Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

Epistemology. It’s What You Know

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BarryA’s definition of a philosopher:  A bearded guy in a tweed jacket and Birkenstocks who writes long books explaining how it is impossible to communicate through language without apparently realizing the irony of expressing that idea through, well, language. 

Seriously, I have read a lot of philosophy, and I find some of the philosophers’ ideas valuable (that is, when I can decipher them though the almost impenetrable thicket of jargon in which they are usually expressed).  In particular, epistemology (the theory of what we know and how we know it) is one of the most useful philosophical ideas for the ID – Darwinism debate.  Indeed, many of the discussions on this blog turn on questions of epistemology.  So I thought it would be helpful to give a brief overview of the subject in the ID context.  So here goes – 

Consider the following statement one often hears:  “We can be as certain that the diversity and complexity of living things arose by chance and necessity through blind watchmaker Darwinism (BWD) as we are that the earth orbits the sun.” 

To examine this statement, we must first understand what it means to “know” something, and this is where epistemology comes in.  The standard philosophical definition of knowledge is “justified true belief.”  Why not just “true belief”?  Because if we have no basis for our belief, the fact that our belief might in fact be true would be a mere coincidence.  We cannot, therefore, say we know something unless we have evidence to support our belief; in other words, the belief is justified. 

Keep in mind that our beliefs can never be justified in an absolute sense.  You have a justified belief that you are sitting at your computer reading this scintillating post.  Even though this belief is highly justified and almost certainly true, you cannot rule out that you are dreaming or that you are in the Matrix or that you have been deceived by one of Descartes’ demons.   

A corollary to the proposition that beliefs can never be absolutely justified is that justification is always relative.  Indeed, these are two ways of saying the same thing.  Thus, justification of our beliefs comes in degrees; some beliefs are more justified than others.  About some beliefs we can be all but certain they are true.  While there is some remote possibility you are in the Matrix and not actually reading this post, for all practical purposes we can discount the Matrix possibility and conclude that your belief is true.   

It is interesting to note that the Matrix idea is not new.  In the 1700’s George Berkeley (after whom the California city and university are named) proposed that an individual cannot know that an object “is.”  He can only know that he has a “perception” that there is an object.  In his “Life of Johnson” Boswell records Dr. Johnson’s response to Berkeley: 

“After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berkeley’s ingenious sophistry to prove the nonexistence of matter, and that every thing in the universe is merely ideal.  I observed, that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it – ‘I refute it thus.’” 

At one level Boswell was right and Johnson was wrong.  As a matter of pure logic, Berkeley’s ideas are irrefutable.  Berkeley would have replied that when Johnson kicked the stone, all he could be certain of was that he had a perception in his mind that he kicked a stone.  He could not be absolutely certain that he had in fact kicked a stone.  Nevertheless, Johnson’s main point is valid.  Our sensory experience of the outside world is all we have.  If we doubt that experience, we are left in a hopeless mire of doubt and skepticism.  Therefore, while we can never be certain that Berkeley was wrong, as a practical matter, in order to live our lives and make progress in science, we can safely ignore him.   

It is beyond the scope of this post to discuss philosophical hyper-skepticism in detail.  For my present purposes, I will note that even hyper-skeptics look both ways when they cross the street.  In other words, while hyper-skepticism may be interesting to discuss in the parlor on Sunday afternoon after lunch, it is perhaps the least practically helpful idea in all of philosophy.  For the scientific enterprise (and life generally) hyper-skepticism may be dismissed with a nod.   

In summary, therefore, we can trust our sense impressions to give us generally reliable information about the world upon which to base our scientific conclusions.  For my purposes here, “sense impressions” include both direct impressions on our senses and impressions from various measuring instruments such as telescopes and microscopes.  Moreover, science has a check against conclusions based upon erroneous sense impressions.  All scientific observations must be “inter-subjectively” testable.  In other words – as the scientists who announced they had achieved cold fusion a few years ago found to their dismay – scientific conclusions are not usually accepted until other scientists replicate the results in independent experiments.   

Having slain the dragon of hyper-skepticism (or at least banished him to his cave like the bad boy he is),  we move on to the practical business of scientific discovery.  This method is familiar to most of us.  In truncated summary the model is: 

1.  Think of a question that needs to be answered.  

2.  Formulate a hypothesis to answer the question.

3.  Test the hypothesis by experiment and/or observation. 

Here is where the concept of “fact” comes in.  In philosophy, a “fact” is a state of affairs described by a true proposition.  In science we say that a “fact” is an objective and verifiable observation.  I have a hammer in my office (I don’t know why, but I really do).  Just now I picked up the hammer, held it above the floor, and dropped it.  The following is a statement of fact.  “It is a fact that Barry’s hammer fell to the floor when he dropped it.”  In science we have a epistemic hierarchy:   

1.  Facts:  The raw objective and verifiable observations.  Of the correspondence between truth and proposition, this is where we have the most confidence.  Unless I’m in the Matrix (a possibility we have decided to ignore), it cannot reasonably be disputed that my hammer really did drop to the floor. 

2.  Hypothesis:  An explanation for a phenomenon that can be tested. 

3.  Theory:  A coherent model that gives a general explanation of observed data. 

About facts, we can be certain, but our conclusions based on those facts (our theories) are less certain.  In fact, some of our most cherished beliefs can turn out to be untrue even though they were highly justified and seemed to correspond to the data perfectly.   

Ptolemy’s cosmology is a perfect example.  Ptolemy, who lived from about 83 to 161 AD, was the greatest of the ancient astronomers.  It is a modern conceit that the ancients were quaint simpletons who thought we live in a cozy little universe.  It is true that the ancients did not know as much as we do, but they were not stupid.  For example, Ptolemy knew the universe is enormous.  In the “Almagest,” his famous work on astronomy, he wrote that the earth, in relation to the distance of the fixed stars, has no appreciable size and must be treated as a mathematical point.   

