Disappointed with Shermer

_{Mark

April 6, 2009

Intelligent Design}

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From EXPELLED Dr Caroline Crocker.

“Recently I attended a lecture by Michael Shermer at the UCSD Biological Science Symposium (4/2/09). His title was, “Why Darwin Matters,” but his topic was mostly religion. He started by defining science as “looking for natural explanations for natural phenomena” and said that his purpose was to “debunk the junk and expose sloppy thinking.”

We were all subjected to an evening of slapstick comedy, cheap laughs, and the demolition of straw men.

His characterization of ID was that the theory says, 1) If something looks designed, 2) We can’t think how it was designed naturally, 3) Therefore we assert that it was designed supernaturally. (God of the gaps.) Okay everyone, laugh away at the stupid ID theorists.

I was astonished at how a convinced Darwinist, who complains about mixing science and religion, spent most of his time at the Biological Science Symposium talking about religion.”

Get the full text here.

Comments

----David: "Stephen, personal vs. impersonal is not an attribute? Really?" Not necessarily. Mortimer Adler, for example, has argued that we can prove that God exists but we cannot prove his attributes. The point is to distinguish between the God's "existence" and God's "essence." The former can be proven through reason while the latter cannot. Do you like that formulation better that attribute vs. non-attribute? If so, then go with it. The whole point of saying that reason cannot take us to God's "attributes" was to clarify the point that we cannot prove the God of the Bible through reason. Do you have anything to say about the argument that is on the table? I have dropped most of the technical terms so that critics cannot feign confusion.StephenB_{April 12, 2009
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David, I provided a step by step analysis of three arguments in 402. I asked everyone to look at each step and find a flaw. Hazel is on board with every step except the last step, so that is where we are. In the spirit of bringing this matter to an end, I have provided the neatest, terse, argument I can muster to simplify things. It may not perfectly summarize what went on before, but it contains very few words. I thought that you would understand that the big bang means that the universe began in time and is, therefore, contingent by definition. If you don't understand that, then you don't understand that. In any case, I am not going to explain to you and Diffaxial why your perceptions of inconsistency on my part are misguided. Objections in one context call for different answers than objections in another context, and I have no intention, at this late date, of trying to justify my multi-contextual responses and explain why they are part of a larger whole. The time for sniping is over, and the time for arguing or not arguing has arrived. The latest proposition is on the table, and that is the only one I will entertain. (Unless someone has an objection to one of the earlier steps at 402) which I may or may not addresss. In any case, anyone who doubts the validity of the causeless cause has been left behind, and I am not going back to get them. We have moved on to impersonal first cause vs. personal first cause.StephenB_{April 12, 2009
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David Kellogg, I told kairosfocus that he was being baited over nonsense. That is one of the few comments I made. The latching or non latching is a silly non issue so why did anyone continue on about it. "I don’t think anybody on the evolutionary side thinks Weasel is that big a deal" You cannot be serious on this. Why not say "whatever" at comment #2 and call it a day. Both sides get baited easily. You are one of the easiest persons to bait since you are a blue sky/grey sky guy a lot. If I say blue sky, you say grey sky. If I say grey sky, you say blue sky. I provided the Monash site and you immediately misquoted me. There is a syndrome for this, something like hitting your knee with a round pointed metal object.jerry_{April 12, 2009
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Stephen, personal vs. impersonal is not an attribute? Really?David Kellogg_{April 12, 2009
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jerry [406], "the nonsense over the Weasel software is approaching 800 comments on various threads." First, about 400 of those comments are probably by kairosfocus, and they are probably the longest ones too. Who is being baited exactly? Second, I don't think anybody on the evolutionary side thinks Weasel is that big a deal. However, ID folks have spent years trying to refute it, misunderstading it repatedly along the way. Apparently they think refuting Weasel will provide a great blow against evolutionary.David Kellogg_{April 12, 2009
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Diffaxil, your nonsense is starting to wear a little thin. Do you know what an "attribute" is, as in "Christian God who loves his creatures," or "loving God who makes sacrifices," or "a compassionate God who is "over and above" things and "in" things, or a "Jealous God who wants no other God's competing for adoration," or an "incarnate God who becomes enfleshed," or a God-man who rises from the dead?" I am distinguishing between an impersonal creator and a personal creator, and I have simplified the argument so that three people can analyze it, assuming that all three people are capable of discursive reasoning.StephenB_{April 12, 2009
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StephenB, Happy Easter! I must say, What you have provided in [408] does not really "condense everything" but rather restates a part of your case. I don't know why you now want to avoid a term like "contingent," since it was important to you before. Indeed, you introduced it. In [73], you said that an argument using contingency was "airtight." You repeated that argument in [74]: "Once one assumes the fact that contingent beings exist, a necessary being follows as a matter of logical certainty." In [85], you wrote "All the objections to the contingency/necessity argument have been answered, and all have been found wanting." You repeated the terms in [91], said in [135] that "there is no way around" the contingency argument, and in [152] repeated it again, this time noting that no scientific evidence is needed for it to hold. In [160] you again restrict the term to philosophy rather than science, and in [169] you claim that this meaning is both specific and stable. In [193] you claim that the term defines an external reality (but apparently not an empirical one, since it's outside of science). You refine the definitions in [194] and [206]. In [355] you asked me to "think over" the question of whether the universe itself is contingent, which you said was a "very, very good question." In [396], you actually criticize hazel for moving from the contingency argument to the "causeless cause" argument. In [402], you say that contingency has nothing to do with observation and repeat the argument from contingency, this time as one of three arguments. Whatever the merits of your latest post, it sure doesn't condense even what you have said earlier.David Kellogg_{April 12, 2009
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StephenB:
There is no way we can reason our way to the “attributes” of the causeless cause, we can only reason our way to its ”existence.” Existence is a totally different matter than essence.
