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Christopher’s Challenge

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Christopher Hitchens is nothing if not a straight-shooter. He calls it like he sees it, and not even a vicious attack could stop him from denouncing evil, racist ideologies that are still with us today. He is also a fearless and formidable debater. In recent years, he has declared himself an anti-theist, a term he defines as follows:

You could be an atheist and wish that the belief was true. You could; I know some people who do. An antitheist, a term I’m trying to get into circulation, is someone who’s very relieved that there’s no evidence for this proposition.

On Bastille Day in 2007, in response to an article entitled What Atheists Can’t Answer by op-ed columnist Michael Gerson in The Washington Post, Christopher Hitchens threw down the gauntlet to theists:

Here is my challenge. Let Gerson name one ethical statement made, or one ethical action performed, by a believer that could not have been uttered or done by a nonbeliever. And here is my second challenge. Can any reader of this column think of a wicked statement made, or an evil action performed, precisely because of religious faith? The second question is easy to answer, is it not? The first – I have been asking it for some time – awaits a convincing reply. By what right, then, do the faithful assume this irritating mantle of righteousness? They have as much to apologize for as to explain.

Hitchens has repeated this challenge on numerous occasions since then. The first time I heard him issue this challenge, I thought: “He has a point.” Going through the Ten Commandments (a natural starting point for someone raised in the Judeo-Christian tradition), it seemed to me that the only ones that a nonbeliever couldn’t keep were the ones relating to the worship of God. But Christopher Hitchens might reasonably object that if religious belief only makes believers more ethical in the way they relate to God, then it has no practical moral value. Surely, if God exists, then the belief that God is real should also infuse a deeper meaning into our interactions with other people. For the belief that God is real is meant to transform the way in which we think about and act towards others. In that case, there should be ethical actions directed at other human beings that a believer can perform, and that a nonbeliever cannot.

Christopher Hitchens has been criticized before for failing to provide a secular justification for his moral beliefs, and for waffling on the subject of free will. I will not rehash those criticisms here. Instead I will throw the floor open, and invite submissions from readers in answer to the following question:

Can you name an ethical action directed at other human beings, that a believer could perform, and that a nonbeliever could not?

To help readers along, I’ll make my question more focused. Let’s call it “Christopher’s Challenge”:

Can you name an ethical action directed at Christopher Hitchens, that a believer could perform, and that a nonbeliever could not?

I’m deeply ashamed to say that it took me two whole weeks to think of the answer to this question, and then I kicked myself hard for not having thought of it sooner. But I confidently predict that someone reading this post will come up with the answer within 24 hours.

Answers, anyone?

Update on Professor Feser’s response to my post

(By the way, I would like to thank Professor Edward Feser for his lengthy and detailed reply to my post, and I would like to add that I deeply respect his passion for truth. Professor Feser and I have a somewhat different understanding of Thomist metaphysics and how it should be interpreted in the 21st century, and I would also disagree with his bold claim that even if scientists one day managed to synthesize a life-form from scratch in a lab, that life-form would not be an artifact. But in the meantime, I would like to draw readers’ attention to a remark Professor Feser made in his post, “Intelligent Design” theory and mechanism, on 10 April 2010:

Perhaps the biological world God creates works according to Darwinian principles; and perhaps not.

Those were incautious words, and I believe they betray a profound misunderstanding of what Aquinas wrote on the Creation. In a forthcoming post, I will demonstrate that Aquinas would never have accepted the Darwinian account of how evolution is supposed to work, even if he had known then what we know now. I will also show that according to Aquinas, certain life-forms cannot be generated from non-living matter by any kind of natural process, even in a universe sustained by God, and rife with final causes. Stay tuned!)

