Disappointed with Shermer

_{Mark

April 6, 2009

Intelligent Design}

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From EXPELLED Dr Caroline Crocker.

“Recently I attended a lecture by Michael Shermer at the UCSD Biological Science Symposium (4/2/09). His title was, “Why Darwin Matters,” but his topic was mostly religion. He started by defining science as “looking for natural explanations for natural phenomena” and said that his purpose was to “debunk the junk and expose sloppy thinking.”

We were all subjected to an evening of slapstick comedy, cheap laughs, and the demolition of straw men.

His characterization of ID was that the theory says, 1) If something looks designed, 2) We can’t think how it was designed naturally, 3) Therefore we assert that it was designed supernaturally. (God of the gaps.) Okay everyone, laugh away at the stupid ID theorists.

I was astonished at how a convinced Darwinist, who complains about mixing science and religion, spent most of his time at the Biological Science Symposium talking about religion.”

Get the full text here.

Comments

David, I never implied that you were not a grown man and a scholar. I never said you "need" a reading list. It's called a discussion, an exchange of ideas for goodness sakes. But here's one thing you do apparently need--to stop being so defensive when there is no offense, otherwise your shadowboxing an opponent that doesn't exist my man. I'm sincerely interested if you're at all familiar with sehnsucht and its literary value, being that you're a literary guy. If anything, my interest in your opinion proves that I do consider your opinion valuable on literary matters. No need to be defensive about that.Clive Hayden_{April 16, 2009
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----Nakashima: "Do you accept that truth is contingent on the set of axioms you choose?" No. In think that truths come in a hierarchy. Some truths illuminate other truths and some truths are more important than others. Consider the same point analyzed from three POSSIBLE perspectives, scientific, philosophical, and theological. Assume all three are true for the sake of argument: Example 1: Scientific truth [provisional fact] Earth revolves around the sun. It's true, but it has no meaning. (Fact without meaning) Example2: Philosophical truth. Earth revolves around sun to indicate the universe is designed, possibly for a purpose. {Fact with meaning, but without significance.) Example3: Theological truth. Earth revolves around sun to indicate that the universe is designed, the purpose of which was to create a moral universe in which individuals work out their eternal destiny. (Fact with meaning and significance.) Notice that, in this case, the theological truth illuminates the philosophical truth, which in turn, illuminates the scientific truth. The higher truths matter more that then lower truths, but they are all aspects of the same truth. Of course, monists will not likely accept the upper two layers of truth, whereas theists most likely would.StephenB_{April 16, 2009
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Mr Clive Hayden, If this thread is going to continue, is it possible for you to create a new opening post? Perhaps Mr Vjtorley's excellent formalization would be appropriate as a new starting point. Thank you.Nakashima_{April 16, 2009
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David, I have taken a thousand times more heat for saying that skeptics are irrational than you will ever experience for embracing Christianity, which is quite popular here. My statement is controversial; yours in not. Get real.StephenB_{April 16, 2009
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David Kellogg, I have a couple of comments relevant to your post #582. First, I think StephenB (in 580) made a valid point. The Bible does say that disbelief in a creator is inexcusable. There may be some other interpretations that I'm not familiar with (I'm not an expert), but that scripture does seem fairly clear. I'm not saying that Christianity is right, but it seems that belief in a creator that has made him/her/itself known is fundamental to being a Christian. Second, I would not presume to question your rationality. This is just anectodal, but the most deeply spiritual and rational person I know is at best agnostic, borderline athiestic, and definitely anti-relgion. Based on personal experience, I can't question a persons rationality based on one (albeit important) decision. For most of my life I've considered myself to be Christian, but ID (particularly some pro-ID, but non-Christian, posters on this site) has made me consider some other possibilities. Objectivity is another matter. Frankly, I don't believe that an objective person can dismiss the ideas supported by ID. Maybe my perspective is skewed. Well, certainly my perspective is skewed, but about 20 years ago I made an honest attempt to see things from the non ID perspective. I read books (recommended to my by athiests that I respect) that support the non-ID perspective. None of it was remotely convincing. More recently (maybe a year ago) I read some of Richard Dawkins books that conflict with ID. I honestly felt embarrassed for the people that support the non-ID perspective. Anyway, for what its worth, I respect the courage you've shown. You've done two things that are difficult. You've posted anti-ID comments on a pro-ID site, and you've identified yourself as a Christian. Both of those actions take courage. I don't agree with you, but based on what I've seen (admittedly not much), I think you're one of the good guys.dl_{April 16, 2009
