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Atheists/Materialists Are Closet Moral Objectivists

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1. If morality is subjective (by individual or group), as atheists/materialists claim, then what any individual/group ought to do is necessarily relative to that individual/group purpose. IOW, if my purpose is to make a frozen margarita, I ought put ice in the blender. If my purpose is to make fresh peanut butter, I ought not put ice in the blender. The ought-ness of any task can only be discerned by mapping it to the purpose for which the act is committed. Under moral subjectivism, acts in themselves are just brute facts with no objective moral value; they must be mapped to the subjective purpose to determine subjective moral value (oughtness).

2. The question “Is it moral to gratuitously torture children?” implies that whomever does such an act finds it personally gratifying in some way, and we are asking a third party if the act is moral or immoral. The only possible, logically consistent answer a subjective moralist (atheist/materialist) can give is that yes, it is moral, because the moral challenge is tautologically valid in the subjective morality model. If my purpose is to gratify myself, and torturing children gratifies me, there is a 1 to 1 mapping of act to purpose- I ought do so. It is moral by definition for anyone who is gratified by the act to do so for their own gratification.

3. If the moral subjectivist says that the act is immoral “to them”, they are committing a logical error. The acts of others can only be morally evaluated according to that particular person’s subjective purpose, not according to the subjective purposes of anyone else. That is the nature of subjective commodities and relationships. Whether or not it is something a third party “ought” do for their purposes is entirely irrelevant and is treating the third party’s purposes as if they are objectively valid and binding evaluations on the acts of others.

4. Would an atheist/materialist intervene if someone else was gratuitously torturing children? If they had the power to snap their fingers and eliminate this kind of activity from the world, would they do so? I suspect the answer to both would be: yes. Note how self-described moral subjectivists would treat their own personal preferences as if they were objectively valid and binding on others.

5. Only a sociopath can truly act as if morality is subjective. “Moral subjectivism” is a intellectual smokescreen. It is a self-deception or an oughtright lie. Its proponents cannot even act or respond to questions as if moral subjectivism is true. They betray themselves as closet moral objectivists in denial, hiding from the implications of a morality they must live and act as if objective.

Comments
I certainly don’t want to debate the OP again. I was delighted to finish it where we did. But I am intrigued by this:
Neither of us know whether or not morality refers to an objective commodity. Neither of us know whether or not our consciences act like another sensory capacity that is gathering sensory information from an objectively existent moral landscape.
This suggests that when we talk about morality we don’t actually know what we are talking about!  When I talk about morality I mean what my conscience (aka known as moral feelings) drive me to do. Even if that pricking were caused by some objectively existent landscape, that it isn’t what I am talking about.  I suppose we might discover one day that our conscience is caused by some other thing – just as we have discovered the sensation of seeing red is caused by certain wavelengths of light. But “red” means what I see. It doesn’t mean those wavelengths (The colour blind don’t see red when they receive those wavelengths).Mark Frank
January 21, 2014
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Or do you think otherwise?
Yes, I do. So have many other physicists and philosophers that have held the view that the structure of the universe is dependent upon mind/consciousness, - that mind is, in fact, primary and that only potential exists without it. Some of posited that information is the fundamental building block of the universe. Which supports my contention that there may be aspects of the mind that are not only objectively existent, but are more fundamentally real than the ball and the roof in your example.William J Murray
January 21, 2014
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WJM: No, it doesn’t. Gravity is a model of the regular, predictable behavior of objects wrt their mass. It has no “objective existence” whatsoever.
"Gravity" is merely the name we give the objective effects of massive bodies in relation. I'll show you that it's objective: I'll drop a ball from the roof and we can all watch it fall at a given predicted rate within a given predicted time. Totally objective results and effects as anyone with normal senses can perceive. And this phenomenon objectively exists independently of any mind. Or do you think otherwise? You obviously do not understand the different between an objective event and a subjective one. Sorry, but you're off the rails. You can have the last word.CentralScrutinizer
January 21, 2014
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MF, et al, Lincoln is said to have once asked a man, if we say the tail of a sheep is a leg, how many legs will it have? The man answered, five. To which Lincoln said, saying cannot make things so. Your real problem is that your a pripri worldview system -- which recall, evidently requires you to imagine that intelligence, design and so forth are all delusions, figments reducible to blind chance and mechanic al necessity (never mind insoluble needle in haystack challenges and self referential incoherence) -- is inherently amoral and so morality is reduced to power games so if a sufficiently well backed and funded group pushes hard enough on things you are interested in, it is suddenly "moral." Sorry, saying cannot make things so. And you still have not processed the implications of how it is patently, and on pain of absurdity, objectively and self evidently wrong to kidnap, torture, rape and murder a young child. I put it to you -- as one not bound up in a politically correct age and context [= manipulation backed up by media and political might makes 'right'] -- that with all due respects, the case you just put up on how cleverly inventing and pushing a term and thereby violating the basic and obvious nature of the sexes in a demonstrably disordered way is suddenly "moral," simply red flags your system as opening the door wide to nihilism. I think you need to get out of your comfort zone and think again about what your system actually implies and where it may therefore very well end up. KFkairosfocus
January 21, 2014
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“Gravity” has an objective existence.
