Repeat after me: “this has nothing to do with my views on religion”

Dawkins: I sort of do. Yes. But it is an inconsistency that we sort of have to live with otherwise life would be intolerable. But it has nothing to do with my views on religion it is an entirely separate issue.

LOL! The irrational inner life of Richard Dawkins.

Don’t worry folks, good, evil, and free will do in fact exist and are not merely convenient glosses we put over things.

My compliments for a very sharp, simple question that obviously threw Dawkins for a loop.

So the human condition is designed such that the irrational is necessary for us to operate? Funny how that works.

I don’t see how an adherent to classical theology is any more consistent. After all, since God created ex nihilo, ultimately God is responsible for The God Delusion.

jaredl

I don’t see how an adherent to classical theology is any more consistent. After all, since God created ex nihilo, ultimately God is responsible for The God Delusion.

No, because free will exists, therefore, Dawkins is responsible for his book because he elected to write it, not God.

It is really quite simple.

It seems really complex.

1. It has always been true that I will sin tomorrow. (Assumption: Omnitemporality of Truth)
2. It is impossible that God should hold a false belief or fail to know any truth. (Assumption: Infallible Foreknowledge)
3. God has always believed that I will sin tomorrow. (From 1 and 2)
4. If God has always believed a certain thing, then it is not in anyone’s power to do anything which entails that God has not always believed that thing. (Assumption: Fixed Past)
5. It is not in my power to do anything that entails that God has not always believed that I will sin tomorrow. (From 3 and 4)
6. That I refrain from sinning tomorrow entails that God has not always believed that I will sin tomorrow. (Necessary truth and from 2; Principle of Transfer of Powerlessness)
7. Therefore, it is not in my power to refrain from sinning tomorrow. (From 5 and 6)
8. If I act freely when I sin tomorrow, then I also have it within my power to refrain from sinning. (Assumption of Libertarian Free Will)
9. Therefore, I do not act freely when I sin tomorrow. (From 7 and

once again, the smiley was a reference to statement 8.

And, may future posters who take issue with this argument note - the fact that God knows something is going to happen doesn’t mean he makes it happen. You just can’t have both free will and the God of classical theology. That’s the point.

jaredl ,
If I understand you correctly, I’d question (at least) your assumption #4: someone (God or anyone else) having advance nowledge of a certain outcome doesn’t mean that he necessarily caused that outcome.

In the end, free will is huge. Regardless of any philosophical assumptions that a person may hold, I have yet to meet the person who lives his life as though he doesn’t exercise free will.

But since the God of classical theology created from non-being all that is, infallibly foreknowing all future consequences of that action, He therefore is also responsible for The God Delusion. The classical theist is also a determinist, unless he simply declares, by fiat, free will and infallible foreknowledge are logically compatible, and this despite the argument given in my post at #5.

And, may future posters who take issue with this argument note - the fact that God knows something is going to happen doesn’t mean he makes it happen. You just can’t have both free will and the God of classical theology. That’s the point.

That is just silly. Just because I know you are going to do something doesn’t mean you have no free will. And that is just me. God on the otherhand doesn’t have the same relationship with time that you and I have, therefore, there is no logical incompatibility with God having perfect foreknowledge and you having free will.

That having been said, I am not sure that God does have perfect foreknowledge but not for any of the reasons you give.

jaredl,

Maybe we do have freewill, and God has perfect “foreknowledge” of tomorrow but perhaps our will was free only in the past, before the world was. And that this is merely a playing out of past choice. This is how C.S.Lewis handled it.

Or maybe classical theism is just wrong. The Hebrew Yahweh appeared to be limited at times with regards to the future.

@ jaredl: What is your take on free will? Just curious

7. Therefore, it is not in my power to refrain from sinning tomorrow.
8. If I act freely when I sin tomorrow, then I also have it within my power to refrain from sinning. (Assumption of Libertarian Free Will)(From 5 and 6)

I agree with 7 but not 8 ie “assumption of Liberatrian Free Will.”

It comes down on how you define sin, I suppose… I take the view that a sinner cannot please God in whatever he does and that even his “good” deeds are not truly good (given God defines Good) rather they are sin (don’t want to argue this here just cf. Hebrews 11:6 “Without faith it is impossible to please Him.”)

So his free will can only choose sin and his choices are uniquely his and not God’s ie God doesn’t choose his sins for him.

I guess your criteria just depends on your definitions of good and evil , and the limits of free will.