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-----David: -----“If I seemed annoyed or expecting to be mocked, it’s because there’s a lot in the attitude on this thread that exemplifies what drove me away from traditional faith in the first place.” ----"Life lesson: every time I say anything about myself here, I regret it." What is there to regret? I often raise the point about Romans 1 and Psalm 19 with all the "Christian Darwinists" who come here and tell me that they have reconciled their faith with their "science," even as they subordinate the former to the latter. So, you are not the first person who has been asked that question. Also, we have discussed your orientation to Christianity in the past in the context of your allusions to heterodox theologians. Self disclosure is not all that unusual here. I am a Catholic Christian and I often have to endure slanderous attacks against my own church right here on this site, but I don't complain. I just make my case amd expose the errors. I don't even mind if someone suggests that my faith influences my judgment and my arguments. Of course they do. That is why I often ask others what informs their philosophy. There are no totally disinterested, objective, above it all people. There are only those who are fair and unfair. Indeed, the only people I trust are the ones who know their own biases and prejudies and make allowances for them. When someone tells me that everything they believe is a function of their scientific investigations, I hide the kids (and I don't have any kids).StephenB_{April 16, 2009
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David, Have you any experience with sehnsucht? Did you follow up on any of those links? I find this sort of thing to be intensely interesting.Clive Hayden_{April 16, 2009
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Nakashima, thanks. I'll try not to regret it. In general, I find my failure even to elicit an acknowledgment of the other's rationality (my larger hope) depressing beyond measure.David Kellogg_{April 16, 2009
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Mr StephenB, Do you accept that truth is contingent on the set of axioms you choose? Do you accept that for any set of axioms strong enough to build arithmetic, there will be unprovable truths? Do you accept that even axioms as fundamental as the law of non-contradiction may be deleted, and the resulting system of logic still be useful?Nakashima_{April 16, 2009
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Mr David Kellogg, Please don't regret it. I honor and respect your courage.Nakashima_{April 16, 2009
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In the final analysis, David, Diffaxial, Hazel, and Mark are Kantian skeptics. They do not believe that we can reason our way to truth, because they don't believe there is any truth toward which reason can strive. So, naturally, it follows just as day follows night, that they will not believe that we can reason our way to God. They propose a journey without a destination. They don't understand that their orientation to the life of the mind makes no sense, nevertheless, it makes no sense. A while back, I listed several [my own formulations, mostly] principles of right reason. The first two were as follows: [A] Truth exists, and [B] we can know truth. If you don't believe in these principles then your gift of reason (and it is a gift) is of no use to you. Indeed, it is a curse because it has nowhere to go except to leap out and then retire back into your own mind, having looked for something worthwhile to do and having found nothing.StephenB_{April 16, 2009
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David, Here are some links if you want to follow up on the aspects of my last comment. Sehnsucht in Wiki: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sehnsucht The Bright Shadow of Reality: Spiritual Longing of C. S. Lewis: http://www.amazon.com/Bright-Shadow-Reality-Spiritual-Longing/dp/0802846270 Orthodoxy, Chapter 4, "The Ethics of Elfland": http://www.cse.dmu.ac.uk/~mward/gkc/books/ortho14.txtClive Hayden_{April 16, 2009
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Life lesson: every time I say anything about myself here, I regret it.David Kellogg_{April 16, 2009
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Quoting myself now: "If I seemed annoyed or expecting to be mocked, it’s because there’s a lot in the attitude on this thread that exemplifies what drove me away from traditional faith in the first place." Case in point: 580.David Kellogg_{April 16, 2009
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Clive, one more side note: If I seemed annoyed or expecting to be mocked, it's because there's a lot in the attitude on this thread that exemplifies what drove me away from traditional faith in the first place. What basically has me ticked off is a pattern of false dialogue that dismisses the experience or perspective of others as invalid. Indeed, that pattern on this thread seems actually intended to produce such dismissal: a series of baiting questions are offered which set the terms of debate so that the opponent is labeled as either irrational or nonresponsive. The pattern was exactly the same in earlier discussions of relativism. I have not and will not argue against theism, but the idea that a person who does not accept a fairly abstract argument in favor of theism must be irrational strikes me as both absurd and arrogant. That is what I have been arguing against. My positive claim is that lots of people have good enough reasons to believe or disbelieve a whole host of things. In discussing the existence of God, rationality is not and has never been at stake.David Kellogg_{April 16, 2009