Not only did Ptolemy know that we live in an immense universe, he also knew that the celestial bodies behave in certain highly predictable ways.  On a certain night of the year Orion, for example, is always in the same place in the sky.  While the stars seemed to be fixed in place, the planets seemed to wander among them (“planet” means “wanderer”).  Ptolemy combined these observations with his belief that the earth was the center of the universe and developed a system, a theory, that predicted the movements of the celestial bodies with great accuracy.   

Briefly, in Ptolemaic cosmology “deferents” are large circles centered on the Earth.  “Epicycles” are small circles the centers of which move around the circumference of a deferent.  So the sun, the moon and the planets have their own epicycles, and each epicycle in turn moves along a deferent around the earth.  This system sounds very complex, and it was.  But it provided astonishingly accurate predictions of the movements of the celestial bodies.  In Ptolemy’s “Handy Tables,” one could find all the data needed to predict the positions of the sun, moon, planets and stars and also eclipses of the sun and moon. 

Ptolemy’s system was so good that it was the basis upon which celestial predictions were made for over a thousand years.  Copernicus first published his theories in 1543.  Forty years earlier, armed only with his knowledge of Ptolemy, Columbus was able to awe the Indians on present day Jamaica by predicting the lunar eclipse of February 29, 1504. 

Importantly, note that Ptolemy’s system has every attribute of a sound scientific theory, and if the scientific method had been around in his day, scientific experiments would have supported his theory.  For example, suppose Ptolemy was interested in accounting for the observed movement of Mars across the sky.  He could have used the steps of the scientific method as follows: 

1.  Question:  What accounts for the observations of Mars’ movements across the sky. 

2.  Hypothesis:  Mars orbits a certain epicycle which in turn moves around the circumference of a certain deferent. 

3.  Observation/test:  When we look at the sky and make numerous detailed observations of Mars’ position, we see that Mars’ motion though the sky is perfectly consistent with the posited epicycle and deferent. 

4.  Conclusion:  The hypothesis is not falsified. 

5.  Theory:  This non-falsified hypothesis is consistent with the general theory that all celestial bodies move along epicycles and deferents.   

Ptolemy’s cosmology was accepted for over 1,400 years.  It began to crumble only when later observations of the celestial bodies required more and more and more adjustments to the theory so that it became staggeringly complex.  Along comes Copernicus with a judgment based upon his religious sensibilities:  Surely God would not have designed such a clunky universe.  There has to be a more elegant answer.  And motivated by his essentially aesthetic judgment, he developed a heliocentric cosmology that gradually displaced Ptolemy.   

Yet another modern conceit is that scholars in Copernicus’ and Galileo’s day rejected heliocentric cosmology for dogmatic religious reasons even though the conclusion that Copernicus’ model was superior was intuitively obvious to even the most casual observer.  This is simply not true.  Yes, religious considerations motivated opposition to Copernicus to a degree.  That cannot be denied.  Nevertheless, the conceit is false.  Sixteenth century scholars were not motivated SOLELY by religious considerations as the conceited modern would have it.  They had good SCIENTIFIC arguments to support their position.  These arguments turned out to be wrong, to be sure, but it is important to remember that they were not utterly unreasonable.   

Ptolemy was wrong, but he was not stupid.  His beliefs were justified in the sense that there was substantial evidence to support them.  He observed the celestial bodies move in certain ways; from his perspective the sun appeared to orbit the earth.  Even today we say the sun rises when we know it does no such thing.  Ptolemy’s fundamental assumption was that the earth is the center of the universe.  His assumption was not based upon dogmatic anthro-centrism.  He argued for his conclusion based on the data he observed.  Ptolemy believed that all bodies fall toward the center of the universe.  All falling objects are seen to drop toward the center of the earth.  Therefore, the earth must be the center of the universe. Ptolemy rejected the notion that earth rotates on the ground that objects thrown into the air fall back to the same place from which they were thrown, which would be impossible if the earth were rotating beneath them while they were in the air. 

But the most fundamental reason that scholars did not immediately roll over and accept Copernicus was the fact that, for all its clunkiness, Ptolemy’s system had for 1,400 years provided exceedingly accurate predictions about the movements of the celestial bodies.  They said, “The system we have accounts for the observed data exceedingly well and has done so for well over a millennium.  The burden is on you, Copernicus and Galileo, to show us why we should abandon it.”  Only in retrospect, with the advantage of 500 years of experience, do we look back on the scholars of Copernicus’ day with contempt.   

For our purposes it is important to note that for the most part, the “facts” Copernicus used to develop his theory were the same “facts” Ptolemy used to develop his.  Copernicus looked at the sky and saw the same movements of the celestial bodies Ptolemy saw.  But by the time of Copernicus there had been many additional observations, and Ptolemy had had to be tweaked again and again to account for these new observations, and Copernicus began to suspect that these tweakings were ad hoc, and perhaps the theory itself needed to be reexamined.  The death blow, of course, was Galileo’s observations – made possible by improvements in telescope technology – of the four largest moons of Jupiter.  If moons orbit around Jupiter, it is obvious that not everything orbits the earth as Ptolemy believed.   

Now what does all of this have to do with the statement under consideration:  “We can be as certain that the diversity and complexity of living things arose by chance and necessity through BWD as we are that the earth orbits the sun.” 

Once we understand basic principles of epistemology, we understand that this statement is obviously false.  Breaking the statement down we see that it combines three propositions:  (1) We know the diversity and complexity of living things arose by chance and necessity through BWD.  (2) We know the earth orbits the sun.  (3) Our knowledge of “facts” (1) and (2) is epistemically equal. 

