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Eric lets the amoral cat out of the bag: “It may be ‘so what’ to you (and me) that morality is ultimately subjective . . .”

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It is instructive to see this inadvertently revealing comment on a blog post by Jason Rosenhouse.

But first, let’s remind ourselves of a very important visually made point:

Of Lemmings, marches of folly and cliffs of self-falsifying absurdity . . .
Of Lemmings, marches of folly and cliffs of self-falsifying absurdity . . .

And now:

>>eric April 15, 2015

Of course, you can challenge my definition. You can say that it’s just a product of my own subjective judgment that it’s bad to harm sentient beings. But so what?

I have not read Arrington’s posts, but I would bet that he is exactly going after the subjective vs. objective distinction. There’s been a recent spate of philosophers and/or reasonably prominent atheists trying to propose an objective morality (without the need for a god). I would bet he is going after these ideas.

It may be “so what” to you (and me) that morality is ultimately subjective, but many people find that thought upsetting. Arrington is pushing on that discomfort to gain converts for theism. He’s proselytizing: design will give you laypeople back that foundation for objective morality you want so badly, so (this part is implied and rarely stated) therefore you should believe in design.>>

In short, we are right back to an indifferent shoulder-shrug to the longstanding (cf. Plato in The Laws Bk X, c 360 BC) implication of evolutionary materialism, that might and manipulation make ‘right.’ (So, it’s just a matter of who has more might and who is cleverer at manipulating the opinions — and, especially the emotions — of the sheeple who think that we are under objective moral government of OUGHT. Who actually imagine they have real unalienable rights, starting with life, liberty, conscience and the like.)

Which, should ring some very loud warning bells.

In answer to such cynicism, I draw to our attention, a warning and a hope at the foundation of modern liberty and democracy, as Locke cites Hooker in his 2nd treatise on Civil Government:

>>. . . if I cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man’s hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire which is undoubtedly in other men . . . my desire, therefore, to be loved of my equals in Nature, as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to themward fully the like affection. From which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn for direction of life no man is ignorant . . . [[Hooker then continues, citing Aristotle in The Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 8:] as namely, That because we would take no harm, we must therefore do none; That since we would not be in any thing extremely dealt with, we must ourselves avoid all extremity in our dealings; That from all violence and wrong we are utterly to abstain, with such-like . . . ] [[Eccl. Polity, preface, Bk I, “ch.” 8, p.80]>>

And again, Jefferson et al as they built on that foundation in the US DoI 1776:

>>We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.–That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, –That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness . . . >>

So, whose report do we believe — eric et al, or Locke, Hooker and Jefferson et al, why? And, where does this all point? END

