentally new body plans? As the Dembski-style explanatory filter aptly summarises, there are two such empirically confirmed causal forces or factors for generating highly contingent [though not necessarily functional] information, which is what "variations" is referring to: [1] chance, and [2] agency. Materialists object to agency, and "lucky noise" is simply another word for chance production of the required FSCI, once we stipulate that the information must function. But, my descriptive term FSCI (which traces back to Orgel, 1973) also highlights what R is plainly overlooking. Namely, that we have a serious search space challenge to get to biofunction. For, as the Dembski UPB indicates, it is not credible on the gamut of the observed universe that even as little as 500 - 1,000 bits of functionally specific information should emerge by chance on the gamut of our entire observed cosmos across its lifespan. Similarly, if R were to actually seriously engage the Plantinga type challenge, he would see that the problem of arriving at a credible mind per non-foresightful chance variation plus probabilistic culling of relatively unfit BEHAVIOUR extends far beyond problems with understanding Quantum theory, into the basic cognitive functionality of mind. Nor is this news: there is a reason why the so-called hard problem of consciousness is hard, and why since at least Darwin himself, evolutionary materialism has had no answer to the credibility of the minds required to think even materialistic thoughts. As Denyse cited Darwin in the original post:
. . . the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?
Indeed, after dozens of opportunities and days upon days, R has repeatedly failed to substantially address the challenge that, fundamentally, mechanical necessity plus chance conditions and forces simply are incapable of getting us to what we need to have a credible mind. So, the fact that, we consistently see little more than strawman dismissals, selective hyperskepticism and question-begging should tell us far more than R is willing to admit about the deficiencies of his basic case. So, again, I refer the astute reader to comments 11, 15, 19, 20, 27, 30, 41, 43, and 44 above. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
November 28, 2008
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-----ribczynski “Even if an immaterial mind existed, it would mean no such thing. You would still have to show that an immaterial mind containing no mass or energy is capable not only of altering the progression of material brain states, but of doing so without violating the laws of physics. You certainly haven’t done that in your comment.” All I have to show is that the mind influenced the brain. I need not prove it in materialist terms since I am not a materialist. The “placebo effect” demonstrates the point quite nicely? But it doesn’t end there. I also know that the brain cannot be the organ of thought. Matter is the principle of individuation. That means that universals, that is concepts, names etc, cannot be in matter. If I have two balls, each occupies a different space. That is what makes them two. The “concept” of ball cannot be in matter. Indeed, you cannot imagine the concept of “ball”, you can only imagine this red ball or that white ball etc. Only you mind can pick up on universals. ------“There is nothing about the phenomenon of self-control that defies materialist explanation. One part of the brain can influence another. Why should this be surprising? They’re connected, after all.” Both parts of the brain (whatever parts you are talking about) are tied in to the material world and, are, therefore, subject to its laws.. Matter cannot reverse matters decision. Only a non-material mind can do that. -----“More precisely, the materialist believes that matter in certain extremely complicated configurations is capable of investigating other matter. You’ve offered no reason why it should be problematic for the investigator and the investigated to be of the same substance”. Yes, I have. I have indicated that only an immaterial mind can resist the brains impulses. Materialism, on the other hand, is incompatible with free will. Also, I have shown that the brain cannot be the organ of thought. Matter cannot investigate matter. -----“Why may a dualist assume that we have rational minds? Supposing that the mind is immaterial does nothing to guarantee its rationality.” The rationality consists in the mind apprehending something other than itself. For materialists, matter apprehends matter, which makes no sense as I have indicated. -----“What gave you the idea that materialists deny any correspondence between mind and reality?” Materialists don’t think that the mind is any different than the reality it comprehends. By definition, correspondence refers to the mind and its relationship to truth. Materialists don’t even believe in truth. -----“Materialists are quite comfortable with the idea of representations, which are really correspondences by another name. It’s just that materialists believe that these representations are physical, not ethereal.” Well, yes, they call everything that exists by another name to avoid acknowledging what it is. -----“Incidentally, neuroscientists are busy working out the details of representations in our brains, particularly in the visual system. The idea of physical representations in the brain is not a mere hypothesis.” A physical representation in the brain would not be a thought, nor can it be. When the mind apprehends a universal, it apprehends a non-material entity.StephenB
November 28, 2008
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kairosfocus wrote:
I in particular reiterate the challenge to evolutionary materialist thought that natural selection is only a probabilistic culler of the relatively unfit, a destroyer not an innovator.
Selection by itself is a "probabilistic culler of the relatively unfit", as you say, but it becomes capable of innovation when coupled with heritable variation. The variation is the source of the innovation, and selection prevents the useful variations from being swamped by the neutral or deleterious ones.
Indeed, as Plantinga pointed out, NS is mind-blind: it culls on adaptive behaviour, not on the truth or falsity of underlying beliefs.
True, and this explains, for example, why our minds have such a poor intuitive understanding of quantum mechanics and relativity. We evolved in an environment where quantum mechanical and relativistic effects were negligible, and so there was no selection pressure toward brains capable of intuitively grasping these subject areas. It takes discipline, talent and hard work to become a competent modern physicist, and even then, as physicists readily admit, intuition fails them. What is the dualist's explanation for this? Plantinga's argument fails because for thoughts to become more adaptive, they must in general become truer. To reuse an earlier example, nobody is going to survive long on the savanna if he thinks that hungry lions are cuddly pets to be played with. Most importantly, survival is improved by the ability to think logically -- an ability that has applications far beyond the problems of mere survival.
Lucky noise is not a credible source of mind and messages in mind.
Luckily, we don't depend on "lucky noise". Our brains have been shaped by the highly nonrandom process of natural selection.ribczynski
November 28, 2008
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Onlookes: Re question-begging. Kindly cf 11, 15, 19, 20, 27, 30, 41m 43, 44 with the just above at 50. I in particular reiterate the challenge to evolutionary materialist thought that natural selection is only a probabilistic culler of the relatively unfit, a destroyer not an innovator. Indeed, as Plantinga pointed out, NS is mind-blind: it culls on adaptive behaviour, not on the truth or falsity of underlying beliefs. (Cf above for links.) Something else has to generate the massive biofunctional information, and the alternative mechanisms are chance, intelligence or necessity. Lawlike necessity is not a source of high contingency. Islands of biofunction, credibly are immensely isolated in the configuration space beyond the probabilistic resources of the observed universe. And we know that agents routinely generate functionally specific, complex information. So, the empirically best warranted source of such information is agency, not chance. Lucky noise is not a credible source of mind and messages in mind. G'day GEM of TKIkairosfocus
November 28, 2008
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I wrote:
For example, the temperament, personality, cognitive abilities and memories of an Alzheimer’s patient may be damaged to the point that the person bears no resemblance to his former self. To a materialist, this makes sense. Alzheimer’s damages the brain, and when the brain is damaged, the person is damaged. The naive dualist has a much harder time explaining how these faculties can be so seriously damaged if they are wholly (or even primarily) carried out by the soul and not the brain.
StephenB responded:
The obvious answer is that, while the mind is dependent on the brain to function properly, it is, nevertheless, disctinct from it.
No, the obvious answer is that the brain is wholly responsible for these functions. As I said, Alzheimer’s damages the brain, and when the brain is damaged, the person is damaged. Introducing an immaterial mind, as you wish to do, is not obvious at all, and it adds nothing to the materialist's explanation of the Alzheimer's patient's sad decline. An immaterial mind is an extraneous element added only to match the preconceptions, often religious, of the person suggesting it. Ever hear of a guy named Occam?
That means that each [of the mind and the brain] can impact the other...
Even if an immaterial mind existed, it would mean no such thing. You would still have to show that an immaterial mind containing no mass or energy is capable not only of altering the progression of material brain states, but of doing so without violating the laws of physics. You certainly haven't done that in your comment.
...a point that we confirm each time we summon the power of our mind to resist the brain’s impulses. The technical name for this phenomenon is “self control,” one of the many qualities that separates men from animals.
There is nothing about the phenomenon of self-control that defies materialist explanation. One part of the brain can influence another. Why should this be surprising? They're connected, after all. As for the idea that self-control separates us from the animals, haven't you ever seen a well-trained dog who, despite being hungry, will refrain from eating a juicy steak thrown in front of him until his master gives the okay? Self-control is not exclusive to humans.
On matters of science, it is the materialist who is naive, believing that matter can investigate matter, which is another way of saying that, for him, the investigator is of precisely the same substance as the object of the investigation.
More precisely, the materialist believes that matter in certain extremely complicated configurations is capable of investigating other matter. You've offered no reason why it should be problematic for the investigator and the investigated to be of the same substance.
Rationality, on the other hand, begins with the assumption that [A] we have rational minds, [B] we live in a rational universe, and [C] there is a “correspondence” between the two.
Why may a dualist assume that we have rational minds? Supposing that the mind is immaterial does nothing to guarantee its rationality.
Materialists deny this correspondence between the investigator’s mind and reality that it investigates because, bound by their atheistic monism, they can’t conceive that there could possibly be any difference between the two.