[T]here is no logical incompatibility with God having perfect foreknowledge and you having free will.

This, despite a sound logical demonstration of the exact opposite, is exactly what I was referring to in post #8. And with that, I bow out, unless a weightier response should occur.

10 - Mike (and 11 - jpark320),

Yes, I hold something similar to the “open” view of God’s foreknowledge. My view on the correctness of classical theism may be inferred from the fact that I’m not a classical theist.

The Hebrew Yahweh appeared to be limited at times with regards to the future.

Can you support this mike1962? I’m just wondering if you think only a couple of verses point to His limited knowledge, or that after a comprehensive look at all the verses dealing with God and His knowledge that it seems like He is limited.

I think that some verses, isolated by themselves, make God seem cruel, however looking at all the verses about God’s character I come out w/ that He is still an incredibly loving and just. Just wanted to know what you were actually thinking, thanks.

” … since God created ex nihilo, ultimately God is responsible for The God Delusion.”

Dawkins’ response tells me he’s not sure if he is, in fact, a determinist. If he is, he’s definitely a ’secular determinist’, whose philosophical bent would be blaming atoms (and I guess the Big Bang) for everything one does.

Determinism in this flavor is meaningless (to me anyway), since you can’t blame the superstructure for what one chooses to do with it.

” … because free will exists, therefore, Dawkins is responsible for his book because he elected to write it, not God.”

I agree, unless predestination is true.

Yes, I hold something similar to the “open” view of God’s foreknowledge. My view on the correctness of classical theism may be inferred from the fact that I’m not a classical
theist.

Sorry to bother yah again jaredl. Just wanted to know your response to my question (since you said you were “bowing out”) to your definition of sin.

And the limits of “libertarian free will” or a definition of that.

I agree with you on your logic, GIVEN YOUR PRESUPPOSITIONS, but I think you need do defend those presuppositions.

I guess for the argument of freewill in general, what do choices look like to somebody not confined by time? It’s not like those of us in the 4 dimensions where if somebody asks us “What do you want to do today” we have to answer it in time (its not instant) and b/c of that limitation we don’t know the answer. And this doesn’t have to be specifically about God, but any being that is outside time and space - answer = We Don’t Know.

I would also agree that God truly wouldn’t know everything if He was confined by time and space (I’m sure He would be a really good guesser though), but since He is not, we cannot really comment on how the interface between a timeless and matterless being is like with beings confined by such things unless He tells us.

Apparently God can know and plan in 4 dimensions before things happen and men in those 4 dimension also truly have free will. Unless you know how things work outside our 4 dimensions or that limits of our 4 dimensions are still binding to God, it is something we just have to accept (but many do not like it… I do!).

Main point: We have no idea what a being not confined by time and space is like, but we still place limits on God as if was.

What Dawkins is doing is a classic Enlightenment liberal move: he makes an Unprincipled Exception. He has his ideology, but to follow it makes life as he likes it unlivable, so he makes an exception to his ideas.

RD: “it is an inconsistency that we sort of have to live with otherwise life would be intolerable”

I think I would find the opposite to be true - that it would be intolerable to live with such an inconsistency. But, I suppose most folks have such conundrums that we manage to blissfully ignore.

… the fact that God knows something is going to happen doesn’t mean he makes it happen. You just can’t have both free will and the God of classical theology.

Point one: Does God know everything that will happen to the iota? That’s one heck of a lot of calculating. For one, it’s absurd based on simple logic. What is the point of a scripted existence?

Point two: It would absolutely rule out free will, making our existence pointless, at least from an ‘active’ creator’s standpoint. We might feel we were doing our own thing, but to Him it would be like watching reruns.

Early beliefs in absolute theistic determination, especially to the extreme as in Calvinism and Islam, are likely based on faulty logic, i.e. God is omnipotent, therefore He must know everything, and by extension, He must know the precise details of each and every event, every grain of sand, and of course, every hair on your head. He might ‘could’, but would He choose to?

I doubt that a personal God would choose that kind of reality. Further, a belief in absolute determination can cause havoc, because ‘technically’, it gives one license to commit any act with impunity. All of the above are MHO.

Sometimes I get carried away, as you can see by my last post. It entirely fits the comment you made in the prior one, and goes contra to the stated thems of the article.

Please delete it, and I apologize!

Jaredl:

Your point 1 seems to make an unwarranted assumption…Aristotle brought up the question as to whether or not the statement “The battle will be won tomorrow” (paraphrase) is true before the battle has been waged. If it is true beforehand, then doesn’t that entail determinism?