No, it doesn't. Gravity is a model of the regular, predictable behavior of objects wrt their mass. It has no "objective existence" whatsoever. It's been expressed both as a force exerted by mass (attraction), and as a condition of curved space-time. Gravity and other so-called "fundamental forces" of the natural world (time, entropy, inertia, etc.) are not things in and of themselves with "objective existence", but are rather only models of patterns of behaviors held entirely in the mind of observers. Those models attempt to characterize such regular behaviors as if such patterns of behavior reflect some objective commodity. Thus, you have yourself "reified" the mental model that describes patterns of behavior as an "objectively existent" thing which you call "gravity", when all you are really referring to is a consistent pattern of behavior of physical objects.
Morality occurs solely in the mind. That makes it subjective by definition.
I've already explained why this is irrelevant.
I think we’re done here.
We were done the minute you admitted that subjective morality = might makes right.William J Murray
January 21, 2014
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“Gravity” has an objective existence. Massive bodies exhibit actions on each other in ways we have learned to predict and we have must reason to believe they would do so if all minds became extinct...
This isn't quite apt. Gravity is the force which we see exhibited through the presence of massive bodies, but it is not emergent through them. Or at least that is not the currently held theory. Gravity would still exist without large bodies, but there would be no large bodies to exhibit gravity to observers. Morality is exhibited through the existence of sentient minds. If morality is an objective and unseen thing, for the sake of argument, that flows from God, then one must conclude that without minds, morality would still exist even though there is nothing to exhibit it.TSErik
January 21, 2014
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WJM, "I also cannot point out gravity, time or entropy, either." "Gravity" has an objective existence. Massive bodies exhibit actions on each other in ways we have learned to predict and we have must reason to believe they would do so if all minds became extinct. Or do you believe otherwise? Morality occurs solely in the mind. That makes it subjective by definition. In order for something to be objective, like the effects of massive bodies on each other (gravity), it has to exist on it's own outside of minds, like the sky or a snowflake... or gravity. If all minds ceased to exist they would still be there, if it has objective existence. So I ask again, where is this objective morality outside of subjective minds, that has an existence of its own outside of subjective minds? I think we're done here.CentralScrutinizer
January 21, 2014
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You do the same, you just won’t admit it. If it were otherwise, you could point to this mythological “objective morality” that you keep talking about and yet never do.
You are assuming a conclusion neither of us can arrive at via evidence. Neither of us know whether or not morality refers to an objective commodity. Neither of us know whether or not our consciences act like another sensory capacity that is gathering sensory information from an objectively existent moral landscape. I also cannot point out gravity, time or entropy, either. As far as defining morality as "of the mind" and thus not objective, it is my view - and the view of many throughout history - that what we call "the mind" is actually comprised of both objective and subjective commodities. So your definitional approach is not appropriate because that is part of the crux of the debate. Obviously, I don't "do the same" when it comes to believing that personal feelings are the basis for my moral actions, any more than "personal feelings" are the basis for my behavior with regards to gravity or time. Yes, of course even my touching a brick wall is a "personal feeling", but the question is whether or not one regards that "feeling" as part of an objective reality or as simply their personal preference. So, the only thing left is if I am "doing the same" wrt the reality of what morality actually is. If it is just a subjective commodity, then you are right. If it is an objective commodity, then you are wrong and, unless you are a sociopath, neither of us are acting on what are only subjective, personal feelings - we are both acting in relationship to an objective moral landscape we sense through our conscience and arbit with reason. Since neither of us can know if morality is objective or subjective (contrary to your assertions otherwise), but rather can only believe one way or another, then in the only practical sense available - what we assume and believe - I am not doing "the same thing" as you, because I am not acting from the premise that morality is nothing more than my personal preference.William J Murray
January 21, 2014
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WJM: They either are assumed to reflect objective values, or it’s just you forcing your personal preferences on others.
You do the same, you just won't admit it. If it were otherwise, you could point to this mythological "objective morality" that you keep talking about and yet never do. At best, there is consensus amongst subjective individual views. But consensus can and does change over generations. Nothing objective about it, except to say that it's an objective fact that subjective individuals forms consensuses about what is right and wrong behavior.CentralScrutinizer
January 21, 2014
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WJM - that's great - thanksMark Frank
January 21, 2014
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Mark F: I'm perfectly content to let the debate remain as is. I appreciate your contributions.William J Murray
January 21, 2014
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MJW
It is clear to me that you haven’t thought any of this out – you are just throwing up combinations of words out of emotion and using rhetoric in an attempt to justify a poorly-considered worldview.
Later in a comment to CS you write:
No. I’ve never read any philosophy books – other than my own.