His evil twin:
...the creator cannot be an impersonal “tao.” It must be personal. Here’s why...As soon as you agree that the universe began in time, you are committed to a personal causeless cause.
Diffaxial_{April 12, 2009
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Jerry, I will condense everything so that you, Diffaxial, and Hazel can all follow together: I will simply argue from the standpoint of reason without making any distinctions between philosophy and science, since such distinctions are not necessary if we stop talking about such formal terms as philosophical “contingency.” Hazel now agrees that an uncaused cause is responsible for the universe. She also understands that multiple universes simply beg the question about the ultimate cause. She is trying to say that the uncaused cause can be "impersonal," as in the "Tao," or some other such undefined entity. So, the only task left is to show that the uncaused cause must be personal, which is not hard to do for anyone who can follow the agument. Since you are here, I ask you to help Diffaxial and Hazel follow it. I will trust you as arbiter, if you disagree, with the analysis, no hard feelings. In any case, I don't understand what there is to disagree about. First, we understand that the uncaused cause must be changeless and timeless, since both time and space came into existence at the time of the big bang. That means that a timeless, changeless, transcendent cause, created time and space. Second, and this is key, the creator cannot be an impersonal “tao.” It must be personal. here’s why: A changeless, timeless, impersonal cause cannot exist without its effects. If a changeless, impersonal condition for the effects is timeless, then the effects must be timeless as well. We know, for example, that water freezes below O degrees C. If the temperature was below zero from all eternity, it would be impossible for the water to BEGIN to freeze. The only way that water could BEGIN to freeze a finite time ago is if a personal agent chooses to create a NEW effect without any prior determining conditions. The Tao assumes that both the causes and the effects are infinite and is therefore compatible only with a timeless universe. As soon as you agree that the universe began in time, you are committed to a personal causeless cause. Not that hard is it?StephenB_{April 12, 2009
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Thanks for contributing, Jerry. :)hazel_{April 12, 2009
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StephenB, This thread is an interesting experiment. I have read almost none of it but was one of those who helped steer the discussion to atheism to see where it might go. A day before this went up, I made the comment on another thread that atheism was intellectual bankrupt. Hazel was upset at such a comment so when this thread went up and there were a few comments on Shermer's atheism, I pointed out that Shermer who is an atheist and a big believer in natural selection was an embarrassment to their cause because he or atheists couldn't defend it. I emphasized the atheist on purpose to see what would happen. Hazel took the bait and here we are 400 comments later and atheism is still intellectually bankrupt. Maybe you could summarize what went on some time since I never intend to read it. Poor Shermer and his inept non sequitur performance never had a chance. Maybe idnet.com.au could post it again and limit comments to Shermer. The anti ID people can be baited in interesting ways. I think the nonsense over the Weasel software is approaching 800 comments on various threads. The real question is will this thread approach the record of the Chimp thread from a year ago. I am sure Hazel will give it her best shot.jerry_{April 12, 2009
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StephenB:
Contingency has nothing to do with observation.
