Compatible? Not Really.

_{Barry Arrington

December 20, 2008

Intelligent Design}

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One of our commenters says he has solved the determinism problem by becoming a “compatibilist.” Briefly, a compatibilist is someone who tries to avoid the logic of his premises by resorting to semantic dodges about the meaning of free will. The compatibilist says that free will is compatible with determinism (thus the name). Isn’t that kinda like saying my existence is compatible with my nonexistence? Yes, it is. But the compatibilist avoids this problem by re-defining “free will.” The compatibilist says that “free will” does not mean “the liberty to choose;” instead, says he, it means “the absence of coercion.” In other words, he says that so long as a choice is not coerced it is completely free even if it is utterly determined.

The problem with this approach is easy to see – just as we don’t get to win a game by changing the rules to suit us in the middle of the game, we don’t get to impose meaning on words to suit the conclusion we want to reach. The entire issue in the determinism/free will debate is whether we have liberty to choose. Suppose I ask my friend Joe the following question: “Do I have free will, if by “free will” I mean ‘the liberty to choose?’” It is obviously no answer to that question to say, “Yes, you have free will if by free will you mean, “the absence of coercion.” I really do want to explore the question about whether I have the liberty to choose, and Joe’s answer is not helpful. You might even say Joe dodged the question. Thus, in the end, the compatibilist answers a question no one has asked.

“Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1953, aphorism 109

Comments

William J. Murray (#107): "if god is able to know in advance what choices you are going to make with your free will, exactly how can one rationalize that those choices aren’t predetermined?" As I have suggested, if one wants to believe in an omniscient God, and still maintain free will, that difficulty could be overcome by thinking of that God as "out of time". If God is the creator of everything, including time, there is no difficulty in thinking that he knows everything, because all time is before Him. But only a knowledge "inside time" of what still has to happen would really create a problem for free will.gpuccio_{December 22, 2008
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William J. Murray (#103): "It seems to me apparent that quantum indeterminancy is required to allow a free will agent to act." I agree. Indeed, practically all recent non deterministic theories of the mind make some use of QM, from Eccles to Penrose. QM and its probabilistic "collapse of the wave function" are certainly a "window" where intelligent and free agency could intervene with neuronal processes, influencing them without violating any explicit physical law. It is interesting that free will could, in a sense, act like the design process, imparting order and meaning to random processes. That conversion of a truly random substrate into a pseudo-random order could be the true pattern of interaction between consciousness and matter. But that is only a model. In reality, deeper things could be involved. I am sure that our understanding of matter and of physìcal reality, including QM, is till very superficial. I do believe that physics (and/or other sciences) will give us new and unexpected knowledge, and that the new perspectives will be of great relevance for all the themes we are discussing, from design to consciousness to free will. So, I have great confidence in the future of science, and I am grateful to anybody who discovers a new piece of information, whatever his scientific ideology may be.gpuccio_{December 22, 2008
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I think that what Mark might be looking for is an answer to #2, where the ability to accurately predict the outcome "means" that you don't have free will. If so, then it doesn't matter if the machine or god can accurately predict your choices; your free will would be an illusion. Fortunately, I don't believe in a version of god that knows what my choices are going to be before I make them. I think that there might be an argument to be made that some theists are also compatabilists; if god is able to know in advance what choices you are going to make with your free will, exactly how can one rationalize that those choices aren't predetermined? The very fact that any entity can access the actual result witout error prior to its realization logically indicates IMO there is no true free will involved.William J. Murray_{December 22, 2008
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"I trust Rib will reconsider his behaviour, apologise and correct his errors, so that he may one day return as a participant in serious and responsible dialogue." Does Rib possess the free will to make such a decision or is he determined and forever sentenced to such behavior. kairosfocus, I have not been following this debate but it seems to me that Sartre who was an atheist believed in free will or at least he believed we were actualized by our choices and who we were was an outcome of what we chose to do in life. I believe an example Sartre used was the prisoner tied to the rock in a dungeon whose fate was bleak but even this prisoner had choices as to how he reacted to his guards and his plight. I ask you since you are a font of knowledge on such stuff. But if anyone else has any knowledge on Sartre or the other atheist existentialists (I know not all were atheists), I would be interested in how these atheists believed in free choice or free will. By the way the Teaching Company has a course on free will and determinism and it periodically goes on sale and it is possible to get the course relatively inexpensively to listen on your IPOD or computer.jerry_{December 22, 2008