Comments
Allen MacNeill, At this point it also seems quite striking to me that vjtorley (a person whose discernment and judgment I respect) can only find one action that a believer could perform that a non-believer could not (i.e. intercessory prayer) and that there is no reliable empirical evidence that this action has detectable effects, it raises the question “What difference does it make if one is a believer or not?” First, I don't think that's a fair summary of VJ Torley's view. He has focus primarily on intercessory prayer here, but his original finding was much broader than that. (It also seems he would disagree with you on the 'empirical findings' in those cases, but he can speak for himself.) Second, I pointed out two things: 1) That materialist atheists are utterly incapable of pursuing spiritual goods, or attempting to help others pursue spiritual goods. If there does exist a transcendent good, a consistent materialist atheist cannot intentionally pursue it, or intentionally assist others in pursuing it. At most they can perform acts* that are 'happy coincidences' with those pursuits. 2) I also illustrated, to no answer, that Hitchens' test is supremely flawed. Replace "atheist" in the question with "nihilist". A nihilist can still perform (aside from what I mentioned in 1) all the 'ethical actions' an atheist could. That would leave you in the position of saying "What difference does it make if someone is a nihilist or not?" I consider that to expose a major flaw in this entire discussion. Hitchens' question is employed as little more than an intellectual smokescreen. And I submit that only a fool would say 'Because a nihilist is capable of performing any 'ethical act', whether or not a person is a nihilist doesn't matter - and shouldn't matter to religious people or people who believe in real spiritual goods, even when choosing to elect and empower leaders'.nullasalus
April 22, 2010
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PaV @ 166, I think Hitchens knows Mother Theresa better than most people, having written a book about her, made a documentary, and been appointed by the Vatican to represent her as a devils advocate in her beatification hearings. There is a wealth of evidence that she deliberately denied proper medical attention to the poor victims of her ministrations and revelled in their poverty despite raising huge sums of money from very dodgy donors. Not to mention campaigning against contraception in an extremely poor and over-populated part of the world.zeroseven
April 22, 2010
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----Allen: “If something (say nutritional biochemistry) is necessary for morality, does that mean that morality can be derived from that thing? After all, life itself is necessary for morality (non-living things cannot be moral), and carbohydrates are necessary for life, so does this mean that morality can somehow be derived from (and predicated on) the principles of nutritional biochemistry?” The point is that MET proposes that morality itself and all the human faculties that allow the individual to practice it, emerge from matter and cannot, therefore, be grounded in anything but matter. Thus, it rules out, in principle, any kind of apriori morality, which means that morality, under those circumstances, must be ever-emerging, ever-changing, and relative. If there is no such thing as human nature, then obviously there can be no unchanging morality proper to human nature. ---“Please cite references in any textbook on modern evolutionary biology that states that evolutionary theory is presumed to explain the origin of morality.” ---Yes, there are books written by evolutionary biologists for the popular press that do so, but none of these authors (to my knowledge) knows even the most basic principles of ethical philosophy. That doesn’t stop them from writing speculative hogwash about the evolution of morality, but that doesn’t mean that they are right, nor that they represent the current state of the science of evolutionary biology, as opposed to its applications to ethical philosophy, which indeed strike me as “dubious”. Pick either your first comment, which disputes my claim, or your second comment, which affirms it, and then we can go forward. ---“Indeed, I did (glad you noticed that). Had I included them I should be considered by any rational person to be a complete idiot, as atheists as atheists obviously cannot either worship a “Creator” nor pursue Its final end.” There are some moral acts that atheists cannot perform. Isn’t that the point that you are contesting? IF God deserves to be worshipped, and IF man has a final end that he ought to pursue, then it should be obvious that atheists cannot execute morality in that context. Thus, the only way the atheist can claim to be as moral as the theist is by denying certain aspects of morality. ---“But that wasn’t my point: stephenB asserted once again that atheists cannot “lov[e] (in a practical way, not just the avoidance of hating) enemies and refrain… from lust, because doing so are impossible except for the grace of God….” Simply asserting that this is the case is in no way support for that assertion. Why, precisely, are atheists incapable of genuinely loving their enemies or avoiding lust? And please, don’t just make another unsupported assertion; provide some evidence that this is a necessary conclusion about the behavior and motivations of all atheists that is necessarily derived from the fact that they are atheists.” Let’s just consider the vice of lust for now. First, the atheist must believe that lust is wrong. Do you know of any atheists who insist, without compromise, that chastity is a moral imperative and that