Comments
kairosfocus @113 I wanted to respond to your step 21 separately. It goes as follows:
21: This, post the valid part of Hume’s guillotine argument (on pain of the absurdity of ultimate amorality and might/manipulation makes ‘right’) implies that there is a world foundational IS that properly bears the weight of OUGHT.
This is not the first time I’ve responded to this claim; and unsurprisingly the answer has not changed much. The proper response is to note that Hume’s argument was out of date as soon as he wrote given the prior work of Locke, Aristotle, and others. This I posted back at comment #106 (with some edits): —————————————————————–THE OUGHT-IS GAP—————————————————————– This problem is simply the question of how the existence of facts in the world (the IS) leads to the conclusion that some things are morally necessary (the OUGHT). How does a fact become an obligation? kairosfocus attributes this problem to Hume:
Hume’s Guillotine:
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised [orig; surpriz’d] to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ’tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason. [Hume, David (1739). A Treatise of Human Nature. London: John Noon. p. 335.]
This is a classic statement of the IS-OUGHT gap, and it is what I had in mind in saying: “The question, in short, is whether we actually are under moral government of ought.”
kairosfocus also cited Arthur Holmes on this:
So, we are back to Arthur Holmes in Ethics:
However we may define the good, however well we may calculate consequences, to whatever extent we may or may not desire certain consequences, none of this of itself implies any obligation of command. That something is or will be does not imply that we ought to seek it. We can never derive an “ought” from a premised “is” unless the ought is somehow already contained in the premise . . . .
In a nut-shell, the so-called “OUGHT-IS” gap occurs when we try to take the step from what things are to what thing we ought to do. How do we justify that step? In fact, the ought-is “gap” is no more than a crack in the sidewalk; bridging the OUGHT-IS gap is trivial. How? kairosfocus posted the idea himself many times when KF cited from Locke and Aristotle (via Hooker):
… let me draw attention again to the pivotal clip from Hooker cited by Locke in his 2nd treatise on govt ch 2 sec 5:
. . . if I cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man’s hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire which is undoubtedly in other men . . . my desire, therefore, to be loved of my equals in Nature, as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to themward fully the like affection. From which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn for direction of life no man is ignorant . . . [[Hooker then continues, citing Aristotle in The Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 8:] as namely, That because we would take no harm, we must therefore do none; That since we would not be in anything extremely dealt with, we must ourselves avoid all extremity in our dealings; That from all violence and wrong we are utterly to abstain, with such-like . . . ] [[Eccl. Polity,preface, Bk I, “ch.” 8, p.80]
In plain English: Locke asks a question: If I want people to do good to me, how can I expect my desire to be satisfied unless I satisfy that desire in others? Locke’s answer is that nature imposes a natural duty of treating others with the same care we want them to treat us. Because we are all equally human, natural reason directs us clearly on this matter. Aristotle’s comment is likewise obvious: we must refrain from doing to others that which we don’t want them to do to us. Hume’s exaggerated “gap” is easily bridged by reciprocity. We are obligated to behave morally because we want to be treated morally. We cannot expect others to treat any of us better than we treat others. This ain’t rocket science. It’s an ancient idea we call “The Golden Rule”. Because of how the world IS and how it BEHAVES we are obligated to avoid doing evil because we dearly want to NOT be on the receiving end of Evil. The facts of nature (the IS) compel us to act in certain ways (the OUGHT) if only in our self-interest. The obligation created by our social nature, by duty or by empathy, sympathy, or compassion impose obligations even if not in our self-interest. Even more ironic is that Locke’s answer to Hume’s Guillotine precedes Hume’s work by decades. Aristotle’s comment is centuries older; as is the Golden Rule. Hume’s Guillotine was obsolete as soon as he wrote it. Responding to Arthur Holmes (cited above); an obligation does not need a “command” given by a person; an obligation can be imposed by natural imperatives. sean s.sean samis
July 26, 2015
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kairosfocus @113 I appreciate arguments in the form you used here, they give readers a chance to see how your logic works with a minimum of distraction. I read this comment carefully, and have a response. I have no quibble with any of your steps 1 through 14. I would note that I found your use of the term “being” unexpected; you use it to denote any kind of phenomena, from fire to persons. I am not troubled by that except that you left your readers to figure that out on your own. But I have no objection to how you use the term “being”. After so many well connected points, at step 15 you introduce a significant gap; you wrote about “serious candidate necessary beings”. Nowhere prior to that step do you define what you mean by “serious” or “candidate” much less “serious candidate necessary beings”. Again you leave it to your readers to figure this out. In the very next step (16) you appear to resolve this partially; in your comments about the “Flying Spaghetti Monster” (FSM) you tell us that you consider the FSM an “unserious candidate” at least in part because it is composed of parts and materials. But nowhere have you established why a “serious candidate necessary being” must not be composed of parts or materials. This is yet another gap. In all fairness, I must add that this last gap seems unimportant to me; I can see why an “actual necessary being” cannot be composed of parts or materials, but the gap was left by you. By “candidate” I believe you mean proposed necessary beings. A “candidate necessary being” has been proposed to exist, but has not been established; its actuality remains uncertain. I suspect that when you talk about “serious” candidates, you mean something that the proponent actually thinks is real, not snarky props like the FSM. That’s fine. Then at step 17 you assert that God is a “serious candidate necessary being”. But again you do not define what you mean by “God”; yet another gap. As with “serious” and “candidate” you leave it to your reader to bridge this gap in your logic. In the ordinary way of things, a God is a being with attributes of intellect, foresight, purposeful action, will, desire, etc. Are these attributes required of a “serious candidate necessary being”? If so, why? You never explain. Yet another gap. In step 17 you also refer to God as “The Eternal Root of being.” What this means is unexplained; yet another gap. You write that the root of reality is the best class of candidate necessary beings. What distinguishes this class? What makes this class the “best candidates”? What other things are in this class? Three more gaps. One final gap: is it necessarily the case that there is only one actual necessary being? If so, why? The question you pose to me is; aside from God, are there any other “serious candidate necessary beings”? Your conclusion seems to be that if God is the only serious candidate necessary being, then the existence of God is preferred, if not established. There are three responses to your conclusion. A: There is another set of serious candidate necessary beings. Although I agree that necessary beings cannot be COMPOSED OF material; there is no logic that objects to necessary beings actually BEING THE MATERIAL from which contingent beings are made; or that they be the FORCES ACTING ON contingent beings. Necessary beings could be the fabric and force of existence. Thus a fundamental particle could be a necessary being, and is a “serious candidate necessary being”. Let us refer to this as a “necessary particle”. For the record, a particle is a dimensionless and uniform being with characteristic properties and behaviors. B: Clearly if there existed only one necessary particle then existence would be much emptier than it is. But you have not provided any logical reason why there must exist one and only one necessary being, or only one KIND OF necessary beings, so a small suite of distinct necessary particles is a “serious SET OF candidate necessary beingS”. Each kind of necessary particle would exist in vast numbers and interact in many, many ways. Let me be abundantly clear on this: I am not proposing that any known subatomic particle is a necessary particle; I only suggest that the necessary beings could be kinds of particles. In line with your steps 18 and 19, the choice would between necessary particles as impossible or as actual. Since there is no good reason to see necessary particles as impossible, or as not serious candidates to be necessary beings, the burden would be on the denier to show that necessary particles are impossible. Of course, the choice you try to force in steps 18 and 19 is false: your God and my necessary particles could be possible, but not actual. This is because ... C.There is no logical requirement that actual necessary beings must be knowable, much less must be known at this time. All “candidate necessary beings” are propositions; they may or may not be actual necessary beings. Even if your unspecified God were the only serious candidate necessary being (He’s not.) that would not mean that your God was an actual necessary being. It is quite rationally possible that all actual necessary beings are still unknown to us; perhaps even unknowable to us. So to summarize: your logical structure has many gaps; some should be simple for you to resolve. Some will be more challenging. What does “candidate necessary being” mean? What does “serious candidate necessary being” mean? Why can’t a “serious candidate necessary being” be composed of parts and materials? What does “God” mean? What does “Eternal Root of being” mean? What makes “root of reality the best class” of candidate necessary beings? What other classes of candidate necessary beings are you comparing it to? What other things are in the class “root of reality Why are all serious candidate necessary beings either IMPOSSIBLE or ACTUAL? How many actual necessary beings could there be? Must all actual necessary beings be knowable? Must all actual necessary beings be known now? Against the claim of your step 22, there exist two objections to God as the “only serious candidate necessary being”: i: a small suite of distinct necessary particles is a “serious SET OF candidate necessary beings”. ii: all actual necessary beings might be unknown or unknowable. I look forward to your response. Take care. sean s.sean samis
July 26, 2015
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Brent @110
Sean, You’ve changed the subject. Whether believing our moral code comes from God, or not, helps us to abide more or less closely to it, is completely beside the point.
No, Brent, I have not. You and kairosfocus claim that your moral system is preferable -- even objectively true. I have just replied to your extraordinary claims. Challenging the bases of your claims IS THE POINT. An objective morality must be knowable beyond reasonable doubt to everyone; that’s pretty much what objective means. What I’ve shown is that your belief system is not objective. It cannot be objective because it is based on nothing more than subjective preferences regarding your God and what your God supposedly commands. Nothing which is predicated purely on subjective claims can be objective. The bar for objectivity is quite high; if you claim to measure up to that high standard, it is ON TOPIC to challenge that measurement. I have not changed the subject; it appears you have forgotten what the subject is. The reliability of claims (yours and mine) IS THE SUBJECT.
If man is the source of the moral code, then man governs morality, and morality doesn’t govern man.
Brent, I understand your concerns, but this undesirable conclusion does not make your claims true. If you have never heard the voice of God, then the source of your moral code IS MAN; its source is the humans who claim to know about God; its source is the humans who claim to know what this God supposedly commands. Unless you heard it FROM GOD, unless you heard GOD’S VOICE, you heard it only from these humans. They are the source of your moral code. These humans telling you about God govern your morality. They (NOT GOD) govern you. I have shown that your actually-subjective morality is not in any sense superior to the naturalistic one I propose. Unless you are in a position to authenticate their claims, these humans telling you about God govern your morality. And only God could authenticate their claims. Your beliefs do not become objective just because you are really, really, really sure. sean s.sean samis
July 25, 2015
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F/N: Let me clip: _____________ >>I have long since suggested that we start with the foundations of worldviews and then overnight, that we focus on a pivotal issue, root of being in a necessary being and of what character. Cf here for an outline i/l/o modes of being and ontology: https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/on-the-reasonableness-and-importance-of-the-inherently-good-creator-god-a-necessary-and-maximally-great-being/ I must assume that you have not simply ignored a linked discussion, in haste to drum out talking points in disregard of there being another side to the story. If you all are unable to recognise this as addressing a body of evidence on the general approaches of inference to best explanation, comparative difficulties and particularly grand sense-making, in light of evidence accessible to all who would inquire, then it shows logical, epistemological and broader philosophical impoverishment. Which, is unsurprising. Let me do a basic outline of key points: 1: A world, patently exists. 2: Nothing, denotes just that, non-being. 3: A genuine nothing, can have no causal capacity. 4: If ever there were an utter nothing, that is exactly what would forever obtain. 5: But, per 1, we and a world exist, so there was always something. 6: This raises the issue of modes of being, first possible vs impossible. 7: A possible being would exist if a relevant state of affairs were realised, e.g. heat + fuel + oxidiser + chain rxn –> fire (a causal process, showing fire to depend on external enabling factors) Fire_tetrahedron 8: An impossible being such as a square circle has contradictory core characteristics and cannot be in any possible world. (Worlds being patently possible as one is actual.) 9: Of possible beings, we see contingent ones, e.g. fires. This also highlights that if something begins, there are circumstances under which it may not be, and so, it is contingent and is caused as the fire illustrates. 10: Our observed cosmos had a beginning and is caused. This implies a deeper root of being, as necessarily, something always was. 11: Another possible mode of being is a necessary being. To see such, consider a candidate being that has no dependence on external, on/off enabling factors. 12: Such (if actual) has no beginning and cannot end, it is either impossible or actual and would exist in any possible world. For instance, a square circle is impossible, One and the same object cannot be circular and square in the same sense and place at the same time One and the same object cannot be circular and square in the same sense and place at the same time . . . but there is no possible world in which twoness does not exist. 