Statements can not only be true or false, but also “undefined” or “null”. For example “Shut the door!” is neither true nor false. Similarly, the statement “I will sin tomorrow” is undefined in terms of truth value until you actually choose to sin or not sin.

That is how I’ve always looked at it. (Sorry Dr. D if my post is also off track..)

Dawkins: “Oh they were just determined by their molecules.” It’s stupid to punish them. ”

Of course, it’s also quite stupid to refer to those who do want to blame or praise others as stupid–for it was determined that they would feel precisely that way. Likewise, it was stupid of me to refer to that attitude as stupid…and so on ad infinitum. So there’s no point in making a fuss about culpability, etc (Although it’s not like you have any choice in the matter.)

*sigh* When will you religious fundamentalists stop giving poor Richard a hard time?! Let him be inconsistent as much as he wants, while we have our laughs.

It’s good to see Dawkins admitting that there are at least some inconsistencies in his world view.

That said, there are Christian determinists (predestinationists) and there are atheist compatibilists. I have never heard a definition of free will that truly satisfied me, so I don’t feel qualified to form an opinion either way. I’m thus sympathetic with Dawkins when he says that we all feel as if we have free will, but it does not follow that we actually are free.

But it has nothing to do with my views on religion it is an entirely separate issue.

Um…yeah, right. If there is even a hint of free will in the universe then you, Mr. Dawkins, have been shown to be wrong on so many subjects - especially the subject of religion.

Free will is a problem for the strict materialist.

What is the reality? From an experiential point of view, I experience drives and automatic behaviors that seem to be programmed. But, I also experience free will. I really don’t try to theorize about it beyond that. As to how God relates to all of this, I don’t know.

It’s interesting that Noam Chomsky believes determinism and free will are compatible and says he doesn’t understand how. And Peter Van Inwagen says free will and indeterminism are compatible but doesn’t understand how.

Dawkins never really takes this question on b/c he knows that his theory (determinism) does not chide well w/ reality (freewill) and tries to get off the hook by saying

Now I don’t actually know what I actually think about that, I haven’t taken up a position about that, it’s not part of my remit to talk about the philosophical issue of determinism.

I think he knows the conclusion he will come up with if does try and I know people have been bothering him about this for years before the God Delusion came out…

Ben Z,

“And Peter Van Inwagen says free will and indeterminism are compatible but doesn’t understand how.”

From my understanding, Van Inwagen works the system from the reverse - if we do have free will (and I believe he considers it utterly apparent that we do), then a deterministic system cannot stand. I think his problem is he does not claim to understand the specific point at which what would otherwise be a deterministic system breaks down - but he insists that it must if free will is a reality.

I think it’s easier to argue free will in an indeterministic system than in a deterministic one, but that’s just my ignorant at-a-glance judgement.

The determinism is 19th century physics. Hence, the whole debate above is a 19th century relic.

The fundamental laws of physics prescribe non-deterministic relation between the past and future events i.e. by the laws of Quantum Field Theory (QFT), the most precisely given initial & boundary conditions A at time Ta map into a _set_ of possible outcomes B1, B2, … at later time Tb (Tb>Ta). The only constraint that QFT imposes are the probabilities of outcomes B1, B2,…

Hence, at least in principle, the actual choice of outcome B in an individual instance could be a result of some elemental “free will” of the elementary quantum objects themselves.

This possibility corresponds to panpsychism as the model for the “mind stuff”. The “free will” is just one trait of the “mind stuff”. Present natural science lacks at any model for the “mind stuff”. Hence there is no scientific answer to question: what is it like to be any particular arrangement of elementary particles & fields?

Nightlight brings up a good point concerning quantum physics, and its decidedly non-deterministic nature. I believe many people that visit this site and others like it are versed in QP, yet nobody ever seems to bring it up. There are many interpretations of it, but most seem to point to “mind” existing outside of matter. It just seems odd to me that physicists are dealing with this stuff called matter that is anything but “material” and can be called just plain weird, while Darwinists like Dawkins are still acting like atoms are solid things bumping around aimlessly in space.

Did you read what happened in the 21st century nightlight?

General relativity and quantum mechanics are having a little problem getting along, not to mention the fact that Newtonian calculations work really well in real life (ie like Baseball - Go Cards!) that we can determine stuff w/ almost 100% fidelity.

