Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

Do split-brain cases disprove the existence of an immaterial soul? (Part Two)

Share
Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Flipboard
Print
Email

In my last post, I discussed the problem of split-brain cases, which was first raised by KeithS in a post over at The Skeptical Zone titled, Split-brain patients and the dire implications for the soul (June 22, 2013). I began by distinguishing three varieties of dualism (leaving aside property dualism, whose inadequacies from a theistic standpoint have already been ably exposed by Professor William Dembski – see here and here), which I referred to as substance dualism, thought control dualism and formal-final dualism. I then examined the six assumptions used in KeithS’s split-brain argument from the perspective of each of these versions of dualism.

What is a split-brain operation?

Before I go on, I’d like to provide a brief scientific explanation of what a split-brain operation is. The information below is taken from a Web page created by the Psychology Department at Macalester College (bold emphases are mine):

In a normal brain, stimuli entering one hemisphere is rapidly communicated by way of the corpus callosum to the other hemisphere, so the brain functions as a unit. When the corpus callosum of an individual is severed, leaving a split brain, the two hemispheres cannot communicate. In some forms of epilepsy a seizure will start in one hemisphere, triggering a massive discharge of neurons through the corpus callosum and into the second hemisphere. In an effort to prevent such massive seizures in severe epileptics, neurosurgeons can surgically sever the corpus callosum, a procedure called a commissurotomy. If one side of the brain can no longer stimulate the other, the likelihood of severe epileptic seizures is greatly reduced.

Answering KeithS’s questions on split brain patients

In this post, I’d like to discuss and respond to KeithS’s reductio ad absurdum argument. He begins by posing three questions, based on actual cases of split-brain patients, described in the medical literature:

1. In the case of the man who attacked his wife with one arm and defended her with the other, what did the soul want to do? Is the soul guilty of attacking her? Does the soul get credit for defending her?

2. If the right hemisphere knows something that the left hemisphere doesn’t, then does the soul know it? What if it’s the other way around, with the left hemisphere knowing something that the right hemisphere doesn’t?

3. In the case of the patient whose left hemisphere didn’t believe in God but whose right hemisphere did, what did the soul believe? Was the soul a theist or an atheist?
[NOTE: KeithS is alluding here to a case discussed by the neurologist Dr. V. S. Ramachandran in a video lecture in 2006, about a split brain patient who was asked to point to “Yes,” “No” or “I don’t know,” in response to a series of questions, and whose right hemisphere, when shown the question, “Do you believe in God?”, directed the patient to point to “Yes,” while the patient’s left hemisphere, in response to the same question, directed the patient to point to “No.”]

I might add another interesting case which I’ve come across, relating to a patient named Paul S. (whose case history is discussed in detail on a Macalester College Web page on split-brain consciousness), who underwent brain bisection in the 1970s, and whose right hemisphere (unlike that of most split-brain patients) was able to understand not only nouns, but also verbal commands and also questions, after surgery, and respond to these questions in writing, giving simple one-word answers:

Paul’s right hemisphere developed considerable language ability sometime previous to the operation. Although it is uncommon, occasionally the right hemisphere may share substantial neural circuits with, or even dominate, the left hemisphere’s centers for language comprehension and production. The fact that Paul’s right hemisphere was so well developed in its verbal capacity opened a closed door for researchers. For almost all split brain patients, the thoughts and perceptions of the right hemisphere are locked away from expression. Researchers were finally able to interview both hemispheres on their views about friendship, love, hate and aspirations.

Paul’s right hemisphere stated that he wanted to be an automobile racer while his left hemisphere wanted to be a draftsman. Both hemispheres were asked to write whether they liked or disliked a series of items. The study was performed during the Watergate scandal, and one of the items was Richard Nixon. Paul’s right hemisphere expressed “dislike,” while his left expressed “like.”

(Reference: Atkinson, Rita L., Introduction to Psychology, Eleventh Edition , Harcourt Brace College Publishers, Orlando, c. 1993.)

The case of Paul S. is fully described in an article by Joseph E. LeDoux, Donald H. Wilson and Michael S. Gazzaniga, titled, A Divided Mind: Observations on the Conscious Properties of the Separated Hemispheres (Annals of Neurology 2:417-421, 1977). I’ll quote a few relevant excerpts here:

The question of whether the essence of human consciousness can be represented bilaterally in the split brain patient has so far remained unanswered. The following observations on a new patient, Patient P. S., may help to resolve the issue. For the first time, it has been possible to ask subjective questions of the separated right hemisphere and to witness self-generated answers from this mute half-brain. This opportunity was made possible by the fact that linguistic representation in the right hemisphere of our patient is greater than has been observed in any other split-brain patient. In addition to an extensive capacity for comprehending written and spoken language, the right hemisphere, though unable to generate speech, can express its mental content by arranging letters to spell words [12]…

Results

The right half-brain spelled “Paul” in response to the question “Who are you!” When requested to spell his favorite girl, the right hemisphere arranged the Scrabble letters to spell “Liz.” The right hemisphere spelled “car” for his favorite hobby. When the right hemisphere was asked to spell his favorite person, the following was generated: “Henry Wi Fozi.” (Henry Winkler is the actor who plays Fonzie.) The right hemisphere generated “Sunday” in response to the question “What is tomorrow?” When asked to describe his mood, the right hemisphere spelled out “good.” Later, in response to the same question, the left spelled “silly.” Finally, the right hemisphere spelled out “automobile race” as the job he would pick. This contrasts with the frequent assertion of the left hemisphere that he will be a “draftsman.” In fact, shortly after the test session, when asked what he would like to do for a living, the left hemisphere said, “Oh, be a draftsman, I guess.” … Finally, it should be noted that on each of these right hemisphere trials the patient was unable to name the lateralized information, thus confirming that the left hemisphere did not have access to the critical information.

Discussion

It is important to reemphasize that these responses were self generated by the right hemisphere from a set of infinite possibilities. The only aid provided to the right hemisphere was the two complete alphabets from which he could select letters at will…

Each hemisphere in P. S. has a sense of self, and each possesses its own system for subjectively evaluating current events, planning for future events, setting response priorities, and generating personal responses…

On a day that this boy’s left and right hemispheres equally valued himself, his friends, and other matters, he was calm, tractable, and appealing. On a day when testing indicated that the right and left sides disagreed on these evaluations, the boy became difficult to manage behaviorally.

I therefore propose to add two more questions to KeithS’s list:

4. What did Paul S.’s soul want to be, an automobile racer or a draftsman?

5. Did Paul S.’s soul support or oppose President Richard Nixon?

These are all fair questions, and they deserve straight answers.

Sir John Eccles on split brain cases

I’ll begin by examining what the late Nobel Prize-winning neurophysiologist Sir John Eccles, a modern substance dualist, had to say about split-brain cases.

To begin with, I would invite readers to take a look at this diagram, taken from Eccles’ 1979 Gifford Lectures on The human psyche. As readers can see, the main channel of communication between the (disembodied) conscious self and the brain is via the dominant left hemisphere, but there is also a limited degree of communication with the minor right hemisphere. Next, here is a diagram of communications to and from the brain and within the brain, after the corpus callosum has been severed. Communication from the conscious self to and from the brain is now exclusively via the dominant left hemisphere.

In his 1979 Gifford lectures on The human psyche, Sir John Eccles describes the performance of the two hemispheres of the brain, after a split brain operation:

[T]he left (speaking) hemisphere has a linguistic ability not greatly impaired. It also carries a good memory of the past linked with a good intellectual performance and with an emotional life not greatly disturbed. However it is deficient in all spatial and constructional tasks. By contrast the right hemisphere has a very limited linguistic ability. It has access to a considerable auditory vocabulary, being able to recognize commands and to relate words presented by hearing or vision to pictorial representations. It was also surprising that the right hemisphere responded to verbs as effectively as to action names. Despite all this display of language comprehension, the right hemisphere is extremely deficient in expression in speech or in writing, which is effectively zero. However, in contrast to the left hemisphere, it is very effective in all spatial and constructive tasks and it is also proficient in global recognition tasks.

After reviewing some investigations by Roger Sperry et al. (1979) on two split-brain patients that were designed to test for aspects of self-consciousness in the right hemisphere, Eccles was forced to acknowledge:

It can hardly be doubted that the right hemisphere has at least a limited self-consciousness.