If not, what in your argument does?Diffaxial_{April 12, 2009
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I'm going out for a while, but I can easily point to an error in the last step of each argument: not all people speak of the uncaused cause et al as God, because that implies all sort of attributes that go beyond merely pointing to an uncaused cause et al. For instance, I may call the uncaused cause the Tao, which in my understanding is very different than what you mean by God. I believe that above you agreed that we can use the argument about uncaused causes to conclude that the universe had a cause, but that we can go no further in ascribing attributes to that cause. Therefore concluding that "this all men speak of as God" is wrong.hazel_{April 12, 2009
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Hazel, after all this time, it is clear that shortcuts will not work. I should have done this three hundred posts ago. Note my response at the end of Diffaxial. Three of the most important arguments are listed step by step. If you care to, raise your specific objections to any step in one of the arguments, perhaps the third argument. Tell my why one step does not follow from the other.StephenB_{April 12, 2009
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Diffaxial: -----The last of these make it clear that Stephen in these passages intends “observation” in a sense continuous with scientific observation: observations that collect “facts in evidence” such wet streets and the presence of rain, or the necessity of breathing for life. He clearly asserts in these passages that it is the amalgam of logic and observation in this sense that characterize his cosmological argument, distinguishing it from the ontological argument. Similarly, the sort of contingency that may be established by means of such observations is contingency in the ordinary and scientific senses, not the more rarified philosophical contingency he elsewhere evokes. Contingency has nothing to do with observation. -----“The cosmological argument is just that, an argument. It rests on the observation that everything in the known world has a beginning and infers that the Universe as a whole must therefore have had a beginning. But this is an inductive rather than a deductive argument. We have no reason to believe that what we can observe is everything that there is. The conclusion is suggested but not compelled by the premises.” One cannot observe that everything in the world has a beginning; one must reason to that conclusion. Beginnings are not observed; they are inferred. ------“It may be repeating here that the relationship between rain and wet streets, or breathing and living, exemplify ordinary causal chains, and hence contingency in a manner consistent with the scientific sense of contingency, not the more rarefied “philosophical contingency” he claims in the passage above. These are the examples through which he anchors the cosmological argument to “observation.” Yet elsewhere he works very hard to insulate himself from arguments that request evidence:” That isn’t really what is happening. In effect, you are taking the context of the answer to one objection and conflating it with the context of an answer to another objection. That doesn't work. -----“Nevertheless, by doing so you may go some distance to providing a response to my original question: “Given that the articulation of these arguments themselves cannot resolve the question, by what means is it decidable in which sort of universe we are uttering these ‘decisive’ arguments?” I can’t respond to the question because I don’t know what you mean. If you can rewrite it or if anyone else can explain what you mean, I will respond to it. ----So logical arguments about entities that are in fact unknowable cannot be tested. You can play with words about such things as God and ultimate causes and contingent and necessary beings, but if we don’t know whether the concepts the words are meant to represent are in fact as we think they are, then our logical manipulations can’t be held to compel belief about the world. I have an idea. I will take you through the steps of the three most important arguments (partially copied from another source) and you and Hazel can pick one. That way we will not be all over the map. The only condition is that we cannot move to a later one until we have completed the analysis of the earlier one. Fair enough. The First Way: Argument from Motion 1. Our senses prove that some things are in motion. 2. Things move when potential motion becomes actual motion. 3. Only an actual motion can convert a potential motion into an actual motion. 4. Nothing can be at once in both actuality and potentiality in the same respect (i.e., if both actual and potential, it is actual in one respect and potential in another). 5. Therefore nothing can move itself. 6. Therefore each thing in motion is moved by something else. 7. The sequence of motion cannot extend ad infinitum. 8. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God. The Second Way: Argument from Efficient Causes 1. We perceive a series of efficient causes of things in the world. 2. Nothing exists prior to itself. 3. Therefore nothing is the efficient cause of itself. 4. If a previous efficient cause does not exist, neither does the thing that results. 5. Therefore if the first thing in a series does not exist, nothing in the series exists. 6. The series of efficient causes cannot extend ad infinitum into the past, for then there would be no things existing now. 7. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God. The Third Way: Argument from Possibility and Necessity (Reductio argument) 1. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, that come into being and go out of being i.e., contingent beings. 2. Assume that every being is a contingent being. 3. For each contingent being, there is a time it does not exist. 4. Therefore it is impossible for these always to exist. 5. Therefore there could have been a time when no things existed. 6. Therefore at that time there would have been nothing to bring the currently existing contingent beings into existence. 7. Therefore, nothing would be in existence now. 8. We have reached an absurd result from assuming that every being is a contingent being. 9. Therefore not every being is a contingent being. 10. Therefore some being exists of its own necessity, and does not receive its existence from another being, but rather causes them. This all men speak of as God.StephenB_{April 12, 2009