What gave you the idea that materialists deny any correspondence between mind and reality? Materialists are quite comfortable with the idea of representations, which are really correspondences by another name. It's just that materialists believe that these representations are physical, not ethereal. Incidentally, neuroscientists are busy working out the details of representations in our brains, particularly in the visual system. The idea of physical representations in the brain is not a mere hypothesis.ribczynski
November 28, 2008
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Clive Hayden quotes C.S. Lewis:
We find that matter always obeys the same laws which our logic obeys. When logic says a thing must be so, Nature always agrees. No one can suppose that this can be due to a happy conincidence. A great many people think that it is due to the fact that Nature produced the mind. But on the assumption that Nature is herself mindless this provides no explanation.
Clive, Lewis makes the implicit assumption that it takes a mind to design a mind, and so of course he finds Nature inadequate to the task. This is not a problem for a materialist who sees the brain (and therefore the mind) as the product of billions of years of natural selection.ribczynski
November 28, 2008
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-----ribczynski: "The naive dualist has a much harder time explaining how these faculties can be so seriously damaged if they are wholly (or even primarily) carried out by the soul and not the brain." The obvious answer is that, while the mind is dependent on the brain to function properly, it is, nevertheless, disctinct from it. That means that each can impact the other, a point that we confirm each time we summon the power of our mind to resist the brain's impulses. The technical name for this phenomenon is "self control," one of the many qualities that separates men from animals. On matters of science, it is the materialist who is naive, believing that matter can investigate matter, which is another way of saying that, for him, the investigator is of precisely the same substance as the object of the investigation. Rationality, on the other hand, begins with the assumption that [A] we have rational minds, [B] we live in a rational universe, and [C] there is a "correspondence" between the two. Materialists deny this correspondence between the investigator's mind and reality that it investigates because, bound by their atheistic monism, they can't conceive that there could possibly be any difference between the two. By disavowing the conditions necessary for rationality, they unwittingly declare themselves to be irrational people.StephenB
November 26, 2008
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ribczynski, This insight from C.S. Lewis may help. "The rational and moral element in each human mind is a point of force from the supernatural working its way into Nature, exploiting at each point those conditions which Nature offers, repulsed where the conditions are hopeless and impeded where they are unfavorable. A man's Rational thinking is just so much of his share in eternal Reason as the state of his brain allows to become operative: it represents, so to speak, the bargain struck or the frontier fixed between Reason and Nature at that particular point. A nation's moral outlook is just so much of it's share in eternal Moral Wisdom as it's history, economics, etc. lets through. In the same way the voice of the Announcer is just so much of a human voice as the receiving set lets through. Of course it varies with the state of the receiving set, and deteriorates as the set wears out, and vanishes all together if I throw a brick at it. It is conditioned by the apparatus but not originated by it. If it were--if we knew that there was no human being at the microphone, we should not attend to the news." ~Miracles "In the second place, to understand that logic must be valid is to see at once that this thing we all know, this thought, this mind, cannot in fact be really alien to the nature of the universe. Or, putting it the other way around, the nature of the universe cannot be really alien to Reason. We find that matter always obeys the same laws which our logic obeys. When logic says a thing must be so, Nature always agrees. No one can suppose that this can be due to a happy conincidence. A great many people think that it is due to the fact that Nature produced the mind. But on the assumption that Nature is herself mindless this provides no explanation. To be the result of a series of mindless events is one thing: to be a kind of plan or true account of the laws according to which those mindless events happened is quite another. Thus the Gulf Stream produces all sorts of results: for instance, the temperature of the Irish Sea. What it does not produce is maps of the Gulf Stream. But if logic, as we find it operative in our own minds, is really a result of mindless nature, then it is a result as improbable as that. The laws whereby logic obliges us to think turn out to be the laws according to which every event in space and time must happen. The man who thinks this an ordinary or probable result does not really understand. It is as if cabbages, in addition to resulting from the laws of botany also gave lectures in that subject; or as if, when I knocked out my pipe, the ashes arranged themselves into letters which read: 'We are the ashes of a knocked-out pipe.' But if the validity of knowledge cannot be explained in that way, and if perpetual happy coincidence throughout the whole of recorded time is out of the question, then surely we must seek the real explanation elswhere." ~De FutilitateClive Hayden
November 26, 2008
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DaveScot wrote:
Think of a brain like a radio with tuner fixed at one frequency so that it can only receive one radio station. Turn off the radio (death or near death) and, although the broadcast station is still “on the air” it can no longer be heard but otherwise remains the same. Turn the radio back on and it’s back the same as always.
Dave, There are some serious problems with that metaphor. The most obvious is that in reality, information flows both ways between body and mind. The broadcast station/radio receiver metaphor represents the information as flowing only one way. We can correct the flaw in the metaphor by stipulating that the receiver is really a two-way radio that can transmit as well as receive, and that the broadcast station is really a base station with two-way capability. If we adopt the modified metaphor, another question arises: which functions are performed by the base station (soul), and which by the radio (brain and body)? The naive view (held by a surprising number of people who are unfamiliar with the findings of modern neuroscience) is that all of the "interesting" stuff -- thinking, feeling, remembering, deciding -- is carried out by the soul, and that the body (including the brain) has only two main functions: passing information to the soul, and carrying out the commands issued by the soul. Naive though it is, many people cling to this idea because it allows them to believe in a soul that survives death while retaining all of a person's essential characteristics: memories, temperament, cognitive abilities, etc. In reality, of course, the brain isn't nearly as passive as the radio metaphor would suggest. Evidence shows that the brain is intimately involved with (and possibly fully responsible for) all of the characteristics mentioned above. For example, the temperament, personality, cognitive abilities and memories of an Alzheimer's patient may be damaged to the point that the person bears no resemblance to his former self. To a materialist, this makes sense. Alzheimer's damages the brain, and when the brain is damaged, the person is damaged. The naive dualist has a much harder time explaining how these faculties can be so seriously damaged if they are wholly (or even primarily) carried out by the soul and not the brain.ribczynski
November 26, 2008
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Exactly, DaveScot. ribczynski wrote:
If hammers are so unnecessary, let’s see you frame a house, driving every nail with your bare hands.
You are beginning to understand. The eye's task is to see. The hammer's task is to drive a nail. The task of the person behind the eye or hammer is much larger.
The fact is that hammers work better than bare hands, which is why we use them.
Yes! The hammer only works better if you need to drive nails for any decent length of time. Even then, the hammer does not work by itself; it needs a hand to hold it.
Yet people experiencing NDEs and OBEs report that they see just fine without the help of their bodies, so those expensive eyes, optic nerves, and visual cortices do nothing for them — unlike hammers, which are useful tools.
You've stopped understanding. You imply that hammers are useful and hands are not, even though hands can drive nails. It just so happens that hands holding hammers can drive nails for a longer period of time than just bare hands.
And I noticed that you avoided this question: Why do most blind people spend the rest of their lives sightless if the soul is capable of seeing the entire time?
I didn't avoid it, I provided an answer you either didn't like or didn't understand. The hand is not capable of driving a nail "the entire time". I would not expect a soul to be able see "the entire time". This is exactly what we observe - that souls can't see "the entire time"; only during extremely unusual circumstances.
Good grief. At some point you have to ask yourself this question: “Am I so determined to continue believing in a soul that I will deny the obvious?”