But then he went on to add:

These tests for the existence of mind and of self-conscious mind [in the right hemisphere – VJT] are at a relatively simple pictorial and emotional level. We can still doubt if the right hemisphere has a full self-conscious existence. For example, does it plan and worry about the future, does it make decisions and judgements based on some value system? These are essential qualifications for personhood as ordinarily understood (Strawson, 1959; Popper and Eccles, 1977, Sects. 31 and 33)…

I would agree with DeWitt’s (1975) interpretation of the situation after commissurotomy:

Both minor and major hemispheres are conscious in that they both, no doubt, have the basic phenomenal awareness of perceptions, sensations, etc. And they both have minds … in that they exhibit elaborated, organised systems of response hierarchies, i.e., intentional behaviour. But in addition I would conjecture that only the major hemisphere has a self; only the language utilising brain is capable of the abstract cognising necessary in order to be aware of itself as a unique being. In a word, only the major hemisphere is aware of itself as a self.

This corresponds to the situation in real life, where the associates of the patient find no difficulty after the operation in regarding it as the self or person that it was before the operation. The patients themselves would of course concur, but they do have a problem arising from the splitting of the conscious mind. There is the difficulty in controlling the movements emanating from the activity of the right hemisphere with its associated mind. These movements are completely beyond the control of the conscious self or person that is exercised through the left hemisphere. For example they refer to their uncontrollable left hand as their ‘rogue hand’.

It would seem that this interpretation of DeWitt conforms with all the observational data on the commissurotomy subjects, but avoids the extreme philosophical difficulties inherent in the hypothesis of Puccetti that even normally there is a duality of personhood – ‘two persons in one brain’ as he provocatively expresses it.

Eccles died in 1997. More recent studies have shown that both hemispheres of the brain are extensively involved in self-recognition, and that only the right hemisphere possesses the further ability to recognize familiar others (see Lucina Q. Uddin et al., “Split-brain reveals separate but equal self-recognition in the two cerebral hemispheres”, Consciousness and Cognition 14, 2005, pp. 633–640). In an article titled, Self-Awareness and the Left Hemisphere: The Dark Side of Selectively Reviewing the Literature (Cortex, (2007) 43, 1068-1073), Alain Morin argues forcefully that it is a mistake to equate self-recognition (the ability to recognize oneself in a mirror) with self-awareness, which requires a deeper awareness of one’s current emotions, goals, values and thinking patterns. Even the much-vaunted “Theory of Mind” (or the recognition that other minds exist out there in the real world) fails to exhaust self-awareness – as Morin puts it, “It is very likely indeed that one needs first to access one’s own mental self before one can ponder about others’ potentially comparable inner life” (p. 1069). Morin finds that self-awareness is widely distributed across both sides of the brain, but suggests that if anything, it is the left hemisphere (and not the right hemisphere, as argued recently by some authors) which predominates in self-awareness. Elsewhere, Morin argues for the notion of a relation between inner speech and self-awareness, and he concludes: “one must not neglect the role of language (i.e., inner speech) in self-awareness — an activity deeply associated with normal functioning of the left hemisphere.” (Right hemispheric self-awareness: A critical assessment, Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2002) 396–401.)

In another paper, titled, “The split-brain debate revisited: On the importance of language and self-recognition for right hemispheric consciousness” (Journal of Mind and Behavior (2001) 22 (2):107-118), Morin elaborates his argument for the significance of inner speech in self-awareness. Inner speech, he writes, allows us to “incorporate other persons’ potential views of ourselves in our self-talk and gain an objective vision of ourselves which facilitates self-observation” and “address comments to ourselves about ourselves, as others do towards us.” Referring to the mute right hemisphere, he writes: “Certainly it can experience an emotion, but without inner speech I suggest that it might not clearly know that it is experiencing it.” Morin concludes his discussion of split brain cases as follows:

My position is that two unequal streams of consciousness (i.e. self-awareness) emerge out of the transection of the forebrain commissures…. [T]his analysis incorporates empirical evidence (1) regarding the importance of language (inner speech) for self-awareness, and (2) concerning the legitimacy of self-recognition as an operationalization of self-awareness.

Morin adds that in his opinion, the case of Paul S. (discussed above) is “the only convincing case of real full double self-awareness in a split brain patient,” probably owing to the fact that this patient suffered early brain injury in the left hemisphere at the age of two, which led to his language abilities being bilateralzed. Morin regards it as an open question as to whether Paul S. actually has “two independent streams of inner speech – two concurrent but different self-conversations” (p. 531). For my part, I would regard such a claim as doubtful: the extent of Paul S.’s right-hemispheric language abilities amounted to comprehension of simple verbal commands and questions (in oral form), the ability to read single words and the ability to spell single words with Scrabble letters. That’s hardly an argument for the existence of a second independent streams of inner speech in the right brain.

I conclude that Sir John Eccles’ empirical claim that the conscious self is predominantly linked to the left hemisphere of the brain remains a highly defensible position which will probably turn out to be verified over the next few decades, whatever one may think of Eccles’ interactionist substance dualism.

A substance dualist’s answers to five tricky questions on split brain patients

We can now answer the five questions posed above, from the standpoint of Sir John Eccles’ modern version of Descartes’ substance dualism. It is important to note that for Eccles, the terms “self” and “soul” were more or less inter-changeable, as when he wrote: “I am constrained to attribute the uniqueness of the Self or Soul to a supernatural spiritual creation” (Evolution of the Brain: Creation of the Self, Routledge, paperback, 1991, p. 249), and he went on to liken the body and brain to a computer built by genetic coding, while “the Soul or Self is the programmer of the computer” (pp. 249-250).

1. In the case of the man who attacked his wife with one arm and defended her with the other, he attacked her with his left hand (which is controlled by the right hemisphere) while simultaneously trying to protect her with his right arm (which is controlled by the left hemisphere). Since the conscious self interfaces with the brain only via the dominant left hemisphere after a split-brain operation, what the man’s soul wanted to do was to defend his wife – an act for which he gets credit. The man is not morally responsible for what his rogue left hand does, as it is controlled by the right hemisphere, which is no longer controlled by the conscious self.

Indeed, Eccles famously suggested in The Self and its Brain (Berlin: Springer International, 1977, p. 329) that a homicide committed by the left hand of a split brain patient (which is controlled by the right hemisphere) would be manslaughter rather than murder!

2. If the right hemisphere knows something that the left hemisphere doesn’t, then the conscious self (or soul) doesn’t know it. But if If the left hemisphere knows something that the right hemisphere doesn’t, then the conscious self knows it.

3. In the case of the patient whose left hemisphere didn’t believe in God but whose right hemisphere did, the patient’s soul, I am sorry to say, didn’t believe in God. In the case described by Dr. Ramachandran, all the patient had to do was point to “Yes” or “No”, when asked, “Do you believe in God?” But that behavior is not enough to warrant the attribution of a belief to someone, in the way in which that word is properly applied to rational beings. A belief is pre-eminently something which you may be called upon to justify, and state your reasons for. The patient’s right hemisphere couldn’t say why it believed in God; nor could it defend its point of view against objections. Hence it could hardly be said to have a belief in the proper sense of the word. It may have had a residual belief in God from early childhood, when people are unable to vocalize the grounds for their beliefs, but since the patient, as an adult, came to consciously reject that belief, then the patient’s soul, or conscious self, will be held liable for this rejection and judged accordingly.

4. Paul S.’s soul or conscious self wanted to be a draftsman, since that is the answer given by his left hemisphere.

5. Paul S.’s soul supported President Richard Nixon, since his left hemisphere expressed a liking for the man.

How would a thought control dualist answer these five questions?

One of the main differences between substance dualism and thought control dualism is that the former identifies the soul with the highest part of a human being – the conscious self – whereas the latter regards the soul as a hierarchical structure which informs the body at multiple levels, the highest of which (rational thought) is immaterial. In other words, thought control dualism, like Professor Edward Feser’s formal-final dualism, is hylemorphic: it regards the soul as the essential form of the body.

What that means is that according to thought control dualism. my lower mental states (e.g. sensations, desires) are just as much “mine” as my higher mental states (e.g. acts of reasoning, understanding and will). However, I am only morally culpable for those states which are subject to rational control.

1. In the case of the man who attacked his wife with his left hand (which is controlled by the right hemisphere) while simultaneously trying to protect her with his right arm (which is controlled by the left hemisphere), what his soul wanted to do on a rational level was to protect his wife. However, on a sub-rational level, he may well have had some feelings of hostility towards his wife. These feelings would also be attributable to his soul, but because the movement of his left hand was no longer subject to reason, he would not be morally culpable for attacking his wife with his left hand, as it is controlled by the right hemisphere.