But it takes no great perspicuity to see that statement (1) is at a wholly different epistemic level than statement (2).  Statement (2) is an objective and verifiable observation.  We have gone into space and actually observed the earth orbiting the sun.  Conversely, statement (1) has not been the subject of a direct, objective and verifiable observation.  No one has ever observed any living thing evolve into a different species.  Inescapable conclusion:  Statement (3) is false. 

Now all of this is not to say that I am certain that the diversity and complexity of living things did not arise by chance and necessity through BWD.  I am in fact not certain at all.  While I personally do not believe it, this proposition may be true.  My point is not to “disprove” Darwinism.  My point is that the debate will be much more robust if we all use proper epistemic categories.  The story of Ptolemy is a cautionary tale for those who would make statements like the one we discussed above.  There are obvious parallels between Ptolemy and Darwin. 

1.  Ptolemy was a brilliant astronomer who made countless highly detailed observations from which he developed a theory of cosmology.  Darwin was a brilliant biologist (despite the fact that he had no formal credentials in the discipline) who made countless highly detailed observations from which he developed a theory of evolution. 

2.  Ptolemy’s theory is based on a fundamental assumption:  the earth is the center of the universe around which all celestial bodies orbit.  Darwin’s theory is based upon a fundamental assumption:  chance and necessity are the only forces available to account for the diversity and complexity of life. 

3.  If Ptolemy’s fundamental assumption were correct, something like his cosmology is NECESSARILY true as a matter of logic.  If Darwin’s fundamental assumption were correct, something like his theory is NECESSARILY true as a matter of logic. 

4.  Given the information available to him, Ptolemy’s theory accounted for the data brilliantly.  Given the data available to Darwin (and indeed to all biologists through about 1950), his theory accounts for the data brilliantly.   

5.  New data was observed, and numerous ad hoc adjustments had to be made to Ptolemy’s theory.  New data arose (for example, it is now generally accepted that the fossil does not support gradualism in the way Darwin envisioned), and ad hoc adjustments to the theory have been made (e.g., punctuated equilibrium).   

6.  A new theory (heliocentrism) was proposed to compete with Ptolemy.  The new theory rejected Ptolemy’s central assumption, but Ptolemy’s defenders clung to the old theory in large part due to their metaphysical/philosophical/religious commitments and refused to give the new theory a fair evaluation.  A new theory has arisen (ID) to compete with Darwin.  The new theory rejects Darwins’s central assumption by positing that a third force (agency) may account for the data.  Darwin’s defenders cling to the old theory in large part due to their metaphysical/philosophical/religious commitments and refuse to give the new theory a fair evaluation  

7.  Ptolemy and Copernicus were attempting to develop a model that accounted for the same “facts,” i.e., the observed motions of the celestial bodies were the same for both camps.  Darwinists and ID theorists also must deal with the same “facts.”  For example, the fossil record is a fact.  Both camps have to deal with the same fossil record.  It is the interpretation of the facts, not the facts themselves that make the difference.   

8.  In the end, new technology made it possible for profound new data to be discovered that simply could not be accounted for in Ptolemy’s theory (Jupiter’s moons orbiting around that planet).  In recent years new data has been discovered (staggeringly and irreducibly complex nano-machines in the cell; extraordinarily complex specified information stored in the DNA molecule) that cannot be accounted for in Darwin’s model.  Consider:  Is the electronic microscope analogous to Galileo’s improved telescope? 

9.  Pope Urban VIII persecuted Galileo for his “heretical” ideas in opposition to Ptolemy.  High priests of an entrenched and hidebound secular orthodoxy persecute ID proponents for their “heretical” ideas in opposition to Darwinism and the philosophical materialism upon which it is based.  Consider:  Is Richard Dawkins analogous to Pope Urban VIII?  Are Dembski and Behe the new Copernicus and Galileo?   

This has been fun to write.  I hope my readers enjoy it and find it useful.