The evidence (not just NDE/OOBE, by the way) fits my hypothesis, not yours. You are the one willing to discard evidence simply because it doesn't fit into your worldview. You are the one in denial.angryoldfatman
November 25, 2008
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ribczyski You asked if the soul can "see" without a brain/eyes during NDE and OBE why blind people can't see using the same spooky mechanism. First, for the sake of argument, let's say the OBE phenomenon is real and not imagined or fraudulent in some way. Your question is then quite valid and must be explained. One answer might be that brain serves an anchor or focal point for a soul. Think of a brain like a radio with tuner fixed at one frequency so that it can only receive one radio station. Turn off the radio (death or near death) and, although the broadcast station is still "on the air" it can no longer be heard but otherwise remains the same. Turn the radio back on and it's back the same as always. Now imagine there are a zillion different broadcast stations and new radios are being made constantly but each is capable of receiving just one station selected at random. Physics and our knowledge of the universe at very small and very large scales is incomplete enough so this easily fits into the realm of possibility. When cosmologists think some 70% of the universe is made up of undescribed, unpredicted "dark energy" that permeates everything everywhere, and another 25% some unseen "dark matter" it kind of drives home the point that the visible universe is just the froth on a deep unfathomed ocean. And there's still a deep divide between quantum and classical mechanics such that each must be treated as separate magisteria. The biggest question is of course whether the OBE phenomenon is real or just paranormal jibber jabber in the category of hauntings, witchcraft, and UFOs. I'd argue that it is indeed paranormal with the caveat that it could possibly be real. Given that materialism rests on incomplete information and theories at present then what appears to be immaterial or supernatural or paranormal today might become material, natural, or normal in a future where materialism rests on a better foundation.DaveScot
November 25, 2008
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ribczynski: Maybe we have "no basis for a continued discussion": that is becoming my impression too. Anyway, I don't think that I have abused the language. When I said that "Explaining it [consciousness] away as a function of the brain is impossible." I meant just that, and I state that again. I have only specified, seeing what your objections are, that I am speaking from an empirical and scientific point of view: I am absolutely convinced that there cannot exist a scientific empirical explanation of consciousness on a materialistic basis. As all scientific affirmations, that affirmation remains always falsifiable. Therefore, I wanted to specify that it was not my purpose to "demonstrate logically (as in a mathematical theorem)" such an affirmation. I have tried to demonstrate it empirically, scientifically, not "logically"; in other words, my affirmation that "explaining it [consciousness] away as a function of the brain is impossible" is a scientific inference, and not a mathematical deductive demonstration. Can you understand that? Indeed, my words were: "Maybe I have not been precise enough on one point: my purpose is not to demonstrate logically (as in a mathematical theorem) that it is “impossible” that the brain is the cause of consciousness." which should have been clear enough, if you had read it with more attention. But I hope now it is clear. Regarding the second point, I don't understand what you mean. I am not joking at all. I am very serious. I have stated that "consciousness" does not mean "waking consciousness". I state that "consciousness" means that there is a subject who perceives something. That "something" can be different things: reconstructions of the external world, like in waking consciousness, reconstruction of a mental world, like in dreams, a deep sens of rather informal peace, like in deep sleep without dreams, and so on. But, if a subject is there and is perceiving something, that is consciousness anyway. That is perfectly consistent with the definition I gave of consciousness, and with all the reasonings I have made. You say that such a definition makes "conscious" synonymous with "alive". I don't know why you say so. I have never given any definition of "alive", and I would not even try. "Life" is much more difficult to define than "consciousness". I can't understand why you say that. Please, give your own definitions if you want. So, you may not agree with what I say, but why do you say that I "abuse the language"? That is simply not true. When a word can mean different things in common language, I try to carefully define it in my contest, and that's exactly what I have done in my posts to you. I have always spoken of consciousness simply as the existence of a perceiving subject, of a perceiving "I". Are you affirming that, when one is dreaming, one is not perceiving anything? I am simply affirming that I believe that our "I" is always perceiving something, in all the states of its existence. And obviously, as should be evident from my points about NDEs, IMO that does not change after death. But, if you think that we have ""no basis for a continued discussion", that's OK for me. I wish you the best.gpuccio
November 24, 2008
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ribczynski (and so GP and onlookers): First, on a point of correction re 42: GP -- a medical practitioner BTW, who plainly speaks from both training and experience -- has not conflated being conscious with being alive. Instead, he has spoken to being alive as a human who exhibits subjective self awareness and cognition. This even comes out explicitly in the cite you made just above. In short, it seems that -- again -- it is your consistent overlooking of our experiential fact no 1 (our first person subjectivity including consciousness and mentality) that leads to a breakdown in your analyses. Also, I see I need to add further details on my own remarks (at this stage, perhaps more for the benefits of the onlooker). So: 1] I see, in 37, your: You claim that the idea of an embodied consciousness leads to “self-referential absurdity”, but you don’t demonstrate this. Actually, I have, TWICE: in outline at 27 (with supplements at 30) and in the links provided in 27, in more details here. Further to this, GP has provided several serious posts which come at essentially the same result from his own angle. For instance, re-excerpting Reppert from 30, following Lewis et al:
. . . let us suppose that brain state A, which is token identical to the thought that all men are mortal, and brain state B, which is token identical to the thought that Socrates is a man, together cause the belief that Socrates is mortal. It isn’t enough for rational inference that these events be those beliefs, it is also necessary that the causal transaction be in virtue of the content of those thoughts. If anything not in space and time makes these thoughts the thoughts that they are, and if naturalism is true, then the propositional content is irrelevant to the causal transaction that produces the conclusion, and we do not have a case of rational inference. In rational inference, as Lewis puts it, one thought causes another thought not by being, but by being seen to be, the ground for it. But causal transactions in the brain occur in virtue of the brain’s being in a particular type of state that is relevant to physical causal transactions.
In short, once we imprison mind within mechanical cause-effect chains tracing to chance + necessity [by locking it up in the brain], we end up in not only self-reference (we are using minds to think about minds), but we end up in implying that lucky noise plus mechanical forces give rise not just to apparent messages [despite all odds] but real, trustworthy ones. And the "Welcome to Wales" example shows why that simply will not do. If handing over the mind to the control and determination of chance + necessity acting in the brain, leads to a credible account of rationality, why then did my Marxist interlocutors of old think it adequate to undermine opposed arguments -- of course IMO, self referentially absurdly -- by tracing them to the determinism of class conditioning? Behaviourists, to operant and classical conditioning [so that it is apt to ask Skinner if he is simply another rat trapped in the cosmic maze]? And Crick, to electrical and chemical activity in neural networks in the CNS? At the risk of giving too much, I excerpt from the linked on the case of Crick, as it is so tellingly classic:
k] . . . something is very wrong with Sir Francis Crick's remark in his 1994 The Astonishing Hypothesis, to the effect that: "You," your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules . . . l] Philip Johnson duly corrected him by asking whether he would be willing to preface his own writings thusly: "I, Francis Crick, my opinions and my science, and even the thoughts expressed in this book, consist of nothing more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules." [Reason in the Balance, 1995.] m] In short, as Prof Johnson then went on to say: “[t]he plausibility of materialistic determinism requires that an implicit exception be made for the theorist.” n] Thus, unless evident "fact no 1" -- that we are conscious, mental creatures who at least some of the time have freedom to think, intend, decide, speak, act and even write based on the logic and evidence of the situation -- is true, the project of rationality itself is at an end. That is, self-referential absurdity is the dagger pointing to the heart of any such evolutionary materialistic determinism as seeks to explain "all" -- including mind -- by "nothing but" natural forces acting on matter and energy, in light of chance boundary conditions . . .
Thus, your response at 37 comes across as a dismissal by unsupported assertions, instead of an engagement on the merits. This comes out further in the next point you made: 2] The idea of a brain thinking about itself is no more “self-referentially absurd” than the idea of an eye looking at itself in a mirror. Of course, eyes do not look at themselves in mirrors, and brains do not think about themselves. WE do: conscious, mentally active, intelligent beings. We often use our eyes to look at things, including the eye itself in a mirror. Just so, we use our cognitive faculties, which do find a seat in the brain, to reflect on cognition and consciousness. Thus, we exhibit self- awareness and self- transcendence. In short, the central fact of our experience -- conscious, intelligent, cognitive subjectivity -- is again being passed over without recognition. Once we correct that, we can then see that:
1 --> We know, immediately, that chance + necessity, acting on a pile of rocks on a hillside, can make them roll down the hillside and take up an arbitrary conformation. There thus is no in-principle reason to reject them taking up the shape: "WELCOME TO WALES" any more than any other configuration. Especially if, say, by extremely good luck we have seen the rocks fall and take up this shape for ourselves. [If that ever happens to you, though, change your travel plans and head straight for Las Vegas before your "hot streak" runs out!] 2 --> Now, while you are packing for Vegas, let's think a bit: [a] the result of the for- the- sake- of- argument stroke of good luck is an apparent message, which was [b] formed by chance + necessity only acting on matter and energy across space and time. That is, [c] it would be lucky noise at work. Let us observe, also: [d] the shape taken on by the cluster of rocks as they fall and settle is arbitrary, but [e] the meaning assigned to the apparent message is as a result of the imposition of symbolic meaning on certain glyphs that take up particular alphanumerical shapes under certain conventions. That is, it is a mental (and even social) act. One pregnant with the points that [f] language at its best refers accurately to reality, so that [g] we often trust its deliverances once we hold the source credible. [Indeed, in the original form of the example, if one believes that s/he is entering Wales on the strength of seeing such a rock arrangement, s/he would be grossly irrational to also believe the intelligible and aptly functional arrangement of rocks to have been accidental.] 3 --> But, this brings up the key issue of credibility: should we believe the substantial contents of such an apparent message sourced in lucky noise rather than a purposeful arrangement? That is, would it be well-warranted to accept it as -- here, echoing Aristotle in Metaphysics, 1011b -- "saying of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not"? (That is, is such an apparent message credibly a true message?) 