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Mark: You say: "“How do I know that what appears to me to be my free will is not determined?”" Well I agree with what William Murray has already argued: the burden of proof should be mainly on the determinist. Why? In a sense, it is obvious that we cannot at present know for certain from a purely objective point of view: human behaviour remains completely impredictable in terms of the laws of physics, and our understanding of how the brain works is still so gross that we can be sure that the situation is not going to change for a very long time. But on the subjective side, we have empirical knowledge that consciousness works with a whole phenomenological cohort of properties, states, and logical connections which make up a consistent set of experience, and that free will is a very strong ad essential component of that set, as I have tried to show in my previous posts. From a determinist point of view, all those properties, and especially free will, are essentially self-deceptive. As materialists have not succedeed in explaining how consciousness emerges, least of all why it should so completely fool itself about itself, the simplest explanation is still to give some credit to the phenomenology of subjective experience, and to accept it as the best hypothesis until and unless objective observations prove it false. Has that happened? No. Will it happen? IMO, never. But I can wait. In the meantime, free will, like consciousness, remains a fundamental component in my view of reality.gpuccio_{December 22, 2008
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Mark: Excuse me, but I don't understand. If the purpose of the scenario (be it with card selection or friend betrayal) was to prove "that compatibilism is not just a semantic trick", I can't see how it accomplishes that. If I understand well, even in the case of card selection, the selected card is determined, even if the agent id convinced that he has choosen freely. In other words, all compatibilsm accomplishes, if determinism is true, is to affirm that an agent can "believe" that he is choosing freely while he is not doing that at all. In my opinion, that means only that free will does not exists, but that we can erroneously think that it exists, in other words that we can fool ourselves. That is no great news, but in what sense should it demonstrate "compatibility"? That determinism can be compatible with self-deception is apparently no great result. My "moral" variation of the scenario allows a better visualization of what is implied. Say I betray my best friend. If I feel that was my free choice, and that I could have acted differently (the usual scenario), then I will probably feel guilty (if I have retained that capacity). My friend, if and when he discovers truth, will be sad, or angry, or depressed, or will just forgive me (not the most likely option, I know). But if I did not really choose anything, if the MRI would have demonstrated that my betrayal was already written in my previous state, save for random fluctuations, then my guilt is self-deception as much as my feeling of being able to choose, and so are my friend's feelings, whatever they are. After all, all these reactions (guilt, anger, and so on) have really no character of freedom in them: they are determined too. But then, if I happen to be determined to understand the fact that determinism is true, then I will be perfectly justified in not feeling any guilt (if I succeed in that, with the help of some precious determination). My friend would then be justified in not feeling any anger, although I doubt that he would cooperate. And so on. Where is the intellectual achievement of compatibilism? Where is it saying anything else than that we can fool ourselves in believing things which are not true, and that that could perhaps be a good idea, just to appear more human to ourselves and others? And please, mote that these arguments are not about the problem if compatibilism is true, but only about the problem of what it really means if it is true. Because at present, it really seems to me that it is a semantic trick.gpuccio_{December 22, 2008
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#101: That's a great website - thanks for sharing. It occurs to me that the quantum indeterminancy, coupled with the lawful behavior of natural phenomena and the existence of the mind & brain, appears to be specifically designed to (1) allow a free will intent/choice, (2) interpret that choice in a meaningful way, and (3) act on that choice with meaningful, reliable consequences. It seems to me apparent that quantum indeterminancy is required to allow a free will agent to act.William J. Murray_{December 22, 2008
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Mark Frank You wrote: "...I want to explore what the non-compatiblists mean by free will and determinism and what grounds they have for believing the two are not compatible." If you want a good argument for rejecting compatibilism, I suggest you start with this argument, taken from "Causality and Determination," by the philosopher G. E. M. Anscombe: "Ever since Kant it has been a familiar claim among philosophers, that one can believe in both physical determinism and 'ethical' freedom. The reconciliations have always seemed to me to be either so much gobbledegook, or to make the alleged freedom of action quite unreal. My actions are mostly physical movements; if these physical movements are physically predetermined by processes which I do not control, then my freedom is perfectly illusory. The truth of physical indeterminism is then indispensable if we are to make anything of the claim to freedom. But certainly it is insufficient. The physically undetermined is not thereby 'free'. For freedom at least involves the power of acting according to an idea, and no such thing is ascribed to whatever is the subject (what would be the relevant subject?) of unpredetermination in indeterministic physics. ("Causality and Determination," An Inaugural Lecture, Cambridge: University Press, 1971, p.26). There's the case against compatibilism in a nutshell: if my actions are determined by circumstances beyond my control, then they are not free. If you'd like to read more about Anscombe's views, you might like to try this site: http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/anscombe/ . I'd also be interested to hear your opinion of this Website, which articulates a very well thought-out position on free will: http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/ .vjtorley_{December 22, 2008