13: To see such, begin with the set that collects nothing and proceed: { } –> 0 {0} –> 1 {0, 1} –> 2 Etc. 14: We thus see on analysis of being, that we have possible vs impossible and of possible beings, contingent vs necessary. 15: Also, that of serious candidate necessary beings, they will either be impossible or actual in any possible world. That’s the only way they can be, they have to be in the [world-]substructure in some way so that once a world can exist they are there necessarily. 16: Something like a flying spaghetti monster or the like, is contingent [here, not least as composed of parts and materials], and is not a serious candidate. (Cf also the discussions in the linked thread for other parodies and why they fail.) Flying Spaghetti Monster Creation of Adam Flying Spaghetti Monster Creation of Adam 17: By contrast, God is a serious candidate necessary being, The Eternal Root of being. Where, a necessary being root of reality is the best class of candidates to always have been. 18: The choice, as discussed in the already linked, is between God as impossible or as actual. Where, there is no good reason to see God as impossible, or not a serious candidate to be a necessary being, or to be contingent, etc. 19: So, to deny God is to imply and to need to shoulder the burden of showing God impossible. [U/D April 4, 2015: We can for illustrative instance cf. a form of Godel’s argument, demonstrated to be valid:] godel_ont_valid 20: Moreover, we find ourselves under moral government, to be under OUGHT. 21: This, post the valid part of Hume’s guillotine argument (on pain of the absurdity of ultimate amorality and might/manipulation makes ‘right’) implies that there is a world foundational IS that properly bears the weight of OUGHT. 22: Across many centuries of debates, there is only one serious candidate: the inherently good, eternal creator God, a necessary and maximally great being worthy of loyalty, respect, service through doing the good and even worship. 23: Where in this course of argument, no recourse has been had to specifically religious experiences or testimony of same, or to religious traditions; we here have what has been called the God of the philosophers, with more than adequate reason to accept his reality such that it is not delusional or immature to be a theist or to adhere to ethical theism. 24: Where, ironically, we here see exposed, precisely the emotional appeal and hostility of too many who reject and dismiss the reality of God (and of our being under moral government) without adequate reason. So, it would seem the shoe is rather on the other foot.>> _____________ Of course, if you dispute that the serious candidate on the table is such, or is unique, put forward an alternative rather than implying or acting like you assume that morality is groundless. KFkairosfocus
July 20, 2015
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SS: This cuts to the heart of your views and the issue, and is inadvertently revealing:
I really don’t care whether morality is “from a transcendent source” or not. My only concern is to find a way to understand what is or is not moral. I don’t care where it comes from, I only care what it is.
This is tantamount to walking away from the issue of reasonable grounding of OUGHT. That walk-away from rational grounding implies that you hold that or wish to act as though morality is essentially ungrounded and subjective, and such actions that speak as loud as words directly open the door to the nihilist credo and agenda that might and manipulation make 'right,' 'truth' etc. Per fair comment, such can be seen from the way you go along with the twisting of law (e.g. of the US 14th Amdt to its Const) to suit agendas in another thread. And when issues of onward implications were pointed out, you evasively refused to acknowledge or respond reasonably to the relevance of the concern. With that already on the table, you are now in the position of being credibly untrustworthy with words, fact or truth claims, declarations of motive, and argument. You have destroyed the basis for reasoned dialogue, the issue now is to expose, warn and protect from advocacy of ruthless, amoral and nihilistic agendas. We are fully justified to conclude prudentially on your declared lack of interest in grounding, that for you and ilk, morality is indeed just a matter of perceptions and feelings to be manipulated for political agendas. In short, it is a convenient delusion to be manipulated. I have already pointed out the implication of such a cynical view, that once grand delusion is let loose in our interior life it undercuts rationality ending in self-referential incoherence. The basic challenge can be found in Provine's notorious U Tenn 1998 Darwin Day keynote:
Naturalistic evolution has clear consequences that Charles Darwin understood perfectly. 1) No gods worth having exist; 2) no life after death exists; 3) no ultimate foundation for ethics exists; 4) no ultimate meaning in life exists; and 5) human free will is nonexistent . . . . The first 4 implications are so obvious to modern naturalistic evolutionists that I will spend little time defending them. Human free will, however, is another matter. Even evolutionists have trouble swallowing that implication. I will argue that humans are locally determined systems that make choices. They have, however, no free will . . .
. . . and, in Crick's 1994 The Astonishing Hypothesis:
. . . that "You", your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules. As Lewis Carroll's Alice might have phrased: "You're nothing but a pack of neurons." This hypothesis is so alien to the ideas of most people today that it can truly be called astonishing.
. . . not to mention Dawkins:
In a universe of electrons and selfish genes, blind physical forces and genetic replication, some people are going to get hurt, other people are going to get lucky, and you won’t find any rhyme or reason in it, nor any justice. The universe that we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but pitiless indifference . . . . DNA neither cares nor knows. DNA just is. And we dance to its music. [“God’s Utility Function,” Sci. Am. Aug 1995, pp. 80 - 85.]
In short, as with Provine and Crick, you undermine responsible, rational freedom, so revealing that your view is irretrievably incoherent and self-falsifying. Indeed, I am now entitled to treat all your talking points as simply attempts to twist and manipulate, assigning you zero credibility save for when you let out an inadvertent admission that reveals agenda. Kyle Butt's response to Provine is all too apt:
Provine’s . . . [address] centered on his fifth statement regarding human free will. Prior to delving into the “meat” of his message, however, he noted: “The first 4 implications are so obvious to modern naturalistic evolutionists that I will spend little time defending them” (Provine, 1998). It is clear then, from Provine’s comments, that he believes naturalistic evolution has no way to produce an “ultimate foundation for ethics.” And it is equally as clear that this sentiment was so apparent to “modern naturalistic evolutionists” that Mr. Provine did not feel it even needed to be defended . . . . [However, i]f it is true that naturalistic evolution cannot provide an ultimate foundation for determining the difference between actions that are right and ones that are wrong, then the door is wide open for subjective speculation about all human behavior. [Rape and Evolution, Apologetics Press, 2005.]
J B S Haldane, realising what was implicit in evolutionary materialism, long ago warned:
"It seems to me immensely unlikely that mind is a mere by-product of matter. For if my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically. And hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms. In order to escape from this necessity of sawing away the branch on which I am sitting, so to speak, I am compelled to believe that mind is not wholly conditioned by matter.” ["When I am dead," in Possible Worlds: And Other Essays [1927], Chatto and Windus: London, 1932, reprint, p.209.]
Plato, 2,350 years ago in The Laws Bk X, already took the measure of the matter:
Ath. . . .[The avant garde philosophers and poets, c. 360 BC] say that fire and water, and earth and air [i.e the classical "material" elements of the cosmos], all exist by nature and chance, and none of them by art . . . [such that] all that is in the heaven, as well as animals and all plants, and all the seasons come from these elements, not by the action of mind, as they say, or of any God, or from art, but as I was saying, by nature and chance only [ --> that is, evolutionary materialism is ancient and would trace all things to blind chance and mechanical necessity] . . . . [Thus, they hold] that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature, but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them; and that the alterations which are made by art and by law have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the moment and at the time at which they are made.-
[ --> Relativism, too, is not new; complete with its radical amorality rooted in a worldview that has no foundational IS that can ground OUGHT, leading to an effectively arbitrary foundation only for morality, ethics and law: accident of personal preference, the ebbs and flows of power politics, accidents of history and and the shifting sands of manipulated community opinion driven by "winds and waves of doctrine and the cunning craftiness of men in their deceitful scheming . . . " cf a video on Plato's parable of the cave; from the perspective of pondering who set up the manipulative shadow-shows, why.]
These, my friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, which find a way into the minds of youth. They are told by them that the highest right is might,
[ --> Evolutionary materialism -- having no IS that can properly ground OUGHT -- leads to the promotion of amorality on which the only basis for "OUGHT" is seen to be might (and manipulation: might in "spin") . . . ]
and in this way the young fall into impieties, under the idea that the Gods are not such as the law bids them imagine; and hence arise factions [ --> Evolutionary materialism-motivated amorality "naturally" leads to continual contentions and power struggles influenced by that amorality at the hands of ruthless power hungry nihilistic agendas], these philosophers inviting them to lead a true life according to nature, that is,to live in real dominion over others [ --> such amoral and/or nihilistic factions, if they gain power, "naturally" tend towards ruthless abuse and arbitrariness . . . they have not learned the habits nor accepted the principles of mutual respect, justice, fairness and keeping the civil peace of justice, so they will want to deceive, manipulate and crush -- as the consistent history of radical revolutions over the past 250 years so plainly shows again and again], and not in legal subjection to them.
So now, I suggest that you pull back and return to the table of reasoned, responsible discussion in light of the pivotal issue as to the grounding of OUGHT in a world-foundational IS: if we have rights, freedoms and responsibilities beyond nihilistic might and manipulation, that state of affairs is grounded somewhere. Somewhere, that can only lie in the root and source of the cosmos. KF PS: You profess not to know that the IS-OUGHT grounding challenge and the serious candidate on the table are not points of knowledge for you. Such may be readily remedied, cf here in another current thread and onwards to see the exchanges: https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/faith-vs-fact-jerry-coynes-flawed-epistemology/#comment-571983 Original thread: https://uncommondescent.com/religion/as-vs-eyewitness-experience-non-testimonial-evidence-and-the-reasonableness-of-theism/kairosfocus
July 20, 2015
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Brent, well put; the issue is that unless OUGHT is grounded in a world-foundational IS, then we end in might and manipulation make 'right.' KFkairosfocus
July 20, 2015
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Sean, You've changed the subject. Whether believing our moral code comes from God, or not, helps us to abide more or less closely to it, is completely beside the point. That renders 75% of what you said meaningless to the topic at hand. Unfortunately, the other 25% was you backtracking to your already refuted position of attempting to ground an objective morality in nature, trying to make it look as if it isn't ultimately down to man's whims. And since you are back at ground zero, I'll say again: If man is the source of the moral code, then man governs morality, and morality doesn't govern man. Let me ask you: Why ought I be unselfish?Brent
July 20, 2015
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kairosfocus @107
Now, you may suggest that sense of ought is a delusion.
Quite the contrary. I suggest no such thing. This “sense of ought” is quite natural and urgent. I only ground it differently than you do.
The only place where is and ought can be bridged is the roots of reality.
Agreed. And that is where I ground it; in the very roots of reality regarding what it is to be human.
You already know the only viable, serious candidate: the inherently good Creator God, a necessary and maximally great being.
The problem is that I don’t know this. Whatever deities might exist, they have never revealed themselves to me. Everything that I ”know” about deities comes from claims by other humans or by my own reasoning. Which is to say that I know nothing about any God. Unless this “inherently good Creator God, a necessary and maximally great being” speaks directly to every person, those to whom He has not spoken must find their “ought” wherever they can. No deity has ever spoken to me; I have never heard God’s voice. So for me and the many others like me, nature is the only moral grounding available to us. Fortunately, as I have shown, it more than suffices. Brent @108
I think you are working from a false premise: Namely, that if we are able to discern how morality may be beneficial to us either individually or on a larger societal level — that it will “pay me” in the long run — then it isn’t from a transcendent source.
If this is what you think, then you are mistaken. I really don’t care whether morality is “from a transcendent source” or not. My only concern is to find a way to understand what is or is not moral. I don’t care where it comes from, I only care what it is.
...even if morality truly is from God, there is no reason to think it wouldn’t benefit us in exactly those ways.
Agreed, but this only emphasizes the irrelevance of where it comes from.
And in any case, this doesn’t speak to the problem of morality being non-binding if it isn’t from a transcendent source.
Unfortunately, the fact that people (including theists) routinely break whatever moral laws they have; claiming the moral law has a “transcendent source” is futile. Especially if this “transcendent source” is mysterious or dubious to most humans.
If men were wise enough to come up with the morality that we have today, it is just not binding. You try to catch KF out, but the Golden Rule is not obligatory to follow minus a transcendent source, which is the real issue.
Your false premise is that all obligations must be imposed by some Person, some Authority, some “transcendent source”. Please tell us why. Looking at history, believing that is so has not kept believers from all manner of evil.
It may be a really, really, really good idea on the whole to follow the Golden Rule even if God doesn’t exist, but necessary it is not.
Obeying your God is not necessary, it would merely be a “really, really good idea” if you want to avoid His Threats. But only if you believe in His Threats. It’s a really, really, really good idea to follow the Golden Rule to avoid the natural and foreseeable consequences of not doing so.
As the ethecist Richard Taylor points out, “A duty is something that is owed . . . But something can be owed only to some person or persons. There can be no such thing as duty in isolation.”