4 --> The answer is obvious: no. For, the adjusted example aptly illustrates how cause-effect chains tracing to mechanical necessity and chance circumstances acting on matter and energy are utterly unconnected to the issue of making logically and empirically well-warranted assertions about states of affairs in the world. For a crude but illuminating further instance, neuronal impulses are in volts and are in specific locations in the body; but meaningfulness, codes, algorithms, truth and falsehood, propositions and their entailments simply are not like that. That is, mental concepts and constructs are radically different from physical entities, interactions and signals. So, it is highly questionable (thus needs to be shown not merely assumed or asserted) that such radical differences could or do credibly arise from mere interaction of physical components under only the forces of chance and blind mechanical necessity. For this demonstration, however, we seek in vain: the matter is routinely assumed or asserted away, often by claiming (contrary to the relevant history and philosophical considerations) that science can only properly explain by reference in the end to such ultimately physical-material forces. Anything less is "science-stopping." But in fact, in say a typical real-world cybernetic system, the physical cause-effect chains around a control loop are set up by intelligent, highly skilled designers who take advantage of and manipulate a wide range of natural regularities. As a result, the sensors, feedback, comparator, and forward path signals, codes and linkages between elements in the system are intelligently organised to cause the desired interactions and outcomes of moving observed plant behaviour closer to the targetted path in the teeth of disturbances, drift in component parameters, and noise. And, that intelligent input is not simply reducible to the happenstance of accidental collocations and interactions of physical forces, bodies and materials . . . . 7 --> Indeed, Richard Taylor speaks to this too: Just as it is possible for a collection of stones to present a novel and interesting arrangement on the side of a hill . . . so it is possible for our such things as our own organs of sense [and faculties of cognition etc.] to be the accidental and unintended results, over ages of time, of perfectly impersonal, non-purposeful forces. In fact, ever so many biologists believe that this is precisely what has happened . . . . [But] [w]e suppose, without even thinking about it, that they [our sense organs etc] reveal to us things that have nothing to do with themselves, their structures or their origins . . . . [However] [i]t would be irrational for one to say both that his sensory and cognitive faculties had a natural, non-purposeful origin and also that they reveal some truth with respect to something other than themselves . . . [For, if] we do assume that they are guides to some truths having nothing to do with themselves, then it is difficult to see how we can, consistently with that supposition [and, e.g. by comparison with the case of the stones on a hillside], believe them to have arisen by accident, or by the ordinary workings of purposeless forces, even over ages of time. [Metaphysics, 2nd Edn, (Prentice-Hall, 1974), pp 115 - 119.] . . . . 12 --> So, as the Wales example and the debates it sparked at UD have brought out, the inference to design highlights the radical difference between [1] what chance + necessity acting on matter + energy on the gamut of our observed universe can credibly do (up to an apparent message by lucky noise) and [2] what mind routinely does (i.e. routinely creating real messages). But [3] it thus also has in it an aspect that points to the nature and origin of mind (and, thence, of morals as a particularly important function of mind). Indeed, [4] in the cosmological form, the inference to design also points to the serious possibility that mind is the source of matter, not the converse. Inter alia, this would make it utterly unsurprising that -- as we experience it every time we decide to speak or type on a keyboard, or click a mouse button or the like -- mind can interact causally with matter, even though we may not currently know how to explain just how that happens. We know that mind, even though as yet we do not really know how mind . . . . . . . [evolutionary] materialism [a worldview that often likes to wear the mantle of "science"] . . . argues that the cosmos is the product of chance interactions of matter and energy, within the constraint of the laws of nature. Therefore, all phenomena in the universe, without residue, are determined by the working of purposeless laws acting on material objects, under the direct or indirect control of chance. But human thought, clearly a phenomenon in the universe, must now fit into this picture. Thus, what we subjectively experience as "thoughts" and "conclusions" can only be understood materialistically as unintended by-products of the natural forces which cause and control the electro-chemical events going on in neural networks in our brains. (These forces are viewed as ultimately physical, but are taken to be partly mediated through a complex pattern of genetic inheritance ["nature"] and psycho-social conditioning ["nurture"], within the framework of human culture [i.e. socio-cultural conditioning and resulting/associated relativism].) Therefore, if materialism is true, the "thoughts" we have and the "conclusions" we reach, without residue, are produced and controlled by forces that are irrelevant to purpose, truth, or validity. Of course, the conclusions of such arguments may still happen to be true, by lucky coincidence — but we have no rational grounds for relying on the “reasoning” that has led us to feel that we have “proved” them. And, if our materialist friends then say: “But, we can always apply scientific tests, through observation, experiment and measurement,” then we must note that to demonstrate that such tests provide empirical support to their theories requires the use of the very process of reasoning which they have discredited! Thus, evolutionary materialism reduces reason itself to the status of illusion. But, immediately, that includes “Materialism.” For instance, Marxists commonly deride opponents for their “bourgeois class conditioning” — but what of the effect of their own class origins? Freudians frequently dismiss qualms about their loosening of moral restraints by alluding to the impact of strict potty training on their “up-tight” critics — but doesn’t this cut both ways? And, should we not simply ask a Behaviourist whether s/he is simply another operantly conditioned rat trapped in the cosmic maze? In the end, materialism is based on self-defeating logic . . . . [from the linked discussion]
In short, once we revert to evolutionary materialistic explanations, slowly but surely, step by step, we end up in self referential absurdity. As they say out here in the Caribbean at folk dances: wheel and tun and come again. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
November 24, 2008
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gpuccio wrote:
Maybe I have not been precise enough on one point: my purpose is not to demonstrate logically (as in a mathematical theorem) that it is “impossible” that the brain is the cause of consciousness.
Then it was probably not a good idea for you to state that it is impossible:
Explaining it [consciousness] away as a function of the brain is impossible.
You wrote:
I think you confound “consciousness” with “waking consciousness”. That’s a serious mistake. Consciousness, in its human form (that is, as long as we are alive in a material body) exists in different “states”. A very simple consideration will show that we have at least three fundamental states of consciousness: a) waking state b) sleep with dreams c) sleep without dreams We have many others, less universal or common: farmacological anesthesia, hypnosis, mystic experiences, coma of different levels, hallucinations, NDEs, and so on. My point is: the various states of consciousness are often very different one from the other, but consciousness is always there.
You must be joking. You've just defined "conscious" as being synonymous with "alive". If you're going to abuse the language this way, we have absolutely no basis for a continued discussion. From Alice in Wonderland:
`When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, `it means just what I choose it to mean -- neither more nor less.'
ribczynski
November 24, 2008
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ribczynski: I had no time to answer earlier, and I see that the discussion has advance in the meantime. I have not the time now to catch up with all that has been said, and especially with Adler's essay. But for now, I would like to go on from where we had stopped (your post #16). First of all, I am happy that you are doing your best to understand my arguments, and even if in the end you don't agree with them, or find them valuable, at least you are acknowledging that they exist. So, let's proceed this way. I will add just a few comments on the "brain produces consciousness" issue, and then will consider it as "discussed" (unless you want to add new angles). Then I will pass to your other points, and I ask you to consider that obviously some of my views are inevitably related, more or less, to my first argument. So, what can I say to make my argument more clear? You say: "You seem to be saying that because we have no successful theory of strong AI, it is therefore impossible for the physical brain to be the seat of consciousness" First of all, I have to say that I do believe that the brain is the "seat" of consciousness, at least during normal human life, but I don't believe that it is the "cause" if consciousness. But probably you meant "the cause", and so I will go on from that assumption. Maybe I have not been precise enough on one point: my purpose is not to demonstrate logically (as in a mathematical theorem) that it is "impossible" that the brain is the cause of consciousness. I am not interested in that kind of affirmations, because I think they have no application to the empirical world. So, if your problem is that you want to go on thinking that it is "in principle possible" that the brain is the cause of consciousness, be my guest. I am not interested in that. As it should be clear from all that I have said, my main approach is empirical, and tries to stay empirical as far as possible. That's one reason why I prefer speaking of consciousness and not of a "soul", and even the word "immaterial" would have to be substituted by "not explained by a material theory". In other words, my reasoning is very simple, and, I believe, very pragmatic. Let's try to state it again in brief: 1) Consciousness is an empirical fact, and a fundamental one. Therefore, science should try to explain it as well as possible. You seem to repeatedly understate this point, but I think you miss its epistemological importance. In science, you cannot simply do without a theory of consciousness, because it is one of the main parts of reality, just as a physicist cannot today do without a theory of dark energy, because it is very likely that it is one of the main components of the universe. So, we need some theory of consciousness, otherwise our maps of reality are largely incomplete. 2) Thee are two ways to build a scientific theory of consciousness: try to explain it as derived by other principles (matter, energy, and their related laws) or considering it a different principle, and trying to understand its properties and its interactions with the rest of reality. The first option leads to materialist and reductionist theories of consciousness. Of these, essentially strong AI is the only one which has a minimum of internal structure. the second option leads to non reductionists theories of consciousness, where it is described and investigated in order to understand it as an independent principle, and to understand its interactions with matter. 3) Great part of my post #20 has been dedicated to showing that strong AI is a failure, because it has none of the characteristics of a good scientific theory: it has no empirical support, and its logical structure does not explain any of the properties of the object which it tries to understand, that is consciousness itself. As you have made no specific comment about my arguments against strong AI, I will assume that in some way you are partially accepting them. 4) On the contrary, non materialistic theories of consciousness can tell us much about its nature, and its interaction with matter. Obviously, many different non materialistic approaches to consciousness exist, but that variety is a sign of richness, not of confusion. The fact is that, when we observe consciousness without a reductionist prejudice, it uncovers many important secrets. Even materialistic, but non completely reductionist, approaches to consciousness, like classical psychoanalysis, which I am not a big fan of, have at least given us interesting concepts, like the existence of a subconscious mind. 5) So my point is: materialist theories of consciousness (those which try to understand it in terms of the laws of matter) have failed, and explain nothing. Non materialistic theories instead (those which try to understand its internal laws considering it a special empirical principle), while not being perfect, are more appropriate to investigate the subject, and yield some results. In that sense, material theories of the brain do not explain consciousness, and the best scientific explanation is to consider it as a different principle in reality. You can argue that, maybe, some time there will be a materialistic theory which explains consciousness: I can concede that only as a pure possibility, without any scientific relevance. In principle, I may think that anything could be explained in a way that I like, but unless and until I can produce valid reasons to believe that, mine will remain a personal fantasy, and not a scientific theory. 