I have a degree in philosophy and this is a philosophical question. I am not saying that I am right because of my qualifications – philosophy is a game anyone can play and I want you to attend to my arguments not me; but, given your relative ignorance of what world famous figures have said and thought about the subject, I do think you might refrain from dismissing what I write so glibly. These are subtle questions that very intelligent men and women have debated for millennia. If the answer seems straightforward to you then you have probably not understood the all the subtleties of the issue.  So please cool the personal side of things.   To return to the debate. I was going to write a whole lot of stuff backing up my case that for a subjectivist to campaign for what they feel is right is neither hypocritical nor irrational. However, your comment #68 suggests you agree. As I  understand it, you conclude this means that subjective morality amounts to “might makes right”.  As you graphically put it:
This is where atheism/materialism takes us, and takes society: nihilism and forcing ones will on others because one feels like it and because one can.
This is  misleading. You make it sound as though subjectivists were acting on selfish whims. We are not talking about any old feeling that we would like it to happen. We are talking about a moral feeling such as a desire for someone else to be happier, or a desire for rewards to be shared more fairly (It is a challenge to neatly define which feelings are moral but I think we recognise them when we come across them). All that subjectivism amounts to is that we try to do what we feel is morally right. Don’t you? In general that doesn’t mean brute force. It means actions like voting, protesting, persuading and making donations. Using brute force to enforce what I feel to be right raises exactly the same issues as it does for you: is the issue important enough to risk the harm that arises from brute force including the risk that I might change my mind over the issue and decide I was wrong after all? As far as I can see there is no difference in the kind of actions that a subjectivist or objectivist would take. They would both do what they judge to be right. So where does the difference lie?  I agree with CS that there is no practical difference but I can think of a couple of theoretical possibilities: 1) The subjectivist may be more inclined to recognise that the opponent has sincere but different views and therefore be prepared not to act if the issue is not that important. On the other hand I guess the objectivist should be prepared to recognise that the opponent has come to a sincere but different conclusion about what is objectively right – so I am not sure it amounts to much. 2) In principle the subjectivist decides what is right in a different way from the objectivist. The subjectivists examines and explores a situation (a particular event) or a principle (such as abortion) and having explored it comes to a subjective opinion. An objectivist needs to somehow assess the objective truth.  This is the bit that I find tricky about objectivism. How does that enquiry take place? There seems to be one school of thought that your conscience is a God given apparatus for telling you the objective truth.  Unfortunately people’s consciences often lead to different conclusions. So it is not a very reliable apparatus and to my mind indistinguishable from coming to a subjective opinion about the what is right. Another school of thought suggests that we can determine what is right from natural moral law or some other set of principles. The problem here is that those principles themselves need to be assessed and what principle do we use for that other than our subjective opinion?  Look at how real ethical debates take place in practice. They are all about trying to get the same subjective emotional reaction from others that feel themselves e.g. describing how gruesome abortion is or how gay marriage will lead to the breakdown of marriage as an institution.Mark Frank
January 21, 2014
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For some reason, the fact that people have subjective values, and act to enforce their will somehow makes the values “objective” in WJM’s mind.
No. They either are assumed to reflect objective values, or it's just you forcing your personal preferences on others. Since you admit that's all your morality boils down to, then your actions do not logically need to refer to an assumed objective value. In your mind, you're content pushing people around because you feel like it. I have no argument against that because that is what the argument is designed to reveal.William J Murray
January 20, 2014
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What I meant to write was: ---- So, that is 2 moral subjectivists who agree that subjective morality boils down to might makes right ---- This is where atheism/materialism takes us, and takes society: nihilism and forcing ones will on others because one feels like it and because one can.William J Murray
January 20, 2014
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So, that is 2 moral subjectivists who agree that morality boils down to might makes right (because I feel like it, because I can). When you add Robin from TSZ, that's 3. My argument is set up to either gain this admission, or reveal that those who will not admit it are either deceiving themselves or are hypocrites.William J Murray
January 20, 2014
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Mark Frank: why is “inflicting” my personal view of what is right on others behaving as if it is objective?
For some reason, the fact that people have subjective values, and act to enforce their will somehow makes the values "objective" in WJM's mind. He keeps saying "people act as if the morality is objective." No they don't. He's made an unjustified leap here. People merely act as if their WILL is important to themselves. Duh! Even dogs do that. Do they have an objective morality too?CentralScrutinizer
January 20, 2014
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WJM: How I feel about a thing, and what I think my response should be, is determined in great measure by whether or not I consider that thing to be subjective (personal preference) or objective (applies to everyone, at all times).
Good for you. It isn't true for me. The question of subjectivity vs objectivity is irrelevant, and doesn't even come into play in practical situations. I do what I do for the reasons stated in my previous post.
IOW, how I – or anyone – behaves in a practical way with regards to moral questions cannot help but be affected by our beliefs about “what morality is”.
I'm convinced that most people act as I have described in my previous post. But this is largely beside the point which is, nobody how you slice it, it all boils down to a subjective exercise. There is no objective morality. If there is, where can I find it? The only you have is was is subjectively between your ears. And that can be changed, altered and affected by chemical and structural changes. It might help if we reviewed what the term "subjective" means, the first definition from Dictionary.com: 1. Proceeding from or taking place in a person's mind rather than the external world The first two definitions for "objective": 1. Of or having to do with a material object. 2. Having actual existence or reality. Necessarily, all morality is subjective in nature. It takes place within a person's mind. There is no actual morality "out there" that you can point to. You are merely reifying your own opinion. Pardon if others disagree with your reified object.