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David, You know, C. S. Lewis was a literary man who also wrote poetry, though his prose is considered much better than his poetry. But the point is that he loved it too, and saw things, even in his philosophy in literary terms. I'm reading a book right now called The Bright Shadow of Reality: Spiritual Longing of C. S. Lewis by Corbin Scott Cornell, who, when he wrote the book, was a professor of English at the University of Florida. It deals with the subject of a particular kind of longing, called sehnsucht in the German, which is the word Lewis used. This was a common theme in Lewis's writings, and whether you agree or disagree with the theological implications that such a longing may have, it is at least very interesting to consider this sort of longing for its own sake, because it is very mysterious. And the book that I mention deals with this theme as it is presented in literature. What makes me think of this is your line "Desire under the boot-heel of the mind.” The Desire you mention might be the sehnsucht type, that almost eludes any explanation by the mind. Also, Chesterton was a poet and literary man. What preserves mystery, to me, in nature at large, is the chapter The Ethics of Elfland, from his book Orthodoxy. If you haven't read it, I would highly recommend it.Clive Hayden_{April 16, 2009
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----David Kellogg: "I still consider myself a Christian." One of the most important elements of Christianity is is reasonableness. Romans 1:20 and Psalm 19 point out that God's handiwork has been made manifest so that all can detect it and that none are without excuse. For better or worse, you hold the opposite point of view. In your judgment not only does nature not prove God's existence, it doesn't even need God at all. So, if you are identifying with Christinity, it must be solely a matter of fideistic sentiment, because there would not seem to be any meeting of the minds between yourself and your God.StephenB_{April 16, 2009
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Vjtorley #569 I think you have confused me with some other person. Most of what you write does not relate to anything I have written. For example, I have not made any comments about morality in this thread or accusing Koons of being slippery. However, I would like to pick up on the issue of what is meant by necessary and contingent. I do think there is an important problem with the definition of necessary versus contingent in Koons’ paper and throughout the Cosmological argument generally. No one who is presenting the argument seems to be able to define “necessary” any more than “metaphysically necessary” as though that were clear. You write that metaphysical possibility is the fundamental form of possibility – but that hardly clarifies what you mean. Later on you challenge someone (I don’t think it is me) “what do you mean by necessity? What makes anything necessary, on your scheme of things” My answer to this is the same as I have written elsewhere. 'Necessary' and 'contingent' are words that only make sense relative to some kind of constraint which may be stated explicitly or implied. So when Koon quotes the example of the number of molecules in a pencil being odd it really does not help. The “could have” makes no sense unless you add some context. It might mean there is no law of nature preventing an even number of molecules or that the production process is just as likely to lead to an even number as an odd number. On the other hand if the pencil is part of an experiment which sorts pencils into those with odd and even numbers of molecules – then this statement might be false. I don’t believe in any absolute metaphysical kind of necessity. And that’s why I struggle with the whole cosmological argument.Mark Frank_{April 16, 2009
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Clive [577], I don't mind. I still consider myself a Christian. However, if a time machine allowed my evangelical self of twenty-five years ago to confront myself today, the 1984 self would pronounce the 2009 self a non-Christian. He would make that pronouncement, in part, based on his presumed knowledge of God. It's hard to talk about such a gradual shift in terms that translate to other people. I will say that, while many things pushed me away from traditional faith, a serious engagement with poetry (as student, scholar, and writer) kept me from abandoning spirituality entirely. Among the things poetry values are mystery, contradiction, story, relationship, language -- all things that the person of Jesus values in the synoptic gospels. These are also crushed by traditional philosophy and theology ("Desire under the boot-heel of the mind," as I put it in one poem). So maybe "mystical" isn't the right way to describe my faith experience but "poetic" or even "literary."David Kellogg_{April 16, 2009
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David, I appreciate your answer. I'm not trying to be mocking. I do, however, wonder why you think that you have less knowledge of God now as by comparison to when you were a Christian. What are you using as your basis of comparison between your current lack of knowledge and your (as it seemed to you at the time) more thorough knowledge when you were a more traditional Christian? I'm also curious about your sacred experience. But if you don't want to expound on your experience, I understand and respect that.Clive Hayden_{April 16, 2009
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vj writes, at 569,
For the point I’m making is a simple one: notwithstanding the fact that the sun has risen every morning for the past 4.54 billion years, we have no reason to believe that it will rise tomorrow, if we reject belief in God.