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“How do I know that what appears to me to be my free will is not determined?” or: "How do I know that what appears to be designed isn't really the product of natural laws, chance, deep time and multiple universes?" or: "How do I know that these profound, virtually universal ideas of basic morality and ethics aren't just relative inventions of evolution?" or: "How do I know that the complex, coded, specified information in DNA isn't the result of some as-yet undiscovered natural law that isn't really intelligent, but generates information as if it were?" I've got a question: why invest so much effort avoiding what is apparent and trying to salvage a belief system that renders everything ultimately pointless and meaningless, including this discussion?William J. Murray_{December 22, 2008
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#95 gpuccio "Do you still believe that your MRI would predict the outcome in all cases?" Yes (except for completely random variation).But my concern is only to show that compatibilism is not just a semantic trick (as Barry suggested in the initial post). I am not out to prove it true in this limited space. To show that it is more than a semantic trick I want to explore what the non-compatiblists mean by free will and determinism and what grounds they have for believing the two are not compatible. You have given me two extensive accounts of what you mean by free will. But part of your definition was "not determined" so in your case I guess it comes down to: "How do I know that what appears to me to be my free will is not determined?" The scenario just gives it a bit of context.Mark Frank_{December 22, 2008
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#94 and #90 "That is, it is entirely compatible with a Mind/brain system in which the mind is a higher level supervisory processing element." I should have explained the point of the thought experiment. It is not about dualism vs materialism. It is about exploring what you mean by free will and determinism. It works just as well if you allow the causal chain to hop into some transcendental realm and back again (although clearly I don’t believe in such a realm). If we allow a bit of dualism in the middle of the causal chain, do you accept this little scenario might be possible sometime in the distant future? It includes a complete causal chain from current brain state through to decision and this allows the researcher to predict with certainty the decisions of the subject. If you don’t think it is possible – how do you know?Mark Frank_{December 22, 2008
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Mark, a couple of points: 1. what you are describing (89) is not compatibilism but determinism -- assuming of course this predictive method works each time, since if it didn't you'd have proved free will. 2. when you use science fiction to defend your argument, you've lost the debate :-)tribune7_{December 22, 2008
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1) Is there anything about your current experience of choosing that tells you this can never happen? Never? Well, it could certainly happen for many if not most people, but I doublt it would work on me and many others a lot of the time. After many years of examining the issue of free will from both an atheistic and theistic point of view, I came to my current conclusion that not everyone demonstrates free will, because their behavior is utterly predictable, even to how they interpret and process informtion, and what they'll say (or write) in response. We see this often on this website, and other such websites; we see it all the time in real life. It's really no wonder materialists consider humans to be biological automotons; I mean, who really even needs a machine to predict behavior? Con men, magicians, mentalists, and detectives do it all the time. Did anyone here not predict that Rib would eventually choose to be banned, in order to satisfy what he wanted to believe about the moderation here? In such people (systems that reveal little or no free will), it is obvioulsy possible to closely predict behavioral choices. Note: one can predict behavioral choices with various degrees of high accuracy; however, IMO one cannot predict free will intentionality with a high degree of accuracy. To explain better, here is a real-world example from my life. I bought a video game and it wouldn't load on my computer. I tried to take it back but they wouldn't take back opened software. Now, what are my possible response choices? Anger? the mental state of "I just wasted $40.00" ? Resignation? None of those choices were going to lead to me being happy and joyful leaving the store, yet those were my only reasonable options. If you programmed a computer to recognize the "mental states" of a particular individual and extrapolations of those mental states, it would require programming in all possible such states, and all possible extrapolations of that intitial state with corresponding meaning. My actual free will mental, emotional response to the above scenario was, "Great! For every $10 I spend in good faith that seems wasted, I'll receive 10x .. no ... 15X that amount in return from the world somehow!" It was an intent of faith that transformed the "loss" into a good feeling and a sense of positive gain and joy. Irrelevant to the main point, but just to finish the story (and this is all true), later that day at work, a co-worker asked me how I as going to spend my rebate check. I didn't know what he was talking about. He explained the government rebates that were coming (this was at the time of the Bush economic incentive) and that I was going to be getting $600 since my wife didn't work. Do the math. The point, though, is that free will intent is pre-language (since the same intent can be expressed in any language), pre-image (since the same intent is often expressed in variant imagery, like love, success, happiness, etc.), and doesn't necessarily have to correspond to any known material or mental cause (epiphany, innovation, creativity, etc.) In fact, there's really no telling how a free will intent is going to manifest from time to time