lust is a moral failing? Second, the atheist must believe lust is wrong to the extent that he is willing to develop, through rigorous discipline, the self control necessary to avoid that failing. Do you know of any atheists who have expressly trained their will and bent it in the direction of sexual purity [not Puritanism]. It’s one thing to see the light; it is quite another thing to summon up the moral strength to follow it. How does the atheist train his will to prefer what it ought to prefer when he doesn’t even acknowledge that such a thing as a “will” exists? ---“And, to make this a little more interesting, please indicate why Buddhists are fundamentallyincapable of loving their enemies or avoiding lust (Buddhism, of course, not being predicated on the existence of any deity).” I am putting atheists and Buddhists in separate categories. However, I tend to agree with you, if I understand your point correctly, that Buddhism is, in the final analysis, practical atheism. On the other hand, I suspect that Buddhists could love their enemies and refrain from lust inasmuch as they attempt to destroy important elements of their personality by extinguishing desire rather than using it for a worthwhile purpose. However, to the extent that they are successful, and I doubt that few are, they pay a heavy price by removing all passion, motivation and righteous anger. By rooting out the vice in exactly that way, [as opposed to retaining passion and redirecting it toward nobler ends] they also root out the potential to perform moral acts that require passion. There are three possibilities: Atheism, which typically allows the passions to run wild; Buddhism, which, in principle, seeks to kill the passions; and Christianity, which seeks to regulate passions and redirect them toward meaningful and moral ends. Can there be any doubt which of the three is most likely to produce consistently moral acts?StephenB
April 22, 2010
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P.S. This is off-topic, but perhaps one of the moderators or commentators might be interested in a discussion on the topic of "swarm intelligence" [ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swarm_intelligence ] and/or "self-organizing systems" [ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-organization ] as these seem to be relevant to a discussion of the relationship between evolution, intelligence, and design/teleology. Just a thought...Allen_MacNeill
April 22, 2010
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One more comment on the question of the (biological) evolution of ethics. Lest anyone accuse me of misrepresenting sociobiology, it is indeed the case that there are several branches of evolutionary biology that propose mechanisms for the evolution of altruism. These include (but are not limited to) William D. Hamilton's theory of kin selection, Robert Trivers' theory of reciprocal altruism, Robert Axelrod and William D. Hamilton's theory of the evolution of cooperation, and George R. Price's theory of group selection. And indeed, I think that these theories provide strong support for the idea that the tendency toward altruism among humans and other primates (and among social carnivores, cetaceans, herding ungulates, foraging groups of birds and fish, naked mole rats, and members of the Hymenoptera and Isoptera, along with various mutualistic symbioses) is the result of evolution by natural selection. Furthermore, there is abundant natural history evidence in support of these theories. But none of these theories nor the evidence supporting them can legitimately be used to formulate or especially to justify any system of ethics. They all describe how humans and other social animals are and say absolutely nothing about what we ought to be. For example, not all theories of ethics prescribe altruism as the basis for ethical behavior. Objectivism (the otological, epistomological, and ethical system formulated and advocated by Ayn Rand, a dedicated and outspoken atheist, capitalist, and anarchist libertarian) explicitly states that altruism is the root of all evil, and that all valid ethics are grounded in individual self-interest. We formulate, justify, promulgate, and eventually agree upon ethics using a fundamentally different logic than we use to empirically investigate the natural world. Confusing the two or (much, much worse) deliberately conflating the two is neither justified nor benign, and historically has resulted in the prosecution of very great evil.Allen_MacNeill
April 22, 2010
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At this point it also seems quite striking to me that vjtorley (a person whose discernment and judgment I respect) can only find one action that a believer could perform that a non-believer could not (i.e. intercessory prayer) and that there is no reliable empirical evidence that this action has detectable effects, it raises the question “What difference does it make if one is a believer or not?” Allen, et al, at the risk of repeating myself, I refer you again to my post #33 above. I put it to all of you that Hitchens challenge is, when all is said and done, irrelevant, because Christian ethics is made up of, at an absolute minimum (there may be more components?): 1. intentions 2. statements 3. actions Hitchens challenge addresses a subset of Christian morality and he is guilty of a logical error in that he clearly thinks that if he can demonstrate that an atheist can replicate ALL of SOME PARTS of Christian ethics, then that atheist is conforming with ALL of THE ENTIRETY of Christian ethics. This is so transparently false (at least to how I see things) that I am frankly surprised that this thread has dragged on so long and taken the turns that it has. Since when has SOME of something been equivalent to ALL of something? Unless Hitchens is prepared to engage with INTENTIONS then I will pay him no more mind. There are numerous things that a Christian can "do" that an atheist cannot. One of them is have an intention to love and worship God with a pure heart. An atheist can never intend that because he rejects God. Why do y'all think that Jesus spent so much time castigating the Pharisees, not for their statements or their actions (their apparent conformance with the law) but because of the poverty of their hearts?Spiny Norman