The fact that it has risen day after day for centuries doesn't count as a reason? And how does belief in God change the picture? I would find it much easier to believe that God might decide for the sun not to come up tomorrow (if I believed in God) than I would to believe all the laws of physics etc. will somehow fail by sunrise tomorrow. By this same reasoning, I have no reason to believe that a dropped ball will fall next time I drop one, which I find a untenable proposition. I know that a theistic belief is that God not only created the universe but that he upholds it, including all of it that we see as lawful behavior in nature, continually by his will. But this is a large statement of faith, and not at all a necessary conclusion. Perhaps I am misunderstanding you, but if you are really saying that one who doesn't believe in God has no reason to believe that the universe will go on as it has been going, then I think you are really wrong. vj writes, as part of an explanation,
Koons highlights one reason to distrust induction, for those who happen to believe in the multiverse: "[T]he simplicity and regularity of natural law is … an artifact of observer selection……Among the universes that agree with all of our observations up to this point in time, the number that go on to break this generalization is far greater than the number that continue to respect it.
I don't follow this. Multiverses have nothing to do with this. This is the universe we observe, and we observe some regularities so, well, regularly, that to doubt that they will continue would be irrational. vj writes,
Additionally, I would say that the very notion that nature is “reliable” rests upon an anthropmorphism: that Nature is a creaure of settled habits, and that it is trustworthy. But nature has no habits, settled or otherwise; and it cannot keep its word.
Again, backwards, to me. Human beings are quite whimsical and untrustworthy - habits are one small tool for keeping ourselves in check. I don't see human habits as a good metaphor for nature. On the other hand, God is an anthropomorphism - a projection of a particular view of human beings upon the world. God as a willful being could cause the sun to stand still or the ball to drop, but as an atheist I don't consider that a possibility, so I am confident, to a very high degree of probability, that neither of those will happen Last, vj writes,
Until now, I have been very kind to the skeptics on this thread, by letting them get away with their talk of “natural necessity” - be it of the laws of nature or the Tao, or what have you.
I did a search and found that you are the only person here who has used the phrase "natural necessity", so I am not sure what you are referring to here. I have not been arguing that any particular view of the world is "necessary", or that any part or attribute of the universe is necessary. I have been arguing that the claim that any rational person will find the arguments for God necessarily and logically compelling, is wrong.hazel_{April 16, 2009
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So many things to respond to! I can't possibly take them all up. I'll say something about the specifics as time permits. A quick correction: in [569], the second part of vjtorley's response is to me, not Mark Frank. Clive [574], I'd define my experience of God in more or less mystical terms. I don't think I have much in the way of knowledge of God (though I thought I did when I was a more traditional Christian). I do have a kind of sacred experience. Is there enough for you to mock in that?David Kellogg_{April 16, 2009
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David Kellogg, "I tend to think philosophical arguments about God are inherently presumptuous." I'm curious, David, how do you gain any knowledge of the God that you believe in? Is it directly from some holy writ? or is it from somewhere else?Clive Hayden_{April 16, 2009
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Mr Vjtorley, That is an interesting definition of intelligence, but not the one that Koons seems to be using in his paper. I'm still having a hard time following the inference from 5 that a non-human maker of objects with arbitrary specific teleological properties must be intelligent.Nakashima_{April 16, 2009
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Just to reiterate - for me positing a first uncaused cause (although not necessarily the immediate cause of our universe) has not been the question, The issue has been the claim that logically, or even beyond a reasonable doubt, that first cause has to be a personal first cause, with attributes such as will and foresight. That is the point that I don't believe is true - that we necessarily know that the uncaused cause is like that.hazel_{April 16, 2009
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----- David: “I don’t see why the cause (or causes) for a contingent universe must be noncontingent.” -----“Again, this is not my belief; I’m talking about the strength of the argument.” I am very confused by those two statements in the same correspondence. What exactly do you “believe” about the matter irrespective of the strength of the argument? If, as you say in your second statement, you don’t believe what is in your first statement, what is it exactly that you do believe on this matter. -----“(I tend to think philosophical arguments about God are inherently presumptuous.) I strongly agree with StephenB [560] when he notes that “everything around us, everything we know about, and everything we interact with in the universe is contingent.” Quite. Given that every bit of our experience is contingent, why can’t everything be just contingent?” Please take a position on this. Earlier you disagreed with Koon’s assumption that the universe is contingent. Now, in order to reduce all of reality to contingency, you assume that the universe may be contingent? Are you trying to say that you agree with me on all matters except for the level of certitude involved? In other words, are you saying that, beyond a reasonable doubt, we can reason that the universe is contingent and that it requires a necessary first cause, but I cannot go all the way with StephenB, who says it “must” be so?” Is that what you are saying? If so, let's compromise the point and end the thread. Can we both say that, "beyond a reasonable doubt," a contingent universe indicates a necessary first cause.StephenB_{April 16, 2009
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Stephen B
We are not really arguing about metaphysics at all, we are arguing about epistemology.