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Very good, and thanks. [/cheerleading]hazel_{April 12, 2009
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"It may be repeating here that..." should read, "It may be worth repeating here that..."Diffaxial_{April 12, 2009
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I see difficulties in StephenB's formulation of the cosmological argument that arise due to equivocation on question of whether the "contingency" of observed entities is established by observation or by philosophical definition. The result of that equivocation is ambiguity regarding whether his argument has an observational basis, or resorts to "brute logic" only (which he agrees cannot be conclusive). As I read Stephen's posts here, he tries to have it both ways: when he wants to avoid being characterized as having employed brute logic he invokes "logic supported with observation" (the observation that there are entities that are contingent); when he wishes to insulate himself from critiques that reference the limitations of induction from observations, he withdraws contingency and its consequences into the realm of unassailable philsophical definition. Some examples. In the following passages Stephen insists that his argument differs from the exercise of logic because it is also grounded in observation:
Hazel first labored under the misapprehension that the cosmological argument uses only “brute logic,” confusing it with the ontological argument. When I informed her that the cosmological argument does not rely solely on brute logic, that it also takes observation into account, she continued to use the term “brute logic” anyway, indicating that she was not in any way following the argument. I can only wonder if she get’s it now. As I pointed out over and over again, logic by itself is not the same as logic supported with observation. You made it clear that you have not yet mastered your own subject matter by suggesting that I was using “brute logic,” when I was, in fact, using logic with observation. In point of fact, you confused the “ontological argument” [brute logic”] with the “cosmological argument,” [logic with observation]. They begin with facts in evidence or an assumption consistent with facts in evidence. You would be correct if you were referring to the “ontological” argument for God’s existence. The “cosmological arguments” are different. I went out of my way to explain that observed facts play a role and I provided several demonstrations...If I observe that the streets are wet, I can reason my way to the fact that it must be raining. Similarly, if its raining, I can conclude that the streets are wet. It is not enough to speak of the principles of logic. You must be able to apply them in context and in real life situations.
The last of these make it clear that Stephen in these passages intends "observation" in a sense continuous with scientific observation: observations that collect "facts in evidence" such wet streets and the presence of rain, or the necessity of breathing for life. He clearly asserts in these passages that it is the amalgam of logic and observation in this sense that characterize his cosmological argument, distinguishing it from the ontological argument. Similarly, the sort of contingency that may be established by means of such observations is contingency in the ordinary and scientific senses, not the more rarified philosophical contingency he elsewhere evokes. However, Stephen simultaneously labors mightily to insulate his argument from empirical or scientific scrutiny by claiming for his definition of contingency a "philosophical" rather than scientific status. He does so in response to critiques based upon the limitations of inductive reasoning, such as that mounted by Seversky:
The cosmological argument is just that, an argument. It rests on the observation that everything in the known world has a beginning and infers that the Universe as a whole must therefore have had a beginning. But this is an inductive rather than a deductive argument. We have no reason to believe that what we can observe is everything that there is. The conclusion is suggested but not compelled by the premises.
In response (or sometimes preemptively) Stephen has asserted the following, almost always with a dismissive tone:
I, am not talking about causal chains (or philosophical or scientific problems with causal chains) I am talking about philosophical contingency, which is a way of describing things that “need not have existed,” or things that “depend on something else for their existence.” .... They, and you, were confusing scientific contingency with philosophical contingency.
It may be repeating here that the relationship between rain and wet streets, or breathing and living, exemplify ordinary causal chains, and hence contingency in a manner consistent with the scientific sense of contingency, not the more rarefied "philosophical contingency" he claims in the passage above. These are the examples through which he anchors the cosmological argument to "observation." Yet elsewhere he works very hard to insulate himself from arguments that request evidence:
This is a philosophical argument, not a scientific argument, so no scientific evidence is called for. That you are asking for “evidence” proves conclusively that you don’t have a clue about what has been said. I am talking about philosophical contingency, which is a way of describing things that “need not have existed,” or things that “depend on something else for their existence.” Mr. Nakashima, You are using the word “contingent” in a scientific way as a means of describing physical causes and their effect. The philosophical argument that deals with that subject matter is the argument from [efficient causality.] The philosophical argument that I am using is the argument from [contingency to necessity]. You are confusing the two.
