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[quote mine] Charles Darwin: “all has been intelligently designed”
| August 20, 2007 | Posted by scordova under Humor, Intelligent Design |
From Letter 3154  Darwin, C. R. to Herschel, J. F. W., 23 May [1861]
One cannot look at this Universe with all living productions & man without believing that all has been intelligently designed
Charles Darwin, 1861
I think that would make a perfect textbook sticker.
220 Responses to [quote mine] Charles Darwin: “all has been intelligently designed”
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Phinehas #209:
I am pleasantly surprised to learn that we are not far apart in understanding that our beliefs about the material world must be tested against evidence (facts). I am especially relieved to learn that you do not consider “truth” to be a metaphysical entity. If those assertions are correct, we can safely move on to address your main point:
An excellent point that I am grateful for, although I am curious to know what those “three big bang hurdles” are.
So the issue would then come down to whether it is plausible that purely natural processes could have generated mechanisms in living beings that enable those beings to correctly interract with the material world. Yes, I have rephrased your sentence; not to create a strawman, but to make a beginning towards explaining why I don’t buy it. To elaborate:
Why does it seem improbable to you? There must be an underlying assumption that warrants your skepticism.
If natural selection had not enabled its products to interact factually with the world, those products, including human beings, would not be here.
I disagree. As I stated in my post #199:
I add this for your consideration: Is this not the procedure you yourself use in all of your transactions with the external world?
On Plantinga’s argument.
kairosfocus #203 and other postings on this subject:
If I understand you and Phinehas, you consider Plantinga’s argument to be non-tautological. That is, it is based on a synthetic, rather than an analytic (tautological) premise. Thus, what you have quoted above must be a hypothesis; it cannot be anything else. (Making that distinction is why I called it “the main event” earlier in discussion with Phinehas.) Since the only way to test a hypothesis is to examine how it fits the data, one must first ask, “What are the data that can possibly be found to test Plantinga’s hypothesis?” He has provided none nor has be pointed to where such data may be found.
Regarding Bayesian analysis especially: Is it not a way of analyzing probabilities in such a way that we can choose between alternatives, namely “likelihood” vs “unlikelihood?” If so, is it not incumbent upon Plantinga and anyone who cites his argument to provide some numerical bases of comparison (as I asked of Phinehas)? Here is a quote from Wikipedia on Bayesian inference:
Note the references to hypothesis and evidence.
It’s even worse: The key proposition that you have so helpfully highlighted: Natural selection doesn’t care what you believe; it is interested only in how you behave assumes that what you believe is somehow disengaged from how you behave. But this is not only an unwarranted assumption, it is prima facie incorrect.
Example: I have learned from experience that fire burns. This warrants my belief that fire burns. One behavioral manifestation of this belief is that I will run away from forest fires, thereby increasing the likelihood of my survival and subsequent opportunities to propagate.
Am I to take it then that you have abandoned your previous formulation of truth as “…a descriptive term for accurate accounting of experience (as in ‘I swear to give the whole truth and nothing but the truth’)?” You have agreed that this falls short, since it only covers, for example, what Tom believed in his recounting and not that thing which we must not conflate with belief? If so, then we are indeed not far apart.
Feel free to satisfy your curiosity by reading KF @ 180:
Based on the following, I am now confused about whether or not we are close in our understanding of truth.
Those who create strawmen always do so in order to make a beginning towards explaining why they don’t buy it. Why not explain why you don’t buy what I’ve said instead of explaining why you don’t buy what you’ve said? The fact that you’ve tried once again to redefine truth, this time as “correctly [interacting] with the material world” demonstrates that you still feel uncomfortable with how truth transcends beliefs or perceptions and are trying to slip a different concept of truth in the back door. How else to explain your rephrase?
Must there be? So it is therefore impossible that there are instead underlying assumptions informing your faith in the power of RM + NS?
You say you disagree, but it seems pretty clear that you are not in fact disagreeing with my statement that “the materialist has no warrant.” On the contrary, you appear to be agreeing with that statement.
Sure, you have grounded your belief. As I’ve stated above, however, the issue isn’t the grounding of beliefs, but the grounding of that which must not be conflated with beliefs.