April 22, 2010
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It's okay, Charles, I freely admit that my temper often gets the better of me (as witnessed by some - many? - of my comments in this thread), and so I can hardly blame anyone else for doing the same. It's part of the problem with asynchronous communication, such as discussion boards like this. Imagine how much worse it might be if we were debating via pen&paper snail-mail. As a great admirer of the voluminous correspondence of the denizens of the 19th century, I am often amazed that anyone continued writing to anyone else. Perhaps this is why so many of the letters from that period strike us "moderns" as excessively obsequious. The slate is once again blank, and I will attempt to practice what I (long-windedly) preach. --Your most obedient and humble servant etc.,Allen_MacNeill
April 22, 2010
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Moderator: Perhaps the moderator would delete my #186? Please?Charles
April 22, 2010
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Allen_MacNeill:
I wrote my comment #175 before I read your comment #167. Please forgive me for my intemperance.
Alas, I posted my 186 before seeing your 185. All is forgiven, please forgive me for my "too quick trigger finger".Charles
April 22, 2010
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Allen_MacNeill:
And Charles, I will no longer respond to you either, for precisely the same reasons [snide attitude] that I will no longer respond to Charlie. Good bye.
Let the record reflect that Mr. MacNeill, having admitted herein at least twice of what he too kindly refers to his own “fundamental attribution errors", to wit:
after reading charles’s response, I realize that my generalization of my experiences with the “demonizing” type of Christian is what could easily be referred to as “fundamental attribution error”. And so, I admit that I have in comment #85 committed precisely such an error and will attempt to be more careful in the future.
and (failing to be more careful in the future):
And yes, it is once again a failing of mine that I would characterize a belief system by the actions of one of its more unhinged (indeed, vicious) adherents. IN doing so, I have once again committed a “fundamental attribution error”, but one that seems extraordinarily common on both sides of this issue.
Mr. MacNeill, having previously juxtaposed “demonizing type of Christian" and "its more unhinged (indeed, vicious) adherents" against the views of others (and giving him a pass on his "joe cool" typo), now characterizes my factual candor in my answering his last questions, as my "snide attitude". There, for all to witness, is the hypocritical umbrage of the insincere.Charles
April 22, 2010
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Re Charles in comment #167: I wrote my comment #175 before I read your comment #167. Please forgive me for my intemperance. This reminds me of a story (one that I find applies especially to a Quaker like me):
A person is getting a lift to work from a friend who is a Quaker. Another driver cuts her off, and she yells profanity at the offender and flips him off. The passenger says "My goodness, I thought you were a Quaker" and the driver replies "It's because I'm prone to cussing and flipping people off that I need to be a Quaker".
If we were all "naturally good" then we wouldn't need ethics or religion, would we?Allen_MacNeill
April 22, 2010
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PaV in comment #182: Ethical good is fundamentally different from prudential good. The former has to do with what people "ought" to do, irrespective of what they want to do, whereas the latter is entirely limited to what they "want" to do and has nothing to do with what they "ought" to do. For example, I can (prudentially) say that "vanilla ice cream is good", but my use of the word "good" in that statement does not in any way imply that "vanilla ice cream is ethically justifiable". And so, from a purely self-interested standpoint (i.e. prudential "good") I can easily state that it would be "good" (indeed, very "good") for the Dean to increase my salary, but that would not in any way have any bearing on whether or not I should use the increase in my salary to do "good" to other people (by donating it to a charity, for example). The problem is that we use the same word – "good" – in two fundamentally different ways, which can only be distinguished from each other in context.Allen_MacNeill
April 22, 2010
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Hitchens on coveting:
Then it's a swift wrap-up with a condemnation of adultery (from which humans actually can refrain) and a prohibition upon covetousness (from which they cannot). To insist that people not annex their neighbor's cattle or wife "or anything that is his" might be reasonable, even if it does place the wife in the same category as the cattle, and presumably to that extent diminishes the offense of adultery. But to demand "don't even think about it" is absurd and totalitarian, and furthermore inhibiting to the Protestant spirit of entrepreneurship and competition.