WMJ: "For many, the “navel gazing” belief that morality is "subjective, while irrationaly acting as if it is objective..."
All morality is ultimately irrational because the basis of it always boils down to a set of values that is an end in of themselves without any rational justification. Your actions are just as irrational as anyone else's because the root of the tree is irrational.
"...may be to a large degree harmless as long as it is riding along in a culture largely structured around a belief in objective morality."
Harmless or not, this is, in fact, how human nature operates.
"However, once you deeply imbed in the psyche of a population and its government that it’s perfectly moral to use others as a means to gratify your own personal preferences, and that there are no necessary consequences, I don’t think you or I would care to live in such a society."
I agree. Probably because we largely share core values. This does not make them any less subjective or rational.
"Far from being “navel gazing” and making no practical difference, whether one believes (actually believes, meaning they also act as if true) in subjective or objective morality can make an enormous difference in behavior."
I disagree. I value consciousness, not because there is any objective standard that I can point to, but because my subjective material is wired up that way. I can't help it. I am a subjectivist and yet I would risk my life to save a child from a torturer as well as I'm sure you would. Your hypothesis is hereby falsified.
CS seems to think that if I feel homosexuality is wrong, it is perfectly valid, and if I feel strongly enough about it I can to try and stop any and all homosexual activity by any means I am comfortable with, including executing homosexuals.
How you feel about homosexual is entirely subjective, and what you do about it is your choice based on many factors. I may agree or disagree, and I may join your crusade or fight you tooth and nail. But it's all still quite subjective. Unless you can point to some objective standard "out there" that we're all suppose to be following.
CS further thinks that it is “navel gazing” for me (the hypothetical me) to consider the distinction between “subjective” morality, “natural law” morality, and “command authority” morality, because regardless of my conclusion, I will still go around “doing what I feel” – executing homosexuals.
What most people do is based on a lot of complex factors in their minds. It's not usually as simple as you make it out to be, although there are some who have acted along those lines: "homosexuality bad for society therefore I will kill them" and go about killing them. Regardless, it's all still subjective. Unless you can point to some objective morality "out there." "However, I can attest that when my beliefs about a thing change, my feelings about that thing change as well. How I feel about various acts, wrt morality, has dramatically changed several times in my life, depending on the beliefs that I adopt about morality itself." Good for you. But it doesn't make it any less subjective. In fact, what you are describing is an entirely subjective process. How you can't see that is astonishing.CentralScrutinizer
January 20, 2014
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I am still having difficulty linking morality (regardless of its subjectivity or objectivity) to purpose. Can you point me to some authors of whose work could shed some light on this topic?
No. I've never read any philosophy books - other than my own. Well, I read Zen and the art of Motorcycle Maintenance, and The Little Prince. And some book by Casteneda. But I don't remember any of the content of any of them - that was a long time ago. It's a simple matter of logic; oughts necessarily relate to goals or purposes. Otherwise, an act is just brute fact. You may like it or dislike it, but there is no "ought" to it unless there is a purpose or goal involved. For instance, to say you ought to treat others kindly; the question is, why ought I do that? The answer is always a purpose, even if it is to fulfill my personal preferences. I shouldn't do X? Why? Not all behaviors involve "oughts", as you described with breathing.
Is your view that absolute moral commandments do not constrain free exercise of the “will”? (In a sense as the weak nuclear force constrains atomic decay.) If so, why do you hold to that belief.
I don't consider what morality refers to - the purpose of creation - to be a "commandment" in any sense of the term, but rather to be architectural. It's innate in anything god creates. As far as I can tell or reason, I don't see that there are any limitations put on our will; we can will self-contradictory or absurd things, even if we cannot actually do them. If you think there are things we cannot will, tell me. I'd find that interesting to consider. I answer the rest of this at the bottom.
My fixation with absolute moral commandments are, that to be an absolute constant (like the speed of light, planck’s constant, and the like…), there has to be a way to define the constant such that you can prove/detect its existence.
That would matter if I cared about proving the actual existence of a thing to anyone. My arguments are never about that, but rather only about the consequences of premises and beliefs and if one's beliefs are rationally reconcilable with their behavior. Whether or not absolute morality is actually true is, IMO, an irrelevant consideration considering (1) our subjective nature, (2) the fact that we must act as if that is the case anyway, and (3) humans have the capacity to deny anything.
That is why I’m arguing that the existence of a moral constant must necessarily constrain our ability to enact our will (specifically to formulate an intent that would contravene the moral absolute). If it (absolute moral) cannot constrain our will, then can it rightly be called absolute? At best, it could only be called a pseudo-absolute.
Okay, I see what you mean here. Yes, our capacity to enact our will is constrained; we cannot ultimately derail the purpose of creation. We can intend to (unlimited free will); we cannot enact those intentions (not free action). We can only act in detriment to the good to the degree that it takes to get ourselves destroyed in the attempt.William J Murray
January 20, 2014
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MF, It is clear to me that you haven't thought any of this out - you are just throwing up combinations of words out of emotion and using rhetoric in an attempt to justify a poorly-considered worldview. Let's unpack your use of a couple of words in your posts. First, you use the word "for" in order to characterize the mother's actions in a way that your premise cannot actually, logically, accommodate.