I have no problem with this, the obligations of nature and the Golden Rule are owed to other persons; they are not duties in isolation.
God makes sense of moral obligation because his commands constitute for us our moral duties.
No, for two reasons. 1. Since God is unknown to many people (including myself) invoking God to explain something is to invoke one mystery to explain another. That makes no sense of either. 2. Invoking a deity is not necessary. Nature’s imperatives constitute a sufficient source of moral duties.
Now I strongly suspect you’ll want to say that, indeed, our duties ARE owed to persons . . . the others around us. But again, nothing obliges me to subscribe to this.
It’s ironic that you could predict only part of my response because you’ve already seen the rest of it before: Nothing obliges anyone to subscribe to any moral grounding except their sense of morality or their self-interest. Even a transcendental, theistically grounded obligation can be ignored. That is evidenced by history.
I can dispute the rules of men all day long, and sometimes do ...
And people do dispute the rules of God ad infinitum. Grounding rules in a God does nothing for us.
Even if, for example, I decide to agree with a man-made moral system and vow to abide by society’s rules, I can change my mind midstream. I’ve done nothing wrong whatever.
You can do the same thing regardless of how you “ground” your morality; people (including theists) have been doing that since forever.
...even if everyone agreed to follow society’s self-made rules, we are really only obliged even to do that IF there is an actually binding transcendent morality that says we OUGHT to keep our promises.
There is a binding morality that “says we OUGHT to keep our promises”. It’s not transcendent, but transcendence is irrelevant.
And every single attempt to remove God from the source of morality ultimately relies on simply smuggling in an ACTUAL binding moral ought on which it all really stands.
Two errors in this: 1. I’m not trying to “remove God”, I’m just doing without Him because, I know nothing about him; and 2: I’m not smuggling anything. I am quite open about what I’m about. I’m searching for and finding the source of “an ACTUAL binding moral ought on which it all really stands ”. It is grounded in the truth of nature, reason, and history. sean s.sean samis
July 19, 2015
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Sean @106, I think you are working from a false premise: Namely, that if we are able to discern how morality may be beneficial to us either individually or on a larger societal level --- that it will "pay me" in the long run --- then it isn't from a transcendent source. But of course, even if morality truly is from God, there is no reason to think it wouldn't benefit us in exactly those ways. And in any case, this doesn't speak to the problem of morality being non-binding if it isn't from a transcendent source. If men were wise enough to come up with the morality that we have today, it is just not binding. You try to catch KF out, but the Golden Rule is not obligatory to follow minus a transcendent source, which is the real issue. It may be a really, really, really good idea on the whole to follow the Golden Rule even if God doesn't exist, but necessary it is not.
As the ethecist Richard Taylor points out, "A duty is something that is owed . . . But something can be owed only to some person or persons. There can be no such thing as duty in isolation." God makes sense of moral obligation because his commands constitute for us our moral duties. From Philosophical Foundations For A Christian Wroldview, J.P. Moreland & William Lane Craig
Now I strongly suspect you'll want to say that, indeed, our duties ARE owed to persons . . . the others around us. But again, nothing obliges me to subscribe to this. I can dispute the rules of men all day long, and sometimes do :) Even if, for example, I decide to agree with a man-made moral system and vow to abide by society's rules, I can change my mind midstream. I've done nothing wrong whatever. For even if everyone agreed to follow society's self-made rules, we are really only obliged even to do that IF there is an actually binding transcendent morality that says we OUGHT to keep our promises. And every single attempt to remove God from the source of morality ultimately relies on simply smuggling in an ACTUAL binding moral ought on which it all really stands. It's a neat trick, but it is a lie and evil.Brent
July 18, 2015
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SS: Red herring and strawman. The problem is not whether on avg being nice to people will make them be nice back to me. Often that works, often it does not. Bullies after all love to prey on nice, helpless folks; a lesson the school yard should have long since taught us all. They get away with breaches of the golden rule, or there would be no bullies. Oppressive, exploitive ruling classes and the like are much the same writ large, and unless there is a principle of justice -- yet another ought issue -- that can reform social systems in light of rights freedoms and responsibilities (more oughts), we are at deadlock: might and manipulation make 'right.' We really do need well grounded OUGHT. And generally speaking ought and is are not synonymous. The issue is, that we find a strong and insistent voice in ourselves that others OUGHT -- face a binding obligation -- to be just in dealing with us. A very different issue. And Hooker, cited by Locke, is plain: if we find that others are under binding oughts to us, so are we to them as they share the like nature with us. Now, you may suggest that sense of ought is a delusion. That lets grand delusion loose in our inner life and undermines rationality itself, not to mention the principles of justice, rights and more. On which, attempted discussion is pointless. So, you don't really believe that (you are trying to argue), and yet it is the consequence of evolutionary materialism. You face that OUGHT is real, and binding. Which points to the grounding problem. And the problem of finding what it is that can properly ground ought. Going in circles at our level or talking about natural imperatives does not work. (You are just saying ought is bound up in our world and we recognise it. Yes, but on what does that stand.) The only place where is and ought can be bridged is the roots of reality. You already know the only viable, serious candidate: the inherently good Creator God, a necessary and maximally great being. KFkairosfocus
July 17, 2015
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-----------------------------------------------------------------THE OUGHT-IS GAP----------------------------------------------------------------- This problem, which kairosfocus places great emphasis on is simply the question of how the existence of facts in the world (the IS) leads to the conclusion that some things are morally necessary (the OUGHT). How does a fact become an obligation? kairosfocus attributes this problem to Hume (@93):
Hume’s Guillotine:
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised [orig; surpriz’d] to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ’tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason. [Hume, David (1739). A Treatise of Human Nature. London: John Noon. p. 335.]
This is a classic statement of the IS-OUGHT gap, and it is what I had in mind in saying: “The question, in short, is whether we actually are under moral government of ought.”
kairosfocus also cited (@104)
So, we are back to Arthur Holmes in Ethics:
However we may define the good, however well we may calculate consequences, to whatever extent we may or may not desire certain consequences, none of this of itself implies any obligation of command. That something is or will be does not imply that we ought to seek it. We can never derive an “ought” from a premised “is” unless the ought is somehow already contained in the premise . . . .
In a nut-shell, the so-called “OUGHT-IS” gap occurs when we try to take the step from what things are to what thing we ought to do. How do we justify that step? In fact, the ought-is “gap” is no more than a crack in the sidewalk; bridging the OUGHT-IS gap is trivial. How? kairosfocus posted the idea himself EIGHT (8) TIMES: (In the OP, @21, 32, 59, 82, 86, 100, and 104) ; it’s in kairosfocus’s cite from Locke and Aristotle (via Hooker):
... let me draw attention again to the pivotal clip from Hooker cited by Locke in his 2nd treatise on govt ch 2 sec 5:
. . . if I cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man’s hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire which is undoubtedly in other men . . . my desire, therefore, to be loved of my equals in Nature, as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to themward fully the like affection. From which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn for direction of life no man is ignorant . . . [[Hooker then continues, citing Aristotle in The Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 8:] as namely, That because we would take no harm, we must therefore do none; That since we would not be in anything extremely dealt with, we must ourselves avoid all extremity in our dealings; That from all violence and wrong we are utterly to abstain, with such-like . . . ] [[Eccl. Polity,preface, Bk I, “ch.” 8, p.80]
In plain English (something kairosfocus is not comfortable with) Locke asks a question: If I want people to do good to me, how can I expect my desire to be satisfied unless I satisfy that desire in others? Locke’s answer is that nature imposes a natural duty of treating others with the same care we want them to treat us. Because we are all equally human, natural reason directs us clearly on this matter. Aristotle’s comment is likewise obvious: we must refrain from doing to others that which we don’t want them to do to us. This exaggerated “gap” is easily bridged by reciprocity. We are obligated to behave morally because we want to be treated morally. We cannot expect others to treat any of us better than we treat others. This ain’t rocket science. It’s an ancient idea we call “The Golden Rule”. I am sure kairosfocus is familiar with the Golden Rule but clearly he’s not thought about what it means. Because of how the world IS and how it BEHAVES we are obligated to avoid doing evil because we dearly want to NOT be on the receiving end of Evil. The facts of nature (the IS) compel us to act in certain ways (the OUGHT) if only in our self-interest. The obligation created by our social nature, by duty or by empathy, sympathy, or compassion impose obligations even if not in our self-interest. Even more ironic than kairosfocus posting the solution to his dilemma 8 times is that Locke’s answer to Hume’s Guillotine precedes Hume’s work by decades. The Golden Rule is older by centuries. What does this fact tell us? If a problem is useful, it can be very hard to see the easy solution. This “gap” is very useful to Hume and kairosfocus so neither is able to see that it is actually a trivial problem solved millennia ago. Responding to Arthur Holmes (cited above); an obligation does not need a “command” given by a person; an obligation can be imposed by natural imperatives. sean s.sean samis
July 17, 2015
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Thanks KF. Very good stuff.Brent
July 14, 2015
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Brent: Useful skeletonisation. The pivot is that if OUGHT is real, it is grounded in a world-root level IS, for which there is but one serious candidate, the inherently good creator God, a necessary and maximally great being, etc. The rejection of OUGHT as real, on the other hand, lets loose grand delusion in our thought-life utterly undermining rationality. Reductio. So, we are back to Arthur Holmes in Ethics:
However we may define the good, however well we may calculate consequences, to whatever extent we may or may not desire certain consequences, none of this of itself implies any obligation of command. That something is or will be does not imply that we ought to seek it. We can never derive an “ought” from a premised “is” unless the ought is somehow already contained in the premise . . . . R. M. Hare . . . raises the same point. Most theories, he argues, simply fail to account for the ought that commands us: subjectivism reduces imperatives to statements about subjective states, egoism and utilitarianism reduce them to statements about consequences, emotivism simply rejects them because they are not empirically verifiable, and determinism reduces them to causes rather than commands . . .
And, as the next objection in line is to object to the possibility of ethical, moral knowledge, let me draw attention again to the pivotal clip from Hooker cited by Locke in his 2nd treatise on govt ch 2 sec 5:
. . . if I cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man's hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire which is undoubtedly in other men . . . my desire, therefore, to be loved of my equals in Nature, as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to themward fully the like affection. From which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn for direction of life no man is ignorant . . . [[Hooker then continues, citing Aristotle in The Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 8:] as namely, That because we would take no harm, we must therefore do none; That since we would not be in any thing extremely dealt with, we must ourselves avoid all extremity in our dealings; That from all violence and wrong we are utterly to abstain, with such-like . . . ] [[Eccl. Polity,preface, Bk I, "ch." 8, p.80]
KFkairosfocus
July 13, 2015
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Sean @101, So you aren't interested in providing a defense of your clearly irrational attempt to ground an objective morality without a transcendent source? Telling. Let's use this as a moment for a tidy summary then, which seems what you were doing already. Our discussion started with me telling you your understanding of the theists position, at least as regards a defense of theism, is akin to having the cart in front of the horse. After repeatedly telling you this, you're still refusing to put this right. Though not stated explicitly, I've really put the argument thus: 1. If objective moral values and duties exist, God exists. 2. Objective moral values and duties do exist. 3. Therefore, God exists. You don't seem to have an issue with premise 2, so premise one is where you've challenged this argument. You say that objective moral duties and values can and do exist without God existing. I, therefore, have challenged you to defend your position that objective morals can exist without a transcendent source. You have failed miserably so far, and didn't even take your last post as a further opportunity to attempt to. Thus, my argument is so far validated. God exists, and He is the source of the objective morality that exists. I'm sorry, but it is an important point to get the horse back where it belongs, and so I won't respond further until you acknowledge that.Brent
July 13, 2015
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SS: Again, the facts are there for all to see. There is conscience and we generally know the difference between warped or deadened, dulled conscience and normal conscience; that is the basis of genuine reform. The categorical imperative and golden rule are quite clear, and that people err in morals no more implies futility of moral reasoning on the law of our nature than errors in arithmetic invalidate book-keeping. The fundamental issue remains, do we have rights and therefore also duties? If so, we are under moral government. That is, we are under government of OUGHT and there is a foundational IS in the world that properly bears the weight of OUGHT. For which, there is but one serious candidate as already discussed. Where, to suggest that the sense of ought and linked responsible rational freedom are delusional, leads to self-referential absurdity. As was also discussed. Beyond, the rhetorical move of suggesting imperfections in knowing implies absence of knowledge is a rather ill-advised move. Locke in the intro to his essay on human understanding, sect 5, has some words of warning:
