As a preliminary step to a discussion [DV, to follow] of the significance of and warrant for the design inference, let us now symbolise how we interact with and draw inferences about signs and symbols (generally following Peirce et al [Added, Feb 28: including P’s thought on warrant by inference to best explanation i.e. abductive reasoning; where also warrant can be understood on Toulmin, Plantinga, Gettier and others (cf broader discussion here )]):
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Signs: I observe one or more signs [in a pattern], and infer the signified object, on a warrant:
a –> Here, as I will use “sign” [as opposed to “symbol”], the connexion is a more or less causal or natural one; e.g. a pattern of deer tracks on the ground is an index, pointing to a deer.
(NB, 02:28: Sign can be used more broadly in technical semiotics to embrace “symbol” and other complexities, but this is not needed for our purposes. I am using “sign” much as it is used in medicine, at least since Hippocrates of Cos in C5 BC, i.e. to point to a disease on an objective, warranted indicator.)
b –> If the sign is not a sufficient condition of the signified, the inference is not certain and is defeatable; though it may be inductively strong. (E.g. someone may imitate deer tracks.)
c –> The warrant for an inference may in key cases require considerable background knowledge or cues from the context.
d –> The act of inference may also be implicit or even intuitive, and I may not be able to articulate but may still be quite well-warranted to trust the inference. Especially, if it traces to senses I have good reason to accept are working well, and are acting in situations that I have no reason to believe will materially distort the inference.
e –> The process of observation may be passive, where I simply respond to effects of the sign-emitting object; or it may involve active emission of signals or interaction with the object. For instance, we may contrast passive and active sonar sensing here, noting that both modes are used by sea-animals as well as technical systems. (NB: “Object” is here used in a very broad sense [u/d 02:17: it includes objects and credibly objective states of affairs].)
f –> A sign can also be iconic, i.e sufficiently resembling [u/d, 02:17: or representing] the object to be recognisable as a representation, as a general class [a rock shaped like a face] or in specific [a sculptural portrait]. [u/d 02:28: In the case of a mace in its rest in Parliament, unless an elaborate form of a former weapon sits there, Parliament is not legitimately in session.]
Symbols: I observe a {set} of one or more symbols, and infer the/a signified meaning, on a warrant:
g –> Here, the connexion we are reflecting on is more or less conventional; involving an alphabet of defined sufficiently distinct symbols, a dictionary of meanings and rules for using symbols to convey meanings. E.g. the alphanumeric text in this post uses an alphabet of symbols, in light of the vocabulary of English [and a side-light or two from Logical/Mathematical symbols], more or less in accordance with the general rules of English language.
h –> We habitually associate the use of such symbols and rules in language-using contexts, with minds that have sufficient freedom of choice and action, that they can select symbols, string them together in accord with conventional rules, compose intentionally directed configurations, and communicate meanings.
i –> Where physical media are involved, the encoded/modulated, transmitted, received and demodulated/decoded symbols of a signal may be corrupted by noise, and the inferred meaning may not be the intended message. (Hence the concept and measure, signal to noise ratio.)
j –> The inference to a received, decoded symbolic message therefore is always an inference to intentionally and intelligently directed configuration, in the face of the possibility of a configuration triggered by noise. That is, it is an inference to design, in the context of:
k–> Thus, if a set of symbols is received and decoded as meaningful and functional in a context where at least one physical variable has been modulated according to a convention for modulation and/or a code, that implies a fairly complex set of co-adapted matching parts: encoders/decoders, modulators/demodulators, transmitters/receivers, and associated protocols, rules and procedures.
l –> In the case of a structured set of symbols expressing an argument, if it is sound, there may be a logical connexion to the meaning. E.g. that Socrates is a man, where men are mortals, means by force of logic, that Socrates is mortal.
m–> In addition, a message in a given situation may also be a sign, that a discerning observer may be able to infer additional (perhaps, inadvertent) significance from. E.g. the way of speaking of a schizophrenic may be a diagnostic sign; as, sadly, seems to be evident from the recent events in Arizona, USA.
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With these points in mind, we should now be able to more precisely focus our onward discussion of the significance of the design inference on signs that are believed to warrant the conclusion that they are best explained on design rather than a spontaneous natural process tracing to undirected forces and circumstances of chance and/or mechanical necessity.