6) Finally, your point about the aurora borealis has the same flaw of your point about liver. Both the aurora borealis and the liver are perceived by the senses. They are part of the objective world. It is perfectly reasonable to look for objective explanations of them, even if at present not yet found. It is not the same for consciousness. that is he essence of my first statement about consciousness. Consciousness is objectively subjective. It has properties and internal laws which are completely different from those of the external objects we perceive by the senses. You may not agree (your right), but please, don't make in your next post a third example saying that what I affirm about consciousness is like saying that as in 1500 they had no theory of chemical reactions, they would think that they cannot have a physical cause. We could go on forever that way, and we both have better things to do. Well, I am finished on that. For me, it is "discussed". Let's go on. You say: "Take a look at consciousness. It goes away when our brains enter a state called sleep. A blow to the head can cause it to vanish, and particular brain injuries can cause it to vanish permanently, even though the rest of the brain and body continue to function correctly. Alcohol changes consciousness, and too much alcohol eliminates it entirely. Drugs affect it." That's an interesting point. I have already admitted that it is absolutely trivial that consciousness is strongly influenced by matter. We have always known that, and that has never been a problem for all those who during the centuries have entertained non material theories of consciousness (that is, most philosophers and scientists in the course of human history). In the general opinion, the prevalence of a materialistic theory of consciousness in modern times is due to science: modern scientific discoveries would have brought a lot of evidence in favor of a materialistic theory of consciousness. I have tried to show, with much detail, in my post #20, that that is false. there is nothing essentially new today about the problem of consciousness which comes from scientific discoveries. Not empirical facts (the discoveries of neurophysiology give us no essentially new information, in that regard, beyond what we have always known about the connection between consciousness and the physical body); not theoretical arguments (AI theory is a failure). So, what is happening today? Have humans suddenly become more intelligent? Are our scientists or philosopher so much better than, say, Plato or Shankara or St. Augustine, that they draw so different brilliant conclusions from the same data? I don't think so. Non materialistic theories of consciousness remain the best. And I am honored of being on the same part of Plato, Shankara and St. Augustine, and not of Dawkins, Dennet and Hitchens. So, we agree that consciousness is heavily influenced by matter. It work both ways. Events in consciousness do influence matter (see the consequences of many human theories on the world). But I have to disagree with you on many specific points about consciousness: - I don't believe that "It goes away when our brains enter a state called sleep" - I don't believe that "A blow to the head can cause it to vanish, and particular brain injuries can cause it to vanish permanently, even though the rest of the brain and body continue to function correctly." - I do believe that "Alcohol changes consciousness", but... - I don't believe that "too much alcohol eliminates it entirely" - Finally, it is perfectly true that "Drugs affect it". Perhaps you can see my point, but I will state it explicitly: I think you confound "consciousness" with "waking consciousness". That's a serious mistake. Consciousness, in its human form (that is, as long as we are alive in a material body) exists in different "states". A very simple consideration will show that we have at least three fundamental states of consciousness: a) waking state b) sleep with dreams c) sleep without dreams We have many others, less universal or common: farmacological anesthesia, hypnosis, mystic experiences, coma of different levels, hallucinations, NDEs, and so on. My point is: the various states of consciousness are often very different one from the other, but consciousness is always there. It cannot be annihilated. It just passes from one state to another, and often the following state has no clear understanding or recollection of the previous one. Sleep is a good example. You say that "(consciousness) goes away when our brains enter a state called sleep". That is not true. At least for sleep with dreams, it is easy to verify that consciousness does not go away. Even if we completely forget most of our dreams, we have sufficient evidence from the limited part we remember. For sleep without dreams, evidence is more difficult, but I do believe that consciousness is there, in a less formal and deeply resting state, and i don't think you can demonstrate the contrary. A blow to the head can certainly momentarily (or sometimes permanently) affect normal waking consciousness. But not consciousness itself. And so on. "Waking consciousness" is only one form of consciousness. it is the one we most easily recognize and remember. t is the basis of what we usually recognize as our personal ego. But it is not the whole reality. Indeed, it is probably a small part of it. Even materialistic views like psychoanalysis have stressed the great importance of the subconscious mind (please notice that I purposefully don't call it "unconscious")in human reality. You say: "The evidence is overwhelming that consciousness depends on the brain." I will reformulate that: "The evidence is overwhelming that consciousness, in normal human life, is strongly influenced by the activity of the brain, and strongly influences it." In that form, and only in that form, I agree. Finally, my comments to your 7 points: 1) "dualists haven’t explained how souls or spirits give rise to consciousness" Again, my point is not that "souls" or "spirits", whatever we mean with that, "give rise" to consciousness. I am not affirming that consciousness is some function or consequence of an immaterial principle. I am stating that consciousness "is" an immaterial principle. The transcendental subject perceives, because it is a subject. There is no other way of saying it. There is no problem of "giving rise" to consciousness. Consciousness exists (empirical fact), perceives (empirical fact) and is immaterial (the most reasonable scientific inference). 2) "The dualist must explain how the immaterial soul or spirit interacts with and controls the physical body. Materialists have no such problem. " We must explain how consciousness interacts with the physical body. But, once admitted that consciousness is a principle of nature (like matter and energy and law), to "explain" does not mean any more "to explain it away in material terms", but rather "to understand how the inner laws of consciousness interact with the inner laws of matter, without contradicting what we know about those laws." Such an "explanation" is not easily attainable, but we can certainly understand much if we research and reflect with an unbiased attitude. On the contrary, we will never understand anything of the laws of consciousness by denying them and by trying to reduce them to a completely different, and inappropriate, set of laws. And let's remember, materialist do have the problem of explaining consciousness in material terms. 3) "If the will is even partly dependent on the physical brain, and can be disrupted by damage to the brain, then in what sense can we continue to attribute moral responsibility to the soul?" I have already answered to that in post #11. For your convenience, I quote here what I wrote: "Wow, that’s a very big issue! But a brief answer is due. For me, “will” and “free will” are two different concepts. Will is the general faculty of consciousness to initiate outputs. But those outputs are not necessarily “free”. They are often influenced by many external conditions, and by many internal conditions (including conditions of the brain and mind). The concept of “free will” is that, even if our consciousness is always influenced by many things, it is never completely “conditioned” by them (in a totally determinist way). There is always some space for freedom, even if, in many contexts, it may appear really small. So, the outputs of consciousness (will) are never totally deterministic, even if they are heavily influenced by other conditions. We are not totally free (we cannot do things in a completely free context, independent of our environment, of our body, of our brain, of our mind), but we are never totally slave. Because our consciousness is transcendental, and is endowed with free will. That’s also the origin of responsibility." 4) "Why have eyes and ears if NDEs and OBEs show that your soul can see and hear without them?" I will leave that for the end. 5) "Why, in lab experiments, have OBE “experts” never been able to demonstrate the ability to travel to a remote location and read a message that has been left there?" I don't know to what experiments you refer here. In natural OBEs, perception of objective events is sometimes documented. Of course, in this kind of things it is easy to be hyperskeptic. But why should the experiencer of an OBE be necessarily able to "travel to a remote location"? I don't understand your point here. 6) I think that goes with point 4. In a moment. 7) "If cognition, emotions, memory, perception, and will all depend on the brain, and can be completely disrupted by changes or damage to the brain, then why do so many people believe in a separable soul that can go on experiencing all of those things when the body is dead?" I think I will try to answer here to this, together with points 4 and 6. It is not a simple answer, because it implies some more detailed theory of the relationships between consciousness, mind and body. I have no pretense to give an universal answer. In a sense, I will not even give a real answer. I will just try to suggest a possible, and very generic model, to show that "it is possible" to answer. You must understand that you are asking very deep questions, even if your main purpose is to show apparent contradictions in a non materialist approach to consciousness. What I suggest is that you consider a model where we can distinguish at least three different levels of experience. Let's call them consciousness, mind and body (for our purposes, essentially the brain). 1) Consciousness we define as the principle of which I have spoken so long: a transcendental subjective I, which perceives all the modifications and relates them to itself. It is a purely subjective principle (in a very objective sense). It exists, is not generated by the brain, and in human life it perceives mainly what comes to it through the brain and mind. It exists in various state, essentially determined by what it perceives, but it can never be completely suppressed. 2) The mind we define as the whole set of subjective procedures and functions "used" by consciousness and "perceived" by consciousness. Let's say that, in this model, the mind is not generated by the brain, but is strongly linked to it, and is anyway formal. It has laws, procedures, functions, contents, mechanisms. The important point is that the mind, while being separate from the transcendental subject, is not the brain. It can exist without the material brain, although in human life it is strictly connected to it. You can ask what is the nature of this "mind". Let's say it is not material, but still "formal". I am afraid we cannot go deeper than that. Remember, I am offering these considerations not to convince you, but only to show that some of your difficulties are no more difficulties in a different model of reality. My anser to your points should now be clear. In NDEs, consciousness is still expressing itself through the mind, but no more (transiently) through the brain. For instance, you ask about sensations. In normal human lives, sensations come through the physical senses, and are elaborated in the cerbral cortex. And then? Then they "pass" to the mind, which transforms them in formal modification appropriate to be perceived by the I. The mind creates a reality from outer impulses, and in the state of waking consciousness it largely employs the brain to do that. In dreams, the mind creates a reality without outer impulses (or with a minimum contribution from them), and still employs the brain, but in a much lesser way. In NDEs, the connection between brain and mind is severed to a point which is not usually reached in normal states of consciousness: indeed, the brain is as "dead" as it can be, out of the state of final irreversible death. And what happens to consciousness? It still perceives through the mind. But the mind is in a different condition, having been momentarily "detached" form the brain. You say that in such a condition the mind should be "less functional", having lost its physical part. but that's not what happens. The mind feels greater freedom, greater satisfaction, in that state. And it goes on perceiving, only it perceives different things. Non material things, but things which, like the mind, are "formal". And, in some conditions, it can even perceive parts of the material world, even without the help of the physical senses, just using the mental senses (OBEs). Remember that OBEs are only a small part of NDEs, and usually happen at the beginning of them. But deep NDEs go far beyond. And they are deeply moving, involving, and usually gratifying experiences. So, as far as NDEs are involved, again you have only three alternatives: a) Denying them (difficult to do, today they are a well established empirical ensemble of facts). b) Explaining them away as a product of the brain (even a greater failure than AI theories: materialistic explanation of NDEs are almost ridiculous) c) Accept them as true experiences of the consciousness and mind, and try to learn from them. And believe me, there is much to learn.gpuccio
November 24, 2008
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crow thrall wrote:
The argument he is making is that all material things are particulars while our general concepts are universal applicable to all members in the class and therefore not material.