Apply to "lust".Charlie
April 22, 2010
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Allen (177)
Personally, I believe that evil is evil, whether it is directed at one person or 30 million, and that how many people are affected by an evil act makes no fundamental ethical difference. I also believe that the same thing is true for good. Indeed, doing good for one person is how all good actions begin, and doing evil to one person is how all evil actions begin.
This strikes me as a rather wild and reckless statement/position. St. Augustine, a Manichean---those believing that there is a principle of good and a principle of evil, a sort of 'spiritual' dualism---wrestled with this in becoming a Christian. He finally posited that 'evil' is no more than the 'absence of evil'. So, at least your statement is consistent: if you don't think there are gradations of evil, then, likewise, you should not believe in gradations of good. What does this position look like? As I understand you, it looks like one can take one step in either direction---in the direction of the 'good', or that of 'evil' (which, per St. Augustine, of course, amounts to 'not' taking the step). And, thus, in this construction, there is no room for 'better' (or, worse). Strange. It is 'good' that Cornell University pays you a salary; but are you denying that it is better should they give you a raise? Be careful in answering, a Dean might be looking on! ;) (Gone for the day)PaV
April 22, 2010
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In comment #178 stephenB wrote:
"You left out the other two–worshipping the Creator and pursuing his final end."
Indeed, I did (glad you noticed that). Had I included them I should be considered by any rational person to be a complete idiot, as atheists as atheists obviously cannot either worship a "Creator" nor pursue Its final end. But that wasn't my point: stephenB asserted once again that atheists cannot "lov[e] (in a practical way, not just the avoidance of hating) enemies and refrain... from lust, because doing so are impossible except for the grace of God...." Simply asserting that this is the case is in no way support for that assertion. Why, precisely, are atheists incapable of genuinely loving their enemies or avoiding lust? And please, don't just make another unsupported assertion; provide some evidence that this is a necessary conclusion about the behavior and motivations of all atheists that is necessarily derived from the fact that they are atheists. And, to make this a little more interesting, please indicate why Buddhists are fundamentallyincapable of loving their enemies or avoiding lust (Buddhism, of course, not being predicated on the existence of any deity).Allen_MacNeill
April 22, 2010
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"Charlie, I don’t address you with the snide attitude with which you have addressed me in comment #171. " Hmmm.
And, reward what, exactly? I can’t even figure out what this question is supposed to mean; it seems logically incoherent and obscure to the point of meaninglessness.
I'm sorry you've taken this tack ... again. But you tend to when your errors have piled up on you.Charlie
April 22, 2010
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In comment #176, stephenB wrote:
"If organic chemistry, sedimentary geology, or meterology presumed to explain the arrival of consciousness, intellect, and will, all of which are necessary for morality..."
If something (say nutritional biochemistry) is necessary for morality, does that mean that morality can be derived from that thing? After all, life itself is necessary for morality (non-living things cannot be moral), and carbohydrates are necessary for life, so does this mean that morality can somehow be derived from (and predicated on) the principles of nutritional biochemistry? Lots of things are necessary for morality and moral behavior, including all of the objects and processes studied by empirical scientists, but none of the principles formulated by such scientists are sufficient (or even relevant) to explain the origin of morality, much less its metaphysical justification. That is the whole point to the "naturalistic fallacy". In comment #176, stephenB also wrote:
"...if they presumed to explain the arrival of morality itself, then, yes, they would be amoral. Fortunately, only MET and its dubious derivatives arrogate unto themselves that privilege."
Please cite references in any textbook on modern evolutionary biology that states that evolutionary theory is presumed to explain the origin of morality. Yes, there are books written by evolutionary biologists for the popular press that do so, but none of these authors (to my knowledge) knows even the most basic principles of ethical philosophy. That doesn't stop them from writing speculative hogwash about the evolution of morality, but that doesn't mean that they are right, nor that they represent the current state of the science of evolutionary biology, as opposed to its applications to ethical philosophy, which indeed strike me as "dubious".Allen_MacNeill
April 22, 2010
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---Allen: "Why, precisely, would a non-Christian (or, more precisely, an atheist) be “incapable of the act of loving one’s enemies or refraining from lust”?" You left out the other two--worshipping the Creator and pursuing his final end. (There are other obligations, by the way. The list was not complete.) In any case, there are two answers to your question. First, an atheist would likely not accept the proposition that loving one's enemies and refraining from lust are necessary for moraltiy. If there are any atheists who do accept that proposition, I tip my hat to them since they are stretching well beyond their world view. Second, both actions [loving (in a practical way, not just the avoidance of hating) enemies and refraining from lust] are impossible except for the grace of God which atheists obviously reject.StephenB