Men have reason to be well satisfied with what God hath thought fit for them, since he hath given them (as St. Peter says [NB: i.e. 2 Pet 1:2 - 4]) pana pros zoen kaieusebeian, whatsoever is necessary for the conveniences of life and information of virtue; and has put within the reach of their discovery, the comfortable provision for this life, and the way that leads to a better. How short soever their knowledge may come of an universal or perfect comprehension of whatsoever is, it yet secures their great concernments [Prov 1: 1 - 7], that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their Maker, and the sight of their own duties [cf Rom 1 - 2, Ac 17, etc, etc]. Men may find matter sufficient to busy their heads, and employ their hands with variety, delight, and satisfaction, if they will not boldly quarrel with their own constitution, and throw away the blessings their hands are filled with, because they are not big enough to grasp everything . . . It will be no excuse to an idle and untoward servant [Matt 24:42 - 51], who would not attend his business by candle light, to plead that he had not broad sunshine. The Candle that is set up in us [Prov 20:27] shines bright enough for all our purposes . . . If we will disbelieve everything, because we cannot certainly know all things, we shall do muchwhat as wisely as he who would not use his legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no wings to fly.
KF PS: Note, the notion that complex human behaviours above things like reflexes and breathing are genetically or otherwise programmed beyond choice is quite problematic, especially when implications for responsible rational freedom are brought to bear. I suggest a comparison of the 12-step addiction recovery methods and movements is helpful (noting that vulnerability to alcohol may have a genetic component), as would be this text. We should be very wary indeed of any scheme, notion, ideology or movement -- whether or not it is dressed in a lab coat -- that would undermine human responsibility and the point and hope that conscience-guided reason linked to supported moral discipline and recovery methods sustained across several years can lead us to walk in a better way. There are many, many, many cases of successful transformation of people in bondage to all sorts of addictions, dependencies, and destructive lifestyles. A truth that seems to be very politically incorrect and widely suppressed today. Let me just say finally for now that 60+ years ago Alcoholics Anonymous was mocked and derided by the experts and media, especially when a co-founder backslid. But now, its approach, on long significant success, has become a widely respected and adopted model. Teen Challenge is similar. Though of course if you don't want to have to fight for your life to get off the barbed hook, don't bite on the seemingly tasty fly floating by.kairosfocus
July 12, 2015
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Brent, I embarked on my usual step-by-step response to your #95, but after further thought I decided to redraft my response. I’ll omit all the detailed comments because, at the end of the day, those details are overshadowed by the fundamental problem of how can we know what your God wants us to do? This problem you have not responded to yet. Basically, in #95 you have simply repeated prior arguments but made superficial changes to them. Whether we talk about a God-given moral system, moral standard, or moral judgments; we are talking about the same thing. A dog is a dog, whether we call it a dog, a hound, or a canine. That which we call a rose ... The problem with all these God-given moral X’s is that we humans do not know that they exist or what their particulars are unless and until that God communicates them to us. We don’t know what God’s moral system is, what moral standards God employs, or what God’s moral judgments are unless that God communicates them to EACH AND EVERYONE OF US. Barring that direct, specific, and personal communication, we don’t know what God wants. Apart from that, all any of us have is stuff other fallible humans tell us. If we cannot trust fallible humans to reason from nature alone, then we certainly cannot trust their accounts of what they claim some unknown deity supposedly told them. And as I’ve already demonstrated, however much personal bias might impugn reason from nature, it absolutely destroys theistic rationales. This is why only a rational moral system grounded in the truth of nature, reason, and history can be at all trust worthy. The only moral standard we need is TRUTH. The only judge we require is honest persons who can explain the rational and factual bases of their judgements. You did propose a work-around (@88): “For when God wants to make sure we get some message, He will write it on our hearts. He will intertwine it in our human nature.” I refuted that in #90. Kairosfocus has objected to that response; but the response stands: there are people in the world who engage in behaviors (NO SPECIFICS HERE.) which you and kairosfocus strongly object to, but who insist that their behaviors are part of their very nature. If you reject their claims as erroneous then you assert a right AS A FALLIBLE HUMAN to veto what these persons can sincerely believe to be part of what “God wrote on their hearts and entwined in their nature.” If they can be wrong, then so can you or I. I don’t accept the logic you used in #95 to justify the necessity of a Godly moral standard and judgement, but that is irrelevant. EVEN IF what you say is true (which I sincerely doubt) the fact that God has not revealed it to me and to many, many others makes it unknown and ineffective to us. Perhaps someday we will find out what these Godly rules are, but we still have to get through our lives without it; we cannot put off living, and it is foolish to give decisional authorities to those fallible humans who claim to have heard from God. I have only just now seen kairosfocus’s comment # 100; I will respond to that later. sean s.sean samis
July 12, 2015
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SS: Let me now take up 76 on several points of note: a: >>[KF:] The question, in short, is whether we actually are under moral government of ought, … [SS:] This phrase is too vague for me to make sense of. Perhaps you could clarify? I would say to your hypothetical situation that the conduct described is immoral because it is harmful to the child and lacks justification or necessity. The child’s lack of strength or eloquence is irrelevant.>> Why is harm an issue? Why ought we not to harm? What needs "justification," and why? All of these point to the basic point that we find ourselves inevitably governed by OUGHT to the point where those who seem to suppress or be lacking in this regard are understood to be abnormal, socio-/psycho-paths. Next, you try to dismiss the issue of strength and eloquence in the child. But in fact this is an unfortunately actual case of the child not having been able to force the predator to back off, nor to persuade him to leave him to go home to his family. (I am speaking of a 7 - 8 yo boy.) However, on relativist grounds or the like, particularly evolutionary materialism, right and wrong are a matter of power and persuasion. In more blunt terms, of might and manipulation making 'right.' However, while you do not say so in so many words, you imply that it is indeed truly wrong -- what ought not to be done -- to treat a child like this. That is, ought is real and binding. So, there must be a foundation for OUGHT in the world. In short, post Hume, we seek an IS -- a foundational reality -- that grounds OUGHT. Where also, it is worthwhile to point out that the idea that responsible, rational and moral freedom are an illusion is widespread, and has self-referentially incoherent consequences. Notice Eric as cited in the OP:
I would bet that he is exactly going after the subjective vs. objective distinction. There’s been a recent spate of philosophers and/or reasonably prominent atheists trying to propose an objective morality (without the need for a god). I would bet he is going after these ideas. It may be “so what” to you (and me) that morality is ultimately subjective, but many people find that thought upsetting. Arrington is pushing on that discomfort to gain converts for theism. He’s proselytizing: design will give you laypeople back that foundation for objective morality you want so badly . . .
In short, our sense of right and wrong is just a matter of personal opinion, shaped by cultural and particular influences. Never mind the burning sense of shame and the voice of conscience, you are just having a delusion that you are bound by any ultimate right and wrong. And ever so many more would say much the same. Let's cite Provine in his 1998 U Tenn Darwin Day keynote as a capital example given at a significant time and place (as in, recall Dayton, Tenn 1925 and a certain Mr John Scopes):
Naturalistic evolution has clear consequences that Charles Darwin understood perfectly. 1) No gods worth having exist; 2) no life after death exists; 3) no ultimate foundation for ethics exists; 4) no ultimate meaning in life exists; and 5) human free will is nonexistent . . . . The first 4 implications are so obvious to modern naturalistic evolutionists that I will spend little time defending them. Human free will, however, is another matter. Even evolutionists have trouble swallowing that implication. I will argue that humans are locally determined systems that make choices. They have, however, no free will . . .
Now, indeed, if we are not responsibly free we cannot be bound by oughtness. There can be no foundation for ethics above and beyond might and manipulation make 'right.' But equally, there can be no foundation for the responsibly free and rational mind in general. That was implied by the well known Sir Francis Crick in his The Astonishing Hypothesis, 1994:
. . . that "You", your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules. As Lewis Carroll's Alice might have phrased: "You're nothing but a pack of neurons." This hypothesis is so alien to the ideas of most people today that it can truly be called astonishing.
Philip Johnson was right to retort in Reason in the Balance (1995) that the distinguished scientist should have been willing to put as a preface to his books and papers: “I, Francis Crick, my opinions and my science, and even the thoughts expressed in this book, consist of nothing more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules.” That is, “[t]he plausibility of materialistic determinism requires that an implicit exception be made for the theorist.” That is why, in 74 above, I pointed to the issue of grand delusion and its self-refuting import for evolutionary materialism -- a point that you most distinctly did not address:
The question, in short, is whether we actually are under moral government of ought, or else whether our hearts, minds and consciences delude us on this matter. As, ever so many advocates of evolutionary materialism argue or imply. If the latter, we have let general delusion loose in our interior lives, and face self-referential absurdity and incoherence. (Indeed, an infinite regress of Plato’s cave delusional words; this is a case of how radical skepticism, whether global or arbitrarily selective, leads to self-refuting utter breakdown of rationality. Such is usually not obvious when one is on the rhetorical defensive but comes out as soon as it is realised that one’s implied worldview must also be grounded. Cf. discussion here on, part of context for the first linked. Hyperskepticism undermines rationality and undercuts itself through self-falsification.) We have every good reason to acknowledge that OUGHT is real and binding. But, how can such be grounded?
This of course goes to Hume's "surpriz'd" argument, and thus it's implication that there is just one place where IS and OUGHT may be unified, at world foundation level. b: >> [KF:] That is, at base/root level, there must be an IS that grounds OUGHT, … [SS:] This is another strange phrase—at least to me—but I take it to mean that moral imperatives must be grounded in actual facts. I agree with that. [KF:] …an IS that is inherently moral and properly and adequately supports OUGHT. [SS:] Reality needs no inherent moral valence to support the “ought”; that ‘it is’ suffices; it is sufficient that reality is. Truth is the basis of the moral imperative.>> Truth is best understood as that which says of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not. So, if there are moral truths as opposed to opinions and feelings, they must be grounded not on mere brute facts but on reality, world foundational level reality. Perhaps, Arthur Holmes' point in his Ethics, may help clarify:
However we may define the good, however well we may calculate consequences, to whatever extent we may or may not desire certain consequences, none of this of itself implies any obligation of command. That something is or will be does not imply that we ought to seek it. We can never derive an “ought” from a premised “is” unless the ought is somehow already contained in the premise . . . . R. M. Hare . . . raises the same point. Most theories, he argues, simply fail to account for the ought that commands us: subjectivism reduces imperatives to statements about subjective states, egoism and utilitarianism reduce them to statements about consequences, emotivism simply rejects them because they are not empirically verifiable, and determinism reduces them to causes rather than commands . . .
This then points to the issue of a world-foundational IS that can ground OUGHT. If our sense of ought is not delusional -- which notion has shattering consequences for responsible, rational freedom as was already pointed out. In 74, I then pointed out a summary on the issue of candidates to be such an IS-OUGHT unifying, world-foundational IS:
We have every good reason to acknowledge that OUGHT is real and binding. But, how can such be grounded? Post Hume and his “surpriz’d” argument, only at world-foundation level. That is, at base/root level, there must be an IS that grounds OUGHT, an IS that is inherently moral and properly and adequately supports OUGHT. There is but one serious candidate, after centuries of debates, as can be seen from comparative difficulties analysis of alternatives. Namely, the inherently good Creator-God, a necessary and maximally great being worthy of ultimate loyalty and the reasonable service of doing the good in accord with our evident nature. [--> to unpack some of what that is pointing to, cf here at initial level: https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/on-the-reasonableness-and-importance-of-the-inherently-good-creator-god-a-necessary-and-maximally-great-being/ ] One way to see this is to echo Boethius on the challenge of good vs evil in his Consolation of Philosophy as he faced unjust sentence of death to get rid of a roadblock to powerful and oppressive courtiers after the fall of the Western Roman empire: “If God exists, whence evil? But whence good, if God does not exist?” In short, is there fairness, or justice, or a duty of care to respect the truth, the right and rights? If yes obtains for any of these in any context, we face the implications of being under the moral government of OUGHT, highlighting the foundational nature of the good and implying that evil is not a thing in itself but the frustration, privation or perversion of the good out of its proper purpose or end.