The concept of a circle is that it consists of all points equidistant from a given point, the center. This is universally applicable to all circles, but nothing about it precludes material representation. Anyway, I'm glad to see you concede that Adler's argument is not sound. I concur.ribczynski
November 24, 2008
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"Judging from the quote, Adler clearly believes that the only way to represent a class using matter is to represent every instance separately. Otherwise, why would a material representation lack the requisite universality?" You are still attributing things to Adler that he does not say. The argument he is making is that all material things are particulars while our general concepts are universal applicable to all members in the class and therefore not material. The distinction is between particular/material and universal/immaterial. Our concepts being acts of our intellect would then be immaterial as well and so our intellect would be immaterial. The major weakness of this argument in my opinion is that while our concepts are universal the acts of our intellect are particular. So I dont think that the argument presented here is completely sound. Adler does expand on this argument in some books if anyone is interested. "The difference of man and the difference it makes" and "intellect"crow thrall
November 24, 2008
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The idea of a brain thinking about itself is no more “self-referentially absurd” than the idea of an eye looking at itself in a mirror. By George! I think he's starting to get it!!tribune7
November 24, 2008
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kairosfocus, You claim that the idea of an embodied consciousness leads to "self-referential absurdity", but you don't demonstrate this. The idea of a brain thinking about itself is no more "self-referentially absurd" than the idea of an eye looking at itself in a mirror.ribczynski
November 24, 2008
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angryoldfatman, If hammers are so unnecessary, let's see you frame a house, driving every nail with your bare hands. The fact is that hammers work better than bare hands, which is why we use them. Yet people experiencing NDEs and OBEs report that they see just fine without the help of their bodies, so those expensive eyes, optic nerves, and visual cortices do nothing for them -- unlike hammers, which are useful tools. And I noticed that you avoided this question: Why do most blind people spend the rest of their lives sightless if the soul is capable of seeing the entire time? Good grief. At some point you have to ask yourself this question: "Am I so determined to continue believing in a soul that I will deny the obvious?"ribczynski
November 24, 2008
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If so, then why do our bodies have eyes, optic nerves, and a huge and elaborate visual cortex? These are expensive structures to build and maintain. If you are correct, they are an unnecessary and wasteful extravagance. Why are we saddled with them? And why do most blind people spend the rest of their lives sightless if the soul is capable of seeing the entire time?
Why do hammers have fiberglass handles, claws, rubber grips, a steel head, etc.? These are expensive structures to manufacture. If you can drive nails with your hands, they are an unnecessary and wasteful extravagance. Why are we saddled with hammers? And why do most people without hammers spend their lives never driving a nail if their hands are capable of doing so the entire time?
It makes no sense.
You're right, it makes no sense from a materialist standpoint. Just like driving nails with your hands doesn't make sense.angryoldfatman
November 24, 2008
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crow thrall wrote:
Rib, you clearly don’t understand what a universal concept is. It has nothing to do with infinite sets which Adler never mentioned. A universal concept is the intelligible essence of a thing stripped by the intellect from its accidents and conditions. In language they are represented by general nouns like dog or tree ect.
crow thrall, Look at what Adler wrote:
The argument hinges on two propositions. The first asserts that the concepts whereby we understand what different kinds or classes of things are like consist of meanings that are universal. The second proposition asserts that nothing that exists physically is ever actually universal. Anything that is embodied in matter exists as an individual, a singular thing that may also be a particular instance of this class or that. From these two propositions, the conclusion follows that our concepts, having universality, cannot be embodied in matter. If they were acts of a bodily organ such as the brain, they would exist in matter, and so could not have the requisite universality to function as concepts that enable us to think of universal objects, such as kinds or classes, quite different from the individual things that are objects of sense perception, imagination, and memory.
Judging from the quote, Adler clearly believes that the only way to represent a class using matter is to represent every instance separately. Otherwise, why would a material representation lack the requisite universality? What he's missing is that our minds don't represent large or infinite classes by enumeration. Think of the class of all circles. When we think of this class, we aren't holding all members of this class in our minds simultaneously. Instead, we are thinking of the characteristic that unites them: the fact that for each circle, all of its points are equidistant from a given point, the center. Nothing about this characteristic defies material representation. Adler is simply wrong.ribczynski
November 24, 2008
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anryoldfatman wrote:
So it is not vision nor any other particular sense that is made easier by possessing a body.
If so, then why do our bodies have eyes, optic nerves, and a huge and elaborate visual cortex? These are expensive structures to build and maintain. If you are correct, they are an unnecessary and wasteful extravagance. Why are we saddled with them? And why do most blind people spend the rest of their lives sightless if the soul is capable of seeing the entire time? It makes no sense.ribczynski
November 24, 2008
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Rib, you clearly don't understand what a universal concept is. It has nothing to do with infinite sets which Adler never mentioned. A universal concept is the intelligible essence of a thing stripped by the intellect from its accidents and conditions. In language they are represented by general nouns like dog or tree ect. This link was not directed to you but for the general interest, as it represents a different perspective from those being offered. The fact that you feel the need to overreach your ignorance and comment on something that you did not understand speaks volumes.crow thrall
November 24, 2008
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ribczynski wrote:
Why, then, don’t people who have experienced NDEs and OBEs report that their vision and hearing were impaired? To the contrary, they typically report that their senses were enhanced during the experience.
If we use the hammer analogy and the link I provided, then we see that there is no impairment of strength in using mere hands; nails can be driven through skillets. So I surmise it is with souls, given the evidence. So it is not vision nor any other particular sense that is made easier by possessing a body.angryoldfatman
November 24, 2008
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R However tempting it may be, I am not interested, for want of time, in a lengthy back-forth. I will note on a few key defects in your response, leaving the rest to others: 1] we perceive the world via our consciousness, but that in no way settles the question of whether the physical brain, on its own, can produce consciousness. You have this back ways: the fundamental relevance is that we perceive the physical word through the conscious inner life. Thus, on this topic, we must inevitably address self reference and what it can lead to: self referential absurdity. And, as the Welcome to wales example shows, step by step, that is precisely what happens when we try to account for the credibility of information per material objects interacting through forces of chance and necessity, as opposed to the work of intelligent directed contingency. We may not understand what mind is in detail, but we know that it is the premise of our rationality, and we know that it cannot be wholly accounted for on the grounds of chance + necessity without falling into self referential absurdity. So, we have to be open to a world in which there is something more than matter- energy- space- time and chance + mechanical necessity. That "something more" is per logical necessity im-material, however we may wish to label it. Next, we see that conscious, effectively reasoning mind is inherently not accounted for on the platform of physico-chemical interactions in the brain and its neurones and their networks, etc. Reppert, building on Lewis [as I noted in my previously linked], aptly summarises why:
. . . let us suppose that brain state A, which is token identical to the thought that all men are mortal, and brain state B, which is token identical to the thought that Socrates is a man, together cause the belief that Socrates is mortal. It isn’t enough for rational inference that these events be those beliefs, it is also necessary that the causal transaction be in virtue of the content of those thoughts. If anything not in space and time makes these thoughts the thoughts that they are, and if naturalism is true, then the propositional content is irrelevant to the causal transaction that produces the conclusion, and we do not have a case of rational inference. In rational inference, as Lewis puts it, one thought causes another thought not by being, but by being seen to be, the ground for it. But causal transactions in the brain occur in virtue of the brain’s being in a particular type of state that is relevant to physical causal transactions.