Comments
Okay . . . : It seems that pace my just posted, there is life through exchange on both sides in this thread yet. I draw attention of all to the comment I just made at no 142 in the Big Blue thread. For I believe it gives us a conceptual context to address many of the underlying challenges here, too. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
January 16, 2008
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"Teleology" comes from the Greek word for "end" -- telos. Thus, teleological processes are those that are done, or implemented, with an end (i.e., a goal) in sight -- in other words, for a purpose. "All teleological" refers to the various ways of improving the chances of success in the marketplace. All involve a person or persons first deciding that the goal of improving upon an existing product is a worthwhile pursuit, and then utilizing the listed methods. You're right that feedback loops can provide "direction" in a purely mechanical way. But the setpoint of a feedback loop has to come from somewhere. In the case of control systems, e.g., a thermostat, the setpoint is chosen by a person -- an intelligent agent -- either directly (e.g., by setting a dial by hand) or indirectly (e.g., by programming an HVAC system for a diurnal cycle, etc.). As for "non-intelligent feedback", I really don't see those you list being very helpful for product design. The information provided is too coarse (and to an intelligent human, obvious). In essence, they're regions of immediate death. What's needed is finer-grained information from regions of relative success. Plus, the classification of things according to categories such as climate type and sociopolitical status requires intelligence. According to Darwinian theory, the "setpoints" of biological evolution are supposed to be established by the randomly varying environment. These would, indeed, be nonteleological. That this could account for variation of already existing features (microevolutionary changes) is uncontroversial. But is it sufficient to account for macroevolutionary changes -- the introduction of novel cell types, tissue types, organs, and body plans? There's no evidence-based reason to believe that this so. "Survival of the fittest" is tautological because what constitutes fitness depends on what variations occur. It's only after the fact that one can say, "That's it's it. That's what the fittest is." The fittest are the ones that survive, and vice versa. It's a practical tautology, due to the complexity of the system. But if the system was simple enough to avoid this, then it would be trivial, and certainly incapable of generating "endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful." It's a Catch-22. For Darwinian evolution to be what it's supposed to be, it needs to entail this tautology -- but, in the words of Karl Popper, "the explanatory power of a tautology is obviously zero."j
January 16, 2008
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j, in 140 said "There are many ways to significantly increase chances of success: use of focus groups, analysis of market trends, analysis of customer complaints, etc. — All teleological." j, I think you are over-extendinng the claim of "All teleological" with regards to feedback processes. Please help me to understand what you mean with that summary statement. My understanding of that concept, in a nutshell, is that teleological implies that something results through direction, purpose, etc. Implicit in this is the assumption, as I undestand it, that some intelligence is behind the process. A feedback loop, however, is a different means to provide direction. It doesn't require intelligence, so I don't think "teleological" is a safe summary for describing all feedback loops. For instance, I mentioned "feedback from the marketplace". That does not only entail people's messages, as with focus groups, customer complaints, etc. It also includes non-intelligent feedback, like the environmental influences you would get from marketing snowmobiles into a desert market, selling electric vehicles into the third world, or using raw rubber for tires in any market. The environmentally-induced feedback into the marketing process can cause those products to fail in the marketplace, independently of the direction of the producer or the consumer. By analogy the same holds that there will be at least a few environmental situations that provide blind feedback to biological processes, i.e. that are neigher tautological or teleological. j, in 140, mentioned "I think they’re a real concern because of the rhetorical implications, per my reply to StephenB." Agreed.Q
January 15, 2008
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StephenB: It seems that Darwinists use the term plan to create the illusion that the process is somehow being directed, when in fact, the environment to which the organism “adapts,” is equally clueless about where it is going, and thefore cannot “direct” anything at all. When do they use the word "plan"? Use of teleological terms for describing (nonteleological) Darwinian evolution tends to make it seem more believable than it otherwise would be. It's difficult to believe that it wasn't a sly rhetorical ploy when Darwin did it ("natural selection," "competition"). Q: ...the will of the automobile engineer isn’t sufficient to assure survival of a model of vehicle. Feedback from the marketplace occurs, and is essential to the process of making the product succeed in the market. In other words, survival of the model doesn’t just happen. Agreed. There are many ways to significantly increase chances of success: use of focus groups, analysis of market trends, analysis of customer complaints, etc. -- All teleological. Q: ...it isn’t the words that are the real concern, as they are simply a medium of transmitting concepts. I'm usually pretty flexible in accepting various words for the same idea. But in this case, I think they're a real concern because of the rhetorical implications, per my reply to StephenB.j
January 15, 2008
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j points out in 137, "This alone doesn’t give any insight into what makes a vehicle successful, or how to change it." True, but it does give other insights. Such as, we can see that the will of the automobile engineer isn't sufficient to assure survival of a model of vehicle. Feedback from the marketplace occurs, and is essential to the process of making the product succeed in the market. In other words, survival of the model doesn't just happen. Oh yeah, I agree with you that words shouldn't be co-opted as they are. But they are. So, greater explanations are needed when people from disparate backgrounds assemble at a website, and each brings their tools-of-the-trade to bear. However, it isn't the words that are the real concern, as they are simply a medium of transmitting concepts. I wasn't keen on aiguy's terms either, but I'm not in his specific field, so checked on what he meant, back in posts 112, 114 and 116. Your rewrite of what I posted works quite nicely, too.Q
January 14, 2008
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-----j writes, "Use of “goal,” “steer,” and “target” is an inapppropriate co-opting of terms that are inherently teleological for a process that is supposed to be nonteleological." -----"There are many better, more suitable words that can be used. For example, instead of “target,” try “outcome.” It makes much more sense when substituted into what you wrote:" This is an excellent point. Is it also not fair to fair to say that, inasmuch as Darwinistic evolution cannot "plan with an END IN MIND," it is not really planning at all? It seems that Darwinists use the term plan to create the illusion that the process is somehow being directed, when in fact, the environment to which the organism "adapts," is equally clueless about where it is going, and thefore cannot "direct" anything at all. In other words, to adapt is not necessarily to plan. The organism does not "read" the environment and make changes based on feedback in the same way a pilot reads signals and makes calculated adjustments. Much less does it have a "destination." It would seem that the mindless adaptation involved in RV+NS is not nearly so noble a thing as that.StephenB