April 22, 2010
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In comment #166 PaV wrote:
"...why should believers be lectured on evil doing by someone who is defending the philosophical outlook of the worst perpetrators of evil the world has ever seen?"
Personally, I believe that evil is evil, whether it is directed at one person or 30 million, and that how many people are affected by an evil act makes no fundamental ethical difference. I also believe that the same thing is true for good. Indeed, doing good for one person is how all good actions begin, and doing evil to one person is how all evil actions begin. It is always good to avoid the beginnings of evil.Allen_MacNeill
April 22, 2010
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---Allen: "Or do you wish to argue otherwise? For example, would you like to argue that organic chemistry somehow “relativizes morality”, or that sedimentary geology, or meteorology, or perhaps Newtonian mechanics does so?" If organic chemistry, sedimentary geology, or meterology presumed to explain the arrival of consciousness, intellect, and will, all of which are necessary for morality, and if they presumed to explain the arrival of morality itself, then, yes, they would be amoral. Fortunately, only MET and its dubious derivatives arrogate unto themselves that privilege. Also, do you have a response to @169.StephenB
April 22, 2010
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And Charles, I will no longer respond to you either, for precisely the same reasons that I will no longer respond to Charlie. Good bye.Allen_MacNeill
April 22, 2010
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Re stephenB in comment #168: Why, precisely, would a non-Christian (or, more precisely, an atheist) be "incapable of the act of loving one’s enemies or refraining from lust"?Allen_MacNeill
April 22, 2010
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Charlie, I don't address you with the snide attitude with which you have addressed me in comment #171. Therefore, I will no longer respond to your comments at all. Good-bye.Allen_MacNeill
April 22, 2010
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In comment #170 stephenB wrote:
"The problem with the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis, or some of its more recent developments, is not that it directly promotes or encourages immorality. The problem is that, because of its definitively amoral foundation, it relativizes morality, and that relative morality always translates into immorality in the end."
No, stephenB, the science of evolutionary biology, like all of the natural sciences, has absolutely nothing to do with morality. Asserting otherwise is once again to commit the "naturalistic fallacy". Or do you wish to argue otherwise? For example, would you like to argue that organic chemistry somehow "relativizes morality", or that sedimentary geology, or meteorology, or perhaps Newtonian mechanics does so?Allen_MacNeill
April 22, 2010
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Hi Allen, After pontificating on ethics for days and over numerous comments why are you now pondering the appropriateness of this thread to this forum?Charlie
April 22, 2010
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---Allen: "And so, back to my query in comment #153: Even if it could be unambiguously shown and universally agreed that people holding a specific ethical and/or religious belief system acted more (or less) ethically toward each other, toward strangers, etc., what conceivable relevance would this have on the validity of any scientific theory of the origin and evolution of life on Earth?" The problem with the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis, or some of its more recent developments, is not that it directly promotes or encourages immorality. The problem is that, because of its definitively amoral foundation, it relativizes morality, and that relative morality always translates into immorality in the end.StephenB
April 22, 2010
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That should read: There are many other ethical practices that a Christian could execute that would normally be out of range for an atheist, including the act of loving his enemies, refraining from lust, fulfilling his moral obligation to worship the Creator, and pursuing his final end. The problem is not in identifying the moral obligations that atheists cannot fulfill but rather in finding atheists who will acknowledge them as moral obligations.StephenB
April 22, 2010
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---Allen MacNeill: "At this point it also seems quite striking to me that vjtorley (a person whose discernment and judgment I respect) can only find one action that a believer could perform that a non-believer could not (i.e. intercessory prayer) and that there is no reliable empirical evidence that this action has detectable effects, it raises the question “What difference does it make if one is a believer or not?” There are many other ethical practices that a Christian could execute that would normally be out of range for an atheist, including the act of loving one's enemies, refraining from lust, fulfilling his moral obligation to worship the Creator, and pursuing his final end. The problem is not in identifying the moral obligations that atheists cannot fulfill but rather in finding atheists who will acknowledge them as moral obligations.StephenB