Spot on!vjtorley_{April 16, 2009
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Diffaxial Referring to my previous post (#561), you write:
Here, and throughout this post, you are in full retreat from the assertion that has been at issue for the most of this thread... Let's be clear: You and Stephen have repeatedly claimed that your conclusions follow virtually axiomatically from your premises.
With the greatest respect, I suggest that you read my posts a little more carefully. I did indeed maintain in my previous post (#561)that knowledge does not require certainty, indubitable premises or airtight argumentation. I also asserted that metaphysical intuitions about reality are more certain than any system of philosophy - even my beloved Aristotelian/Thomist system. I recommended to David Kellogg that he hang on to those metaphysical intuitions, no matter what. And I would say all of those things again. I also said that we were truly fortunate to be living at a time in history when theistic philosophers have had the time and intellectual resources to devote themselves to formulating arguments for God’s existence. And they're pretty good arguments, I might add (see my comments below, where I praise the intellectual cogency of Koons' Uncaused Cause argument). So why do I elevate metaphysical intuition above all these arguments? For two reasons. First, reliance on argumentation alone is smug and elitist. It implies that the vast majority of people who have ever lived have had no rational grounds for belief in God - in other words, they were "stupid, stupid, stupid!" (that's a quote from a John Grisham novel, in case you're wondering). You can have good reasons for believing something, even if you can't articulate why. Second, as someone who has studied the arguments, I know they're much more intellectually refined now than when they were first formulated. I do not regard the arguments in their present form as the best possible articulation of the grounds for belief in God. They will be further refined in the future - and it will be our metaphysical intuitions, which we are always trying to articulate more clearly, that help improve them. In the same post (#561), I approvingly quoted Koons' assertion that the cosmological argument is rationally compelling. I conceded to Mark Frank that the phrase "rigorous proof" (which I carelessly tossed off in #515) might be the wrong term to use to describe the argument - the term "proof," after all, has connotations of indubitability in popular parlance. But I added that Koons' cosmological argument for an Uncaused Cause was a pretty cogent one - the only premises it assumed that an atheist might quibble with were the occurrence of one contingent fact (pretty hard to argue with that!) and the principle that every wholly contingent fact has a cause (you can argue with that, but if you do, you end up with radical skepticism about the future, which places science itself in jeopardy). Now compare this with what I wrote way back in post #112, on the subject of certainty:
Let us return to the objection that the arguments for God’s existence are not compelling, so we cannot know if God is real. The unexamined premise in the foregoing objections to the cosmological argument is that knowledge must be certain and incontrovertible, or else it is not truly knowledge. I have to say that this claim is simply wrong, and it is precisely here that Leibniz and the rationalist philosophers erred. In aiming for absolute certitude, they were aiming too high. There are many things we can properly claim to know in everyday life, yet most of them cannot be established with this degree of certitude. Our law courts operate with a concept of “certain beyond reasonable doubt.” So my question is: why should we not invoke a similar standard of evidence in matters pertaining to religious belief?
Is this what you call a "full retreat"??!! On the contrary, I would say that I have maintained a remarkably consistent line, throughout this post. I have also made it clear that while the argument to an Uncaused Cause is rationally compelling (provided you accept the principle that every wholly contingent event has a cause), the argument that God is a Personal Agent rests on the critical insight that only an Intelligent Agent can guarantee that the universe will remain intelligible to the human mind - in other words, that both thought and the laws of nature will not break down. The force of this point would strike any reasonable person with an open mind; but nowhere did I use the term "compelling" to describe this step in the argument. In your post above, you object to this line of argument as question-begging and "motivated by preferences for consequences", and you objected to my statement that "I’m advocating the God-model over the Natural Necessity model because it offers me a universe where I can think straight and think freely":
Your argument that science and rationality would not be possible in the absence of God does no more than beg a great many questions.