January 14, 2008
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Q, Use of "goal," "steer," and "target" is an inapppropriate co-opting of terms that are inherently teleological for a process that is supposed to be nonteleological. There are many better, more suitable words that can be used. For example, instead of "target," try "outcome." It makes much more sense when substituted into what you wrote:
"The outcome will be survability of the mutation or elimination of the mutation. Outcome, in the sense that there is a distribution to the process - survivability and reproduction or no survivability and no reproduction. The interesting cases are for the non-nuetral mutations, in which there is a bimodal outcome. (Outcome in the feedback process ... just means that the results of the mutation will be some resulting survivability.)" The fitness of the mutation against the landscape will result in either more or less reproduction [of the organism].
"The survivors are those that survive.” Q: That is an unfair characterisation of the theory. The theory includes elements of variation and a feedback process. If anyting, it says survivors will be those that fit their environment. Imagine if someone was asked to analyze the sales of automobiles, and replied, "Those vehicles that fit their markets are the ones that are successful." This alone doesn't give any insight into what makes a vehicle successful, or how to change it. There are millions of ways in which the vehicle could be changed and be either more or less successful due to the change. -- The probability of less success is, of course, vastly greater if the changes are made at random. __________ J.B.S. Haldane (1935): "[T]he phrase, 'survival of the fittest,' is something of a tautology. So are most mathematical theorems. There is no harm in saying the same truth in two different ways."j
January 14, 2008
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Q: Re:
When cast in the model of a feedback system, that simple statement fails to represent the theory . . . . Let’s start with a mutation that occurs in an environment. That environment represents a fitness landscape. The target is survability of the mutation or elimination of the mutation. Target, in the sense that there is a distribution to the process - survivability and reproduction or no survivability and no reproduction . . . . The fitness of the mutation against the landscape will steer the organism towards more or less reproduction.
FYI, first: Feedback control systems have to be carefully tuned and are as a rule designed by experts, using components that are themselves highly complex and functionally specific. For instance, a servosystem actuator or a PID controller or a position sensor are not likely to be just lying around in the spontaneous natural environment. Going on to to your hill-climbing by natural selection example, you are missing the vital issue of the vastness of the relevant config spaces: well beyond the probabilistic resources of the observable universe, much less those of this one small planet. To see my point think about a vast ocean that dwarfs the Pacific by far and away. In it there are a relatively few far-scattered, relatively speaking small islands. To climb the hills and pick the fruit on these islands, you first have to find them before your randomly drifting life-raft runs out of resources and you starve to death. For instance, DNA in functioning life forms is credibly at least 30 - 500,000, and the body plan innovations of the Cambrian credibly required on the order of 100 million bases, and that dozens of times over. 4^300,000 >> 10^150 to 10^ 300, which is all we need to swamp out the islands of functionality in an ocean of non-functional configurations; and 4^ 100 millions is even vastly more beyond that. But we know that agents break through the UPB bartrier all the trime, as they are able to intelligently think though the purpose involved, the forces, materials and structures that can be used to implement the intent, and then can get us to the shores of the relevant island of functionality. Mind is like an engine and a vastly capable radar on your boat, that can pick up the island and allow you tro head directly to it. Then a bit of quick hill-climbing reaches to the juicy life-sustaining fruit: here, standing in for more efficient and effective functionality. This is a matter of routine observation of how information rich functional technologies evolve, cf. for instance TRIZ . . . or the classic case of Berra's blunder, in which he did not see that while indeed one can make out a time-based evolutionary sequence of Corvettes, each of them exhibits a key common factor: they were intelligently designed and adapted to an evolving state of technology and to meet ever-shifting consumer tastes and preferences. So, understand the challenge we again put to you -- and BTW I endorse Steve B's similar challenge on your thinking on the mind (save that I think that some paradoxes are about wonder not apparent contradiction . . .i.e they expose our inadequacy of concepts; indeed I think that true mind is a self-evident truth: reject it and you end up in a morass of logical absurdities, accept it and you see the wondrous nature of a world that is more than the merely material and its empirically based, logically deducible or inferrable emergent properties] -- i.e.:
Kindly show us empirical examples -- observed by us -- where lucky noise and the forces of nature acting on spontaneous or plausibly spontaneous configurations of matter and energy, have given rise de novo to functionally specified, information-bearing complex systems in the beyond 10^150 - 10^300 configurations in the relevant config space.
Until this is answered cogently, we are looking as so many irrelevant arguments. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
January 14, 2008
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-----Aiguy: I only have time to approach the overall texture of your argument. As was the case a few days ago, I will not be back for quite a while. Traditional philosophy builds on the ontological notion of theism or “metaphysical dualism,” which allows for a composite notion of reality consisting of an upper spiritual and a lower material realm. In many of your arguments, you seem to borrow from the upper realm to make the lower realm plausible, while acknowledging only the existence lower realm. This is especially true when you discuss the subject of the “mind” and its role. In fact, dualism posits a rational mind “separate from,” though interdependent with, the brain. We have good reason to believe in a mind separate from matter for a multitude of reasons, not the least of which is the “placebo effect.” Only if the mind is separate from the brain can it extricate itself from the physical laws of cause and effect that the brain is subject to. In other words, the minds ability to overrule the brain’s impulses depends on its being in a separate realm from the brain. Materialism, on the other hand, posits only a brain, or a mind “grounded in the brain.” The latter notion characterizes minds as something that “emerged” from the material realm and entered into some twilight zone between spirit and matter—an impossible middle realm in which the mind is both separate from and grounded in matter. There is no such thing as spirit grounded in matter, nor is there a mid-point between the two realms. Somehow you seem to believe that our ignorance about “energy” or “quantum probability waves,” justifies the notion that they ought to