She wouldn’t do it for any child. It arises from her strong love and desire to help that child, her feelings of shame if she didn’t – subjective, passionately held feelings.
Is she doing it "for the child", or is she doing it because she feels strongly that she should and would feel shame if she didn't? If the other person (like in your example) says they do not want you to do X, and you go ahead and do X, in what sense can you say you are doing X "for" the other person? (1) If you hold X to be a matter of each person's subjective personal preference, you do not do X because that is what they prefer. Thus, you are doing something for someone else. (2) If, regardless of the other person's wishes, you do as you prefer wrt X, then you are not doing anything "for" the other person, but only for yourself, to accommodate your own feelings and to avoid feeling shame. You are spending a lot of effort and prose to try to word your examples and statements in a way that hides what is ultimately true: the only justification you and the mother have under moral subjectivism is that you do what you feel like doing, and only accomplish it because you can. Without an implied reference to an objective commodity, the mother's only justification for disobeying the wishes of others in this example is because she wants to do it. That is where the philosophical buck stops with admitted subjective morality: because I say so. Only if one premises an objective commodity outside of one's own wants or even the other person's wants, and holds it to transcend both, and believes it to be in the best interest of the other person, can one justify the claim that they have done something for the other person regardless of what either person "wants" to happen. Now, for the real gem, where you admit that your morality is nothing more than might makes right:
If I have a subjective view of what is right and believe it strongly enough why on earth would I not try to enforce it on others? (enforce does not necessarily mean using brute force – that is just graphical imagery on your part – it just means try to make it happen). It is what I believe to be the right thing to do.
What does "believe it strongly enough" mean in the context of subjective morality? How is "belief" a quality of "personal preference"? You either like, or dislike, an activity, with gradients of how much you like or dislike it. It has nothing to do with "belief", but rather is a experiential, factual statement about the state of your feelings. You know how much you dislike certain flavors or movies, you know how much you dislike certain behaviors. There is no"believe it" involved. You are applying a phrase that only has value if you are talking about a presumed commodity exterior to your own personal, subjective experience where "belief" would be required to beleive your act would match that exterior commodity. You would already know it matches your subjective commodity because you want to do it. So, "believe it strongly enough" can only be a disguise, a placeholder for "feel it strongly enough", just as "for the child" is a diguise attempting to divert attention away from the fact that the subjectivist mother can only (logically speaking) be acting in her own self-interest, not her child's, because that other person doesn't want her to do what she is going to do, and there is no presumed objective commodity for the mother to refer to in order to both override her child's wishes and not be doing just out of self-interest. Your phrasings demonstrate that you have not really considered what you are saying. Now to reiterate, MF has said:
If I have a subjective view of what is right and believe feel strongly about it why on earth would I not try to enforce it on others?
A clear admission that subjective morality boils down to might-makes-right; MF will do what he wants if he feels strongly enough about it, including forcing his preferences on others for no reason other than because he feels like it and can.William J Murray
January 20, 2014
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RE: Post 29 @TSErik I think there is a distinction between the definition of a behavior, and the justification for a behavior. The two can exist independently of each other. I can be either justified or unjustified in my behavior, without having to change the definition of my behavior. To be justified would simply mean that I have a good or legitimate reason for my behavior. I may scream profanities or exhibit issues of control over my behavior at random intervals of time. If I suffered from Turret's Syndrome, I would be justified in my behavior. If I didn't suffer from Turret's Syndrome or some other neurological disorder, I wouldn't be justified. Another example from most state penal codes would be "justifiable homicide". What's more, to determine a justification for a behavior requires that you compare that behavior to a standard for behavior, does it not? Which gets back to the real question of whether that standard is in fact absolute or relative. As you said, I don't agree that rape cannot occur within the confines of a marriage in either China or many Muslim countries. However, to determine the justification for their behavior requires that we compare their behavior to some standard of behavior. In China, the Chinese courts would compare the behavior to the established penal codes in China (pseudo-absolutes as I call them). The Chinese people may choose to compare the behavior to another standard (e.g. maybe another country's penal codes). They may even appeal to an absolute standard in making the comparison, however, you would need to be able to articulate the absolute standard such that it could be applied correctly in the process of making the comparison. I wouldn't even know where to start with articulating the absolute standard. In the case of murder is it the taking of any life or only another's life? Is it murder to save your own life or the lives of others at the expense of the life of someone else or the lives of a group of others? I think that definitions of a behavior have changed in order to provide a justification for a behavior, and/or to remove a justification for a given behavior. You can see this in the evolution of the USA's (doubtless true in other countries) various penal codes (e.g. "dueling" to settle disputes, "blue laws", sale and use of "controlled substances"). If we define murder as the "taking of another's life", then you are guilty of murder when you take the life of an individual who is attempting to take your life. If we define murder as the "taking of another's life when one's own life is threatened", then you would be "justified" in your behavior when you take the life of some who is trying to take your own. Regarding the "group on a hike" I apologize, but I likely have a poor understanding of what you're trying to communicate to me in the example. In your metaphor, what is the flower? Is it the absolute moral standard for murder (as example)? Are you depicting my various definitions of murder as being the flower's color property?ciphertext