in one's own mind, let alone from individual to individual. So, you see, I could walk into your room and when you ask me to choose a card, the card I choose might be "world peace", because my intent, and my choices, are not constrained by the apparent available options. You couldn't program that into the recognition system of your machine as a potential outcome of the options you provided. Now, if you had a recognition system that could read me as I made my choice (after setting it to my particular pattern/system), so what? You'd just be reading the state of my brain after my free will provided the intent, and my brain interpreted it. This is why I think it is important to distinguish "free will" from any choice; not all choices are equally representative of free will. Many choices, if not most, are absolutely predictable and might even represent a process of subverting free will intent so that the program can output something it recognizes as valid; that isn't because free will doesn't exist, it's only because most people simply don't exercise it - if they do, in fact, have it at all. I'm undecided about that last part.William J. Murray_{December 22, 2008
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Mark (#89): "1) Is there anything about your current experience of choosing that tells you this can never happen? " First of all, it has never happened. Our understanding of the nervous system is so primitive that we cannot even begin to understand what happens in it, except for very trivial associations. But let's pretend such an experiment were in principle possible. I believe that we could never really predict "always" the behaviour by such a tool. But we could certainly predict it sometimes. In other words, we could in some way have a map of the available options in the existing state of mind of the person, and perhaps also of their relative "strength". Sometimes, the strongest option will be really chosen. Sometimes not. But all that could still be a random fluctuation, compatible with a purely quantum model of the mind. Indeed, your example of choosing a card is not so much a good model, because in a sense choosing a card is mainly a random choice, which could bear no meaning. I do insist that free will is related to meaning, both cognitive and moral. So I will change your example a little bit. Let's imagine that the experiment is the same, but that the choice observed is another one, a morally and cognitively relevant one: for instance, you are observed (and it would be better without your knowing) while you decide if you will betray your best friend to get an important personal advantage or not. Di you still believe that your MRI would predict the outcome in all cases? And do you understand the implications for concepts like responsibility, loyalty, value, etc.? I will not answer the second question, because I think I have already expressed my point.gpuccio_{December 22, 2008
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PPS: Mark at 89 on MRI's: What you have presented is consistent with the view of the brain as a front-end I/O processor for the human body considered as a cybernetic system. That is, it is entirely compatible with a Mind/brain system in which the mind is a higher level supervisory processing element. In short, it fails as a proposed experimentum crucis. Cf JDH [88], DG [90] and SB [91]. Cf also my discussion at 92 above, on what I do believe is a key case where there is a fundamental incompatibility between the two views, and which one "wins." GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{December 22, 2008
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PS: A note on the sad case of Rib: I see that, regrettably, Rib refused [48] to apologise for denigrative remarks first pointed out in 4 above and has failed to correct or acknowledge correction of his misrepresentations, as pointed out in 5. (Cf 53, 54, 58.) I further see that in the end he has [again it seems; per Patrick at 12] been banned for cause. While that is sad, and will doubtless be pounced upon by Antievolution.org habitués and framed by them as evidence of "censorship," it seems to me that basic respect and civility are a premise of serious dialogue constrained by responsible use of reason. So is basic truthfulness, rather than suppression of the truth [the echo of Ch 1 of a certain "obscure letter" -- NOT! -- by a certain C1 Apostle is not coincidental . . . ] by use of red herring distractors leading out to oil of ad hominem soaked strawman distortions that are then ignited spectacularly to create a misleading impression of triumph in "debate." (And we must never forget Jefferson's echo of Socrates in Gorgias: debate is the often dubious art of making the worse appear the better case, being in that aided and abetted by rhetoric, the art of persuasion, not demonstration.) I trust Rib will reconsider his behaviour, apologise and correct his errors, so that he may one day return as a participant in serious and responsible dialogue. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{December 22, 2008
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Gentlemen I believe that the split brain story as repeatedly presented to us by evo mat advocates is apparently missing a key "rest of the story part." Pardon a re-presentation of some of that, here, as I believe it is relevant to this thread's topic. First, the usual side, from Wiki:
A patient with a split brain, when shown an image in his or her left visual field (that is, the left half of what both eyes see), will be unable to name what he or she has seen. This is because the speech-control center is in the left side of the brain in most people, and the image from the left visual field is sent only to the right side of the brain. (Those with the speech control center in the right side will experience similar symptoms when an image is presented in the right visual field.) Since communication between the two sides of the brain is inhibited, the patient cannot name what the right side of the brain is seeing. The person can, however, pick up and show recognition of an object (one within the left overall visual field) with their right hand, since that hand is controlled by the left side of the brain.