A thought control dualist would agree with Eccles’ contention that a homicide committed by the left hand of a split brain patient (which is controlled by the right hemisphere) could not be called murder.

2. If the right hemisphere knows something that the left hemisphere doesn’t, then a thought control dualist would say that the soul does know it, but not in a manner which is amenable to reason and critical thinking. (It would be interesting to see what happened if the right hemisphere of a split brain patient was exposed to someone dressed up as a ghost. How, I wonder, would the patient react? My guess is that unless the patient was previously skeptical of ghosts, it would be impossible to convince the right hemisphere that what it had seen was not a ghost.)

What the dominant left hemisphere knows, on the other hand, is amenable to critical thinking and reflection. Such knowledge belongs to the highest faculties of the soul.

3. In the case of the patient whose left hemisphere didn’t believe in God but whose right hemisphere did, a thought control dualist would say that the soul retained, at some level, a habit of belief (derived from childhood, perhaps) in God. However, such a belief is no longer amenable to reason in the split brain patient. By contrast, the belief expressed by the patient’s left hemisphere is a belief that the patient could justify and give reasons for, if asked to do so. Thus it counts as a bona fide belief.

Sometimes, it is true, we may think we believe that something is true because we consciously avow it, but at a subconscious level, we intuitively recognize that what we consciously declare is mistaken. (I know a man who once told me of two ex-Catholics he knew, who publicly denied the faith, but who re-expressed a belief in it after they’d had a few beers!) In a person with a normally functioning brain, reason and intuition doubtless have lots of little tussles of this sort, and they usually manage to resolve them eventually. The truly sad thing about the split brain patient is that this kind of resolution cannot take place. In the case of the left-brain atheist discussed by KeithS, the patient’s right brain may know on an intuitive level that there is a God, but the bridge between intuition and reason has been severed. God, being merciful, will take the patient’s impairment into account.

4. Paul S.’s soul wanted to be a draftsman on a rational level, but on a more primitive, feeling-based level, his soul wanted to be an automobile racer.

5. Paul S.’s soul liked President Richard Nixon on a rational level, but disliked him on an intuitive level.

How would a formal-final dualist answer the above five questions?

The principal difference between thought control dualism and form-final dualism is that on the former account, the soul can interact with the brain and initiate neural processes, while on the latter account, the soul does not make neurons in the brain move: the soul explains the “what” and the “why” of a voluntary human action, but not the “how.” Thus thought control dualism, like substance dualism, would attempt to identify locations in the brain which are still capable of interacting with the rational soul (whose choices, like its acts of understanding, are disembodied acts), whereas formal-final dualism, which rejects such an interactionist account, would attempt to identify those actions performed by split-brain patients which still manifest rationality (and hence are morally praiseworthy or blameworthy), on an operational level – i.e. by performing relevant tests, such as carefully probing the patient’s stated reasons for his/her actions.

Bearing this in mind, we can answer the five questions above from the perspective of the formal-final dualist, as follows:

1. In the case of the man who attacked his wife with his left hand (which is controlled by the right hemisphere) while simultaneously trying to protect her with his right arm (which is controlled by the left hemisphere), both acts are attributable to different levels of the soul, as each human being embodies a psychic hierarchy. However, the action that should be counted as rational (and hence morally evaluable) is the one that the man himself can give a reason for, both before and after performing the act (this last condition is vitally important, in order to prevent confabulation, where patients make up reasons to cover their embarrassment over sudden bodily movements of theirs which they are unable to explain).

2. If one hemisphere knows something that the other hemisphere doesn’t, then a formal-final dualist would say that the soul knows it, but not in a manner which is fully integrated with the entire body. Recall that for a formal-final dualist, the soul is essentially the form of the body. If the form is badly damaged, in a way that affects cognitive functions, then the patient’s awareness may be localized, rather than spread over the global brain.

3. In the case of the patient whose left hemisphere didn’t believe in God but whose right hemisphere did, a formal-final dualist would try to ascertain which stated belief was properly integrated into the patient’s life. For example, if the patient made a habit of praying every night and going to church on Sundays, then that would be a good reason to take seriously the right hemisphere’s avowal that it still believed in God, notwithstanding the left hemisphere’s professed atheism. Deeds speak louder than words.

4. There may be different levels of the soul on which Paul S.’s soul wants to be a draftsman and an automobile racer, but the one that deserves to be called most authentically Paul S.’s wish is the one which he doggedly pursues over a period of several years, as people do when undertaking long-term rational plans.

5. Regarding President Nixon, it’s very hard for a formal-final dualist to ascertain what a split brain patient’s feelings were towards a politician, unless that patient had devoted a fair bit of time towards getting Nixon elected – or alternatively, ejected from office. In the absence of such rational, goal-oriented behavior, a formal-final dualist might be inclined to reject both hemispheres’ professed likes and dislikes as mere preferences, as opposed to rational choices. Of course, if Paul S. was able to say why he liked Nixon, than that kind of behavior would count as evidence, but only if it cohered with the rest of his political views. Since Paul S. was only eleven when Le Doux, Wilson and Gazzaniga wrote their famous article about him in 1977, some skepticism is warranted. (His views now would of course count as evidence, as well.)

In this post, I have tried to answer KeithS’s questions about split brain patients from the perspective of three distinct varieties of dualism. I shall leave it there, and let readers judge for themselves between these versions of dualism. What I have attempted to show, however, is that split brain patients do not pose an insoluble problem – or even a particularly pressing one – for believers in an immaterial soul.

Readers wanting to learn more about the history of how Christian and other dualistic philosophers tackled the problem of split brain patients may like to consult Minds Divided: Science, Spirituality, and the Split Brain in American Thought by Stephen E. Wald (ProQuest LLC, ISBN-13: 2940032034322, eISBN-13: 9780549633204), some of which can be viewed online here).