So the “non-deterministic relations” you’re talking about fizzle away w/near 100% fidelity also. Unless of course, with natural science, you can show that our thoughts (freewill if you, uh, will) are controlled at a level where quantum indetermination is significant - if you can please feel free to share.

Btw, you know that we can determine where a electron will be located about 100% of time right (think those pesky shaped orbitals)? Just not its “exact” position.

So let the freewill vs determinism debate roll on!

Jpark320, one answer you seek can be found here, in ion channels.

On the freedom of the will, the theologian Jonathan Edwards promoted the notion that there is free will, and he defined it as the determination of choice by that which most immediately pleases the mind. The will is free because it always chooses what pleases the mind; if a person’s choice were ever that which did not most immediately please his mind, then he would not be free.

This is only one of the definitions of free will that does not contradict the existence of perfect foreknowledge. Your pleasures can be known beforehand, and your obedience to them, and you would still be free to do as you please, indeed, certainly and deterministically free to do so.

Edwards’s book on the subject is The Freedom of the Will.

nightlight,
Funny how that non-deterministic relation allows us humans to do things with determination, accuracy, and purpose - when we choose to do it that way. How do you suppose we can control this non-deterministic relationship and turn quantum indeterminancy into quantum determinancy *cough* *cough* at will?

jpark320 and Lurker

Probably nightlight was more speaking about the mere possibility of indeterminism in the natural world although at the end there is a reference to its direct implications to free will. This last point cannot be (at least now) solved because of the huge amount of complexity embedded in the human brain. Instead the first point is very interesting and not only from a theoretical point of view.

“not to mention the fact that Newtonian calculations work really well in real life (ie like Baseball - Go Cards!) that we can determine stuff w/ almost 100% fidelity.”

But ot is not always true that microscopic events do not dramatically change the behavior at a macroscopic level. Please consider this simple conceptual experiment. A light source is able to emit a single photon towards a target but according to quantum mechanics the photon could be detected with the same probability by two different sensors put a bit apart on the target. Detection by sensor 1 will get on all the lights in the Yankees stadium in NY, whereas detection by sensor 2 will do the same in The L.A. Coliseum.
Here we have a single and trivial quantum microscopic event that yields one between two huge macrosopic effects.
In conclusion; if quantum ineterminism is actual and not simply a consequence of our investigations bound, this COULD possibly have consequences in macroscopic events.

Addendum: I think that free will is real and can be present in both a deterministic and an indeterministic world. However as a matter of fact atheists have very often used determinism as a way to discard God, as the famous phase that Laplace is supposed to have been spoken to Napoleon shows very well.

I don’t know about you, but I sure don’t feel like my decisions are the result of quantum probabilities any more than I feel like they are the result of chemical reactions.

To #36 (Reed Orak): “I sure don’t feel like my decisions are the result of quantum probabilities any more than I feel like they are the result of chemical reactions.”

They are not result of QFT probabilities. Rather, the probabilities are a different perspective, an “outside” view, on the statistical properties of such decisions. Consider for example, a psychologist measuring your IQ. While you’re working through the test, would you feel that your mental process of solving are “result of” the IQ Gaussian curve? The Gaussian curve merely captures one aspect or property of a ‘large’ number of such mental processes. But it has nothing to do with ‘what is it like to think through and solve test problems’. Similarly, the QFT probabilities for possible events regarding quantum object don’t tell you what is it like for the quantum object itself to ‘decide’ which result to select. As to how one might get from ‘what is it like’ of elemental object to ‘what is it like’ for a large collections of elemental objects, such as those making you or me, one logically coherent possibility is panpsychism:

Stanford Enc. of Phylosophy: PANPSYCHISM
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/

My variant, which is similar to Lebniz’s monads, is sketched in a usenet post:

http://groups.google.com/group.....1dc097e17c

Link pages to related posts:
http://www.uncommondescent.com.....ment-49652
http://groups.google.com/group.....20c272c339

Ooops, there were some typos above. This tiny reply entry box (apparently hardwired to 7 rows x 30 columns), doesn’t let one read easily over the typed text. The typing area ought to be changed to 30+ rows by 72+ columns.

Errata:
“Stanford Enc. of phylosophy”
–> “Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:”

“similar to Lebniz’s monads” –> “similar to Leibniz’s monads”

To #33 (Lurker): “Funny how that non-deterministic relation allows us humans to do things with determination, accuracy, and purpose - when we choose to do it that way.”
—-
If you toss coin 100 times, you can fairly accurately produce result that is not 100 tails. In other words, probabilities of some events may be close to 0 or to 1, which for all practical purposes will appears as deterministic events. On the other hand, when you freely decide whether to blink at this instant, the probabilities of events ‘blink’ and ‘non-blink’ may be 30% vs 70% or some such.