January 20, 2014
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RE: Post 27 @WJM Regarding "Plato's Cave"... This sounds quite similar to the concept of a "frame of reference" when discussing physical laws (arguably objective), found in the Theory of Relativity. In so much as the last comment of that particular paragraph "Everything humans experience – subjective or objective in nature – is experienced, processed and interpreted subjectively", I believe you are saying the same thing. Regarding "purpose"... I am still having difficulty linking morality (regardless of its subjectivity or objectivity) to purpose. Can you point me to some authors of whose work could shed some light on this topic? I don't understand why you couldn't simply have said that morality is a description of oughts (which I understand to mean behaviors); rather than "Morality is a description of oughts that seek to fulfill a purpose." [sic]. Is it that you are saying there is a purpose regardless of intent? Something along the lines of respiration? Your body has an unconscious drive (loosely, a purpose) to survive. Therefore the autonomic nervous system's purpose in conducting the necessary electrochemical interactions with the lungs, is to enable you to respire and thus survive. Despite there not being a conscious connection to breathing (specifically maintenance of the the respiratory cycle), and thus no direct connection to the "will of the mind". Regarding mine and your view concerning absolute commandments... Is your view that absolute moral commandments do not constrain free exercise of the "will"? (In a sense as the weak nuclear force constrains atomic decay.) If so, why do you hold to that belief. Again, the important point isn’t so much the particulars of purpose and the extent of free will, but rather that people must behave as if morality refers to an objective commodity. The idea of group or individual “subjective morality” is either the result of self-deceiving, improper strings of words and concepts, or it’s blatant hypocrisy. That paragraph, on the whole, seems logical to me, in that I would agree that people "...must behave as if morality refers to an objective commodity." [sic] I believe that what the "moral relativists" and "moral absolutists" are in agreement is in saying that whether something is "moral" or "amoral" can only be determined by making a judgement (or a comparison). Where they differ, is in to what the comparison is made, correct? The relativists draw a relation to how comparisons are made in general. As an example, one could use the illustration of measuring a Kilogram. The Bureau of Weights and Measures near Paris France houses the standard Kilogram weight, by which all other measurements are compared in accordance with international treaty. In this sense, through the use of treaty and agreements, the international body of scientists (or more broadly...those who have need to perform comparison) will behave as if this is an absolute. Though, I would say at best, this can only be a pseudo-absolute (or potential absolute, for the mathematically inclined). It seems that the relativist says this is quite fine, the existence of the pseudo-absolute. That there can be discrepancies in culture concerning morality, this would be expected on such a view. For as reference to the standard kilogram, if even one nation disagreed to the use of this "standard kilogram", there could be problems of coherency in translating measurements. I think there is a parallel in the world of morality and ethics. There is another issue with using pseudo-absolutes. This article on NPR describes the issue quite well. This Kilogram Has A Weight-Loss Problem. I wonder if the a parallel can be drawn to morality and ethics. Perhaps in how human society views morals and ethics "on the whole" as it absorbs some ideas and jettisons others. Maybe the change in status of certain segments of human society in relation to that society as a whole (e.g. slaves, women, mentally ill, etc...). My fixation with absolute moral commandments are, that to be an absolute constant (like the speed of light, planck's constant, and the like...), there has to be a way to define the constant such that you can prove/detect its existence. We've done this with the afore mentioned constants, by observing how the constants affect physical phenomena (e.g. propagation of radiation in a vacuum, decay of atoms, etc...). With each frame of reference, we could determine that the constant must be calibrated to "N" value, and that value was the same across all frames of reference. We "backed into" the discovery of the existence of the absolutes, because the constants exerted a control (a constraint) on physical reality. That is why I'm arguing that the existence of a moral constant must necessarily constrain our ability to enact our will (specifically to formulate an intent that would contravene the moral absolute). If it (absolute moral) cannot constrain our will, then can it rightly be called absolute? At best, it could only be called a pseudo-absolute.ciphertext
January 20, 2014
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WJM - looks like I have time for another response.
Because you are judging all behavior according to a single moral standard – your personal preferences – and are willing to enforce it on others. That is the very nature of the difference between a standard assumed to be subjective, and a standard assumed to be objective. This is the precise point where you wish to have your cake and eat it too.
You assert this but you don’t prove it. If I have a subjective view of what is right and believe it strongly enough why on earth would I not try to enforce it  on others? (enforce does not necessarily mean using brute force – that is just graphical imagery on your part - it just means try to make it happen). It is what I believe to be the right thing to do.
First, look at what you are claiming here: that the mother’s act is moral becauseshe, in particular, subjectively believes it to be moral.
I never wrote that.
Note how this directly conflicts with your earlier assertion that it is social consensus that determines “what is moral”, not the personal feelings of any individual even if they are saving their child.
I never wrote that it is social consensus that determines “what is moral”
If the mother is living in ancient Sparta and saving her child from being tossed over the cliff to die because it is imperfect, sacrificing herself, by your prior reference to “social consensus” she is behaving immorally.