Comments
Dr. Torley, thanks for your extensive response.
I will acknowledge, however, that there’s nothing in Scripture that clearly states Jesus had two principles of agency, or for that matter, two minds, two wills, or two spirits – a point which does give me twinges of concern, at times. These ways of speaking, ...
That is exactly the primary reason why I have trouble with the Chalcedonian way of speaking. I think you are exactly right that Miaphysitism or Dyophysitism are two "ways of speaking" about a very unique situation. You said (my emphasis added):
I understand that Miaphysitism tries to circumvent this difficulty by saying that Christ has one nature, but two characters. OK, but what’s the difference between a “character” and a “nature”? For my part, I would define “nature” as a principle of agency. Thus on the Dyophysite account, Christ has two agencies – divine and human – with the former exerting sufficient control over the latter as to prevent the two from ever coming into conflict. Regarding your question about Scriptural texts that would decisively tell in favor of Miaphysitism or Dyophysitism, I can’t think of any clear-cut cases, off the top of my head. The nearest I can think of is Romans 1:3, which speaks of God’s Son as “descended from David according to the flesh” (ESV), while Hebrews 7:3, speaks of Melchizidek as “resembling the Son of God,” by “having neither beginning of days nor end of life” (ESV). But neither text uses the term “nature.”
I think you are showing that the traditional debate of these two "ways of speaking" has bogged down over differences of definitions of favored terms that are not clearly defined in Scripture. No wonder there is difficulty. You said (my emphasis added):
These ways of speaking, as I see it, are developments in Church teaching, which were formulated in order to make sense of seemingly contradictory statements in Scripture, which speak of one and the same person in two seemingly incompatible ways (mortal/immortal, beginning in time/eternal, limited/unlimited in knowledge, etc). The Catholic Church’s solution was to ascribe these ways of speaking to different natures. I realize that’s a Greek philosophical solution to a problem of Scriptural interpretation, but I’m OK with that. I just can’t see any other rational alternative.
Coming from my mathematical background and perspective, rather than introduce plurality where Scripture is consistently singular, my inclination has been to think in terms of a harmonious orthogonal union of fully divine and fully human. If you were to think of a visual metaphor, one could look at a situation or an object from two angles and see from two different perspectives. Each would show or reveal something different. Neither is exclusive of the other. Neither by itself is the whole story. Neither perspective is an illusion. The orthogonality makes it possible for both perspectives to be true harmoniously and without contradiction about the same one subject. For an imperfect physical analogy, one could look at an insulated wire by examining a cross section (which would allow you to see the layers of insulation) or by viewing it from the side so as to see its length. (Please remember the acknowledged imperfection of such an analogy. It might be helpfully suggestive, but it is not claimed to be durable.) With regard to the divinity of the Son = the Word, He has remained as He has always been without diminution or compromise or confusion. He is immortal, eternal, unlimited in knowledge, etc. Then, at a point within time, comes the incarnation...
Consequently, when Christ came into the world, he said, “Sacrifices and offerings you have not desired, but a body have you prepared for me; (Hebrews 10:5, ESV)
Regarding the human incarnation, full and true humanity was added in an harmonious and orthogonal (i.e. integrated yet not conflicting, not colliding) manner. The humanity is mortal (because the added body is mortal and can die), beginning in time (because the incarnation and addition of humanity happened at a point in time), limited in knowledge (because all humans have a conscious human mind (=nous) that is distinct from their spirit (= pneuma), that interacts with the physical brain, and that is limited in how it learns and how much it knows), etc. I do believe that recognizing the human nous vs. pneuma distinction is an essential consideration to eliminating many supposed apparent contradictions.
But if the Miaphysites are right, then we’d have to modify the LNC to: one and the same character of one and the same thing cannot be both X and not-X at the same time.
Without endorsing Miaphysitism, per se, I would point out that it is no violation to the LNC to say that, in light of orthogonal perspectives, certain properties must be evaluated per a perspective to be meaningful. One must specify which perspective to be unambiguous. So I don't see that there is any necessary problem with regard to the LNC.ericB
August 12, 2013
August
08
Aug
12
12
2013
06:40 PM
6
06
40
PM
PDT
Hi ericB, My sincere apologies for not getting back to you sooner. Posts tend to disappear from the main page very quickly these days, which means that if I don't spot a comment by a reader in the side bar on the right, I may not realize that a conversation on one of my posts is still continuing. Thanks also for your kind comments. Re Miaphysitism, what I'm saying is not that the two natures of Christ are contradictory, but their characteristics are contradictory. I still cannot make sense of the notion that one and the same nature might be eternal and have a beginning in time, for instance, as the Miaphysites hold. You quoted a statement saying that according to Miaphysitism, Christ's divinity and humanity are united "without separation, without confusion, and without alteration," in one nature. My question would be: if they are united in the same nature, how can they not be confused? I understand that Miaphysitism tries to circumvent this difficulty by saying that Christ has one nature, but two characters. OK, but what's the difference between a "character" and a "nature"? For my part, I would define "nature" as a principle of agency. Thus on the Dyophysite account, Christ has two agencies - divine and human - with the former exerting sufficient control over the latter as to prevent the two from ever coming into conflict. Regarding your question about Scriptural texts that would decisively tell in favor of Miaphysitism or Dyophysitism, I can't think of any clear-cut cases, off the top of my head. The nearest I can think of is Romans 1:3, which speaks of God's Son as "descended from David according to the flesh" (ESV), while Hebrews 7:3, speaks of Melchizidek as "resembling the Son of God," by "having neither beginning of days nor end of life" (ESV). But neither text uses the term "nature." I will acknowledge, however, that there's nothing in Scripture that clearly states Jesus had two principles of agency, or for that matter, two minds, two wills, or two spirits - a point which does give me twinges of concern, at times. These ways of speaking, as I see it, are developments in Church teaching, which were formulated in order to make sense of seemingly contradictory statements in Scripture, which speak of one and the same person in two seemingly incompatible ways (mortal/immortal, beginning in time/eternal, limited/unlimited in knowledge, etc). The Catholic Church's solution was to ascribe these ways of speaking to different natures. I realize that's a Greek philosophical solution to a problem of Scriptural interpretation, but I'm OK with that. I just can't see any other rational alternative. I understand the Miaphysite solution is to ascribe the two ways of speaking to different characters of the one nature. But consider what would happen to the Law of Non-contradiction (LNC) if we were to allow that. LNC says that one and the same thing cannot be both X and not-X at the same time. If we interpret "thing" to mean "agent" or "nature," then there's no problem with regard to the incompatible characteristics of Christ's divine and human natures. But if the Miaphysites are right, then we'd have to modify the LNC to: one and the same character of one and the same thing cannot be both X and not-X at the same time. What worries me about this new formulation is that I could no longer prove that (say), this crow is not the same thing as that camel. You might argue that they have different shapes, sizes, DNA and so on, but I could reply: "They're both one and the same thing, but this thing has two distinct characters: a crow character and a camel character. The mutually incompatible characteristics you point to (e.g. size, shape and DNA) belong to two distinct characters." On that way of thing, any two things might (for all we know) be one and the same thing. I guess what I want to say is that for all I know, there might be something in Miaphysitism, but if there is, then its defenders have a lot of work to do, if they want to articulate their position clearly against philosophical objections. Perhaps we'll hear more from the Miaphysites in the future. I'd just like to close by thanking you for this exchange of views, ericB. I have learned something useful from it, and it has helped me to think more critically about background assumptions which I had hitherto taken for granted, when discussing the Incarnation.vjtorley
August 12, 2013
August
08
Aug
12
12
2013
08:03 AM
8
08
03
AM
PDT
Dr. Torley, if you have any thoughts about my questions @132, I would still be very interested to hear them, especially regarding the second and third considerations that I offer. In any case, I've wanted to say that I appreciate that you have (albeit unintentionally) made me aware of Miaphysitism. I only began to look into it due to the links you provided to Monothelitism @89, particularly the Wikipedia link. (The Catholic link was unhelpful since it leaves its readers -- including you, until our conversation -- completely in the dark about the fundamental distinction, or even about the existence of the Christian tradition of Miaphysitism. I hope you did not take offense when I criticized their neglect for not providing that minimal level of clarity. It should not be that we have to go to Wikipedia to discover the distinction.) Thanks again for your helpful, patient and informative posts.ericB
August 12, 2013
August
08
Aug
12
12
2013
06:35 AM
6
06
35
AM
PDT
Chris Doyle
Feel free to have the last word, though I may not see what you write as I’ll be taking a break from the comment sections of UD for a while.
Nice way of running away from an argument... No problem if you don't see this, my response will be here for you and onlookers and also as a record (I save this threads for future reference). Most of your argument is based on a simple wish and a refusal to aknowledge the existence of the evidence against free will (namely, the observable correlation between backgrounds and choices).
there are all kinds of influencing factors behind your choices, and, recognising that fact you can reflect upon your conscious choices and see why you made those choices.