2] Suppose that you do have an immaterial intellect. How do you know that it is reliable? Of course, this is an invitation to infinite regress; in a context of self reference. It is also strawmannish, as we experience ourselves as being subject to "Humbling Truth no 1": Error exists. Now, let us follow Josaih Royce: try to deny the truth claim -- you will only instantiate it. Therefore we are well warranted to accept that we can discern truth sometimes but sometimes will err, so we need to be critically aware but open minded. That is independent of the constituents and composition of the mind-brain system. Strawman no 2: challenging me to show the reliability of <the immaterial mind. This works by ignoring experiential fact no 1 and also humbling truth no 1, and then converting what is properly a conclusion [we have minds that work well enough that they can be used to reason with some confidence, and caution; minds that cannot be wholly accounted for on the relevant physical bodies and forces we observe] into an asserted assumption that is then challenged as suspect. So, we point again the central, most relevant of all facts: we EXPERIENCE ourselves as rational and moral mental creatures, who though fallible at least sometimes think accurately, will to do the right and infer correctly. So, if one denies our provisional, fallible but potentially correctable rationality, one has ended all discussion. Through self-referential absurdity. 3] The materialist can point to natural selection as a mechanism for improving the brain over time . . . . An immaterial intellect is not shaped by genetics, and therefore cannot benefit from natural selection. Of course this first neglects that natural selection is a culling filter not an innovator of the functionally specified complex information required for novel body plans. FSCI, per our reliable observation, comes from intelligence, not from forces of chance + necessity. So it does no such thing as "improving the brain over time." And, that is exactly what Plantinga pointed out, at length, here. Excerpting:
. . . evolution is interested (so to speak) only in adaptive behavior, not in true belief. Natural selection doesn’t care what you believe; it is interested only in how you behave. It selects for certain kinds of behavior, those that enhance fitness [e.g. Paul the hominoid runs away from tigeroids based on many different possible belief systems], which is a measure of the chances that one’s genes are widely represented in the next and subsequent generations . . . But then the fact that we have evolved guarantees at most that we behave in certain ways–ways that contribute to our (or our ancestors’) surviving and reproducing in the environment in which we have developed . . . . there are many belief-desire combinations that will lead to the adaptive action; in many of these combinations, the beliefs are false.
So, we see here a strawman mischaracterisation of Plantinga in your: A person who thinks it’s a good idea to play with the hungry lions is less likely to survive and produce offspring than one who keeps a wary distance. But, as Adler exemplifies, a subtler strawman is at work. Who -- apart form a caricature -- says that "An immaterial intellect is not shaped by genetics"? --> You will observe that we accept that mind and brain are a system, and that there are thus influences from brain to mind as well as mind to brain [BOTH of which are empirically/ experientially well warranted]; as my originally linked appendix discusses. --> Cf especially my use of Derek Smith's two-tier controller processor model for AI systems and cybernetics. First an i/o path control processor, then a supervisory processor that interacts with the first and through it with the plant. --> Obviously, if the brain is an i/o processor and interface, then its genetics will have an influence on the overall system, and insofar as NS works as a culling filter thereon, it would have some influence on the adapting outcome for populations over time. 4 ] We know that the human intellect is not perfectly reliable, so whether materialist or dualist, we all have to be careful, double-check ourselves, consult our fellows, solve problems by different methods Now, what was shown already is that the physicalist account fails to address the radical divergence between physical properties and processes and symbolic- mental ones. Next, this actually acknowledges that we experience mind and must trust it to be sufficiently good and effective to work with it. So, if we know that such a mind is not credibly wholly accountable ion physical forces and materials, that leads to the logical inference that there is something more than such at work. 5] Quantum events are random. There is therefore no reason to think that even if they weren’t washed out, they would give rise to ordered, purposive behavior Again, a strawmannish distortion. Kindly compare what was already cited at 27 point 3. I reproduce Calef on Campbell here:
Keith Campbell writes, “The [Heisenberg-Einstein energy-time] indeterminacy of quantum laws means that any one of a range of outcomes of atomic events in the brain is equally compatible with known physical laws. And differences on the quantum scale can accumulate into very great differences in overall brain condition. So there is some room for spiritual activity even within the limits set by physical law. There could be, without violation of physical law, a general spiritual constraint upon what occurs inside the head.” (p.54). Mind could act upon physical processes by “affecting their course but not breaking in upon them.” (p.54). If this is true, the dualist could maintain the conservation principle but deny a fluctuation in energy because the mind serves to “guide” or control neural events by choosing one set of quantum outcomes rather than another. Further, it should be remembered that the conservation of energy is designed around material interaction; it is mute on how mind might interact with matter. After all, a Cartesian rationalist might insist, if God exists we surely wouldn’t say that He couldn’t do miracles just because that would violate the first law of thermodynamics, would we? [Article, "Dualism and Mind," Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.]
This goes beyond "Quantum events are random." Not quite: they are, below Einstein's Energy-time product bound, indeterminate and virtual. Thus, we see that we could nopt only introduce undirected cotningency in that window, but also directed contingency. Thus, we have a context in which we may open up room for investigation. 5] There is no independent evidence supporting the idea that quantum events dominate the brain’s functioning — just the desire on the part of some people to salvage the concept of an immaterial soul. Again, a strawman, this time, tied to an ad hominem. Observe, again, what was actually observed by Harald Atmanspacher:
It is widely accepted that consciousness or, more generally, mental activity is in some way correlated to the behavior of the material brain. Since quantum theory is the most fundamental theory of matter that is currently available, it is a legitimate question to ask whether quantum theory can help us to understand consciousness . . . .
In short there is plainly far more than an attempt to salvage an alleged dubious idea; there is an application of the current best insight on the world of the very small, to the question of our experience of Fact no 1: conscious mind in action. I leave the rest to others. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
November 24, 2008
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kairosfocus, Your lengthy comment boils down to the following three points: 1. Consciousness is primary. 2. Blind physical processes cannot be trusted to yield reliable truths. 3. Quantum indeterminacy provides a way for an immaterial mind to interact with the physical brain without violating the laws of physics. As I explained to gpuccio already, item #1 is true, but irrelevant. Yes, we perceive the world via our consciousness, but that in no way settles the question of whether the physical brain, on its own, can produce consciousness. Item #2 is an argument advanced by C.S. Lewis, Alvin Plantinga and others. It fails because: a. It claims that a physically-based intellect is untrustworthy, while ignoring the fact that an immaterial intellect fares no better. Suppose that you do have an immaterial intellect. How do you know that it is reliable? b. The dualist is even worse off than the materialist in this respect. The materialist can point to natural selection as a mechanism for improving the brain over time. A person who thinks it's a good idea to play with the hungry lions is less likely to survive and produce offspring than one who keeps a wary distance. An immaterial intellect is not shaped by genetics, and therefore cannot benefit from natural selection. The dualist has to assume the basic reliability of the intellect with no justification, while the materialist can point to natural selection. c. We know that the human intellect is not perfectly reliable, so whether materialist or dualist, we all have to be careful, double-check ourselves, consult our fellows, solve problems by different methods to see if we get the same answer, etc. Item #3 is also a common argument, embraced most famously by Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff. Problems with it include: d. The fact that quantum randomness typically gets washed out and doesn't manifest at the macroscopic level. e. Quantum events are random. There is therefore no reason to think that even if they weren't washed out, they would give rise to ordered, purposive behavior. f. There is no independent evidence supporting the idea that quantum events dominate the brain's functioning -- just the desire on the part of some people to salvage the concept of an immaterial soul.ribczynski
November 24, 2008
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crow thrall, Thank you for the link to Adler's essay. Alas, Adler's argument will not console those who believe in a soul or spirit that continues to think, feel, remember, etc., after death. Adler concedes that those things are impossible apart from the brain, which means that they cease at the time of death. Further, Adler's claim that there must be an immaterial component to the intellect, above and beyond the brain itself, is easily refuted. To see why, look at Adler's argument. In his own words:
The argument hinges on two propositions. The first asserts that the concepts whereby we understand what different kinds or classes of things are like consist of meanings that are universal. The second proposition asserts that nothing that exists physically is ever actually universal. Anything that is embodied in matter exists as an individual, a singular thing that may also be a particular instance of this class or that. From these two propositions, the conclusion follows that our concepts, having universality, cannot be embodied in matter. If they were acts of a bodily organ such as the brain, they would exist in matter, and so could not have the requisite universality to function as concepts that enable us to think of universal objects, such as kinds or classes, quite different from the individual things that are objects of sense perception, imagination, and memory. The power of conceptual thought, by which we form and use concepts, must, therefore, be an immaterial power, one the acts of which are not acts of a bodily organ.