P & DK (and others):
The thread continues. However, it is a bit hard for me to interact because of the unresolved problem of the now plainly predictable m-piling. I will soldier on, due to the importance of this thread; a point that includes the issue raised in my post of yesterday, in which CD PERCEIVED design in the cosmos including in life-forms, but sought to lay that to one side on grounds of his incredulity of what God in his estimation would do as designer and creator.
In short, the scientific issue of inference to design is inextricably tied to the question of the grounding and warranting of perceptions and of knowledge and truth claims. (Thence, too the problem of selective hyper-skepticism which injects not only question-begging but also inconsistency into the world of skeptical thought.)
Now, following up on points:
1] DK, 208: Asserting “the concept of truth transcends perception†is not logically equivalent to asserting that there is a subtance called “truth that transcends perception.â€Â
Of course we here see how DK’s rhetorical move of addressing only P gains him an “advantage.†For, he has here ignored the above discussion on how we imply and assume the existence of truth so soon as we assert that something is true – when we make a truth claim we accept that what is true says of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not. And, Dk here plainly makes a claim that he intends be taken as truth not mere perception. So, the pretence that truth does not exist beyond perception self-refers, and undercuts itself.
2] To say, “Tom had a perception,†gains nothing by elaborating, “It is true that Tom had a perception.â€Â
Now, of course what happens here follows from the correction just above: The second simply makes explicit what was in the first. Namely, someone is asserting that “[IT IS TRUE THAT] Tom had a perception.â€Â
And to make a truth claim is to go far beyond to simply state a proposition, P; “ Tom had a perception,†which may well have truth value 0 or 1 depending on circumstances. When we say that IT IS TRUE THAT P, we assert that, on whatever grounds and with whatever warrant, P is true, holding truth value 1. (And this was already long since pointed out, but simply ignored above.)
Once we see these two corrections to DK’s argument, the whole pretence that truth is a suspect notion, an immaterial essence that one has to prove — by what standard, and how is such to be done without assuming or implying the very thing that was to be shown? — exists before it can pass muster, collapses of its own unsupported weight. For the skeptic, then, to try to make the objection, is forced to rely on the objective existence of what he wishes to make us doubt: truth.
In short, that truth exists is undeniable on pain of self-referential absurdity such as we just saw. And, P cites a most telling def’n from DK on the point: a descriptive term for accurate accounting of experience [Just ask yourself, what does it imply to make an ACCURATE account of reality (here, as experienced), without immediately implying that truth says of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not?]
3] If there is a substance called “truth,†is there also a substance called “falsehood†or “untruth?†. . . Where does one stop in the creation of metaphysical entities?
The answer is plain from Einstein’s observation that explanations should be as simple as possible but not simpler than that. Truth exists, as that which accurately refers to reality; error exists – undeniably so, BTW as shown supra – as that which intends to but fails to so refer. Errors are per definition, untrue or false. If the falsehood is intentional and by intent deceptive, we deal with a l-i-e. Each of these is credibly non-material indeed (no atom or neuronal discharge is true or false . . .) but so soon as we engage in serious interaction in a community the reality of all of these is immediately entailed.
So, too, we can see that the EM account that hopes to doubt these is too simple – simplistic – and that the one who asserts selectively hyper-skeptical attempted rebuttals, immediately descends into self referential inconsistencies.
Last but not least, William of Occam most indisputably accepted that truth exists, and that it is possible to be in error about it. That is the context for his recommendation that hypotheses should not be multiplied without necessity.
4] DK, 211: the issue would then come down to whether it is plausible that purely natural processes could have generated mechanisms in living beings that enable those beings to correctly interract with the material world . . . . If natural selection had not enabled its products to interact factually with the world, those products, including human beings, would not be here.
Of course, this neatly ignores the point actually made by Plantinga, as repeatedly excerpted [127, point 2, 203 point 3] and as linked [nb, sorry, link in 127 is broken; strange indeed . . . ] on the gap between what RM + NS rewards, adaptive BEHAVIOUR, and accuracy of belief systems that are in effect transparent to the behaviour:
. . .
P is therefore entirely correct to challenge: what seems entirely improbable is that RM + NS would result in beliefs or perceptions that actually reflect fact, or truth, or whatever else you want to call that thing which we must not conflate with beliefs. The materialist has no warrant for believing that this is the case, which means EM undercuts its own beliefs regarding itself. In other words, it is incoherent.