be removed from the materialistic paradigm and placed in some nobler category---but you do not provide the category. You also argue that the world came out of nowhere, but your rationale for this claim is a strange one indeed. In keeping with this theme, you insist that the notion of spontaneous generation is the rational equivalent of concept of an omnipotent creator. But they are not rational equivalents. Spontaneous generation (materialism) violates the principle of “infinite regress,” while theism (dualism) model confronts it, albeit without fully explaining it. Thus, materialism leads to contradiction, a logical difficulty which cannot be resolved, while theism leads to a paradox, an apparent contradiction which at least holds the potential for resolution. Equally unlikely, “neutral monism” argues for rational minds which are grounded in matter while performing functions that can only be acomplished separate from matter (another contradiction). -------So, you write, “I think ID proponents need to stop using “materialist” as an all-purpose epithet, synonymous with atheist, evolutionist, liberal, moron and other terms that are completely orthogonal to materialism.” I think that materialists should stop using weasel-words like “emergence” and “neutral monism” to camoflage their materialism. Materialism for all its faults, does at least exhibit the virtues of clarity and precision, allowing any reasonable person to discover its self contradictory nature. Materialism’s euphemisms exhibit no such virtue, as their only function is to hide in a semantic fog for the sole purpose of escaping detection for as long as possible. If you want to argue as a materialist, then do it; but do hold yourself accountable to its limitations as well, and avoid the irrational playground of the excluded middle.StephenB
January 13, 2008
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[...]  So far so good.  This is pretty much the same way I defined “fact” just a few days ago in Epistemology.  It’s What You Know.  [...]A Fact is a Fact is a Fact of Course; Unless it’s the Amazing Mr. Darwin | Uncommon Descent
January 13, 2008
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j, in 132, mentions "Darwinian evolution does not “steer toward a target.” “Goal,” “steering,” and “target” are all teleological. " When cast in the model of a feedback system, that simple statement fails to represent the theory. Let's start with a mutation that occurs in an environment. That environment represents a fitness landscape. The target is survability of the mutation or elimination of the mutation. Target, in the sense that there is a distribution to the process - survivability and reproduction or no survivability and no reproduction. The interesting cases are for the non-nuetral mutations, in which there is a bimodal target. (Target in the feedback process does NOT mean a pre-defined objective. It just means that the results of the mutation will tend towards some resulting survivability.) The fitness of the mutation against the landscape will steer the organism towards more or less reproduction. In the feedback process, the goal can be understood as the new target once the feedback from the fitness lanscape is input to the reproduction process. (Again, Goal in a feedback process wouldn't mean a pre-defined objective. If anything, it becomes a post hoc revision towards a refined target. I think the word "revised target" would be better, however.) The theory, using the feedback process, does say that the reproductiveness of a mutation will be steered towards the target of more or less reproduction by how well it fits in the environment. j, says "Darwinian theory has been called a tautology for good reason. (”The survirors are those that survive.”)" That is an unfair characterisation of the theory. The theory includes elements of variation and a feedback process. If anyting, it says survivors will be those that fit their environment.Q
January 12, 2008
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aiguy (113, 115): "the goal of evolution is always to find the genotype that will reproduce most efficiently in a given niche, yes? ...a goal (in cybernetics, anyway) means using negative feedback and correction to steer toward a target." Darwinian evolution does not "steer toward a target." "Goal," "steering," and "target" are all teleological. Use of such language is innacurate and misleading when discussing Darwinian evolution. Also, "efficiency of reproduction" doesn't necessarily mean anything, and so is unhelpful. Richard Lewontin, in his essay "Four Complications in Understanding the Evolutionary Process":
[I]t is not entirely clear what fitness is. Darwin took the metaphorical sense of fitness literally. The natural properties of different types resulted in their differential “fit” into the environment in which they lived. The better the fit to the environment the more likely they were to survive and the greater their rate of reproduction. This differential rate of reproduction would then result in a change of abundance of the different types. In modern evolutionary theory, however, “fitness” is no longer a characterization of the relation of the organism to the environment that leads to reproductive consequences, but is meant to be a quantitative expression of the differential reproductive schedules themselves. Darwin’s sense of fit has been completely bypassed. ... But...what does it mean to say that a type with one set of natural properties is more reproductively fit than another? ... [S]ome theorists...equate fitness with outcome. If a type increases in a population then it is, by definition, more fit. But this suffers from two difficulties. First, it does not distinguish random changes in frequencies in finite populations from changes that are a consequence of different biological properties. Finally, it destroys any use of differential fitness as an explanation of change. It simply affirms that types change in frequency. But we already knew that.
Darwinian theory has been called a tautology for good reason. ("The survirors are those that survive.") -- And a tautology doesn't explain anything.j
January 12, 2008
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kairosfocus, tribune7 - Ah, too much writing! I would ask you to please join "Deep Blue Never Is" at post 93 to see what I think ID needs to do in order to make its claim an empirically grounded proposition. https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/deep-blue-never-is-blue-that-is/#comment-162484 thanksaiguy
January 12, 2008
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AIG--OK, what would it take to make you accept that design and intelligence are realities?tribune7
January 12, 2008
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AIG: On my way back to bed, with rain in the background. Just a quick pickup:
GEM: THE TARGET FOR THE SYSTEM IS SET BY THE PRIMARY INPUT, WHICH IS PURPOSIVE AND GOAL-DIRECTED. That is where mind often enters the system . . . e.g the very sophisticated, precise multi-dimentional parallel input parallel output servosystems that govern my typing hands, to give rise to the FSCI of this blog post comment! Which is message, not lucky noise, nor is it the product of just the voltages and linkages and ion gradients in my neurons: those are just the physical mechanisms for something else, something much bigger and more important than that. That is why, IMHCO, Sir Francis Crick is so patently absurd — he is misreading the chemical-electrical signalling activity of an i/o processor [which only expresses and processes in physical analogue form what has a MEANING that is defined elsewhere] for the originator of the primary inputs! AIG: This is metaphysical speculation. Others disagree, and we can’t resolve the issue by appeal to observations.