Now, I found it interesting to see how you snipped, cited and responded to this: c: >> [KF:] There is but one serious candidate, … Namely, the inherently good Creator-God, … [SS:] A God could only suffice in this if this God engages every person in direct, unmediated, fully expressed communication. For me, this has never happened, and I suspect few people will claim it has for them.>> In short, you short-circuited the step by step reasoning and then demanded a personal interview with God, or else you dismiss claims that God speaks to us or communicates with us on moral law as reducing to attempted imposition by other people: d; >> [SS:] Absent that, no God’s commands are distinct from the commands of other humans; if no human has the standing to provide reliable moral commands, neither has any God who does not directly communicate his clearly intended commands to each and every one of us.>> Sounds neat as a dismissive point, until it is assessed on being selectively hyperskeptical and on the issue of the implications of responsible, rational freedom and the further issue of naturally evident law that is manifest in the fact that we find ourselves instructed from within and without on the inherent value, nature, rights and duties of care towards a fellow human being. Something, which you yourself implied but did not explicitly acknowledge in dealing with the case of that sadly abused and murdered child. Notoriously, we have something called conscience, which speaks in very stringent terms of our duties; unless warped and suppressed. We find something inherent of worth in the fellow human being that we express in terms of rights and associated duties of care not to harm. And more. As outlined, rejecting that voice as delusional ends unhappily, in self referential incoherence and futility. Indeed, it ends in undermining even our vaulted -- but in fact finite and fallible -- rationality. But maybe, we can say it can be mistaken, so we have to bear that in mind. Yes, and our reasoning faculty can be mistaken on many things too, do we then treat it in general as utterly suspect and to be dismissed unless we have a direct and comprehensive interview with God as its author? Patently not. Instead, we recognise a discipline, logic, that inter alia teaches us how to evaluate the quality of reasoning and helps us discern truth and knowledge from error. So, why not count that ability as a part of our equipment that enables us to recognise core moral principles and reason ethically also in an objective manner, including on addressing the roots of OUGHT, of being under the government of rights, duties, responsibilities and the like? Yes, we may and do err ethically, but that is no excuse to abandon our duties as responsible, rational and significantly free agents. Which then implies that such ethical commands as may come from the Divine voice, will make good sense. Which is exactly what Locke acknowledged in the citation from Hooker which is in his 2nd treatise on civil gov't, Ch 2 sec 5, the cite that I have taken time to expand a bit from its source, Ecclesiastical Polity 1594+:
. . . if I cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man's hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire which is undoubtedly in other men . . . my desire, therefore, to be loved of my equals in Nature, as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to themward fully the like affection. From which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn for direction of life no man is ignorant . . . [[Hooker then continues, citing Aristotle in The Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 8:] as namely, That because we would take no harm, we must therefore do none; That since we would not be in any thing extremely dealt with, we must ourselves avoid all extremity in our dealings; That from all violence and wrong we are utterly to abstain, with such-like . . . ] [[Eccl. Polity,preface, Bk I, "ch." 8, p.80]
In short, our real problem is not ignorance primary, but that secondary ignorance that happens when we blind ourselves through our perceived interests, passions, perversions and agendas, too often stubbornly clinging to error. And, genuine reform therefore points us to key principles embedded in our nature and circumstances as responsibly free and rational persons. Which, is exactly what the first two paragraphs of the US DoI, 1776 -- especially as understood in context as already cited which you tried to dismiss as unnecessary reading assignments -- point to:
When . . . it becomes necessary for one people . . . to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation. We hold these truths to be self-evident, [cf Rom 1:18 – 21, 2:14 – 15], that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. –That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, –That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security . . .
Notice, such first principles rights reveal their foundational nature by what happens when we try to deny them . . . as self-evident implies, we land instantly in patent absurdities of incoherence and error that strongly tell us that we are off-track. So, again [cf. 93 above], I point to the role of such foundational rights embedded in our nature as human beings:
[a core human right, defn:] a binding, morally grounded legitimate expectation and demand that one be respected and treated in accord with one’s value, nature, inherent dignity and status as a human being. Such includes first that one has a right to life as without life nothing else can be achieved to fulfill one’s nature, it includes respect for freedom of conscience, thought, speech/expression, innocent reputation, association and responsible freedom in general, as limited by the point that one’s freedom to swing one’s arm ends where the next person’s nose begins and the like. (Note the definition of liberty as cited from Webster’s 1828.)
In short, we all do or should know core morality and how it binds us. And since you seem to have a particular suspicion towards the Biblical, Judaeo-Christian tradition, allow me to cite a summary from one of its main teachers, Paul of Tarsus in his principal epistle:
Rom 2: 1 . . . you have no excuse, O man, every one of you who judges. For in passing judgment on another you condemn yourself, because you, the judge, practice the very same things. 2 We know that the judgment of God rightly falls on those who practice such things [there has been a preceding litany of blatant wrongs of thought, word and deed]. 3 Do you suppose, O man—you who judge those who practice such things and yet do them yourself—that you will escape the judgment of God? 4 Or do you presume on the riches of his kindness and forbearance and patience, not knowing that God's kindness is meant to lead you to repentance? 5 But because of your hard and impenitent heart you are storing up wrath for yourself on the day of wrath when God's righteous judgment will be revealed. 6 He will render to each one according to his works: 7 to those who by patience in well-doing seek for glory and honor and immortality, he will give eternal life; 8 but for those who are self-seeking1 and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, there will be wrath and fury . . . . 14 For when Gentiles, who do not have the law, by nature do what the law requires, they are a law to themselves, even though they do not have the law. 15 They show that the work of the law is written on their hearts, while their conscience also bears witness, and their conflicting thoughts accuse or even excuse them 16 on that day when, according to my gospel, God judges the secrets of men by Christ Jesus . . . . 8 Owe no one anything, except to love each other, for the one who loves another has fulfilled the law. 9 For the commandments, “You shall not commit adultery, You shall not murder, You shall not steal, You shall not covet,” and any other commandment, are summed up in this word: “You shall love your neighbor as yourself.” 10 Love does no wrong to a neighbor; therefore love is the fulfilling of the law. 11 Besides this you know the time, that the hour has come for you to wake from sleep. For salvation is nearer to us now than when we first believed. 12 The night is far gone; the day is at hand. So then let us cast off the works of darkness and put on the armor of light. 13 Let us walk properly as in the daytime, not in orgies and drunkenness, not in sexual immorality and sensuality, not in quarreling and jealousy. 14 But put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make no provision for the flesh, to gratify its desires.
In short, the Judaeo-Christian tradition holds that we find ourselves both inevitably moral and invariably hypocritical, unable to live up to the standards we expect others to accord to us. It goes on to highlight that living by the light we have or should acknowledge is the path of righteousness in which -- however stumblingly and penitently -- we should persist. We see that bey light of conscience we reveal that such standards are written on our hearts, boiling down at core to the mandate to live by the principle of love in accord with our equal nature as neighbours. Then, it calls us to penitent progress. In short, to reasonable, responsible faith and persistently living by the truth and right we do know or should know. (And, specifically on Jesus of Nazareth, cf here: http://vimeo.com/17960119 ) This is precisely what Hooker was discussing, and it is exactly what Locke cited in order to ground what would become modern liberty and democracy. Our problem is, we are now beginning to insist on throwing over the traces and are beginning to cling to the absurd out of perceived interests, agendas and passions spinning out of control. I see a march of folly in progress. Next, you again snip short and out of context: d: >> [KF:] Boethius on the challenge of good vs evil … To Boethius: whence evil if there is no God? The good can be seen in those things that do us no harm.>> This rather misses the point, which is foundational in focus. Cf 74 again:
We have every good reason to acknowledge that OUGHT is real and binding. But, how can such be grounded? Post Hume and his “surpriz’d” argument, only at world-foundation level. That is, at base/root level, there must be an IS that grounds OUGHT, an IS that is inherently moral and properly and adequately supports OUGHT. There is but one serious candidate, after centuries of debates, as can be seen from comparative difficulties analysis of alternatives. Namely, the inherently good Creator-God, a necessary and maximally great being worthy of ultimate loyalty and the reasonable service of doing the good in accord with our evident nature. One way to see this is to echo Boethius on the challenge of good vs evil in his Consolation of Philosophy as he faced unjust sentence of death to get rid of a roadblock to powerful and oppressive courtiers after the fall of the Western Roman empire: “If God exists, whence evil? But whence good, if God does not exist?” In short, is there fairness, or justice, or a duty of care to respect the truth, the right and rights? If yes obtains for any of these in any context, we face the implications of being under the moral government of OUGHT, highlighting the foundational nature of the good and implying that evil is not a thing in itself but the frustration, privation or perversion of the good out of its proper purpose or end.
Yes, we do see good as that which does not harm but instead promotes thriving. However, in light of Hume's "surpriz'd" argument and other considerations, how do we found the good, which is inextricably bound to the ought? The only serious answer is, in an IS that intrinsically grounds OUGHT at the root of reality. Which points to the sole serious candidate (and one notes the striking, consistent absence of a proposed second candidate in objections to that): the inherently good Creator God, a necessary and maximally great being worthy of ultimate loyalty and reasonable service by doing the good in accord with our evident nature. And, given the explanation in brief of evil vs good, it is interesting to see your attempt to indict God as author of evil: e: >>[SS:] If all things are made by God, then evil is among them.>> I point out, again, what was in 74 above, on what evil is:
is there fairness, or justice, or a duty of care to respect the truth, the right and rights? If yes obtains for any of these in any context, we face the implications of being under the moral government of OUGHT, highlighting the foundational nature of the good and implying that evil is not a thing in itself but the frustration, privation or perversion of the good out of its proper purpose or end.
I add, that on the wider problem of evil, you may find this helpful as a beginning: http://nicenesystheol.blogspot.com/2010/11/unit-2-gospel-on-mars-hill-foundations.html#u2_gdvsevl f: >> [KF:] …is there fairness, or justice, or a duty of care to respect the truth, the right and rights? If yes obtains for any of these in any context, we face the implications of being under the moral government of OUGHT, … [SS:] Is this your definition of “being under the moral government of OUGHT?”>> Not a definition but an indicator. g: >> [KF:] … the foundational nature of the good and implying that evil is not a thing in itself but the frustration, privation or perversion of the good out of its proper purpose or end. This relationship can be reversed: evil can be foundational, good could be the absence of evil.>> This fails, as it is little more than an attempt to turn words about. Evil, as pointed out, is based on twisting what is, it is inherently not primary. h: >> [KF:] There are foundational truths that may only be denied on pain of patent absurdity, … [SS:] I agree that there are truths we deny at our peril, that morality cannot be found without reference to reality. It is the “how” of that finding that we disagree on, I think.>> This is at least, a common place to begin from. I trust this point by point response will help in that process. KFkairosfocus
July 12, 2015
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I agree, KF. I agree. It's sad, sad, sad.Brent
July 11, 2015
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Brent, we face lawfare and a situation where reasonableness of courts cannot be assumed; the civil peace of justice has been broken. KFkairosfocus
July 11, 2015
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Sean, I like your post @90, but I'll have to get to it later, carefully, as I think KF is not going to allow any more discussion on the specific instances you raised. Unfortunately, it may be quite a bit later . . . sorry.Brent
July 11, 2015
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Brent, some provocative points! KFkairosfocus
July 11, 2015
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Sean @89,
Outside of ourselves” should mean that Reality is not part of us, but that we are part of it. Reality is not separate from us anymore than my hand is separate from me.
Of course I didn't quite mean that. I mean a transcendent reality that is separate from us, though knowable through some means. But I understand your idea of reality, and I'll refer to it as immediate reality. But in this immediate reality we are a part of, can we agree that man is the supreme being? Is there anything more awesome than man in the universe? I don't think so.
In my definition of reality, whim has no place. If you think whim has a place in the proper definition of reality, you’ll have to explain that. After reading your entire comment, I still don’t get what you’re saying here.