I argue that it is Stephen who is equivocating on scientific versus philosophical contingency, perhaps unwittingly. In some passages contingency is something that is "observed" in the same way as wet streets and breathing are observed - enabling him to claim that his argument is not mere brute logic. In others it is "observed" only in a philosophical sense (sometimes "defined" in that sense), making it clear that he means something that is discontinuous from scientific observation and induction from those observations - enabling him to claim for his conclusions an "ironclad" logical and rational status. At the very least, Stephen, your argument will be more clear and hence strengthened if you disambiguate your definitions of "contingent" and "observed," such that contingency either is or isn't something that is observable in a sense that is continuous with the scientific sense of "observe." However, I anticipate that you will find yourself confronting the horns of a dilemma: should you adopt contingency in the sense that is continuous with ordinary and scientific observation, you must then grapple with objections that cite problems with induction from such observations to the unobserved. If you adopt contingency in the philosophical sense, you will need new examples demonstrating that such contingency is "observed" (rain and wet roads won't do), or leave yourself open to the charge that, because you are reasoning from definitions only, your argument is merely one of brute logic, after all. Nevertheless, by doing so you may go some distance to providing a response to my original question: "Given that the articulation of these arguments themselves cannot resolve the question, by what means is it decidable in which sort of universe we are uttering these 'decisive' arguments?” Absent that clarifiation, I think hazel's objection stands unanswered:
So logical arguments about entities that are in fact unknowable cannot be tested. You can play with words about such things as God and ultimate causes and contingent and necessary beings, but if we don’t know whether the concepts the words are meant to represent are in fact as we think they are, then our logical manipulations can’t be held to compel belief about the world.
Diffaxial_{April 12, 2009
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Thanks Stephen, it looks like we have at least some agreement. You write,
From there [the Big Bang], we can reason our way to the causeless cause, though we can never know anything about that cause’s “attributes.” In other words, we cannot reason our way to the “God of the bible.” We can only reason our way to a causeless cause, which most people will recognize as God, and which others may not, but that’s about it.
Yes. While “most people” may recognize the causeless cause as God, that conclusion is not logically necessay, and others may make other conclusions. That is really about all I have been trying to establish. Also, you write,
That’s right, we don’t. The only thing we know for sure is that there is a next cause. The causeless cause may be further on down the line. Logic does not suggest that the causeless cause is the direct cause of the universe, only that is at the end of the chain wherever that is, which COULD be the very next cause but may not necessarily be.
Again, I agree, and I am glad this is clear. And you close with,
Well, how did I do? Was I civil?
Yes, indeed, and I appreciate it. To me, civility is important in itself, but the more important reason for it is that it furthers discussion. You and I are now clearer, perhaps, about what each of us thinks than we might have been in a more combative discussion. Sometimes it is a reasonable goal of a discussion between people who disagree with each other for each to try and change the other person’s mind fairly immediately. We are trying to argue our case so that a decision can be made. But other discussions, such as most on the internet, should not be of that form, I think. My goal is to articulate, as best I can, my arguments, and to help the person I am discussing with to articulate their arguments as best they can - to get all the cards on the table. Doing so hones both my understanding and my skill in presenting my case. Learning well what the other person thinks helps me learn better what I think. I discuss to learn at least as much as I discuss to convince. In good discussions, minds do change at times, but often not immediately - the effect of the conversation takes time to happen. Civility also furthers this. If someone feels continually challenged, defenses are raised, and in such cases one is very unlikely to feel that one can change one’s mind because too much emotion is invested in the battle. Lowering the emotional tension by being civil increases the chances of both parties learning from the other person.hazel_{April 12, 2009
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David Kellogg, Thomas Reid is called The Common Sense philospher. He would, of course, disagree with your assessment of what common sense can and cannot do. G. K. Chesterton is called the Common Sense Apostle. He would, of course, disagree with your assessment of what common sense can and cannot do. Miracles are only discernable by common sense, common sense applied to events that diverge from the normal behaviours of nature. If common sense didn't already know normal patterns of Nature, then no Miracle could be detected. You have to have a standard before you can know if there is a variation. This is so obvious that it amounts to common sense itself. True Prophecies are only seen to be prophecies when they come true, which is the obvious common sense rule of detecting if the events that were prophecied came to pass by making a comparison between the events. Obvious again. All of your examples have this in common: common sense is a necessary predicate at evaluating the event itself and making the determination that the event was what it was. You remove common sense, and you will not be able to discern a vision from everyday sight, or a miracle from any event in nature, or a prophecy from any other statement, or an angel as opposed to anything else. Your claim demands an impossibility. The opposite is true, common cold light of day sense is the only way we can make sense out of these things.Clive Hayden_{April 11, 2009