That's the delusion precisely. The very act of "reflecting" on something implies using reasoning, and reasoning is a product of our background, so you are already being constrained by your background even when you think you're reflecting on your choices. You can't escape this constrain because it's built into the very reasoning you use to reflect on it, and therefore no matter how "free" you feel when making choices, you ultimately aren't.
most importantly, you are freely choosing whether or not to act rationally or irrationally, to freely choose the default-lazy’ option (which is nonetheless undetermined and indeterminable) or set that aside for the unknown or the challenging option: you can choose pain and discomfort, you can choose doubt even. This is what the empirical data indicates.
In bold you're claiming that the "default lazy option" (I assume you're reffering to the correlation between backgrounds and choices) is "undetermined and indeterminable". However this is contradictory and goes against the evidence. People are not unpredictable if you know enough about them, and the more we know about them, the less unpredictable they are. THIS is what evidence points to, and so you're argument doesn't make any sense.
This is what the empirical data indicates.
Please explain in which way. We can't both be right.
Now, I freely admit, I am not open to the possibility that true free-will is an illusion.
Great way to indicate that you prefer delusion over truth. Sorry if I'm too hard on you, I'm just stating the facts.
This is who you are, Proton, whether you like it or not: you are completely responsible for your choices, and even the intentions behind those choices.
It's not about whether I like it or not, it's whether it's true or false. I have no personal problem with free will, I'm not biased agaisnt it (unlike free will advocates, who are adamantly biased FOR it), but the fact is free will doesn't make sense AT ALL when the evidence is taken into account, it's even laughable that people can believe in it. The concept of free will is simply ridiculous.
And, theologically speaking, I’m no Christian, but the Day is coming when we will all be brought to account for those choices and it doesn’t matter what you believe: we will all face Judgement for our works as we are truly responsible for them.
LOL. You're not a Christian? Well you sound just like one. What's so funny is that as you say that "it doesn’t matter what you believe: we will all face Judgement for our works as we are truly responsible for them.", and yet I can't say with even more confidence the following thing: When you die and you get to be face to face with the Creator you'll understand how naive and deluded you were to believe that something as ridiculous as free will could exist when it was obvious, by looking around you, that it wasn't.
The choice really is yours and no amount of bashing particles will ever take true freedom of will away from you.
Please, keep saying things like this, it only helps onlookers see that free will is something that is believed on faith only and not something inferred from observation.Proton
August 2, 2013
August
08
Aug
2
02
2013
01:35 PM
1
01
35
PM
PDT
Hi Proton. Clearly, you are not open to the possibility that true free-will exists. Yet, in the real world, you surely think and act as though you are truly free to choose how you think and act. You are clever enough and reasonable enough to understand that there are all kinds of influencing factors behind your choices, and, recognising that fact you can reflect upon your conscious choices and see why you made those choices. But, most importantly, you are freely choosing whether or not to act rationally or irrationally, to freely choose the 'default-lazy' option (which is nonetheless undetermined and indeterminable) or set that aside for the unknown or the challenging option: you can choose pain and discomfort, you can choose doubt even. This is what the empirical data indicates. This is who you are, Proton, whether you like it or not: you are completely responsible for your choices, and even the intentions behind those choices. And, theologically speaking, I'm no Christian, but the Day is coming when we will all be brought to account for those choices and it doesn't matter what you believe: we will all face Judgement for our works as we are truly responsible for them. Now, I freely admit, I am not open to the possibility that true free-will is an illusion. That would be like asking me to be open to the possibility that 2+2=4 or my uncle is really my aunt. So, close-minded as we both are on this subject, there is no point debating it any further as neither of us will budge. Maybe you will give theology another try and find out for yourself that you cannot honestly deny free-will. Maybe you won't. The choice really is yours and no amount of bashing particles will ever take true freedom of will away from you. Feel free ;-) to have the last word, though I may not see what you write as I'll be taking a break from the comment sections of UD for a while. I wish you well, Proton.Chris Doyle
August 2, 2013
August
08
Aug
2
02
2013
12:49 PM
12
12
49
PM
PDT
Chris Doyle:
It is insanity to deny true free-will. Or intellectually dishonest
On what grounds? Le me remind you that free will is NOT "the ability to make choices", but "the ability to make UNCONSTRAINED choices". Evidence points to the fact that "unconstrained choices" don't exist. Hence free will is false. It's common sense. Only religious people believe in free will because they're committed to such belief in the same way Darwinists are commited to materialism.
correlation does not equate to causation.
This is not applicable to my argument as I explained here.
even if people are sheep and often choose to follow the crowd, give in to peer pressure, follow in the footsteps of their forefathers, etc, this does not in any way detract from the fact that we all truly freely make our choices
This is wishful thinking. You provide no evidence that people make truly free choices, all you say is they simply do. I base my argument in empirical evidence. What do you base your argument on other than religious commitment?Proton
August 2, 2013
August
08
Aug
2
02
2013
08:43 AM
8
08
43
AM
PDT
Implying that a correlation between backgrounds and choices doesn’t exist is as low as I’ve seen a free will advocate go, no one else here at UD tried to suggest such an insane argument.
I'm with Querius. Furthermore, correlation does not equate to causation. But even if people are sheep and often choose to follow the crowd, give in to peer pressure, follow in the footsteps of their forefathers, etc this does not in any way detract from the fact that we all truly freely make our choices, no matter how unoriginal and common those choices may be. It is insanity to deny true free-will. Or intellectually dishonest. What's your excuse, Proton?Chris Doyle
August 1, 2013
August
08
Aug
1
01
2013
02:25 PM
2
02
25
PM
PDT
Querius:
Your unwillingness to discuss rather than simply to argue is adequately demonstrated by your refusal to answer a simple question after six chances.
You sound just like a Darwinist when they start being cornered.
There’s no compelling correlation. People have tried, but you’re not familiar with the literature.
You're so deluded Querius... Even vjtorley agreed with me regarding the existence of this correlation. Not only that, evidence of this correlation exists EVERYWHERE. Think about any global survey studying human behaviour/opinion/beliefs, it's easy to see how people from different countries/cultures all differ in their worldviews and social/family values, or any other specific behaviour, opinion or belief that emerges from such geographical/cultural backgrounds. And this is just an obvious example of how backgrounds affect behaviour, everywhere you look you'll find more examples, showing how this correlation is not only real, but it's the RULE. Implying that a correlation between backgrounds and choices doesn't exist is as low as I've seen a free will advocate go, no one else here at UD tried to suggest such an insane argument.Proton
August 1, 2013
August
08
Aug
1
01
2013
01:39 PM
1
01
39
PM
PDT
vjtorley @108, I propose that Miaphysitism and Dyophysitism are not as far apart as you supposed. I'd like to offer three points for you to consider. First consideration: Regarding whether "the characteristics of divine nature and human nature are contradictory", after thinking about my response @117 and your original post, I would like to suggest that in your enthusiasm, the use of "contradictory" may have overstated the position of Dyophysitism. I'll give three reasons. 1. To be fair to Pope Leo, the excerpt you quoted from him never said the natures were "contradictory". The actual point was only that "it does not belong to the same nature to" do or say various things. That does not imply that the natures are "contradictory" but only that they each have unique characteristics not shared by the other. A major theme of that very quotation is the harmonious (not contradictory) "oneness" and "communion" of these natures.
So the proper character of both natures was maintained and came together in a single person. ... …Each nature kept its proper character without loss; … There is nothing unreal about this oneness, ... The activity of each form is what is proper to it in communion with the other: that is, the Word performs what belongs to the Word, and the flesh accomplishes what belongs to the flesh ...
2. We know that Jesus has manifested and made known God's invisible nature (e.g. John 1:14-18). When Philip asked the Lord to "show us the Father",
Jesus said to him, “Have I been with you so long, and you still do not know me, Philip? Whoever has seen me has seen the Father. How can you say, ‘Show us the Father’? (John 14:9, ESV)
If the human and divine natures were truly "contradictory", the message expressed through the life of Jesus would be sending contradictory signals, making it effectively impossible to clearly see God's nature in Jesus. 3. Both of the preceding reasons point back to the fact that Dyophysitism maintains that both natures are united in one person in such a harmonious union that the two minds, two wills, and two spirits can act as one with no contradiction in intention or choice. If the two natures were inherently contradictory, such a harmonious union would be inherently excluded. Second consideration: While Dyophysitism proposes a harmonious union of two natures in one person, such that the two minds, two wills, and two spirits act as if they are one (i.e. never in contention or disagreement, etc.), ...
"Miaphysitism holds that in the one person of Jesus Christ, Divinity and Humanity are united in one "nature" ("physis"), the two being united without separation, without confusion, and without alteration. "Miaphysitism has often been considered by Chalcedonian Christians to be a form of monophysitism, but the Oriental Orthodox Churches themselves reject this characterization, a position which the Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches have begun to take more seriously." excerpt from http://orthodoxwiki.org/Miaphysitism