April 22, 2010
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Allen_MacNeill:
No, Charles, it isn’t, but if it reinforces your prejudices, please continue to believe it.
Well, you're 0 for 2 with me on this thread alone.
And Charles, when was the last time you saw anyone at this list freely admit they were wrong and affirm that they will try to do better in the future?
Infrequently. Is that your defense? Are those possibly your 'situational ethics' operating? Two wrongs don't make a right, but merit being ignored anyway?
Indeed, when was the last time you did so?
I'm a bit more methodical about my argumentation than you seem to be. Or perhaps you've chosen the subject matter and opponent poorly, in this instance. I seldom express a viewpoint, I'm usually content to lurk and learn from others. But when I do express a view, it has been carefully researched and nuanced so as to be as accurate and supportable as I know how. I try to anticipate the questions or pushback I might get and triple check to ensure I've done my homework correctly. When I don't know something with confidence, I say so, usually before hand if not when asked. If I disagree with a viewpoint I see expressed, but I am unable to see my way through to proving my point of view, I remain silent. If I have an interest in some subject, but am uncertain of my own knowledge, then my participation is inquiry rather than assertion. When I 'debate' someone, I'm careful to copy and paste their exact words and then build my rebuttal on those words, so as to avoid misstating my opponents view. I try not to quote-mine or cherry-pick. If I can't make my argument from their words, then I have no argument to make. Consequently, I don't make many mistakes, and I honestly can't remember the last time I made the same mistake twice, though I do occasionally make new mistakes and when I do, I admit them and seek a greater understanding of the correction, since that is the only way to not repeat my mistake. On other forums, I've made three mistakes in last few years that I clearly recall, wherein I made and defended assertions of mine that ultimately proved to be factually wrong, at which point I agreed I was wrong. I recall one other instance in which I admitted to an error, only to find out later I had been mislead by my opponent (whom I had presumed to be intellectually honest) who had misrepresented the factual details of some of their "evidence" and they exploited my inexperience in the subject matter. On this forum, the subject matter is usually outside my experience and I rarely assert or offer opinions. But todate, only you, Dave Scot and Miguel_de_Servet have disputed with me here, and todate only you have admitted error (Dave Scot closed a thread on which I was prevailing while Miguel_de_Servet opted for a fighting withdrawal). My point is, I hate being wrong so much that I do everything I can (in advance) to be right, and when that fails (as it has), I study the correction and 'get right' and don't repeat that particular mistake. Admitting an error is de rigueur, but not repeating the error would have been commendable (albeit one is seldom commended for mistakes not made) and one's reputation for engaging in truly meaningful, intellectually honest and reliably accurate discussion, would grow.Charles
April 22, 2010
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Allen [140,141]: Hitchens has a two part argument. His first question is meant to equate atheistic ethical prowess with that of a believer's. He does this by focusing on what an atheists "could" do. As I mentioned in [128], as a residuum of the nature we share, this is hypothetically true, and to refute him would be to begin asking how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. I answered that it is not what atheist "can" do, but what we find them actually doing that distinguishes the ethical differences between believers and non-believers. In Hitchens' second question, he moves exactly in this direction. IOW, he wants us to look at what believers have done. This is no longer a question of what a believer could do, or what an atheist could do, but what has actually happened. His point is that believers have actually done evil. My riposte is simply that the level of historically recorded evil committed by believers versus that committed by unbelievers is hugely one-sided. Your attempt to ridicule the distinction I made does not in the least detract from its force---because why else would such an intelligent and thoughtful man such as Dinesh D'Souza make the very same argument? If someone commits 500 murders does this represent the same level of malevolence as someone who murdered someone in a moment of passion? You see, numbers really do count. And that's the point: why should believers be lectured on evil doing by someone who is defending the philosophical outlook of the worst perpretrators of evil the world has ever seen? Finally, it is not the position of believing Christians that once you begin believing in Jesus Christ that you will never more commit evil. The true difference between Christians and non-believers is that Christians are repentant of their sins, and non-believers are not (Who would they repent to?) As to what Christopher Hitchens has to say about Mother Teresa, he knows Mother Teresas about as well as a 4 year-old knows about Quantum Field Theory. Should Christopher Hitcens never repent of what he has said of Mother Teresa, I believe there is a special place in Hell reserved for him---and I don't normally speak in these kinds of terms.PaV
April 22, 2010
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