Now, an interesting Nature article, from 1983:
Unified response to bilateral hemispheric stimulation by a split-brain patient Justine Sergent Department of Psychology, McGill University, Montreal, Canada H3A 1B1 Surgical sectioning of the corpus callosum in epileptic patients has provided a unique opportunity to study separately the competence and processing capacities of the two cerebral hemispheres, each of which is able to perceive, think, memorize and learn independently and essentially outside the realm of awareness of the other1?4. While research has focused on this 'disconnection syndrome', split-brain patients nonetheless behave as unified individuals in their normal environment, and the present study investigated this aspect of their behaviour in an experimental setting. The two hemispheres of a callosotomized patient were simultaneously presented with information associated with conflicting responses, and the subject was requested to produce a single response. In all combinations of hemisphere stimulation and hand responding, the subject was capable of perfect accuracy, suggesting that he could integrate and resolve the conflicting information before the production of his response, and that his two disconnected hemispheres were simultaneously aiming at the same goal.
Now, that has some interesting implications, as an empirical "existence proof":
1 --> First, if something exists, it is possible, indeed it has been actualised. 2 --> Here we see that Sergent says that the type of behaviour he presents is actually more typical of the behaviour of such patients in normal circumstances (i.e. the oddities we saw reported were under unusual circumstances designed to highlight the appearance of challenges). 3 --> Now, with inter-hemispheric communications severed, we see that typical behaviour is that: "split-brain patients nonetheless behave as unified individuals in their normal environment . . ." 4 --> Indeed, of the subject under study it was observed: "In all combinations of hemisphere stimulation and hand responding, the subject was capable of perfect accuracy, suggesting that he could integrate and resolve the conflicting information before the production of his response, and that his two disconnected hemispheres were simultaneously aiming at the same goal . . . " 5 --> Now, the scenario we had been presented with previously, was one in which such patients exhibited more or less bizzare divided behaviour, sometimes in open violent conflict. And, that divided behaviour was held up as evidence of the materially determined conduct of the body; i.e. the two halves were in effect a creation of split persons sharing one body. (I recall a Sci Fi thriller that played on that, with the surviving brother from an accident being saved by having the salvable half of his twin brother's brain put in place of his own excessively damaged brain hemisphere (right as recall); leading to split behaviour.) 6 --> Now, we learn that such behaviour seems to often be under unusual circumstances. That needs exploration in itself, as it suggests that what is going on is that a viable scenario is that the front-end i/o processor for the mind-brain cybernetic system (with vital store), is facing massive perturbation, leading to disrupted behaviour and perceptions. But that is not the decisive point. 7 --> For, we now see that such patients, under normal circumstances, do exhibit unified behaviour, indeed, an integrated and evidently recognisable self; even in the face of massive trauma tot he brain. [NB: usually to stop something like epileptic grand mal seizures and their deleterious effects. having had a dear friend die from that and complications, I can full well understand the resort to desperate measures. I still miss you Peaches!] 8 --> That brings up the $ 64,000 question: If [a] the "mind" is the product of the brain secreting thoughts as the liver secretes bile as my Marxist friends were fond of saying, and [b] splitting the brain produces two separate functioning organs with no direct communication, [c] what is it that restores and/or sustains that integrated whole? 9 --> In short, it seems to me that another side of the split brain evidence is pointing in a very interesting direction. [Perhaps Ms O'Leary's co-author or Mr Egnor would care to help us out on this?]