So this is irrelevant.
You don’t even recognize that you are contradicting yourself as you flail around to find a lifeline to save you from your ill-considered, muddled statements.
You are not reading what I actually wrote – just what you would like me to have written.
Second, look who is applying their personal view of morality in judgement of the mother’s behavior – you. You are asserting that her behavior “is” moral, and justified, without even considering any hypothetical or actual circumstances surrounding the mother’s act including social consensus; you are imposing your own personal view of morality in judgement of the mother’s act as a de facto objectively valid moral evaluation.
Sure. Who else’s moral judgement should I to use? When you make moral judgements do you get someone else to do it for you?
How can you determine if her act is rationally justifiable as moral in lieu of knowledge of any of the circumstances of the act? You seem to be claiming that it is rational to sacrifice yourself for your child regardless of the circumstances. The rationality of the act can only be assessed in light of the circumstances and cannot be determined by the brute fact of “a mother sacrificing herself for her child”.
I never wrote that,
Is it an act of love? Probably. Instinct? Probably. Reason? Probably not, but it depends on the circumstances.
Sure – I expanded on the example in my later post.Mark Frank
January 20, 2014
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PS. If I fail to respond it is not because I really think I am wrong. It is because I have a job to do and a life to lead outside of this.Mark Frank
January 20, 2014
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TSErik
It is simple, and I had asked this question above but you declined to answer it. What gives you the authority to put your moral standard above others?
I am sorry - rather more questions being asked than I have time to answer. Why do I need an authority (see my example of the mother and child below – does she need authority to override the advice of others)? 
You are behaving as if your moral positions are objective because you believe it is YOU who are in the right. YOUR moral position is what is right, no matter what others think, and should be followed, and you admittedly encourage or discourage acts according to your position. How are those actions different from one who accepts objective morality?
I am behaving as though I believe I am right – of course I am – should I behave as though I think I am wrong?  Yes my moral position is that those who disagree are wrong (although of course I am willing to listen to their reasons and if there are lots of them I will listen especially hard and that will itself be one of the reasons for modifying my opinion). If I thought they were right I would change my position. That is not different from one who accepts moral objectivity. But it isn’t different from one who accepts subjective morality either. My whole point is that there is no effective difference in the position!  It only really comes to the crunch when asked how you know/prove you are right.
The only way you could pass judgement on the torturer, is if you deem his actions immoral. To deem his actions immoral there must be a concrete standard against which you judge his actions.
Not so. I can just react to what he has done. In fact any concrete standard suffers from the problem that we have to have some way of deciding if the standard is right.  
Your example of the mother is confusing, to be honest, but perhaps I’m just not seeing how it fits into your argument.
It is important. I will flesh it out. Suppose a  mother has a teenage child with two defective kidneys. She has only one working kidney. She makes the decision to sacrifice her kidney (and thus go on dialysis fro the rest of her life). This is clearly a moral decision. She is sacrificing herself for her child. She also an atheist and is not highly educated – so she is not basing this decision on any principles she has been told about, read about or even devised for herself. It is highly subjective. She wouldn’t do it for any child. It arises from her strong love and desire to help that child, her feelings of shame if she didn’t – subjective, passionately held feelings.  She does listen to contrary arguments from friends – “the operation might not help the child”, “she should consider her husband”, “she has as much right to a full life as her child” – the child itself thinks she is wrong to do it – but she considers these arguments and decides she still feels that going ahead is the right thing to do. Is she behaving as though there were an objective moral standard? Is she reacting irrationally or hypocritically?  Mark Frank
January 20, 2014
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This is going round in ever deceasing circles – why is “inflicting” my personal view of what is right on others behaving as if it is objective?
Because you are judging all behavior according to a single moral standard - your personal preferences - and are willing to enforce it on others. That is the very nature of the difference between a standard assumed to be subjective, and a standard assumed to be objective. This is the precise point where you wish to have your cake and eat it too.
If a mother sacrifices herself for her child is that her behaving as though her desire to sacrifice herself was objective? Is it irrational? Absolutely not – it is reasonable, rational moral act base on her very strong subjective view of what is the right thing to do.
Now you're just throwing mud on the conversation in hopes of obfuscating and diverting from the salient points. This is you flailing around trying to find some sequences of words or conceptual imagery that saves you from your own self-contrdictions, yet spouting even more self-contradiction. First, look at what you are claiming here: that the mother's act is moral because she, in particular, subjectively believes it to be moral. Note how this directly conflicts with your earlier assertion that it is social consensus that determines "what is moral", not the personal feelings of any individual even if they are saving their child. If the mother is living in ancient Sparta and saving her child from being tossed over the cliff to die because it is imperfect, sacrificing herself, by your prior reference to "social consensus" she is behaving immorally. You don't even recognize that you are contradicting yourself as you flail around to find a lifeline to save you from your ill-considered, muddled statements. Second, look who is applying their personal view of morality in judgement of the mother's behavior - you. You are asserting that her behavior "is" moral, and justified, without even considering any hypothetical or actual circumstances surrounding the mother's act including social consensus; you are imposing your own personal view of morality in judgement of the mother's act as a de facto objectively valid moral evaluation. How can you determine if her act is rationally justifiable as moral in lieu of knowledge of any of the circumstances of the act? You seem to be claiming that it is rational to sacrifice yourself for your child regardless of the circumstances. The rationality of the act can only be assessed in light of the circumstances and cannot be determined by the brute fact of "a mother sacrificing herself for her child". Is it an act of love? Probably. Instinct? Probably. Reason? Probably not, but it depends on the circumstances.William J Murray
January 20, 2014
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This is going round in ever deceasing circles – why is “inflicting” my personal view of what is right on others behaving as if it is objective?