It seems too obvious so I didn't try to explain it. First, though it might seem I'm contradicting myself, whim is not bad. In fact, it is good and healthy. It just means that people have choices and preferences. Nothing more. But, as your hand isn't separate from you, you, and your whims, are not separate from reality. It just is a part of reality that man, including his whims, constitute it. Therefore, whim just is a part of reality, and that is fine as far as it goes. However, this immediate reality seems obviously inadequate as a source of objective morality, something that carries an actual weight of ought. Exactly what does fall outside the realm of immediate reality? Nothing I can think of. (Of course I mean this from within your concept and perspective . . .) Isn't killing, loving, bowling, everything a part of this immediate reality? Man's whims, desires? They're all just a part of the immediate reality. If it is the case that everything is a part of this immediate reality that you say is the source of an objective morality, and it seems that must be the case, then whence a moral stance? For again, we are in the business now of saying that this certain act that is a part of reality is bad, or that particular act that is a part of reality is good, which means that neither good or bad themselves are a part of that reality, but something separate which sits above it and judges it. Or, if there is something of reality that is able to judge the rest of it either good or bad, just what is it? It should be easy to point out. Just what is the part of immediate reality that is goodness or badness, rightness or wrongness? Just what is this goodness or badness telling thing? And now to two alarming statements you made. I said:
And this means that you will not be able to show how my assumptions above were not exactly correct.
And you said:
Agreed. It also means that you cannot show my assumptions are not exactly correct, even tho’ they differ from yours.
First, I was referring of course to my specific assumptions of how you must define reality. I was saying that you only confirmed what I had said. I was referring to something specific, but you are referring to your general idea of the source of morality. I was not saying, "you can't disprove my idea, so accept it." It sounds like you're too willing to go the skeptic route. I said:
We can only access that “reality” which we have somehow discovered, and, interpreted.
You said:
Almost. We can access any part of reality within our ability to do so. We only know about the parts we have already discovered. We will discover more.
This is alarming for it's "promissory noteness" if you will. It also has a skeptical smell lingering, implying we can't really know anything now. You said:
Since we cannot know [deities] better than we know reality, belief in deities cannot lead to an objective moral stand.
Again, cart . . . horse. And, there is nothing to say from within your view that we can't know deities at least as well as we know the immediate reality.
Perfection would be an error-free understanding of Reality. The scientific method tends to self-correct, to remove errors. This constitutes “tending toward perfection”. Please notice I do not think perfection would ever be achieved.
This doesn't alleviate the obvious problem I was pointing out. Again, you only confirm what I said you must mean. Namely, perfection only means, ultimately, the immediate reality. So, what is is the standard of morality, which is supposed to judge what happens — and what happens is only a part of the immediate reality — meaning you have the standard judging the standard, reality judging reality, the is judging the is. But this is not what you do when you make a moral judgment; rather, you say what ought to have been. Making a moral judgment is saying that a certain instance of the immediate reality should, or should not, as the case may be, have been a part of the reality.
What we call “good or bad” is not absolute. A lion catching a deer is “good” for the lion and “bad” for the deer. Reality is about what is or what happens; judgements about things are merely a subset of Reality. So we don’t need anything “outside Reality” to make this assessment. What is True is true, both the good and the bad.
I call bait and switch! This is terrible. A lion and deer analogy has nothing to do with morality. That would only amount to a convenient/inconvenient equivalent, which isn't an arbiter of moral oughts. Some things that are convenient can be, and often are, morally wrong, and vice-versa. I disagree that good or bad isn't absolute in the way you seem to mean it. When we are speaking of an actual case of morality, as opposed to your animal example, we mean that the person who committed the deed and anyone else, if they were victimized by it, were wrong and wronged respectively. Judgments are a subset of the immediate reality? We don't need anything outside this reality to make this assessment? No, no, no! I'm going to go ahead and say it. Even though you claim this to be what you believe, you really do not. Yes, it is a part of the immediate reality that people judge, but of the multitude of times you decry another's judgments, you are saying their judgment isn't in accord with another standard. Now, go ahead and say, "Yeah! They don't accord with MY standard," which will just prove the whole point about your conception of morality not being objective and only being rooted in man's whims.
What is True is true, both the good and the bad.
So, killing is True. It happens. Is it the good, or the bad? Love of others is True. Is it the good, or the bad? I had said:
I don’t think whim poisons reason, but minus an objective and transcendent Good from which to get our bearings, reason poisons whim, and everything else.
Whim is the most healthy thing in the world. It is amoral. Acting on any particular whim may or may not be morally acceptable. Reason and whim are not antithetical. However, if there is no ultimate transcendent reality toward which reason can point, or from which we can derive it, then whim would be the ONLY healthy thing. Imagine a world where there really was no ultimate truth, no mathematics, or anything that made sense; Alice In Wonderland on steroids. The saddest people in the world would be those who were bound by some affliction that made them believe that there was a reason to adhere to reason. Sean, I'm quite sure you don't appreciate the amount of philosophy, true philosophy, that you are "illegally" (lol) borrowing from the rational Christian worldview. You assume so much which doesn't logically follow from your stated beliefs.Brent
July 11, 2015
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NOTICE: Given the pattern of ruthless activists and abuses of law and language already manifest, as thread owner, I am gavelling discussion on the homosexualist agenda in this thread. Those who wish to carry such forward would be well advised to carry it elsewhere. There is more than enough substance in this thread to discuss already. KFkairosfocus
July 11, 2015
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SS: I thank you for the onward response. However, unfortunately, in 87 you make an unpromising start:
[KF:] … you need now to say a right is R and it is or is not binding in the case of that murdered abused child because of X. [SS:] I answered this @76: I would say to your hypothetical [--> nope, as stated, actual . . . and I think the murder is still unsolved] situation that the conduct described is immoral because it is harmful to the child and lacks justification or necessity. The child’s lack of strength or eloquence is irrelevant. [KF:} 1: What is a “right,” and why should — ought — others be inclined to respect such? [SS:] A right is a class of actions that individuals are entitled to engage in unless the community identifies a legitimate and reasoned purpose to limit or ban those actions. Only legitimate reasons regarding mitigation or prevention of actual, unjustified harms to other persons qualify as legitimate reasons to limit or ban behaviors. Your cite from Locke (in 3) tells us why; we don’t want to be harmed so we must not (ought not) harm others. We cannot expect to do X and then ban others from doing the same. If X is harmful to others, we ought not to do X.
What happens here is that there is a circle, reflecting exactly the IS-OUGHT gap highlighted by Hume, that I have been pointing to all along. How does the community decide on legitimate and reasonable grounds, apart from might and manipulation make 'right'? Apart from, we have the power and redefine words willy-nilly very much parallel to Lincoln's example of declaring that the tail of a sheep is to be regarded as a leg (when patently it cannot function as a leg), or 1984's 2 + 2 = whatever The Party needs it to be, Mr Smith (with instruments of ruthless torture or murder hovering in the background). Or do you want me to point to decrees that in effect out-lawed Jews as non=persons in Germany, or the Dred Scot decision that did much the same to blacks in the US in 1857. Including, in the end, per your response on no 2, what is harm, and what is a child that gives it such value that we ought not to harm it? Yes, you reflect the common testimony of conscience and decency here, but that still has not reached to grounding. Before going further, let me put on the table a definition of a right, just for reflection: a binding, morally grounded legitimate expectation and demand that one be respected and treated in accord with one's value, nature, inherent dignity and status as a human being. Such includes first that one has a right to life as without life nothing else can be achieved to fulfill one's nature, it includes respect for freedom of conscience, thought, speech/expression, innocent reputation, association and responsible freedom in general, as limited by the point that one's freedom to swing one's arm ends where the next person's nose begins and the like. (Note the definition of liberty as cited from Webster's 1828.) Such brings us to the pivotal importance for our civilisation at this time of the first two paragraphs of the US DoI, 1776:
When . . . it becomes necessary for one people . . . to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation. We hold these truths to be self-evident, [cf Rom 1:18 - 21, 2:14 - 15], that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. --That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security . . . . [And, I pause to caution you and others who support ever so many currently fashionable agendas, that the evident progressive subversion of law-making and courts, institutions and even language under false colours of law is clearly raising the issue of a long train of abuses and usurpations across our civilisation. If ruthless determined agendas and activists abusing influence and power make reform and freedom increasingly impossible, they will face utter loss of legitimacy and open the door to prospects I do not even want to contemplate. I only hope that remaining freedom of expression and respect for the ballot box will suffice to check the plain agenda to crush conscience and liberty before it is too late, especially with the wolves already howling at the door and racing to acquire nuclear weapons and means of delivery. The march of folly is at critical levels now. Don't ever forget the grim lesson that the reason Syria and Egypt fell so readily to Mohammed's successors was because Byzantium had lost credibility over freedom of conscience. And, for 1300 years since, the clear fact is that they jumped from frying pan into fire. I wonder if we understand the matches we are playing with.]
Such a consideration also puts the IS-OUGHT gap squarely on the table, and so also . . . Hume's Guillotine:
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised [orig; surpriz'd] to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason. [Hume, David (1739). A Treatise of Human Nature. London: John Noon. p. 335.]
This is a classic statement of the IS-OUGHT gap, and it is what I had in mind in saying: "The question, in short, is whether we actually are under moral government of ought." Notice, 74 begins as follows, with a statement and links to two discussions of significant length that set a context for all to follow (we are dealing with a major issue that cannot be responsibly addressed with a brief quip):
SS: A starter on the IS-OUGHT gap in a nutshell (cf. here on in context and here in context). As a core first issue, is it patently wrong to kidnap, bind, sexually assault and kill a young child on its way home from school? Such a child has neither strength nor eloquence to enforce “might and manipulation make so-called right.” And, at some point, we are all in that position, or even more vulnerable, in the womb. (Also, sadly, this is not a hypothetical.) The question, in short, is whether we actually are under moral government of ought, or else whether our hearts, minds and consciences delude us on this matter. As, ever so many advocates of evolutionary materialism argue or imply. If the latter, we have let general delusion loose in our interior lives, and face self-referential absurdity and incoherence. (Indeed, an infinite regress of Plato’s cave delusional words; this is a case of how radical skepticism, whether global or arbitrarily selective, leads to self-refuting utter breakdown of rationality. Such is usually not obvious when one is on the rhetorical defensive but comes out as soon as it is realised that one’s implied worldview must also be grounded. Cf. discussion here on, part of context for the first linked. Hyperskepticism undermines rationality and undercuts itself through self-falsification.) We have every good reason to acknowledge that OUGHT is real and binding. But, how can such be grounded? Post Hume and his “surpriz’d” argument, only at world-foundation level. That is, at base/root level, there must be an IS that grounds OUGHT, an IS that is inherently moral and properly and adequately supports OUGHT. There is but one serious candidate, after centuries of debates, as can be seen from comparative difficulties analysis of alternatives. Namely, the inherently good Creator-God, a necessary and maximally great being worthy of ultimate loyalty and the reasonable service of doing the good in accord with our evident nature. One way to see this is to echo Boethius on the challenge of good vs evil in his Consolation of Philosophy as he faced unjust sentence of death to get rid of a roadblock to powerful and oppressive courtiers after the fall of the Western Roman empire: “If God exists, whence evil? But whence good, if God does not exist?” In short, is there fairness, or justice, or a duty of care to respect the truth, the right and rights? If yes obtains for any of these in any context, we face the implications of being under the moral government of OUGHT, highlighting the foundational nature of the good and implying that evil is not a thing in itself but the frustration, privation or perversion of the good out of its proper purpose or end . . .
Notice, BTW, that there was an answer in anticipation to your later brief suggestion that God must have created evil, one that is longstanding and alluded to in part by Boethius. Evil is not a thing in itself but the twisting or frustration or privation of what is good, credibly reflecting the abuse of something else that grounds the greatest goods such as ability to love and be virtuous as a robot or pc cannot: responsible, rational freedom. Of course, I have to come back, this is but a first part, forgive a cliff hanger for the moment. KF PS: I again link the earlier UD discussion: https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/on-the-reasonableness-and-importance-of-the-inherently-good-creator-god-a-necessary-and-maximally-great-being/kairosfocus
July 11, 2015
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sean
I have no difficulties accepting unconditional love, I’ve just been trying to get you to tell me what you think it means. You’re coming closer now.
Well if you don't accept unconditional love its because you haven't been loved like that. Your argument is not based on logic or anywhere else, it is just an opinion.
There usually IS a reason, whether the reason is a necessity or not is unclear. It’s one of those chicken-and-egg questions.
If there is a reason its not unconditional love.
… but if all love is unconditional, the phrase unconditional love is redundant, so I am left wondering what you mean by this redundant phrase …