I also note that we are really dealing with inference to best explanation in the face of comparative difficulties here; so it should not be surprising that some evidence will be headlined as supportive to the evo mat view, and that other evidence will be similarly held up as supportive to the "more than meat" view. the issue is, which view better addresses the material facts, is more coherent and has greater explanatory power and elegance [being neither ad hoc nor simplistic]. On that, the decisive issue for me is a basic fact: my experience of myself ansd others as having minds of our own. Without real freedom to think based not on materialistic cause-effect chains tracing to genetics and environmental conditioning as well as particular life circumstances, rationality itself collapses. So, the evo mat view, in my considered opinion, at once reduces to incoherence. And, I have yet to see a cogent set of facts that overturns that view forcing me to accept that my independence of mind is a delusion. And if mind is real, propositions are real, numbers are real, mathematical relations are real, logical inference is real, morality and conscience are real etc etc, then the world is far more interesting and complex than the evo mat view would have us believe. In short, on what we can see so far, mind (and yea even soul) win the day on inference to best explanation. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{December 22, 2008
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Humans possess two distinct, complementary functions called intellect and will. In terms of moral judgments, the intellect provides the conceptual target and the will shoots the arrow. In other words, the intellect understands the proposition and the will decides whether or not it likes the proposition and whether or not it will go along with it. The intellect can provide a “target” proposition to the will, and the will can decide on its own behalf whether or not it would prefer to shoot the arrow. Thus, an individual can know that he/she should stop smoking, but may refuse to act on that knowledge. A reasonable proposition presented by the intellect is thus rejected on behalf of a perceived emotional need. In other words, the will can overrule the wisdom of the intellect, assuming of course that the intellect has provided the needed wisdom. Each faculty has a job to do. The job of the intellect is to find truth, while the job of the will is to prefer and love the right things. If the intellect doesn’t bother to rise above mediocrity, then it can hardly present to the will a noble proposition. Or, the will can simply decide that it will reject all reasonable propositions, especially if those reasonable propositions put a strain on the appetites. That the intellect and will can be at war with one another is obvious on inspecting everyday human behavior. For human beings to grow, they must do two things: [A] Illuminate the mind and [B] train the will. Obviously, once one rejects the existence of either or both of these faculties, moral growth becomes problematic. The real issue is not whether humans have free will, but rather whether they will use it for good or for evil. In fact, the world is full of highly intelligent people whose minds are not so much illuminated as steeped in a kind of pseudo-sophistication that often passes for wisdom. Since they don’t recognize their two faculties of soul, their will becomes perverted and starts telling the mind to follow the appetites. So, instead of reason leading the passions, the passions lead the reason. If a man does not conform his way of life to a philosophy, he will, in the end, find a philosophy that conforms to his way of life.StephenB_{December 21, 2008
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"As you came into the room our new super MRI device took an imprint of the state of all the relevant neurons and we predicted that you would spend a minute luxuriating in your choice and choose the 7 of diamonds." Denyse O'Leary "The Spiritual Brain" Also check out some of Michael Egnor's arguments at DI Someone has already claimed that they can do something similar, there is a slight delay between the time the MRI shows activity (apparently this is "the decision point") and materialists claim this is proof that physical activity controls thought. The problem is that thought may be controlling physical activity, there is no way to tell the difference. Is my thinking causing activity in the matter of my brain or is the activity in my brain-matter giving me the illusion of thought? If the latter is true (brain activity causes thought) then thinking is not a reliable way of knowing and any truth-claims I make based upon that belief are rationally incoherent.dgosse_{December 21, 2008
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Here is a little thought experiment for all you non-compatabilists which comes up from time to time in philosophy classes. You accept an invitation to participate in a research project at a laboratory in brain research. All you have to do is enter a room and choose a card from a pack of cards. It is emphasised that you can choose any card and please concentrate on making sure it is your choice. You spend some time luxuriating in your free will and your ability to choose just whichever card you like. Then after a minute you choose the 7 diamonds. A researcher comes out from behind the screen wreathed in smiles. It works! As you came into the room our new super MRI device took an imprint of the state of all the relevant neurons and we predicted that you would spend a minute luxuriating in your choice and choose the 7 of diamonds. We can even show you the electrochemical pathways that led to your decision. Two questions: 1) Is there anything about your current experience of choosing that tells you this can never happen? 2) If it did happen, would your choice of the seven of diamonds have been proven to have been no choice at all but an illusion?Mark Frank_{December 21, 2008