In short, there are a great many ways to be wrong, and a comparatively few to be right. So, the proposed EM mechanism that in the end relies on chance and necessity is forced to try to hit a tightly coordinated, fine-tuned, complex target by chance in a vast space of possible outcomes. In short, again we see surfacing the core challenge to such mechanisms: the only known reliable mechanism for getting to such functionally specified, informationally complex and fine-tuned entities, is: intelligent agency.
That is, we see here EM being – yet again [the same holds for the three previous big bangs: origin of the fine tuned cosmos, origin of the same type of information in cell-based life, origin of the same in body-plan level biodiversity (including of course origin of the brain), and now origin of the mind as an entity reasonably reliably capable of apprehending truth.] — dynamically incoherent and impotent. And, since this issue is one of the mind as a reasoning entity, self-referentially absurd.
5] the materialist does not need an a priori warrant for trusting his beliefs. His warrant is experience and learning, which occur when the mind encounters the external world.
The materialist here has reason to accept as credible, that his mind is capable of reasonably reliably apprehending truth. What he has not addressed is whether his worldview — which claims to account for all of reality as the product of materialistic evolutions from hydrogen to humans — is dynamically capable of supporting that reliability, thence, whether his position is simplistic: unable to account for a blatant fact he needs to even arrive at his belief system. Thence, self-stultification.
6] DK, 212: “What are the data that can possibly be found to test Plantinga’s hypothesis?†He has provided none nor has be pointed to where such data may be found.
Now, I must note with a bit of disappointment: ignoring or brushing aside evidence and reasoning is not at all the same as warranting the claim that such does not exist..
Further to this, you have failed to seriously engage what Plantinga actually argues, in the article linked above (even failing a good link at 127, it is not hard to find online; try Naturalism Defeated plus AP’s name). Namely, that by the generally known assertion of NDT, RM + NS work on BEHAVIOUR not belief, which opens up the gap that Plantinga addresses in his formulation of one of the challenges faced by EM thinkers as they seek to ground the mind. [Note, too, I have always pointed out that Plantinga raises one of several objections, and have taken time to cite multiple cases of how EM thinkers consistently end up in self-referential absurdities when they seek to think about things of the mind and how they can be grounded relative to EM premises.]
And since you failed to engage what Plantinga actually has to say about Bayesian probabilities, your citation on Bayes and remarks following are simply addressed to a strawman of your own making, not to the actual case to be answered.
7] Natural selection doesn’t care what you believe; it is interested only in how you behave assumes that what you believe is somehow disengaged from how you behave. But this is not only an unwarranted assumption, it is prima facie incorrect.
Again, you unfortunately address a strawman. It is blatant that beliefs and belief systems may be sharply de-coupled from behaviour, as Plantinga actually draws out in painstaking details in the paper. Cf for instance his discussion of the creature, “Paul.†[This too serves as an adequate counter to the case on fire that you mention. Yes, WE believe fire burns and thus fear it, but that is besides the point that EM mechanisms are utterly unable to account for the fact of a mind that is reasonably reliably capable of apprehending truth and acting into the physical world on it – here, hangs the whole Em-tinged debate on how our minds can be anything more than an epiphenomenon, an ineffective ghost that emerges somehow magically from the machine once it reaches a certain threshold of complexity . . . ].
8] P, 213: As I’ve stated above, however, the issue isn’t the grounding of beliefs, but the grounding of that which must not be conflated with beliefs.
P here states the bottom-line very well indeed. And, I can only add that it is painfully evident that EM thinkers have consistently failed to meet this challenge.
GEM of TKI
P#213:
I thought after your #209 that we had agreement on some basic premises regarding the meaning of the word “truth,” but your latest seems to revert to an earlier stage in this discussion. So I despair of making further progress.
Debates like this never end unless one party throws in the towel. Which is what I am doing now.
It’ been a learning experience for me and I thank you and kf for taking me seriously enough to engage my postings.
Despite your arguments, I still believe that I am moral and sane, so I will end where I started in my post #27 on August 21: “Pragmatism works for me.”