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-----Hazel: “What I will point out is that what we have observed pertains to the effect, not the cause From the observation of the Big Bang, an effect, we infer according to 1) above that it is a cause. However, since the Big Bang is the at the limit of the reach of our observations, we can have no observational content for any further logic about the nature of that cause. Any further speculations about the nature of the cause of the universe gets us right back to “brute logic” without observation.” We may be getting closer to a meeting of the minds. We are talking about the big bang as an effect, which is why I raised the issue in the first place. Reasoning from the big bang, logic tells us that the universe began in time and that it had a cause other than itself. From there, we can reason our way to the causeless cause, though we can never know anything about that cause's “attributes.” In other words, we cannot reason our way to the “God of the bible.” We can only reason our way to a causeless cause, which most people will recognize as God, and which others may not, but that’s about it. In terms of thinking strategy, reason does not limit us to inductive or deductive logic alone. We can use them in tandem. -----“Among other things, we have no idea as to whether the next cause in the chain - the cause of the universe, is in fact the uncaused cause. That’s right, we don’t. The only thing we know for sure is that there is a next cause. The causeless cause may be further on down the line. Logic does not suggest that the causeless cause is the direct cause of the universe, only that is at the end of the chain wherever that is, which COULD be the very next cause but may not necessarily be. -----In the first case, we are talking about It is entirely possible, logically, that our universe exists in a “world” where “things” (of a wholly incomprehensible nature to us) produce universes in a way analogous to the way the things in our universe produce galaxies, solar systems, and planets. I am not getting your meaning here. -----Of course, such a case would push the uncaused cause problem further back, but lacking observational content, investigating that question remains out of reach. Precisely, which is why it is futile and irrelevant to raise the issue in the first place. We don’t need to “investigate” the reality of a causeless cause to know it is a causeless cause. The causeless cause is a philosophical concept, not a scientific one. We don’t investigate philosophical concepts because they don’t lend themselves to measurement or observation. We can, in fact, begin with science and end with philosophy. That is how we get from the big bang to the causeless cause. Science alone cannot reveal a causeless cause as such because it does not deal with the nature of existence, only about the ways things behave. Perhaps that has been where the hang up is. -----“I think the that rules of logic apply to all our thinking about what the metaphysical world might be like “but, as we have no observational experience of that metaphysical world our propositions about that metaphysical world are will always reman speculations: there is no way to investigate which metaphysical speculations, if any, are true.” We have just made a proposition about the metaphysical world. There is a causeless cause. That is not a speculation, it is a logical conclusion. One which you just agreed to a paragraph or so ago. ------On the other hand, I do think that it is possible that things we think are so true, based on observation in our world, that we consider them as “logically true,” may in fact not be true in whatever “world” that produced our universe. I am not clear on your meaning here. -----“In particular, the fact that every effect has a cause, which presupposes a temporal continuity, might not apply at some metaphysical level. You are talking about efficient causality and causeless causes, which is fine, but remember, my original argument was of a different texture. I was arguing from contingency to necessity. The two arguments are related but not exactly the same. Indeed, each can help confirm the other. -----We can’t really comprehend how that might be, but that shouldn’t surprise us: I feel pretty certain that whatever the nature of the metaphysical world that produced our universe, it is beyond our comprehension and our imagination.” No doubt it is. There is no way we can reason our way to the “attributes” of the causeless cause, we can only reason our way to its ”existence.” Existence is a totally different matter than essence. Well, how did I do? Was I civil?StephenB_{April 11, 2009
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Now, for this cosmological argument. I’ve been thinking about the issues he thinks I’m not addressing, and in particularly why he thinks I’m confusing “the “ontological argument” [brute logic”] with the “cosmological argument,” [logic with observation].” Since one principle of good discussion is to make sure one understands the other person’s position, here is a summary of what I think Stephen is thinking. Maybe he’ll correct me if I’m wrong. 1) The cosmological argument claims, briefly, that all contingent things (which have, among other things, a beginning) must have a cause. 2) Since we have, through observation, reached the conclusion that the universe had a beginning at the Big Bang, the universe must have a cause. 3) Also since we can’t have an infinite regression of causes, there must be a point where we reach an uncaused cause. 