Let me be clear: mere preferences have nothing to do with my opting for theism. My decision is prompted by something far more basic than that: a striving for sanity. The logical consequences of disbelief in God are that the laws of nature could break down at any moment, that our rational deliberations are not free, and our rational deliberations are not trustworthy, except when they pertain to purely practical matters. Believing all that would be enough to drive any normal person round the twist, as I have repeatedly stated on this thread. So here's my challenge for you, Diffaxial: EITHER (a) declare plainly that you are prepared to accept these crazy consequences, and that science is therefore a vastly over-rated enterprise... OR (b) show us why belief in induction, the laws of nature and the validity of human reasoning in theoretical matters (including scientific theories) is warranted even for a dyed-in-the-wool atheist. We're waiting! Which is it, (a) or (b)? Mark Frank I have used the term "metaphysical compass" in my post above (#561) but I nowhere spoke of a moral one, as Diffaxial predicted that I would. I would be grateful if you would kindly refrain from putting assertions into my mouth that I have not made on this thread. You acccuse Koons of being slippery in his definition of "contingent." Not so. Here is what he has to say on the subject of contingency, in section 6.1:
In saying that a fact is contingent, I am saying much more than merely that the corresponding proposition is neither logically true nor logically false. A contingent fact is one that is actual but could have been non-actual, where the relevant notion of possibility is that of broadly metaphysical possibility. Broadly metaphysical possibility is the fundamental form of possibility, of which all other kinds (physical, historical, legal, etc.) are qualifications or restrictions.
He then goes on to argue that attempts by logical positivists to reduce metaphysical possibility to mere logical possibility have failed. Nowhere else does Koons offer a definition of "contingent," so I have to treat your claim of a slipperiness on Koons' part with some skepticism. Koons kindly offers a concrete illustration of exactly what he has in mind by "contingent" at the beginning of section 6:
Besides the logical principles presented above, the cosmological argument depends on only one factual premise: that there exists a contingent fact. For example, suppose there are an odd number of molecules in my pencil at the present moment: surely there could have been an even number. A single contingent fact of this kind is all that I need, although I believe that nearly every fact with which we are acquainted is contingent. I would go so far as to say that every physical fact is contingent [italics mine - VJT].
So far from being slippery, Koons takes great pains here to distinguish his own metaphysical beliefs from the more much modest premises he requires for his cosmological argument to work. You also accuse Koons of a "circular definition" in his identification of the universe with the aggregate of wholly contingent facts. I repeat: there is no such definition in the whole of Koons' article. Rather, Koons argues in Corollary 5 of section 7 that no measurable attribute can be had by necessity. Here is the critical passage:
Any attribute that is measurable participates in the structure of the more and the less. The more and the less constitute a continuous spectrum. Consequently, it seems reasonable to assume that for any measurable attribute A, where A consists in having determinable D to degree MU, and any being x that has A, there is some degree EPSILON such that it is possible for x to have D to degree MU minus EPSILON or MU + EPSILON. Therefore, no measurable attribute can be had by necessity. [italics mine - VJT].
Koons is not saying: I can imagine the quantity having a different value; therefore it's contingent. Rather, he's saying: IF you maintain that some measurable quantity is not contingent, then you have to maintain that it can't possess any other value - not even one which differs by even the tiniest amount. Koons finds this implausible - and so do I. Koons goes on to argue that God is not essentially located in space and time (and hence not a physical object), on the grounds that if God were essentially located in space and time, then the location of God (or at least, God's parts) would be contingent. Once again, the point is the same as the one made above in connection with quantities: to maintain the contrary is to maintain (most implausibly) that God's physical location could not vary by even a micrometer to the left or right. Later in section 7, Koons alludes to reasons for treating the entire cosmos as wholly contingent: in treating of the teleological argument, he discusses the possibility (which he raises purely for the sake of argument) that "all physical constants and Big Bang conditions" may be such as to permit complex life forms. I've had a lot of experience in reading philosophical articles, so I think I can see what he is getting at here. He's simply working from the commonly accepted scientific premise that every basic fact about the world is quantifiable and measurable. The reference to "constants and Big Bang conditions" should make that clear. But Koons has already argued in section 7 above that quantifiable attributes are wholly contingent: to maintain otherwise entails that they cannot possess even slightly different values - even, say, different by 0.000000000001%, which is implausible. Now we can see where Koons is coming from, in section 8.1, where he speaks of the world as a wholly contingent fact, and in section 8.6, where he asserts that "the cosmos itself is a wholly contingent fact." The world is quantifiable; that's why it's contingent. In short, the charge of circularity is misplaced. Koons' article requires careful reading in places to follow his train of thought; but it is nowhere circular. In a previous post, you also accused Koons of committing the fallacy of composition. Now look. The guy is a professor of philosophy. Accusing a professor of philosophy of committing the fallacy of composition is like accusing your dentist of not knowing the difference between a molar and a canine. And the accusation is all the more implausible when he addresses the very charge you make in his article (section 8.6). Finally, you quote and attempt to refute the central assertion I have made throughout this thread, that disbelief in God has fatal consequences for human reasoning on theoretical matters (including science itself):
vjtorley also says: “If I were an atheist, I’d be constantly expecting my mind, and/or the world, to break down at any moment. After all, what’s to stop either of them from doing so?” There are answers to those questions — reasoned defenses of the sufficiency of our knowledge from a materialist framework — but those are not the focus of the current debate... I find such jeremiads about the slippery slope for skepticism hollow (such arguments have been eviscerated by any number of relativist philosophers).