Flaws in Adler's argument: 1. Not all classes are infinite. A finite class can be represented by an exhaustive enumeration of its members without any loss of universality. The argument fails here; Adler has overreached. 2. Even infinite classes don't necessarily require infinite representations. The class of all circles is infinite, but it can be represented very compactly in terms of words or equations. 3a. A computer, despite being purely physical, can be programmed to enumerate the members of an infinite class. For example, it is trivial to program a computer to generate all possible finite strings composed of the letters a, b, and c. 3b. A computer can also be programmed to decide whether a given string belongs to such an infinite class. 4. Humans themselves don't use infinite representations. For example, they don't represent infinite classes by enumerating their members. If they did, then a human could recognize instantly whether an instance was a member of the class. They cannot do this. For a concrete example, think of the class of all chairs. We might recognize a particular wooden object as a chair, but what if the legs are all broken off and half the seat is missing? What about a rock with an indentation in its side? Does it only become a chair after someone sits in it? What about a series of bean bags, from juggler-size up to room size? Which ones are chairs, and which aren't? The fact that humans have to stop, think, and argue about these questions shows that the class "chair" is neither exhaustively nor universally represented in the mind. Adler's argument fails again.ribczynski
November 24, 2008
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ribczynski (and so also GP): Four main points: 1] CONSCIOUSNESS AS THE BASIC FACT OF ALL FACTS: I think we need to come back to a basic point GP made, in no 11 (and note he is there explicitly not the dualist you seem to be making out; per Crow Thrall's link). The point GP made in 11 is crucially central, but it is is a point that is all too easily forgotten or distracted from:
. . . let’s start from the basics. Consciousness is neither a function nor a concept. It is an experienced fact. I will not use the word “observable”, because it could generate confusion, but let’s say that it is a “perceivable”. Obviously, I am speaking here of one’s personal consciousness, which is perceived, and not of other’s consciousness, which is inferred. More than that: our personal consciousness is the basic experience, the supreme fact where all others observables or perceivables happen. So, in a logical ladder of priorities, our consciousness is more “real” than the external world, including our bodies (which, being perceived and cognized in our consciousness, are in some way “external” to it). That’s where your liver example is inappropriate for consciousness, as it is inappropriate for consciousness’ functions, like will (more on that later). Indeed, the liver is defined as an object: we perceive it b[y] the senses, we analyze it by senses and inference. The same word “liver” has been made to define an object, an observable. So. to assume the existence of a “liver spirit” is possible but, as you correctly state, not necessary. Not the same with consciousness. It is perceived from the beginning, and its name was created exactly to define that experience. Here exactly the contrary is true: the assumption that consciousness “has a strict relationship with the brain” is a later inference, certainly correct, but extremely indirect. And the assumption that consciousness “is produced by the brain”, which is all another thing, is a much more imaginative and bold hypothesis, and definitely a wrong one. So, when I say that my consciousness is certainly existing, while the external world is probably existing, I am not at all exaggerating.
He elaborates these in 20. 2] PHYSICS IS NOT COGNITION, THOUGH THEY MAY AND PLAINLY DO INTERACT: Further to all this, some related thoughts on the divergence between physical interactions and cognition, a key and highly relevant function of consciousness, may be helpful [Link here]:
. . . cause-effect chains tracing to mechanical necessity and chance circumstances acting on matter and energy are utterly unconnected to the issue of making logically and empirically well-warranted assertions about states of affairs in the world. For a crude but illuminating further instance, neuronal impulses are in volts and are in specific locations in the body; but meaningfulness, codes, algorithms, truth and falsehood, propositions and their entailments simply are not like that. That is, mental concepts and constructs are radically different from physical entities, interactions and signals. So, it is highly questionable (thus needs to be shown not merely assumed or asserted) that such radical differences could or do credibly arise from mere interaction of physical components under only the forces of chance and blind mechanical necessity. For this demonstration, however, we seek in vain: the matter is routinely assumed or asserted away, often by claiming (contrary to the relevant history and philosophical considerations) that science can only properly explain by reference in the end to such ultimately physical-material forces. Anything less is "science-stopping." But in fact, in say a typical real-world cybernetic system, the physical cause-effect chains around a control loop are set up by intelligent, highly skilled designers who take advantage of and manipulate a wide range of natural regularities. As a result, the sensors, feedback, comparator, and forward path signals, codes and linkages between elements in the system are intelligently organised to cause the desired interactions and outcomes of moving observed plant behaviour closer to the targetted path in the teeth of disturbances, drift in component parameters, and noise. And, that intelligent input is not simply reducible to the happenstance of accidental collocations and interactions of physical forces, bodies and materials.
3] QUANTUM ROOM: Beyond that, it is worth the while to excerpt Harald Atmanspacher from an article in the Stanford Enc of Phil on consciousness:
It is widely accepted that consciousness or, more generally, mental activity is in some way correlated to the behavior of the material brain. Since quantum theory is the most fundamental theory of matter that is currently available, it is a legitimate question to ask whether quantum theory can help us to understand consciousness . . . . The original motivation in the early 20th century for relating quantum theory to consciousness was essentially philosophical. It is fairly plausible that conscious free decisions (“free will”) are problematic in a perfectly deterministic world,[1] so quantum randomness might indeed open up novel possibilities for free will. (On the other hand, randomness is problematic for volition!) Quantum theory introduced an element of randomness standing out against the previous deterministic worldview, in which randomness, if it occurred at all, simply indicated our ignorance of a more detailed description (as in statistical physics). In sharp contrast to such epistemic randomness, quantum randomness in processes such as spontaneous emission of light, radioactive decay, or other examples of state reduction was considered a fundamental feature of nature, independent of our ignorance or knowledge. To be precise, this feature refers to individual quantum events, whereas the behavior of ensembles of such events is statistically determined. The indeterminism of individual quantum events is constrained by statistical laws.
To that, Scott Calef in the Internet Enc of Phil adds as key subtlety:
Keith Campbell writes, “The [Heisenberg-Einstein energy-time] indeterminacy of quantum laws means that any one of a range of outcomes of atomic events in the brain is equally compatible with known physical laws. And differences on the quantum scale can accumulate into very great differences in overall brain condition. So there is some room for spiritual activity even within the limits set by physical law. There could be, without violation of physical law, a general spiritual constraint upon what occurs inside the head.” (p.54). Mind could act upon physical processes by “affecting their course but not breaking in upon them.” (p.54). If this is true, the dualist could maintain the conservation principle but deny a fluctuation in energy because the mind serves to “guide” or control neural events by choosing one set of quantum outcomes rather than another. Further, it should be remembered that the conservation of energy is designed around material interaction; it is mute on how mind might interact with matter. After all, a Cartesian rationalist might insist, if God exists we surely wouldn’t say that He couldn’t do miracles just because that would violate the first law of thermodynamics, would we? [Article, "Dualism and Mind," Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.]
In short, while blows to the head, sleep [and BTW, is not a dream state in some relevant respects a conscious one . . . ?], drugs and alcohol may indeed have various effects on consciousness, we still have not thereby reduced mind to matter or an emanation thereof driven by mechanical forces of chance and necessity. Indeed, we may now look at . . . 4] MATERIAL BODIES AND MECHANICAL FORCES VS MIND AT WORK: We are facing an issue that that which strictly originates in forces of chance plus necessity loses credibility as rational inference or message. A thought experiment following Taylor is helpful: 1 --> Suppose you were standing by a hillside, and saw a pile of rocks suffer an avalanche. Then, before your astonished eyes -- with apologies to Richard Taylor and others as far back as Cicero -- the falling rocks settle into a pattern of shapes, the following alphanumeric, Roman alphabet glyphs, as sequenced thusly: "Welcome to Wales." 2 --> Now, this is not at all forbidden by either physics or logic: per the principles that underly statistical thermodynamics, any particular configuration that is possible could in principle be produced by the agitation and interactions of the falling rocks. (However, it is so obviously vastly improbable that we suffer astonishment; for we know by abundant experience, that non-functional configurations are vastly more probable per chance + necessity, rare functional ones being far more probably induced by intelligent action. This is the point of Hoyle's 747 by a tornado in a junkyard thought exercise.) 3 --> Let us further excerpt, from my second linked above: ". . . the shape taken on by the cluster of rocks as they fall and settle is arbitrary, but [e] the meaning assigned to the apparent message is as a result of the imposition of symbolic meaning on certain glyphs that take up particular alphanumerical shapes under certain conventions. That is, it is a mental (and even social) act. One pregnant with the points that [f] language at its best refers accurately to reality, so that [g] we often trust its deliverances once we hold the source credible." 4 --> Continuing: "But, this brings up the key issue of credibility: should we believe the substantial contents of such an apparent message sourced in lucky noise rather than a purposeful arrangement? That is, would it be well-warranted to accept it as -- here, echoing Aristotle in Metaphysics, 1011b -- "saying of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not"? (That is, is such an apparent message credibly a true message?) . . . " 5 --> Thus: "The answer is obvious: no. For . . . cause-effect chains tracing to mechanical necessity and chance circumstances acting on matter and energy are utterly unconnected to the issue of making logically and empirically well-warranted assertions about states of affairs in the world." 6 --> So, unless there is something crucially more than and distinct from physical interactions and effects thereof at work in our mind, rationality itself collapses. For, law is generally speaking deterministic or at least stochastic, and chance is arbitrary. For us to have rational, directed contingency, we need more than chance conditions + forces of mechanical necessity acting on material bodies. 7 --> In short, the dominant evolutionary materialism paradigm inherently undermines and discredits the very rationality that strong AI adherents must use to formulate their theories. 8 --> In short, GP's doubts on strong AI are not merely a question of future progress of science, but of reductio ad absurdum, per self referential incoherence resting on the fact that we are conscious, reasoning, mental beings. Unless our thoughts are at once logical and factual not just blind results of arbitrary conditions and mechanical forces, we cannot trust the deliverances of reason to be any more credible than the "lucky noise" that in our thought experiment produced an apparent message. So, we must not lose sight of what is the truly central issue at stake. Trust that helps . . . GEM of TKIkairosfocus
November 24, 2008
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