I cannot see how you can say that the God hypothesis is an entirely new kind of thing. You need to show that a consciousness of the specific God hypothesis that is placed against the multi-verse hypothesis is NEWer in either a materialist sense or the dualist sense that fits perfectly with the God hypothesis presented. In either case (materialist or dualits) is the God hypothesis certainly not new in relation to the multiverse.

In the materialist argument God is a material construct of brain chemistry as is the multiverse and both of them is materially unprovable.

To me, Dembski’s comment about infinite universes constituting “inflated explanatory resources” sums it up nicely. Or am I misusing his point here.

No, I think you’ve got it right! The whole point is rescue chance from the contraints of limited probabilities. So, let’s just say that available probabalistic resources for chance to work are infinite and voila! chance is rescued!! And how do we do that? Oh easy…Just postulate an infinite number of (and this is the tricky part) unobservable universes! The materialist’s mantra — infinity: works every time its tried!!!

Donald I would argue that the postulation of an infinite number of other universe’s trying an infinite number of parameters, both known and unknown, is absolutely crushing to the materialistic philosophy for they have opened up the “infinity can of worms”. Since they can by no means say what these parameters are in these other universe’s then it is also infinitely possible for a Omniscient, Omnipotent, Omnipresent, Eternal Being to exist.

In terms of raw logic, I would agree. However, in terms of what materialists (or naturalists) mean when they talk about infinite resources, no. I think Dembski is right: the only reason multiverses are even considered is because the known probabalistic of this universe are inadequate.
The key phrase is probabalistic resources. An infinite supernatural entity, such as God, is not a probabalistic resource, but something categorically and quantitatively different. If it were otherwise, then it could be said that God just happens to be one of those entities that occur from time to time — given infinite probabalistic resources. I don’t want to even contemplate the theology of that!!!

Sure, we can think about infinity in the abstract and be awed by it, but I don’t see how we can consider it as the answer to a riddle when it presents a larger riddle itself. To me, Dembski’s comment about infinite universes constituting “inflated explanatory resources” sums it up nicely. Or am I misusing his point here.

Which lads to the conclusion that all life, which is all irreducibly complex, has been intelligently designed.

“Just as the observation of one black swan will falsify Popper’s example – one observation of a complex machine designed without intelligent agency will falsify the ID hypothesis.”

The corresponding conclusion is that one example of life which can be shown to have been “designed” without an intelligent agency will falsify the ID-hypothesis.

“God” (defined as an infinite being where all things are possible) and an infinite multiverse (defined as an infinite space where all things are mandatory) are both non-scientific. Remember the old saw “A theory that explains everything explains nothing”.

Intelligent agency capable of building complex machines is already instantiated in this universe at least once. One additional intelligent agency in the observable universe is clearly more parsimonius.

The ID hypothesis stated as follows is perfectly scientific according to Popper’s famous example with swans (all swans are white).

All complex machines are intelligently designed.

Just as the observation of one black swan will falsify Popper’s example – one observation of a complex machine designed without intelligent agency will falsify the ID hypothesis.

Behe’s recent book “Edge of Evolution” is very important as it describes an observation (p. falciparum replicating trillions of times) where the ID hypothesis could have been falsified but instead was a confirmed prediction of ID (no complex machines without intelligent agency). It’s hard to imagine a better test of random mutation’s real-world ability than analyzing genetic change in a eukaryote at the nucleotide level over orders of magnitude more replications than all mammals that ever lived.

The multi-verse fails in logic for this reason. If it is required for an infinite number of other universes to exist to account for the fine tuning of this universe and to make the materialistic philosophy palatable, Then by default it is also infinitely possible for God to exist. Thus, if it is infinitely possible for God to exist than God certainly must exist no matter how small the probability.

I made a very similar argument myself back in January of 2002 in response to a paper by William Dembski posted at ISCID (see http://www.iscid.org/papers/De.....012002.pdf )

In the discussion I wrote:

…Could it not be argued that if all possible possibilities are carried out in an infinite number of alternative worlds, then one of those worlds would contain the possibility that an intelligent designer was necessary to bring about the existence of the cosmos known to that world, and was also necessary to bring life itself into existence, and that we happen to be living in just such a world? Given the unlimited scope of the many world’s hypothesis, how could this possibility be eliminated?

I realize that these hypotheses were concocted in order to rule out non-naturalistic explanations. However, I can’t help but wonder if the unintended consequence of these sorts of hypotheses is that they make it easier to smuggle an intelligent designer back into the picture…

To which Dembski responded:

Unlimited probabilistic resources render chance plausible where otherwise it would be implausible. That’s the fundamental intuition. But we do eliminate chance and infer design in practice. So the problem is to draw a principled distinction between when we attribute chance and when we infer design in the presence of unlimited probabilistic resources. I claim there’s no way to do this, and in particular that presupposing naturalism does not constitute such principled grounds.
Donald attempts to turn the tables and wants to argue that unlimited probabilistic resources might in fact make room for a designer in some possible worlds. I don’t see this. Most of the proposals for inflating probabilistic resources assume that other possible worlds/bubble universes/alternative histories are bound by the same general laws and constraints as our world/bubble/history. The presence of a designer in one and the designer’s absence in the other would therefore have to follow on other than scientifically arguable grounds. Moreover, metaphysics is hardly likely to help since the metaphysics of inflation is designed precisely to preclude design.

After I read his response, I agreed Dembski was right regarding this. The paper, by the way, provides a great analysis of the subject of this discussion thread. I recommend it to anyone interested.

Where would they be?

We have no evidence for even one designer, therefore I see that as a bigger leap.

There isn’t any evidence that nature, operating freely, can give rise to living organisms from non-living matter.

So now what do we do?