Not all love is unconditional, i may love you because you give me money, there are different kinds of love, we are talking about unconditional love. Unconditional love precedes reason.
If matter does not exist until it’s measured, there’s nothing to measure; there’s nothing to be consciously aware of.
The figures on the experiment when we don't measure matter and we measure the behavior of matter when its not observered result when we pull a line that separates e.g. the odds at 50%. Probabilities from 0% to 100% are throughout the room, but if you take the positions of the space are just 50% and associations with lines derived those shapes. The shapes are two-dimensional or three-dimensional graphs of mathematical functions known as "probability distributions" (or sometimes "probability density functions"). These have wave shape. The graph does not prejudge the nature of what represents, as the parabolic trajectory of a projectile gun does not tell us everything about the projectile. What we see in the graphs is the wave behavior of matter, which is why the graphs of probability make waves (or shapes such as orbital images) rather than simple circles, but it is like smoke with fire. http://www.hitachi.com/rd/portal/highlight/quantum/image/fig2_l.jpg This image shows a double-slit experiment, where we fire particles and we expect to see the "classic" particle behavior. However because of the very small particles and because we have no meter over the slots, the effect on the final screen is other than expected, "non-classical" ie wave behavior. Eventually they combined (by theoretical physicists) both behaviors into a quantum behavior, where the small quantum particles behave both "classical" and wave.
With regard to the question of matter being created by measurement, the double-slit experiment is irrelevant. It is an experiment on things that actually exist prior to the experiment. No matter is created by this experiment.
No its not a classic experiment as i explained above.
So how does one measure a “mathematical function”? You make no sense.
Neither the particle pattern or wave pattern exists until measurement. The wave result is not the wave function, it is another possibility from the wave function. Sean, you know nothing. Jim F.JimFit
July 10, 2015
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We cannot expect to do X and then ban others from doing the same. Why not?Mung
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Brent; After posting my last comment (#89) I took a walk out to the lake. While there a thought occurred to me; a comment to make to you that I think I should not let pass. In #88, you wrote that “For when God wants to make sure we get some message, He will write it on our hearts. He will intertwine it in our human nature.Let’s take that as a given for a moment. If true, that would mean that homosexuality or being transgendered would be gifts of God and unreproachable. Gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgender persons all report that their natures are entwined into their very beings. Therefore, these must be gifts from God. You could reply that these persons have misunderstood what God wrote on their hearts or entwined in their natures, but that would be fatal your position. You would be saying that, “when God wants to make sure we get some message, He will write it on our hearts or He will intertwine it in our human nature,” but we cannot trust our own sense of those gifts. You’d be telling us we need to turn to other fallible humans to tell us what God wrote or entwined; these mere humans would be needed to interpret God’s intent for us. Again, we’d be left with no way to know what God intends except to trust the untrustworthy claims of other fallible humans. sean s.sean samis
July 10, 2015
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Brent @88:
I’ll agree that morality is grounded in reality, but one outside of ourselves as I’ve hinted already, which is necessarily the case.
I agree with this, I think. “Outside of ourselves” should mean that Reality is not part of us, but that we are part of it. Reality is not separate from us anymore than my hand is separate from me.
In your definition of reality, I disagree that our whims have no place in this.
In my definition of reality, whim has no place. If you think whim has a place in the proper definition of reality, you’ll have to explain that. After reading your entire comment, I still don’t get what you’re saying here.
...things we may think are not real or true actually are, or vice-versa.
Agreed.
And this means that you will not be able to show how my assumptions above were not exactly correct.
Agreed. It also means that you cannot show my assumptions are not exactly correct, even tho’ they differ from yours.
We can only access that “reality” which we have somehow discovered, and, interpreted.
Almost. We can access any part of reality within our ability to do so. We only know about the parts we have already discovered. We will discover more.
There is no difference with what I had said already whatsoever. And so, my points about how this cannot possibly lead to/result in an objective morality stand.
Oh, agreed. But this also applies to our apprehension of deities. Since we cannot know them better than we know reality, belief in deities cannot lead to an objective moral stand.
“Perfect”? “Tends toward perfection”? What standard are you referring to? Reality? If your definition of reality is what is, and reality is the standard, then whatever is is the standard.
Perfection would be an error-free understanding of Reality. The scientific method tends to self-correct, to remove errors. This constitutes “tending toward perfection”. Please notice I do not think perfection would ever be achieved.
But whatever is includes what we call both good and bad. Clearly, if whatever is includes both what we normally call good or bad, we are using something outside of whatever is to make this assesment.
What we call “good or bad” is not absolute. A lion catching a deer is “good” for the lion and “bad” for the deer. Reality is about what is or what happens; judgements about things are merely a subset of Reality. So we don’t need anything “outside Reality” to make this assessment. What is True is true, both the good and the bad.
As long as we keep in mind that rationality’s goal is truth, not good enough or that’ll do.
Agreed. The Goal is Truth.
For when God wants to make sure we get some message, He will write it on our hearts. He will intertwine it in our human nature.
At this point, I get to turn your words against you. Your well-written reply illustrates the theist’s blindness. Your position might be true, but why would I believe it? People claiming God has written things on their hearts or entwined things into our nature tell us to behave in contradictory ways. It is as if God is writing wildly different things on different hearts. You tell a nice story, but how do I validate it? Am I supposed to just trust you? Sorry Brent, I’m sure you’re a nice guy, but that boat don’t float.
And once you kindly put the horse back in front of the cart this problem goes away.
... but only if God actually speaks directly to you. He’s never spoken to me; I know there are few who actually claim to have had a conversation with him, and none who can make that claim credible.
I don’t think whim poisons reason, but minus an objective and transcendent Good from which to get our bearings, reason poisons whim, and everything else.
Odd thought, that. So you think we should just follow our whims? I’m pretty sure kairosfocus (and others) will not agree. Charlie Manson followed his whims, as did Ted Bundy and Jeff Dahmer. I’m sure I’ve misunderstood this thought.
I’ll leave off here for now, though there are more things I’d like to say.
I am interested in your further comments. sean s.sean samis
July 10, 2015
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Reality is a term I use to refer to those things that exist or occur whether we know about them or not. When scientists or explorers refer to their discoveries they use that term because those things were there before the scientist or the explorer stumbled upon them.
That's fine.
Whim refers to those things we want or prefer, even transiently. Reality is not whimsical.
Alright . . . but, our whims are also a part of reality . . . ! Therefore, part of reality IS whimsical.
Morality is grounded in Reality, in what really is. Our whims have no place in this.
I'll agree that morality is grounded in reality, but one outside of ourselves as I've hinted already, which is necessarily the case. In your definition of reality, I disagree that our whims have no place in this. I had written:
…when in fact reality could only be described as man’s interpretation of the world as presented to his senses? Fallible man?
And you replied:
As I wrote, Reality is independent of our interpretations of it.
I agree with this. It means that things we may think are not real or true actually are, or vice-versa. And this means that you will not be able to show how my assumptions above were not exactly correct. We can only access that "reality" which we have somehow discovered, and, interpreted. There is no difference with what I had said already whatsoever. And so, my points about how this cannot possibly lead to/result in an objective morality stand.
You point out a real and significant problem: humans are fallible; how can we trust what they say they found? There are two answers to this: 1. This problem exists even if we claim our Morality comes from a god. How can we trust fallible humans to remove all whim, personal preference, prejudice, or bias out of their descriptions of what they tell us their god commands us to do? If fallible humans cannot be trusted to accurately describe reality, they cannot be trusted to accurately describe deistic commands.
Yes. This problem certainly applies to my own position as well, but you don't fully understand my position and so it doesn't work quite like you seem to think. I'll deal with it below.
2. The problem can only be mitigated by the ability of fallible individuals to verify, replicate, or confirm for themselves reports by other fallible humans.
Here, things are starting to really diverge significantly. The problem can only be mitigated in this way in your account of morality, not mine.
This is why rational persons (especially scientists) are required to publish the bases of their claims so others may check them out. This is not perfect, but it tends toward perfection.
"Perfect"? "Tends toward perfection"? What standard are you referring to? Reality? If your definition of reality is what is, and reality is the standard, then whatever is is the standard. But whatever is includes what we call both good and bad. Clearly, if whatever is includes both what we normally call good or bad, we are using something outside of whatever is to make this assessment.
This is why rational persons are expected to construct rational arguments to justify their claims; arguments which others can examine and critique. This is not perfect either, but it tends over time to weed-out the nonsense.
As long as we keep in mind that rationality's goal is truth, not good enough or that'll do.
For religious claims, where a fallible human claims their god commands certain behavior, individual reasoning cannot go far in validating the prophet’s claims. If the claims seem to defy reason, we are told that “God’s ways are mysterious” or something to that effect. Validation by the individual is foreclosed. We are required to proceed on trust of the fallible prophet or else.
This is a great comment, but for the reason that it aptly illustrates the materialist's inability to see the forest for the trees. Note, we are back to where we started. I had said to you from the first that you had it backwards, and you still do. The morality argument is an argument from morals to God. The claim isn't that God gave certain commands to someone in the wilderness somewhere, but that since all men have an inherent "pressure" telling them what is right, good, and proper, and a conscience that won't let them alone when they don't obey that "pressure", there is every rational reason to take that as a clue to the reality of an objective standard toward which these "pressures" point. The reason this illustrates the materialist's blindness is that you clearly also assume that anything that God wishes to communicate with us needs necessarily to come through some grand medium, one usually quite arbitrary I might add. Yet, many believe that God is actually even willing to communicate through the press! Shocker, I know! But even this, I tell you, is too grand. For when God wants to make sure we get some message, He will write it on our hearts. He will intertwine it in our human nature. And claiming to see, they are blind, for men have been made to believe that what is "natural" is separate from God and couldn't possibly tell us anything about God. It's a nice racket though, for when you define any evidence for God as having to be some monumental miracle, and then rule out the possibility of miracles a-priori, well . . . Otherwise, did you have something specific in mind when you said: "If the claims seem to defy reason, we are told that “God’s ways are mysterious” or something to that effect."
Therefore, with regards to religious claims, unless the individual has a direct, personal, and clear conversation with their god all religious claims must be treated as suspect because they cannot otherwise be verified.
And once you kindly put the horse back in front of the cart this problem goes away.
In summary: to the extent that whim poisons reason, it is far, far more toxic to religion.
I don't think whim poisons reason, but minus an objective and transcendent Good from which to get our bearings, reason poisons whim, and everything else. I'm sorry, but I'm just too tired to continue this book tonight. I'll leave off here for now, though there are more things I'd like to say. B.Brent
July 10, 2015
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kairosfocus @86:
... you need now to say a right is R and it is or is not binding in the case of that murdered abused child because of X.
I answered this @76: I would say to your hypothetical situation that the conduct described is immoral because it is harmful to the child and lacks justification or necessity. The child’s lack of strength or eloquence is irrelevant.
1: What is a “right,” and why should — ought — others be inclined to respect such?
A right is a class of actions that individuals are entitled to engage in unless the community identifies a legitimate and reasoned purpose to limit or ban those actions. Only legitimate reasons regarding mitigation or prevention of actual, unjustified harms to other persons qualify as legitimate reasons to limit or ban behaviors. Your cite from Locke (in 3) tells us why; we don’t want to be harmed so we must not (ought not) harm others. We cannot expect to do X and then ban others from doing the same. If X is harmful to others, we ought not to do X.
2: Is it so, that we OUGHT not to kidnap, bind, gag, indecently sexually assault and kill a young child on its way from school in order to indulge one’s sexual pleasures and aggressive impulses? Why or why not?
We ought not. Because this behavior harms the child, because our personal preferences or self-gratification cannot justify such behaviors. I think we’ve made this one clear. The expanded citation from Hooker made by Locke (in 3) echoes my sentiment. Notice that Locke finds these duties in nature; no deity is required.
4: What then could asking as to whether we are responsibly free, morally governed beings imply for law. government, the civil peace of justice, and for what grounds them at world-roots level? . . .
In brief, persons are free to engage in any activity which does not impose a harm on other persons. I can give you a definition of harm if you need it. sean s.sean samis
July 10, 2015
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