It is simple, and I had asked this question above but you declined to answer it. What gives you the authority to put your moral standard above others? You are behaving as if your moral positions are objective because you believe it is YOU who are in the right. YOUR moral position is what is right, no matter what others think, and should be followed, and you admittedly encourage or discourage acts according to your position. How are those actions different from one who accepts objective morality? The only way you could pass judgement on the torturer, is if you deem his actions immoral. To deem his actions immoral there must be a concrete standard against which you judge his actions. If there is no standard, his actions cannot be any more or less moral than what his desires suggest. To this, you have no authority to judge the torturer's actions, and must accept them as moral. Your example of the mother is confusing, to be honest, but perhaps I'm just not seeing how it fits into your argument.TSErik
January 20, 2014
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If morality = your particular personal preference, and if you inflict that preference on others, you are behaving as if your personal preference is the de facto objective morality. You can call it subjective, but you act as if it is objective.
This is going round in ever deceasing circles - why is "inflicting" my personal view of what is right on others behaving as if it is objective? If a mother sacrifices herself for her child is that her behaving as though her desire to sacrifice herself was objective? Is it irrational? Absolutely not - it is reasonable, rational moral act base on her very strong subjective view of what is the right thing to do.Mark Frank
January 20, 2014
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Here's the problem, Mark: 1. If morality = your particular personal preference, and if you inflict that preference on others, you are behaving as if your personal preference is the de facto objective morality. You can call it subjective, but you act as if it is objective. 2. If morality = any individual's personal preference, then you are logically compelled to agree that the torturer and the Nazi are behaving morally, because the morality of their acts is determined by the nature of their feelings or purpose - not yours. 3. If morality = social consensus, then regardless of how you feel about any particular social consensus, you should set aside your personal feelings and do what the social consensus says, even if it embraces the torturer or the Nazi. 3A. If you do set aside your personal feelings and toe the social consensus line, then you are treating the social consensus as a de facto objective morality. 3B. If you do not set aside your personal feelings but act in defiance of social consensus, then you are applying your personal feelings as if they are the de facto objective morality and overrule the social consensus. The problem, MF, is that you begin with an ideological commitment that morality doesn't refer to an objective commodity, but there's simply no way you can act otherwise. Sane humans must act as if their moral sense (conscience) is accessing something that transcends personal feelings and social consensus.William J Murray
January 20, 2014
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Mark: If you are the one who disagrees with the "widely held, reasoned" view and cannot be argued out of your personal views, what do you do? Do you attempt to reason other people out of that view? If you disagree strongly enough, do you act against it, or ignore the social consensus at least wrt your own behavior? If your answer to the above question is "no", then you are treating what you call a "social consensus" morality as if it were an objective morality by which you must conform your behavior in accordance with, whether you like it or not. This means that if social consensus is to gas the jews or gratuitously torture children, you should go along with it no matter your personal feelings, because as you have defined it above, it is not your personal feelings that define the moral good, but rather the social consensus. If your answer to those questions "yes", then you are not acting in accordance with what you have defined as "what morality is" - the subjective consensus. If morality is the social consensus, and morality is a description of how people ought behave, then your moral duty is not to talk other people out of what is moral by definition (social consensus), but rather change your behavior to be in line with what you have just claimed is the definition of morality - how you ought behave. This means that anyone who attempts to change the social consensus, or acts in defiance of the social consensus, is by definition acting immorally under your system. You cannot have your cake and eat it, too, MF. All sane people act as if morality is a qualitatively different commodity than "personal preferences" or "social consensus". It doesn't matter what society says, if you and I believe X to be wrong, we not only will not do it, we will in some cases attempt to thwart that social consensus or change the public view about it. Under your paradigm that social consensus = morality, you are behaving immorally because you are acting against what you have defined as what determines what is moral; under my paradigm, I am acting morally because my definition (premise) of morality transcends social consensus.William J Murray
January 20, 2014
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WJM
If you claim morality is subjective, but act as if it is objective, you are either deceiving yourself or being a hypocrite
What I am trying to do is pin down the difference between rationally behaving as though morality is objective and rationally behaving as though it is subjective (but reasoned and widely held). The differences are pretty subtle. In both cases you would * present arguments for your point of view * if the motivation were strong enough, intervene the only real difference I can see is what recourse you have available with someone who disagrees. In the objective case there is always the possibility of proving the other person wrong by empirical or logical means, in the subjective case there comes a point when you have to accept it is a matter of opinion - which doesn't stop you intervening if you hold your opinion strongly enough.Mark Frank
January 19, 2014
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