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If we don't have free will this whole argument is moot. Therefore... The convincing argument ( note I did not say proof ) that I have free will does not come from an outside analysis of my brain, or a look at my genetic blueprint. It comes from my self... I know that I decided to post this. I know I could delete it now.... if I chose to. To claim that these are not my choices, but the result of some complex set of information, is only something I would buy into if I was facing overwhelming evidence. ( I believe some would put that as incredible claims require incredible evidence ). But when I look at the materialists philosophies, I do not find overwhelming evidence. At best I find redefinition of terms and obfuscation. This leads me to turn the question the other way. If free will is such a logical conclusion of the evidence from self, then why do the materialists deny it. In my opinion, the reason is that it true free will is incompatible with materialism. So they must put forth strange arguments that strain at the meanings of terms, in order to deny the obvious. There do exist causal agents in this world. The real question is, how many are there, and is there one that was the first and eternal causal agent.JDH_{December 21, 2008
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Very interesting discussion indeed on a very difficult point. A few quick comments: Domoman (#79): "I just don’t want this sweet blog to come across as a place that is intolerant of other’s views." Maybe it happened sometimes in the past. At present, I would say that it is only, very rarely and with extreme reluctance, intolerant of some people's "behaviour" (like any good blog should be). William J. Murray: "There are other reasonings here that “free will” is an effect of the transcendent “I”; I disagree. I think free will is in fact the transcendent “I”, the same as the uncaused cause that creates the universe like the drop to the ocean, the source of all creativity, freedom, and innovation." Well, again let's not stick too much to words. Vivid wants to call free will an effect, you want to identify it with the "I" itself. What about "a manifestation", or "a power" or "a property" of the transcendental I? BTW, thank you for the beautiful words about that "I" which is in everyone of us. As an antidote against the many who see it as just a loop of software, it's beautiful to be remembered here of its sacred nature. vivid (#82): "I am convinced that we always choose that which is our strongest want at the moment. I dont call that being a slave to our wants however if it is not our wants that determine our choices then we must be choosing that which we do not want. That would negate free choice." I agree with a comment: there are in us, at any moment, many different and conflicting wants. One of the wonders of free will is that we can choose not only according to some kind of objective "strength" of them (which would be determinism), but in relation to their kind and quality too (which allows the concepts of freedom and morality). Again, it is important to remember that free choices are such not only because they are not deterministic, but also because they are not random: in other words, they are related to fundamental cognitive and moral intuitions of the I, and therefore they are "choices with meaning". vivid (#85): "I think we would avoid much confusion if the term “free will” was replaced by free choice." I have no problem, but probably we should stick to the more popular term. Moreover, I think that for clarity we should distinguish between "the power of free choice" and "free choices". The second can be said to be the "result" or "effect" of the operating of the first.gpuccio_{December 21, 2008
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magnan (#72) Re the physics of free will: try "The Oxford Handbook of Free Will" by Robert Kane at http://www.amazon.com/Oxford-Handbook-Free-Will-Handbooks/dp/0195178548/ref=ed_oe_p/186-6435243-7676267 .vjtorley_{December 21, 2008
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"Thanks for your feed back!" Ditto "I think talking on free will was the most confusing subject in my entire class" As I stated earlier I think we would avoid much confusion if the term "free will" was replaced by free choice. After all thats seems to be what one means when discussing free will. Vivid Vividvividbleau_{December 21, 2008
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magnan: In response to your call for contributors to "look at empirical evidence that might bear on the issue," here is a good site on the physics underlying free will which you might want to check out: http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/ For two recent articles in "New Scientist" on the physics underlying free will, see "Free will – you only think you have it" at http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg19025504.000-free-will--you-only-think-you-have-it.html and "Free will - is our understanding wrong?" at http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg19526154.200-free-will--is-our-understanding-wrong.html . I would also like to point out that for free will to be genuine, top-down causality must be a genuine possibility. Top-down causality is a necessary but not sufficient condition for freedom: if everything is determined from the bottom up, there really is no place for free will. Here is a link to Richard Cameron's Ph.D. dissertation, "Teleology in Aristotle and Contemporary Philosophy of Biology: An Account of the Nature of Life" at