All the best,
DK
Hey DK,
I think in the end that we do believe the same thing about truth as revealed by:
Whatever that thing is here that we must not conflate with belief — that’s what I am calling truth. Unfortunately, for you to admit to this would sink your argument, since it rests precisely on conflating belief and truth as in:
I understand the precarious position this puts you in, and can appreciate the difficulty in pursuing this further.
If you are implying that either KF or I have argued that you are immoral or insane, then that is a grevous mis-characterization and a poor parting shot. It should be clear from previous posts that KF and I believe that your are both moral and sane. KF has said as much, so I hope he doesn’t mind me speaking for him. We don’t think that your materialism gives your grounding for trusting your belief about your own morality or sanity, but since we are not materialists, we don’t suffer from that same predicament at all, and can affirm with a good deal of confidence that you are both moral and sane.
In any case, good luck. I hope your pragmatism continues to work for you. If you ever find it wanting, however, perhaps you’ll remember this conversation and consider looking beyond materialistic explanations for meaning and purpose in your life.
All (esp P and DK):
This has been a useful thread, m-pile problems notwithstanding.*
In particular, astute onlookers will be able to see for themselves just how hard it is for EM thinkers to account for the 4th of the four big bangs faced by the EM thesis of origins by chance plus necessity from hydrogen to humans; as Ms Denise O’Leary speaks of in this blog and elsewhere. At least, without running afoul of the issue of self-referential inconsistency aptly summarised by P in 159 above (in turn a reasonably good summary of my own summary in 49 etc, and of the wider discussion on the issue of the self-referential undermining of EM as a worldview that claims to be grounded in and to ground “Science.†That in itself suggests the likelihood of a vicious logical circle . . .):
Of course, much of what we need to focus on lies in the details, but such a summary is helpful in highlighting the core issue. (NB: Plantinga’s discussion as linked is 58 tightly argued pages, and Dallas Willard’s is about 20. Reppert wrote a 128 p. book-length summary.)
Of course, also, DK has announced his closing off, so this is my own final remark. [*NB: It is also my final focussed contribution in this blog under current m-pile circumstances, esp. given the unmet problem of how to resolve it. From time to time, I may make comments on points that are of importance, but not in any context that requires a back-forth, which the persistent m-piling hampers. However, I must express appreciation for the opportunity afforded since Feb or so, and for many useful exchanges that will help me in my own work here in the Caribbean.]
Now, on a few final points of interest:
1] Fare thee well, DK:
I too appreciate the generally reasonable tone of this thread, and DK’s role in that. I trust that as he moves on, he will reflect on the issues that have surfaced, and the perhaps surp[rising to him gaps in EM as a worldview.
2] Moral and sane?
I concur with P in his remarks, noting only that our reasonableness is bounded by our finitude and fallibility; and that the sense in which we are moral includes that we struggle to live up to our moral intuitions.
The challenge to EM thinkers is not that Materialists are immoral and insane [beyond the sadly usual run of all of us all too fallible s-i^n-ners], but that they lack a good warrant for their intuitive reliance on logical, factual and moral reasoning within their worldview, which points to its dynamical and logical incoherence – despite the often heard assertion that such a view is scientific and the only one credible for an educated person in the modern world.
3] Pragmatism:
For Americans especially, this is a hardy perennial as an approach to truth and knowledge (and even morality): in effect, if it “works,†it is credibly true or warranted as knowledge, or even in some cases “right.â€Â
But in fact, it falls afoul of several issues linked to the above discussion, and this is why almost 100 years ago, it was more or less abandoned at professional level in philosophy. (I am aware of Rorty’s attempted resurrection; I am not impressed.)
Just to bring up a few: what does it mean to say that something “works� What about the fact that sometimes things that “work†for a long time turn out to be falsified by further data [e.g. several major scientific theories]? What of things that initially did not work very well but later turned out to capture key insights that led to progress towards the truth? What of this: sometimes, things “work,†not because they are right, but because they are wrong but exploit the weaknesses of others and/or are backed up by power? And, does the point where something stops working mark where it suddenly changes from truth, knowledge or right to falsehood, error or wrong? Is that the same thing as what is normally meant by truth, knowledge and right?
So, now,
Cheers
GEM of TKI
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