But AIG, signal voltages and ion gradients and pulse frequencies, are meaningless in themselves. It is modulation and/or coding schemes that give them meaning. These are -- on 100+ years of observation -- mental, semiotic contstructs that are physically expressed. Indeed, 2.0 V = T, 0.7 V = F in a TTL gate in a controller is not inherent to the work done per unit charge moved between specified points in the electrical environment. [Onlookers, that is a definition of potential difference in electricity, aka "voltage."] Recall, too, how I used to introduce the generic comms system model as is in Fig 1 my always linked, then use instantiations of the mathematical and physical operations to shoo how they were givgen concrete reality. The same holds for signals in control systems, which embed the abstract comms system as subsystems: meaning is applied to physical variables, i.e signals, which are passed between the key elements in the controller. The meaning is not inherent to the signals or to the device physics of he components. it is again a designed construct where the physical variable is an analogue that expresses a meaningful construct relevant to the operation of the system. Just think of how you would design an op amp integrator, and what he rail voltages, RC values, pot settings and switches etc do to the process of integration of input signals. Add in the CRO that allows you to visualise the outputs and inputs as signals on a screen: use a classic old fashioned analogue storage scope, preferably one by good old Tektronix or Telequipment [which as I recall Tek bought out years ago]. Then, think about the discrete state, digital filter version that you could implement in hardware and/or software, and display on a screen, whether one of these fancy LCD displays ort even a modern day digital scope makes no real difference. BTW, I still love and deeply miss my old Test Lab test bench Tek 465 100 MHz analogue CRO! Then, think about the onward differential equation capturing system dynamics that the integrators etc are solving. Then think about how you are going to use the result of the simulation in a design situation or even to analyse say an economy or whatever. [Onlookers, Differential Equations rule!] The mental is going on beneath and around the physical, and gives it meaning. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
January 12, 2008
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Kairosfocus, In short I am starting from the indisputable fact that we find our minds reliable and useful... Ok, yes, I agree we have great reason to accept our minds as reliable and useful... ... in an intelligible world ... what BEST explains that. I think evolution does, BUT I WILL NOT ARGUE THAT. In any event, minds are reliable, and let's say we don't know why. So what? Just another question to answer, and it doesn't alter the fact that ID rests upon premises that can't be ascertained empirically (i.e. dualism and free will). In short, we have minds, minds that do not fit the materialist view of he world.. Sorry but I missed the reason that the unexplained reasonableness of minds is contrary to materialism, even if it is contrary to evolution. ...Which is message, not lucky noise,... I agree - message, and not lucky noise... ... nor is it the product of just the voltages and linkages and ion gradients in my neurons: those are just the physical mechanisms for something else, something much bigger and more important than that. This is metaphysical speculation. Others disagree, and we can't resolve the issue by appeal to observations.aiguy
January 11, 2008
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Tribune7, Design exist. It’s an indisputable reality. It’s axiomatic. ID — and I guess you can make the case that the phrase is a redundancy — is basically a methodological, objective, testable way of seeking design. It is not metaphysical in the least. I've made my arguments and I do not see that you've responded to them; I fear we must agree to disagree at this point. Cheers.aiguy
January 11, 2008
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Sorry folks, first try gave a blank: The first try gave a blank . . . PS: note how Here is an interesting system diagram for a MIAC, which captures some of what I am thinking on. [BTW, do you see where my hopes for meeting R Daneel's early "ancestors" lie . . .? (And I here allude to Berra's blunder on the evolution of the Corvette, and the intelligent design that underlay that evolution.)]kairosfocus
January 11, 2008
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kairosfocus
January 11, 2008
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AIG: Overnight, I got brushfires and deadlines and major player stakeholders breathing down my neck on a major project that has erupted into possible opening stages of a stakeholders war. (I'm sure that is a very familiar thing for you . . . and it is why I believe in old von Moltke the elder's premise that Erwin Rommel turned into an art form: no plan survives first contact with the enemy . . .]) So, I don't have much time for now. I will comment on your remark in 113:
It is pointless to entertain the notion that our minds are not reliable, since if it is true, we will not know it.
Notice, please, the full context of what I had actually said in 110, cleaning up that nasty "tot he" that spell checks won't fix -- now there is a real useful possible application for AI! -- and which dyslexics like me [differently wired front end i/o processor optimised for visual spatial not linear verbal; why Einstein "saw" before he worked out on paper . . . ] often don't spot till it's too late:
We know and rely on our minds, to get to the level we are at. So, the reliability of the minds we have is a datum [i.e. empirically anchored fact], what is to be explained, and is more reliable than our explanations: solidly credible facts count for far more than explanatory constructs such as theories, models and worldviews! But, evo mat, a phil that often hides under the lab coats of science, is dynamically impotent to achieve such, on grounds outlined in 106 supra. Thus, it is self-undermining and logically incoherent.
In short I am starting from the indisputable fact that we find our minds reliable and useful in an intelligible world -- which BTW traces to the significance of a theism based premise on which modern sci was launched -- and demanding: what BEST explains that. The answer, as 106 supra discusses, does not come up: EVO MAT. In short, we have minds, minds that do not fit the materialist view of he world -- even though at present we have not got a clue as to how the mind interacts with the front-end i/o processor, though we have a much better idea [often very reverse-engineerable] of how that i/o processor interacts with the sensors and actuators on real-world plants, such as the keyboard I am pounding away at just now. Indeed, note how in control system architectures, we have controllers feeding forward to actuators that act on plants, and sampled outputs are looped back from output monitoring to secondary inputs to the controller for comparison and error correction. BUT THE TARGET FOR THE SYSTEM IS SET BY THE PRIMARY INPUT, WHICH IS PURPOSIVE AND GOAL-DIRECTED. That is where mind often enters the system . . . e.g the very sophisticated, precise multi-dimentional parallel input parallel output servosystems that govern my typing hands, to give rise to the FSCI of this blog post comment! Which is message, not lucky noise, nor is it the product of just the voltages and linkages and ion gradients in my neurons: those are just the physical mechanisms for something else, something much bigger and more important than that. That is why, IMHCO, Sir Francis Crick is so patently absurd -- he is misreading the chemical-electrical signalling activity of an i/o processor [which only expresses and processes in physical analogue form what has a MEANING that is defined elsewhere] for the originator of the primary inputs! GEM of TKIkairosfocus