References, please? Throughout this thread, I have been very generous with my links to articles of interest; I suggest you direct me to one of these enlightened relativists. (Perhaps they'd care to enlighten Alvin Plantinga, too!) For the point I'm making is a simple one: notwithstanding the fact that the sun has risen every morning for the past 4.54 billion years, we have no reason to believe that it will rise tomorrow, if we reject belief in God. Koons highlights one reason to distrust induction, for those who happen to believe in the multiverse:
[T]he simplicity and regularity of natural law is ... an artifact of observer selection... ...Among the universes that agree with all of our observations up to this point in time, the number that go on to break this generalization is far greater than the number that continue to respect it.
Additionally, I would say that the very notion that nature is "reliable" rests upon an anthropmorphism: that Nature is a creaure of settled habits, and that it is trustworthy. But nature has no habits, settled or otherwise; and it cannot keep its word. Until now, I have been very kind to the skeptics on this thread, by letting them get away with their talk of "natural necessity" - be it of the laws of nature or the Tao, or what have you. But now I have to ask: what do you mean by necessity? What makes anything necessary, on your scheme of things? Necessity is, after all, a metaphysical notion: how do you acquire this notion in the first place (a genuine puzzle if you are of a Humean bent) and what warrants the ascription of necessity, on your scheme? Justify yourselves! Mr. Nakashima You ask what "intelligence" means, when ascribed to God. There are any number of good definitions that might appeal to you; as a first approximation, I could say that anything which can create a code for storing information is intelligent. (You might be tempted to reply that computers could be programmed to do that, and I would reply, "That's one reason why they're not intelligent; the other being the fact that they're not even alive.") But if you like, I'll offer you this definition: a Being is intelligent if it is capable of faithfully sending and transmitting messages on request, using a code(s) that it has created. On this definition, a liar is intelligent: even if he/she is never faithful, he/she is capable of being such. The ascription of fidelity to a computer, on the other hand, makes no sense: computers can neither keep nor break their word. As the foregoing definition employs formal rather than empirical terms, which have the additional merit of being familiar to people in IT circles, I don't see any problem with applying it to God.vjtorley_{April 16, 2009
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David Kellogg: Thanks for the response. In commenting on my last post you did, perhaps unintentionally, leave out some of my arguments. Let’s discuss quickly those that you did. -----On the maStephenB [560], your four reasons for insisting that the universe itself is contingent are not bad, but they are not compelling. ------Reason 1 (”Philosophically, we know that universes don’t create themselves”) fails for the reasons I have mentioned before — we don’t know much at all about “universes.” We are entirely within the frame of reference of a particular universe.” If no universe can create itself, then our universe did not create itself. If a universe can create itself, anything can create itself at any time. Your clone and my clone can just pop into existence. A steel wall can suddenly appear in front of your car as you are driving at sixty miles an hour. Once you dispense with the idea that everything has an explanation, anything goes, and reason has left the building, or as I have stated with infamy, irrationality enters the building. If you like, call it the reciprocal of the principle that something cannot come from nothing. Let me make a quick comment about epistemology. Our knowledge is not solely a product of sense impressions. [Pardon the lecture mode] Indeed, we know a great many things that we cannot prove by way of measurement or observation.. I know for example that you are human, just as I am. If I met you, I would experience that which is unique about you with my senses, [i.e. the color of your hair, your features etc] and I would also come to know your humanity with my intellect [the universal, that which we have in common]. Many of the things that we know with our intellect must be assigned to that realm of universals. We can’t just shrug then off on the grounds that they cannot be proven by science. Many of these points I have stressed, perhaps in ways that some deem insufferable, but only as a means of trying to break through what I perceive to be, perhaps unfairly, an in penetrable and ideological wall. To believe that our knowledge ends with sense experience is to end the debate right then and there. That means that we cannot perceive any objective universals that correspond with subjective images in our minds. Well, that is just another way of saying that we cannot know anything at all about the real world. Naturally, if we can’t know anything at all about the real world, then we cannot know