4) From here, through other arguments, Stephen concludes that God is the cause of the universe. Now I will accept points 1) through 3). It is 4) I reject. Stephen and I have agreed that brute logic by itself cannot bring knowledge about the content of its propositions: as he just said in 391, “As I pointed out over and over again, logic by itself is not the same as logic supported with observation. You made it clear that you have not yet mastered your own subject matter by suggesting that I was using “brute logic,” when I was, in fact, using logic with observation.” What I will point out is that what we have observed pertains to the effect, not the cause From the observation of the Big Bang, an effect, we infer according to 1) above that it is a cause. However, since the Big Bang is the at the limit of the reach of our observations, we can have no observational content for any further logic about the nature of that cause. Any further speculations about the nature of the cause of the universe gets us right back to “brute logic” without observation. Among other things, we have no idea as to whether the next cause in the chain - the cause of the universe, is in fact the uncaused cause. It is entirely possible, logically, that our universe exists in a “world” where “things” (of a wholly incomprehensible nature to us) produce universes in a way analogous to the way the things in our universe produce galaxies, solar systems, and planets. Of course, such a case would push the uncaused cause problem further back, but lacking observational content, investigating that question remains out of reach. I’d like to clear up one other point. Stephen says, “no scientist agrees with your misguided idea that the rules of logic end at creation’s door.” I’m not sure what I might have said to make Stephen think that, but I find it ambiguous, so I would like to make clear what I do and do not think. I think the that rules of logic apply to all our thinking about what the metaphysical world might be like, but, as we have no observational experience of that metaphysical world our propositions about that metaphysical world are will always reman speculations: there is no way to investigate which metaphysical speculations, if any, are true. On the other hand, I do think that it is possible that things we think are so true, based on observation in our world, that we consider them as “logically true,” may in fact not be true in whatever “world” that produced our universe. In particular, the fact that every effect has a cause, which presupposes a temporal continuity, might not apply at some metaphysical level. We can’t really comprehend how that might be, but that shouldn’t surprise us: I feel pretty certain that whatever the nature of the metaphysical world that produced our universe, it is beyond our comprehension and our imagination.hazel_{April 11, 2009
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Thanks vj - I hope you have an enjoyable and meaningful day tomorrow.hazel_{April 11, 2009
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I'd just like to wish everyone a Happy Easter. Mark Frank, Hazel and Mr. Nakashima, it has been a pleasure exchanging ideas with you. I'm glad our discussion was a courteous and civilized one. I'd also like to thank any other contributors who left comments for me, including StephenB, HouseStreetRoom, tribune7, Seversky and anyone else whom I might have overlooked. A Happy Easter to you all!vjtorley_{April 11, 2009
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I appreciate your efforts with John. However, since you, and others, have made the claim before, and in respect to me personally, that those of us who are in disagreement with you always run away when we can't answer the tough questions, I felt it was reasonable to respond. And it was not my goal to start our discussion all over again, but rather to point out the subjective nature of judgments about who is and who isn't working to answer questions. Giving answers one doesn't agree with is different than not giving answers. That was my point.hazel_{April 11, 2009
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----Hazel: “ One, we are responsible for our own actions, and our sins: foisting responsibility on those who tempt us is the wrong thing to do, and for those to whom this applies, unChristian.” Don’t get too upset over metaphors. I didn’t mean “sin” literally in that context. I was, in some sense, trying to sympathize with John Davison so he would settle down and dispense with his heavy handed eruptions. I am now beginning to understand that nothing will persuade him to mellow, so I will probably never bring it up again. Still, no one mentioned you personally, so you would have been better off to leave it alone. Since you didn’t, here we go: ……”I have made a quite a few points about the limitations of logic in response to Stephen, and he, in my opinion routinely avoids my points and returns to repeating what he has said before. Who is tempting who here?” All you allusions were strawmen. As I pointed out over and over again, logic by itself is not the same as logic supported with observation. You made it clear that you have not yet mastered your own subject matter by suggesting that I was using “brute logic,” when I was, in fact, using logic with observation. In point of fact, you confused the “ontological argument” [brute logic”] with the “cosmological argument,” [logic with observation]. ------“For instance, a number of people have brought up some things from modern physics that challenge the ability of logic, and words in general, to capture the nature of the world as we are finding it. You dismissed those points as “abstruse scientific realities”, and immediately returned to your comfortable position by saying, “It seems more fruitful to find out why that person chooses not to believe in truth in the first place.” I am aware of the scientific arguments being used, and, as I pointed out, none of these things have anything to do with contingency and necessity in the context that they were being used. They, and you, were confusing scientific contingency with philosophical contingency. -----“Similarly, when I point out that the fact that the Big Bang pointed to a beginning didn’t necessarily mean that a personal creator was responsible, you likewise retreat to talking about “necessary beings” rather than even being willing to