Since you are not used to thinking about Miaphysitism (rather than about Monophysitism), I would especially urge you to not to miss that the union is "without confusion, and without alteration." With this in mind, please consider the following question. Are there any actions of Jesus that are not compatible with either of these ways of describing Jesus? In particular, I would suggest to you that every action of Jesus in the list of illustrations by Pope Leo is compatible with the description given by Miaphysitism. Can you think of any counter examples? Third consideration: Are there any statements of Jesus or statements in Scripture describing Jesus that are not compatible with either of these ways of describing Jesus? On this point, the only indication that comes to my mind is that so far as I know, Jesus is never described as having two minds, two wills, or two spirits. These are always in the singular, never in the plural. Thus, I find no biblical basis for that manner of describing Jesus. Its motivation appears to entirely rest upon various philosophical preferences, despite the consistent use of the singular within Scripture itself.ericB
August 1, 2013
August
08
Aug
1
01
2013
06:16 AM
6
06
16
AM
PDT
Proton, 1. Yes. We can't measure "free will" directly. 2. No. People aren't predictable robots. 3. There's no compelling correlation. People have tried, but you're not familiar with the literature. Your unwillingness to discuss rather than simply to argue is adequately demonstrated by your refusal to answer a simple question after six chances. Goodbye.Querius
July 31, 2013
July
07
Jul
31
31
2013
06:36 PM
6
06
36
PM
PDT
Querius Onlookers can easily see that you're hiding behind the chaos strawman. 1-You believe that, because of chaos theory, we can't predict someone's choices (and assume that free will "uses" this loophole to act, something based on a wish only, no evidence). 2-You believe, therefore, that the pervasive observable correlation between backgrounds and choices we see needs no explanation. 3-Hence, you refuse to try to account for this correlation, and turn the argument around chaos (the strawman). Querius, if you can't account for the correlation between backgrounds and choices (which holds, even under incomplete data, most of the time) USING your chaos argument, then your argument fails completely, simple as that. As I see it, your argument failed already, I'm just waiting on your defense.Proton
July 31, 2013
July
07
Jul
31
31
2013
09:09 AM
9
09
09
AM
PDT
Proton, I'm not disagreeing that internal and external factors influence people. I'm saying that free will exists despite these influences. It's not exclusively one or the other. Chaos theory demonstrates that under some circumstances, the tiniest perturbations, can result in dramatically different outcomes such as storms in Chicago. Chaos theory precisely allows for non-Newtonian interactions (i.e. billiard ball predictability) on mental processes, and it disallows you from assuming that anyone can ever know precisely what the initial conditions were nor could you ever know without collapsing the wavefunction. Practically speaking, I'm aware of people going through similar circumstances and crises. Some reacted one way, some another way. Have you ever heard the aphorism that "attitude is everything"? I believe it's true. Now, despite the heroic rescue attempts by Alan and Elizabeth, I'm now going to ask you an unprecedented sixth time to not evade my simple question: Do you, Proton, believe that pure water exists? Yes or No.Querius
July 30, 2013
July
07
Jul
30
30
2013
04:39 PM
4
04
39
PM
PDT
Great progress regarding mind vs. spirit. vjtorley @108 wrote:
I had another look at 1 Corinthians 14, and finally found the passage you were talking about: 1 Corinthians 14:14-15:
14 For if I pray in a tongue, my spirit (pneuma) prays, but my mind (nous) is unfruitful. 15 So what shall I do? I will pray with my spirit, but I will also pray with my understanding; I will sing with my spirit, but I will also sing with my understanding.
As you correctly point out, this is different from the body-soul(psyche)-spirit division of 1 Thessalonians 5:23. I think what the foregoing verses establish is the existence of two distinct kinds of consciousness in man: spiritual (i.e. super-rational) and mental (i.e. rational). However, I wouldn’t go so far as to say that St. Paul is asserting that there are two distinct parts. Still, it’s an interesting point, all the same. ... What St. Paul does show, however, is that pneuma cannot be equated with “rational consciousness”, as man has a super-rational faculty of knowledge, about which we know very little.
While I'm not stuck on the word "parts", still it seems we can agree that even within one human, the nous and the pneuma are distinct and cannot be equated with each other. I would observe that Paul's declarations also require that the nous and the pneuma each have their own basis of knowledge. Specifically, a human's spirit (pneuma) may know something even though that same human's mind (nous) does not know this. For example, the human spirit may know and understand the meaning of statement or song in an language unknown to the same human's mind. Given that level of distinction -- each with its own basis of knowledge and knowing, I wonder where the source of your hesitation about "parts" comes from. If it is just that "parts" sounds too mechanical and like a machine, I can sympathize with that as being not the most suitable imagery. Something equivalent but less crude might be used instead. Or, is it because you have a prior philosophical commitment that will not permit you to go as far as that (despite the distinction Paul makes)?ericB
July 30, 2013
July
07
Jul
30
30
2013
04:36 PM
4
04
36
PM
PDT
Querius: I'm not keith. If you didn't realize, I'm a theist, and an ID as well.
Ok. A person’s background provides them with analogous experiences and a context for making a decision. Besides direct physical influences, this environment includes the cognitive and affective domains, including knowledge. personal values and convictions, risk assessments, aspirations, impulses, emotions, religious convictions, and so on. A person’s immediate social environment can also play a significant role. The key is that several of these influences can be at variance with each other, producing conflicted motivations.
Agree.
In this case, subtle chaotic factors that have been DEMONSTRATED in the laboratory, observed in nature, and published in books and journals, can result in surprising and counter-intuitive outcomes.
What are you trying to prove with all that "demostrated in labs and published in journals... etc etc"? Did I ever say that I don't believe in chaos theory? No.
For example, in some circumstances a person might become violent for no apparent reason. You know, “He was always such a good boy.” These undetectable and unpredictable chaotic factors, perhaps originating at the quantum level, allow us to make non-deterministic choices that easily do not correlate with expected outcomes.
But you didn't answer the question! All you said is that chaos can account for the apparent unpredictability of SOME choices (which I disagree with), you didn't account for the correlation between backgrounds and choices! You see that all your argument is useless unless you can account for such correlation? You can't escape from it by saying that SOME choices are the result of chaos, because the correlation I base my argument on is PERVASIVE in human experience (it's the rule, not the exception), you can't explain it away with chaos. So are you going to account for this observable correlation or not? You didn't address it not once in your responses, like if you were pretending it's not there. Do you agree that such correlation between backgrounds and choices exists? Let's make that clear before moving on.Proton
July 30, 2013
July
07
Jul
30
30
2013
09:36 AM
9
09
36
AM
PDT
Alan Fox:
Of course pure water exists! It just depends how finely you draw your boundary of definition. Is one water molecule pure?
One water molecule isn't water.Joe
July 30, 2013
July
07
Jul
30
30
2013
06:46 AM
6
06
46
AM
PDT
p.s. The omniscience of God does not exclude choice or randomness due to what I mention @123. Suppose a perfectly random event that cannot be determined by any events or conditions prior to that event within time. That event cannot be predicted based on extrapolation from conditions and cause to effect relationships. No being confined within time would be able to predict such an event. Nevertheless, God, who transcends time, is able to observe the outcome of that event. He sees whether or not that coin came up heads or tails. The observation is causally downstream from the unpredictable event. Yet, since God is not bound within time, His knowledge of that event is not bound within time. He is free to declare what He knows into any point of time. Thus, God's perfect omniscience is fundamentally different from the attempted predictions of time-bound creatures or time-bound conceptions of deity. It in no way depends upon the event being fated and obligatory in a forced sense. (That said, nothing I've said here should be taken to deny God's sovereign control over the events of history.)ericB
July 30, 2013
July
07
Jul
30
30
2013
06:43 AM
6
06
43
AM
PDT
It’s called a potential difference
What is?
The difference in voltage between the inside and outside of a nerve. and it is the required electricity.
What’s it required for?
For us to live, move, talk...Joe
July 30, 2013
July
07
Jul
30
30
2013
06:42 AM
6
06
42
AM
PDT
Regarding my comments on observation and probability as a function of knowledge (@98, 121), vjtorley provided a link and excerpt @108 regarding the necessity of the past. Thanks for the info. So far, I don't see that it really changes my point. Though I make an allusion to the common place experience regarding the past, the real dependency is upon this relationship. Events cause observations of events. or Observations of events are possible effects from events. or Observations of events are causally downstream from the events they observe. That is the basis for saying that a true observation of an event collapses the probability to 1 for the event or 0 for a competing event that did not occur. This would still be so, even if we allowed for people observing events occurring in the future. It is independent of whether our experience or assumptions about the flow of cause and effect with regard to time are suspended.ericB
July 30, 2013
July
07
Jul
30
30
2013
06:34 AM
6
06
34
AM
PDT
I think part of the issue that we compute probability as normalised frequency, and yet if we only have a sample we only have an estimate of the frequencies in the population from which we are drawing. So "probability" estimates based on frequencies observed in a sample should come with error bars :) Which makes rather a mockery of calling it a "probability" in the first place. I think this is a very important point, and has implications for all kinds of things, including free will and predictability. We tend to assume a "God's eye" view of an entire population over time when we talk about probabilities. But for anyone with such a view, the probability of any event is 1 because there is no uncertainty! But from within the system, we only have samples, so there is uncertainty, and therefore probabilities of less than unity make sense, and can be derived from observing patterns of data, and regarding them as samples from a greater whole.Elizabeth B Liddle
July 30, 2013
July
07
Jul
30
30
2013
06:33 AM
6
06
33
AM
PDT