anything about contingent universes or necessary causes or any other such thing. In essence, I think that this point is the 800 pound elephant in the room--Kantian skepticism. WE are not really arguing about metaphysics at all, we are arguing about epistemology. To accept Kantianism is to choose not to accept the testimony of our own minds. From my perspective, that is where you seem to be. You also seem perplexed by my comment that the universe must not only come into being but must also be sustained. Would you ask that question about your own body or someone else’s? Would you say to a newborn baby, for example, “Well, you’ve made it pal, good luck.” Not only do we have to be brought into existence, we must have water, air, optimum temperature, etc.” Why do you assume that universes need not be sustained? Clearly, all living human beings are contingent, why would you think that contingency suddenly becomes less of an issue at the level of the universe where more things than ever are in need of continuing to exist? Indeed, if the universe is winding down, as many claim is the case, does that no scream "contingency?" Again, you can take any reasoned argument and say, “Sorry, I am not convinced.” Still, in the light of all that has been presented, however, it seems pretty hollow. On the matter of extending logic beyond creation’s door, I have made several points that continue to go unanswered. Here are two: [A] When atheist scientists discovered evidence for the big bang, they became very upset and had to be dragged in kicking and screaming before they could accept the finding. Why was that? It was because it showed first of all that the universe began in time and second that the universe was contingent and third that it pointed toward an antecedent cause. Do you think they were consoled with the hope that causation stopped at creation’s door? The record shows that they were not. They understood all too well what it meant. So, I put it to you. Why did these scientists all assume that causation was not limited to the universe that they had hoped was self contained and in no need of a creator? Why were the atheists upset? We know for a fact that they were. [B] We need not worry about whether science and metaphysics embrace the same principles of cause and effect because metaphysics PROVIDED those principles in the first place. It was the Christian notion that God created a rational universe that launched the scientific enterprise and it was the early scientists conviction that they were “thinking God’s thoughts after him,” that prompted them to follow through in spite of all their early discouragements. If you had told them that the laws of cause and effect are irrelevant to the cause of the universe, they would not have been open to that proposition. The more we learn about science, the more reason we have to believe in a first cause. I recommend, “The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science,” by Burtt. This point has been left untouched, so, in the interests of fair dialogue, I raise it again, because the problem persists. How do you say that [A] has nothing to do with [B] when [A] comes from [B].StephenB_{April 16, 2009
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Three minor thoughts on the issue of contingency. First, we have all tended to mingle the cosmological and first cause arguments in this thread, but that may be significant, suggesting that they are entangled philosophically as well. Second, as I said earlier, I don't see what logically compels a person to think that the universe itself is contingent. I have read cases for this, including Koons, but every one extrapolates from parts to whole and moves (implicitly or explicitly) outside the only frame of reference we have. Others (such as Stephen Hawking) have argued that the universe may not be contingent, that "space and time together might form a finite, four-dimensional space without singularities or boundaries, like the surface of the earth but with more dimensions" (A Brief History of Time, page 173). Hawking goes on: "[I]f the universe is completely self-contained, with no singularities or boundaries, and completely described by a unified theory, that has profound implications for the role of God as creator" (174). Hawking is suggesting that the universe may well be what we have been calling non-contingent. Now, I don't think we do or maybe will ever know enough to know this, but the possibility that the universe is noncontingent does not seem unreasonable. If that is the case, the contingency of the universe need not be the only reasonable conclusion. Third, I don't see why the cause (or causes) for a contingent universe must be noncontingent. Again, this is not my belief; I'm talking about the strength of the argument. (I tend to think philosophical arguments about God are inherently presumptuous.) I strongly agree with StephenB [560] when he notes that "everything around us, everything we know about, and everything we interact with in the universe is contingent." Quite. Given that every bit of our experience is contingent, why can't everything be just contingent?David Kellogg_{April 16, 2009
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