think about the possibility of our universe being a product of some larger impersonal metaphysic reality.” You didn’t bring up the big bang, I did. The point was to disabuse you of the notion that metaphysical realities are somehow in conflict with physical realities. Unity of truth is a big deal. In other words, no scientist agrees with your misguided idea that the rules of logic end at creation’s door. In fact, atheist astronomers were, at the outset, upset about irrefutable evidence for the big bang and even resorted to “damage control” because it suggested that the universe began in time and, by extension, implied a creator. You really did evade that issue. In point of fact, you are mistaken about some of your ideas concerning logic as is obvious from this example and from your confusion over the ontological vs. cosmological argument. Sorry to hit you with that again, but this latest correspondence is your idea, not mine. -----“I know that we are not going to settle this issue between us. I point it out to highlight the fact that the moderation policy you mention would be an unsupportable, subjective morass. Let people argue and let the onlookers sort it out.” I think I can live with that.StephenB_{April 11, 2009
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On another thread, Stephen made a remark that I am going to respond to over here because this is where the topic is germane to me. Stephen wrote,
I have noticed in some of my own debates that Darwinists tend to avoid the really hard questions by reframing the issue and laboring incessantly over the less challenging questions. Under the circumstances, I recommend two standards for moderation and deletion, each designed to balance the other: [A] Remove from the thread anyone who [repeatedly] practices the sin of verbal abuse. [B] Remove from the thread anyone who [repeatedly] tempts the verbal abusers to sin by refusing to answer their questions.
I find suggestion B very inappropriate, for two reasons. One, we are responsible for our own actions, and our sins: foisting responsibility on those who tempt us is the wrong thing to do, and for those to whom this applies, unChristian. Secondly, who is to decide who is ducking the hard questions, and who is not. Stephen always claims victory by invoking his visions of what constitutes “right reason” and the power of logic. I have made a quite a few points about the limitations of logic in response to Stephen, and he, in my opinion routinely avoids my points and returns to repeating what he has said before. Who is tempting who here? For instance, a number of people have brought up some things from modern physics that challenge the ability of logic, and words in general, to capture the nature of the world as we are finding it. You dismissed those points as “abstruse scientific realities”, and immediately returned to your comfortable position by saying, “It seems more fruitful to find out why that person chooses not to believe in truth in the first place.” Well, no, maybe it would be more fruitful to think about some of the issues raised by modern physics even if it forces us to rethink some of our ideas about truth. Similarly, when I point out that the fact that the Big Bang pointed to a beginning didn’t necessarily mean that a personal creator was responsible, you likewise retreat to talking about “necessary beings” rather than even being willing to think about the possibility of our universe being a product of some larger impersonal metaphysic reality. So in my opinion you refuse to answer some hard questions just as much as you think others refuse to answer what you think are hard questions. I know that we are not going to settle this issue between us. I point it out to highlight the fact that the moderation policy you mention would be an unsupportable, subjective morass. Let people argue and let the onlookers sort it out.hazel_{April 11, 2009
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Mr StephenB, Thank you for listing out at least some of the rules you call principles of right reason. Also, now I know that if I hear you call someone, or myself, irrational, that I will understand this to be by your private definition of the term. On the building of houses, I thought there was some limitation on building the Tabernacle with respect to the tools used. And we also have Inuit who might saw blocks of ice to lay them up as an igloo, or prairie dwellers doing the same with sod. The point of these examples is that just as hammer, nails and boards are not necesary to all houses, so too your principles of right reason are not necessary to all rational thought. You have something close to an axiomatic system. If it works for you, fine. I don't know whether it allows you to reason to a contradiction or not. I do ask you to admit that there are other axiomatic systems of logic, and it is non-obvious which system of logic actually holds the closest correspndence to the real world. We are all familiar with Euclid's geometry. Triangles sum to 180 degrees. As soon as we started surveying large areas with precision instruments it became clear that Euclid's geometry did not apply to the surface of the Earth. General Relativity tells us that it doesn't hold near any significant mass. We still teach it for historical and pedagogical reasons, but not because we think it represents a model of reality. So to me, the most interesting thing to discuss first is whether you claim that your system of right reason is closer to represnting the physical world than all other systems. That is a better model, and makes better predictions. Do you make these claims? BTW, I apologize if I seem to argumentative, or desiring of drawing people into an argument on their holiday.Nakashima_{April 10, 2009
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Hazel, happy Easter. I hope you have the best weekend yet.StephenB_{April 10, 2009
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David, Happy Easter. I promise to continue working at curbing my lower nature.StephenB_{April 10, 2009
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