About my probability experiment with vjtorley and Elizabeth B Liddle @98, I wanted to add that although each observer gives a different value for the probability, each observer is correct! That may seem like a contradiction ("What is the right answer??"), but if the experiment were repeated over and over, then provided there is not bias, each observer would find their own evaluations of probability confirmed on average. This is not a contradiction, because they would each have a different experience of how often conditions were exactly like they were for them the first time. Thus, though different, each distinct evaluation of the probability is correct, given what they each know at the time. The correctness is not an illusion. It is real and would be confirmed by repeated the experiment. Personally, I think that is pretty cool. It reminds me of how under special relativity different observers make different measurements, but there is no contradiction.ericB
July 30, 2013
July
07
Jul
30
30
2013
06:23 AM
6
06
23
AM
PDT
Querius: if you want an answer to your question, then you would have to give an operational definition of "pure water". Do you mean water in liquid form containing nothing but H20 molecules? What quantity do you have in mind? And how would you assay the purity?Elizabeth B Liddle
July 30, 2013
July
07
Jul
30
30
2013
02:25 AM
2
02
25
AM
PDT
Of course pure water exists! It just depends how finely you draw your boundary of definition. Is one water molecule pure?Alan Fox
July 30, 2013
July
07
Jul
30
30
2013
02:08 AM
2
02
08
AM
PDT
Proton,
I’ll answer your pure water question when you account for the correlation between background and choices (highly or totally suggestive of determinism) in the context of chaos (which you claim is not deterministic when applied to choices).
Really? Is that all you ask? Would like it in book form or a series of 24 chapter installments? LOL Ok. A person's background provides them with analogous experiences and a context for making a decision. Besides direct physical influences, this environment includes the cognitive and affective domains, including knowledge. personal values and convictions, risk assessments, aspirations, impulses, emotions, religious convictions, and so on. A person's immediate social environment can also play a significant role. The key is that several of these influences can be at variance with each other, producing conflicted motivations. In this case, subtle chaotic factors that have been DEMONSTRATED in the laboratory, observed in nature, and published in books and journals, can result in surprising and counter-intuitive outcomes. For example, in some circumstances a person might become violent for no apparent reason. You know, "He was always such a good boy." These undetectable and unpredictable chaotic factors, perhaps originating at the quantum level, allow us to make non-deterministic choices that easily do not correlate with expected outcomes. Now, Proton (you're actually keiths, right?), for the fifth time, don't evade the question. Do you believe that pure water exists? Yes or no.Querius
July 29, 2013
July
07
Jul
29
29
2013
11:18 PM
11
11
18
PM
PDT
vjtorley @108 wrote:
I hadn’t heard of Miaphysitism before, ...
I find that interesting, and in part, I can see why, since the Catholic Encyclopedia entry you pointed me to doesn't bother to mention anything about it -- even though it is the principle alternate Christian perspective on this topic to this day. That also accounts for why you were not aware that there is another Christian tradition still embraced today by the Oriental Orthodox churches on this topic. Now, why would the Catholic Encyclopedia omit all mention of that main alternative? It seems they've chosen to leave you and everyone else in the dark on this. Hmm. ;-) Actually, since you've quoted the sentence before, you probably also read this sentence.
Though the Miaphysites condemned Eutychianism, the two groups were both viewed as monophysites by their opponents.
So you see, even to this day the Catholic Encyclopedia does not bother to educate people about the important differences between the two, choosing instead to lump them together improperly. Not what I would consider a charitable thing to do, nor even displaying a suitable minimum of scholarly integrity. On the other side, some of those of the Miaphysitism position have been prone to concern that the Dyophysitism position is not sufficiently different from Nestorianism. "Sounds quite a lot like your saying there were really two different people inside Jesus" and so on -- an association which the Chalcedonian churches reject. (You'll notice that the Catholic Encylopedia does bother to include entries about that, so that people do understand and are educated about that distinction.) So each side has a concern that the other is getting much too close for comfort to a heretical ditch on the far side of the path.
Miaphysitism holds that Christ has one nature which has both a divine character and a human character, and which retains all the characteristics of both. But if the characteristics of divine nature and human nature are contradictory, then it makes no sense to ascribe them to the same nature. It is for that reason that I find Miaphysitism unintelligible.
I may not be able to say anything to convince you, immediately and directly, that Miaphysitism is intelligible and reasonable, at least so long as you try to understand it from within the perspective of your own paradigm. That never works. As a minimal goal, I would like to suggest to you that it is understandable that you don't understand it. First, because it is (unfortunately) completely new to you. Second, and more importantly, you would have to be willing to consider it within its own framework, not within yours. This is true regarding any paradigm shift. You know about learning another language. If someone tries to learn and speak, say Japanese, while thinking in English, that just doesn't work. The same threshold is encountered when someone tries to understand God or the immaterial from within an implicitly materialistic framework. So even if you don't understand (despite anything I say), I would invite you to nevertheless consider the fact that it does make sense to other people, and the problem of your not understanding just might possibly have to do with the prior assumptions you are still holding on to.
Miaphysitism holds that Christ has one nature which has both a divine character and a human character, and which retains all the characteristics of both. But if the characteristics of divine nature and human nature are contradictory, then it makes no sense to ascribe them to the same nature. It is for that reason that I find Miaphysitism unintelligible.
What if they are not "contradictory"? Distinct, yes. Profoundly different, of course. But "contradictory"? Are you willing to consider that they are not "contradictory"? God knew there would be an incarnation before the first human was created. The human nature was created to be in the image of God. Must we conclude that not even God can create a human nature that is not "contradictory" to incorporating the divine nature. Even though Scripture specifically points out that mankind is made in the image of God, after God's likeness? Does this likeness sound like a declaration of contradiction? With no intention of disrespect, let's look at one supposed example in the list of proofs(?) of "contradiction". What is necessarily contradictory about Jesus weeping prior to raising Lazarus? Scripture commands us to "Rejoice with those who rejoice, weep with those who weep." (Rom. 12:15). When did Jesus weep? Not until He had seen others weeping. He fulfilled what Paul told us was right for all of us to do. This is right for all the sons of God. How then is it "contradictory" for the Son of God to do this? I don't yet see anything like "contradiction" (in the sense needed by that argument) or a reason to expect it, given God's expressed intentions for the creation of mankind and the plan for the incarnation. What might be persuasive to me, and what I have not seen, is any indication in Scripture itself that Jesus had two minds, two wills, and two spirits. Where is that indicated? What I do find seems to say just the opposite, i.e. the use of singular references, never plural that I can recall. It seems that the Dyophysitism position rests primarily on human reasoning about what we confidently expect would have been necessary to resolve issues some believe would have been present, instead of being based on actual references that describe that position or aspects of it as being the truth (e.g. an indication of two minds, two wills, two spirits). But even if none of this is persuasive, please consider that there are those who do consider the position and find it comprehensible. But it will never seem so as long as you bring it into your paradigm's assumptions to consider it. Thanks for your patient help for me. I'll respond to other stuff later.ericB
July 29, 2013
July
07
Jul
29
29
2013
07:11 PM
7
07
11
PM
PDT
vjtorley:
Here’s how I would explain it. If you grow up in a certain environment, then you’ll absorb a certain way of thinking about the world – a world-view, if you like – from those around you, which will, after a certain amount of time, feel like “second nature” to you. It’ll become your “default” mode, and when confronted with situations in real life, you’ll deal with them by thinking about them from the perspective you acquired from your parents and/or peers. So if I know enough about you, I can make a pretty good guess what choices you’ll make, in certain situations.
So you agree with pretty much my entire argument. You also agree that the things you wrote above are the result of inference from the observable evidence right? However, the next part of your argument, and really the part that should let free will enter the ecuation, is not based on empirical evidence, and I'd like to know what is it based on:
And yet, people can and do “step outside” their perspective. Our intellect gives us the ability to not only formulate syllogisms but also critique the premises upon which they are based. Usually we are mentally lazy and don’t bother doing this – hence the high correlation between people’s backgrounds and their choices. But we can question our own adoption of certain goals (“Is this really a good thing?”) and of a certain world-view (“Is life all about maximizing pleasure, as my friends think?”) And this is where freedom comes in: once we open these boxes, there’s no telling where we’ll end up. Anything is possible.