http://web.archive.org/web/20010101-20050101re_/http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/fac/cameron/diss/diss.pdf . Cameron defends the notion of top-down causality and argues vigorously that it is fully compatible with modern biology. Here is an link to an online article by Glenn Miller, entitled "Does the reality of unconscious processes undermine Christianity?" at http://www.christian-thinktank.com/priming.html . Finally, here is a link to a book "The Oxford Handbook of Free Will" by Thomas Kane, http://www.amazon.com/Oxford-Handbook-Free-Will-Handbooks/dp/0195178548/ . (I haven't read it, but it sounds pretty good from the reviews.) Finally, I'd like to question the widely held assumption that Newtonian physics is in fact deterministic, by focusing on billiard ball collisions - supposedly the quintessential example of Newton's determinism. In fact, collisions are only deterministic if the objects colliding are perfectly elastic, so that kinetic energy is preserved as well as momentum. However, in real life, that's just an approximation. Thus it seems to me that even in a Newtonian universe, the thesis that everything is predictable is empirically false. Of course, a dyed-in-the-wool determinist is perfectly free (!) to maintain that events are fully determined, even if they are not predictable; but I think that's just begging the question. I hope these references help.vjtorley_{December 21, 2008
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Vividbleau, lol Interesting point. I remember thinking about this stuff in my philosophy class and it can get so confusing. In fact, I think talking on free will was the most confusing subject in my entire class. I'm honestly not sure how to reply to your post, and I'm not sure I necessarily need to. After all, I haven't figured out the mystery of free will, which is exactly what we're discussing. Thanks for your feed back!Domoman_{December 21, 2008
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One of the more interesting aspects of determinism (and also quite ironic, considering the "rational and scientific" self-image of those who hold it) is that it really amounts to a modern version of Astrology. Our characters, luck, prosperity, and lives are determined by the Particles, and by the whole cosmic chain of events since the Big Bang, which necessarily includes the influence of various stars and heavenly bodies (for "we are made of star-stuff"), that either did exist or still do exist. What goes around comes around. So, what's *your* sign?Matteo_{December 21, 2008
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"Yet, I do not believe anybody is a slave to their wants. If I run across ice cream at my kitchen table I may want it, but I do not have to eat it." If you dont eat it even though you want to eat it you must want something else more, such as good health, etc, etc. I am convinced that we always choose that which is our strongest want at the moment. I dont call that being a slave to our wants however if it is not our wants that determine our choices then we must be choosing that which we do not want. That would negate free choice. Vividvividbleau_{December 21, 2008
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On the idea of free will I think something to consider is this: every person on the planet, aside from a few rare cases (when they have a body disfunction) feels longings or wants. Yet, I do not believe anybody is a slave to their wants. If I run across ice cream at my kitchen table I may want it, but I do not have to eat it. We also should realize that at any given moment every person on the planet must make a choice, such as, "Should I sit here at my computer? Should I sit down in the other room? Should I take a nap?" I think having free will is having the ability to choose between such options as these. To not have free will then, in my opinion, would be to not have the ability to choose. Such that when I saw the ice cream on my kitchen table I was completely forced to eat it (that is, I am not at least, in some sense, in control of my actions). Free will to me, seems, more or less, to be my ability to choose between possible actions. Determinism, at least hard determinism, would seem to be the lack of the ability to choose between options. Of course all humans lack the ability to do certain things, such as we cannot fly naturally, so maybe we're not completely free in that sense. I think I could swap my term "free will" with "free action" and be relatively close to what I'm hitting at. I don't honestly know where I stand on the whole division of believes on free will, but I'm definitely not a hard determinist, and I don't think I'd go with a libertarian either. I'm close to a soft determinist, but I'm not even sure if that's what I'd be. I think are "wants" are caused, but I think what causes us to choose is ourselves. Again, I may want ice cream (that "want" was caused), but I can choose (my response to that "want") not to eat it. Anyway, this might be talking off topic... but if anybody read this, I hope you found it at least interesting. lolDomoman_{December 21, 2008
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#63: Regardless of what actually happens, I can intend whatever I wish. That's the difference between free will and a conditioned, constrained, or coerced choice. You seem to think that I cannot make a choice beyond what is apparently available. I most certainly can. That act is called faith. There are other reasonings here that "free will" is an effect of the transcendent "I"; I disagree. I think free will is in fact the transcendent "I", the same as the uncaused cause that creates the universe like the drop to the ocean, the source of all creativity, freedom, and innovation.William J. Murray_{December 21, 2008
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