January 11, 2008
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I think “capable of creativity” and “bringing into existence” and “generating things unknown” are all far too vague, and therefore untestable, to ever use as a scientific definition. Is "capable of creativity" a true concept? (Before you reply something along the lines of “But a human programmer created the machines that plan FedEx routes!” please think about what sort of argument you are trying to make - what is the point of mentioning the origin of that intelligence? That the machine does not have intelligence. It does not plan (nor does it freely choose for that matter). Need we know the origin of something to determine if it is intelligent? No. But looking at the software behind the FedEx computers you would be able to determine that it is intelligently designed. I am saying that the sort of meaning you wish to give to the word “intelligence” in the context of ID cannot be verified in the context of ID. Design exist. It's an indisputable reality. It's axiomatic. ID -- and I guess you can make the case that the phrase is a redundancy -- is basically a methodological, objective, testable way of seeking design. It is not metaphysical in the least.tribune7
January 11, 2008
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tribune, Capable of creativity would probably be closer to what I meant — i.e bringing into existence, generating things unknown, planning. I think "capable of creativity" and "bringing into existence" and "generating things unknown" are all far too vague, and therefore untestable, to ever use as a scientific definition. The concept of planning using foresight, however, can be given a testable and distinct meaning, so let's look at that. Of course unconscious machines can plan, however - when you mail a package by FedEx there is no human intelligence involved in planning its route; rather, it is a machine intelligence that does it. So are you content to agree that intelligence is something that can apply to a deterministic, physical, mechanical device? (Before you reply something along the lines of "But a human programmer created the machines that plan FedEx routes!" please think about what sort of argument you are trying to make - what is the point of mentioning the origin of that intelligence? Need we know the origin of something to determine if it is intelligent? Do you wish to change your definition of "intelligence" to be something like "something that can plan, but also it can't have been created by a human"?) If you claim intelligence requires the ability to choose freely and you say it can’t be established that one (human beings) can choose freely, then you are claiming that it can’t be established that intelligence exists. No, not at all. I am saying that the sort of meaning you wish to give to the word "intelligence" in the context of ID cannot be verified in the context of ID. The term "intelligence" is given all sorts of different scientific (operationalized) meanings in human and comparative psychology, of course, and we all use the word in informal, unscientific ways as well. Regardless, presuming intelligence exists and design occurs, design can be detected empirically hence ID is science. No, you'll still need to come up with an empirically-grounded definition of "intelligence".aiguy
January 11, 2008
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I think you are using the word “design” here to mean “caused by intelligence”. Is that right? Yes If so, I presume by the word “intelligence” here you are referring to something with the mental attributes of human beings? Such as, perhaps, the ability to make choices freely, and the experience of consciousness? Capable of creativity would probably be closer to what I meant -- i.e bringing into existence, generating things unknown, planning. The notion that anything, including human beings, can make choices “freely” (independent of antecedent physical cause) is a philosophical conjecture, not an empirical fact. If you claim intelligence requires the ability to choose freely and you say it can't be established that one (human beings) can choose freely, then you are claiming that it can't be established that intelligence exists. Which would mean science can't exist. Or even this board. Which I'd grant is a metaphysical argument, but a rather silly one. Regardless, presuming intelligence exists and design occurs, design can be detected empirically hence ID is science.tribune7
January 11, 2008
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Tribune7, There are things of known design. They share commonalities that can be measured objectively — CSI, as you note back in post 104, would be an example. If an object has CSI, objectively measured, we can presume design. I think you are using the word "design" here to mean "caused by intelligence". Is that right? If so, I presume by the word "intelligence" here you are referring to something with the mental attributes of human beings? Such as, perhaps, the ability to make choices freely, and the experience of consciousness? If I have your definitions wrong, please correct me. Otherwise, perhaps you can see the problem. The notion that anything, including human beings, can make choices "freely" (independent of antecedent physical cause) is a philosophical conjecture, not an empirical fact. And since we do not have a scientific understanding of consciousness, there is no scientific way to evaluate the proposition that everything which creates CSI must necessarily be conscious.aiguy
January 11, 2008
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If you’d like to support your view, simply tell us how one can empirically distinguish intelligent causation from other types of causation. There are things of known design. They share commonalities that can be measured objectively -- CSI, as you note back in post 104, would be an example. If an object has CSI, objectively measured, we can presume design.tribune7
January 11, 2008
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Tribune7, If you'd like to support your view, simply tell us how one can empirically distinguish intelligent causation from other types of causation. Otherwise, I'm afraid my statements stand uncontested here.aiguy
January 11, 2008
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ID rests on the assumption that intelligent causation is emprically distinguishable from the rest of causation, And quite a good one. but this is not the case. It most certainly is Rather, it is a metaphysical speculation. Only if you don't know what metaphysics is.tribune7
January 11, 2008
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"Goal" as in the process of a feedback loop. Then we agree. (Maybe a more direct statement, and avoidance of multi-meaning words? "Goal" in my field isn't the same as in yours, apparently :-))Q
January 11, 2008
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Q, I don't consider a goal to entail a prediction; a goal (in cybernetics, anyway) means using negative feedback and correction to steer toward a target. Prediction is a way to use internal modeling to shape the correction, and you are right - evolution does not do that.aiguy
January 11, 2008
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aiguy, in 113 asks "It depends where you draw the boundaries around “the evolutionary process” I think. In a broader view, the goal of evolution is always to find the genotype that will reproduce most efficiently in a given niche, yes?" I would draw the line differently and say no, so that "goal" and "evolutionary process" are mutually exclusive. Based on what I see that "evolutionary process" is supposed to describe, I would draw the line around "environment", "response", and "evolutionary process", but not anything that implies prediction, such as "goal".Q
January 11, 2008
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