So I see some assertions here (let me know if I'm wrong): 1) People are usually "mentally lazy" most of the time, hence: The correlation between backgrounds and choices we see. 2) When people are not lazy (in default mode), they are free (unpredictable), and so exceptions to the correlation occur. 3) I assume you believe then that people shouldn't be held morally accountable (by God) for choices made during the "lazy/default" state right? Is this correct? So for you free will exists because you believe exceptions to the correlation between backgrounds and choices exist, right? If such exceptions didn't really exist (as in proven to be an artifact of incomplete data), would you stop believing in free will? Also, when you say "we can question our own adoption of certain goals and of a certain world-view" you're asserting that our "not mentally lazy moments" are exercises of free will. However, what evidence makes you believe that such "free moments" are not part of the same "default mode" that rules our behaviour most of the time? I believe this is the big question: On what grounds do you give apparent "moments of lucidity" the special status of "excercising free will", when, extrapolating/interpolating from the evidence, we could, more easily, attribute such "lucidity" to part of the default mode/default behaviour? Don't you think that some people, depending on their backgrounds, are more prone to have more or less "lucid" moments, and in different intensity? If those "lucid moments" were actually part of the "default behaviour" of some individual, wouldn't then choices made under that default mode also be "default", and therefore not free? Is there really a reason to attribute free will to moments of "lucidity" when empirical evidence can close the gap easily, implying that such apparent lucidity is just part of a permanent "default mode"? Is there really a reason to believe we're ever OUT of the default mode?Proton
July 29, 2013
July
07
Jul
29
29
2013
10:36 AM
10
10
36
AM
PDT
Joe:
It’s called a potential difference
What is?
and it is the required electricity.
What's it required for?Elizabeth B Liddle
July 29, 2013
July
07
Jul
29
29
2013
10:17 AM
10
10
17
AM
PDT
I would reply by distinguishing between causal randomness (a diversity of outputs, without a cause) and statistical randomness (an absence of bias in the outputs). I quite agree with you that if we look at a finite string of 0?s and 1?s, we cannot tell how it was generated. However, we can test that string for bias, and quantify how likely it is that an unbiased source would generate a string like that. If the likelihood is sufficiently high, we will credit the claim that the string is statistically random. What quantum physics tells us is that down at the micro level, statistical randomness prevails.
I'm not convinced by this distinction, Vincent! We can certainly tell whether the frequency distribution of a string indicates that the causal process was one in which each outcome was equiprobable or not, but I don't see that that tells us that it is "statistically random" or not - indeed, I'm not sure what that would mean, unless it just meant "equiprobable". And we already have a word for that. As part of my job as a cognitive scientists, I often design tasks in which the stimuli are randomised. Sometimes the stimuli will be drawn from a flat distribution (be equiprobable) but more often they will not be. For example I may want one kind of stimulus to be quite rare. But my stimuli sequences are still random and the only change I have to make to my program to alter what you call the "bias" is to change the distribution in the "population" from which my stimuli are still randomly drawn. And there's nothing special about an equiprobable distribution - they aren't all that common in nature - the only times I tend to use them is with signal-processing, where phase angles have a uniform distribution, but because of the Central Limit Theorem, many natural distributions are Gaussian, while others have a Poisson distribution. And lots more, but those are the ones I come across most. But we can draw randomly, or not randomly, from those distributions, and we can draw independently, or not (i.e. we can let the last draw influence the next, or not). So if by "statistically random" you simply mean "equiprobable", as you seem to, then that quantum effects are not "statistically random". They have extremely well defined probability distributions that are far from flat (the universe would be very strange if an electron was as likely to be in your ear as in Alpha Centauri!) In other words, the probability of finding a particle at a given location is highly biased in favour of some locations (where the probability density is high) and against others (where it is near zero).
However, quantum physics says nothing about causal randomness. It cannot tell us, for instance, whether the statistically random sequence of measurements (say, 0?s and 1?s) associated with a given particle was actually generated by some celestial pseudo-random generator invented by God, or whether it is truly uncaused. I prefer the former hypothesis.
I agree that if you have what looks like an a periodic string of 1's and 0's you cannot readily tell what caused it. But I don't see that that gets us very far!
As for the macro level, quantum physics does not tell us that this level is random in either sense of the word. Hence I am inclined to believe that non-random macro states can generate statistically random micro sequences.
Could you flesh out an example?
That’s a good question. You’re asking why we need a non-physical X to bring about top-down causation, where the macro somehow acts upon the micro while preserving its statistical randomness. Actually, we don’t need a non-physical X for that. I’m quite willing to grant that some kind of top-down causation occurs in all living things – even bacteria.
Well, I'm not convinced by the "top-down" distinction, either! It's a common-enough term in cognitive science, but I tend to use "endogenous" (as opposed to "exogenous") myself, to indicate causal factors that lie within the prior state of the organism as opposed those that lie in new incoming data - but all evidence suggests that there is tremendous feedback between those two, not least because what input we next receive is partly a function of how we've reacted to the last lot.
What I would hold, however, is that rational top-down causation requires a non-physical operation by a person, acting on his/her brain. And my reason for holding that is that the brain – or for that matter, any physical system – is simply not capable of instantiating the kinds of abstract concepts that human beings do.
Why not? I mean, what are your reasons for thinking this?
(Ask yourself this: what’s the neurological difference between the concept of “having 999 sides” and that of “having 1,000 sides” (which may both employ the same mental image), or between the Bronsted-Lowry concept of an acid and the Lewis concept of an acid, or between the universal concept of “true” and that of “false”?) That’s my reason for positing an extra-corporeal activity (but not an extra-corporeal agent, as I am not a substance dualist like Eccles). I hope that helps.
Not really, but I do appreciate your response! Thanks!Elizabeth B Liddle
July 29, 2013
July
07
Jul
29
29
2013
10:14 AM
10
10
14
AM
PDT
Well, most electric currents in the body are ionic currents. They don’t exactly give us “the required electricity” – but it’s changes in trans-membrane potentials that determine whether a neuron “fires” or not, i.e. whether a wave of depolorisation flows down the axon to release neurotransmitters at the down stream synapse, so they are crucial to how our brains work.
It's called a potential difference and it is the required electricity.Joe
July 29, 2013
July
07
Jul
29
29
2013
10:05 AM
10
10
05
AM
PDT
From Elizabeth:
OK, let’s suppose that the mind controls the organism, including the brain, and it does so at the quantum level, by, for example, tipping an ion a little nearer, or a little further away, from an ion channel in a neuron, thus infinitessimally affecting how near that neuron is to firing, and thus, Butterfly-In-Peking, like, potentially sending a neural cascade down one path, resulting in one decision, rather than a different path. And it can do so based on reason – presumably based on information from the environment, and some kind of foreknowledge of what the consequences of the two competing actions are likely to be. In what sense, does it differ, then, from the organisms itself doing the same thing, but by supra-quantum means? It has the information; it has the reasoning capacity; what does it lack that requires this extra entity that tips it one way or the other? Or, to put it differently, what does this extra entity have that the rest of the organism doesn’t?
Great question! That's why free will as a concept is ultimately incoherent. -What's the source of our reasoning capabilites (which determine the result of a choice based on the information input) if the brain has no effect on them? The inmaterial soul? -And if our brains (our experiences) do not affect our inmaterial soul, then what is the source of the inmaterial soul's reasoning capabilities? -If the brain has no effect on the reasoning capabilities of our inmaterial soul, then WHAT makes a soul different from another? -If the souls are different (and so are our reasoning capabilities), then wouldn't the external/spiritual cause that made them different take free will away from us by deciding what reasoning capabilities each person has beforehand and therefore deciding beforehand what choices we would make?Proton
July 29, 2013
July
07
Jul
29
29
2013
09:51 AM
9
09
51
AM
PDT
Hi Proton, Thank you for your post. You write:
What I disagree with is the idea that judgment/reasoning is indeterminate. It seems to me that you believe that when a person is faced with choice A or B, people can go either way and nothing determines that other than pure free will.
That's true. I do not, however, claim that acts of will are uncaused. What I hold is that they are undetermined by the causes that act on them. You also write:
What I argue is precisely that evidence indicates that such thing is FALSE: People with certain backgrounds are more inclined to choose B and people with a different background are more inclined to choose A... If you say people can choose between A and B freely, then what do you think when observation shows that people with certain background X choose A a lot more often and people with background Y choose B a lot more often? Doesn't this show that judgement is predetermined to a certain outcome (choice A or B) depending on if your background is X or Y? How does free will make sense to you in such contradicting situation? Are people from backgrounds X and Y really free to choose?
Here's how I would explain it. If you grow up in a certain environment, then you'll absorb a certain way of thinking about the world - a world-view, if you like - from those around you, which will, after a certain amount of time, feel like "second nature" to you. It'll become your "default" mode, and when confronted with situations in real life, you'll deal with them by thinking about them from the perspective you acquired from your parents and/or peers. So if I know enough about you, I can make a pretty good guess what choices you'll make, in certain situations. And yet, people can and do "step outside" their perspective. Our intellect gives us the ability to not only formulate syllogisms but also critique the premises upon which they are based. Usually we are mentally lazy and don't bother doing this - hence the high correlation between people's backgrounds and their choices. But we can question our own adoption of certain goals ("Is this really a good thing?") and of a certain world-view ("Is life all about maximizing pleasure, as my friends think?") And this is where freedom comes in: once we open these boxes, there's no telling where we'll end up. Anything is possible.vjtorley
July 29, 2013
July
07
Jul
29
29
2013
09:40 AM
9
09
40
AM
PDT
1 2 3 5

Leave a Reply