To #33: “How do you suppose we can control this non-deterministic relationship and turn quantum indeterminancy into quantum determinancy *cough* *cough* at will?”

One coherent model for propagating/amplifying ’subjective decisions’ of elemental quantum objects into ’subjective decisions’ of a large collection of such quantum objects making up you or me, is panpsychism (see links in previous post).

There are MANY inconsistencies in Dawkins’ world view, and this is just another. He uses “science” and “logic” and “reason” but he fails to explain how is it that his atheistic worldview justifies such abstract imaterial universal concepts. Dr Greg Bahsen showed that clearly in his debate with Dr Stein, some years back.

To #34 (kairos): “Probably nightlight was more speaking about the mere possibility of indeterminism in the natural world although at the end there is a reference to its direct implications to free will. This last point cannot be (at least now) solved because of the huge amount of complexity embedded in the human brain. Instead the first point is very interesting and not only from a theoretical point of view.”

Yes, there is no presently a scientific model of ‘mind stuff’, hence the present natural science can’t say anything about ‘free will’ (which is an element of ‘mind stuff’). The only potential implication is that any future scientific model of ‘free will’ would have non-deterministic evolution (or its phase). Contrary to both, Dawkins and his critics above, though, the present fundamental physics is indeed non-deterministic theory, exactly as needed to model the ‘free will’ some day.

To #35 (kairos): “However as a matter of fact atheists have very often used determinism as a way to discard God, as the famous phase that Laplace is supposed to have been spoken to Napoleon shows very well.”

Interestingly, the same school of “thought” based on 19th century physics (e.g. Dennett “Consciousness Explained” book or http://www.google.com/search?n.....tnG=Search ) also rejects the ‘mind stuff’ as being an illusion. Yet, the existence of the ‘mind stuff’ is not merely self-evident, but it is the most, if not the sole, self-evident fact altogether. Due to Ockham’s razor, determinism is a weak position to take if one wishes to argue for existence of ‘free will’, ‘mind stuff’ and God.

As luck would have it, the present fundamental physics is non-deterministic. Hence, determinism is not only a weak position, but also a scientifically wrong to the best of present knowledge.

Clarification of ambiguity in #42: “…also rejects the ‘mind stuff’ as being an illusion. ”

What was meant is: “…also rejects the ‘mind stuff’, labeling it as an illusion. “

To #32. (jpark320): “Unless of course, with natural science, you can show that our thoughts (freewill if you, uh, will) are controlled at a level where quantum indetermination is significant - if you can please feel free to share.”

There is no “thought” construct in natural science (the laws of matter-energy transformation). Hence you can’t even ask a scientific question, such as “What is it like to be particular arrangement of atoms that makes you?”, let alone answer it.

Therefore all one can do at present is speculate and toy with heuristic models. My preference is a form of panpsychism, similar to Leibniz’s monads, with a little addition of my own on how such scheme starting with elemental “mind stuff” could give rise to the “mind stuff” at our level (and beyond, such as “mind stuff” at the level of social organism, captured in traditional religions as the ‘god of people’). This addition addresses the “combination problem” of traditional panpsychism, described as:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/#5

————-
“combination problem,” which was first raised by William James, who in the following passage argues that panpsychism will still face its own problem of emergence:

Take a sentence of a dozen words, and take twelve men and tell to each one word. Then stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let each think of his word as intently as he will; nowhere will there be a consciousness of the whole sentence . Where the elemental units are supposed to be feelings, the case is in no wise altered. Take a hundred of them, shuffle them and pack them as close together as you can (whatever that might mean); still each remains the same feeling it always was, shut in its own skin, windowless, ignorant of what the other feelings are and mean. There would be a hundred-and-first feeling there, if, when a group or series of such feeling were set up, a consciousness belonging to the group as such should emerge. And this 101st feeling would be a totally new fact; the 100 original feelings might, by a curious physical law, be a signal for its creation, when they came together; but they would have no substantial identity with it, nor it with them, and one could never deduce the one from the others, or (in any intelligible sense) say that they evolved it (1890/1950, p. 160, original emphasis).

This is a powerful objection since if panpsychism must allow for the emergence of states of consciousness then what prevents an emergence doctrine which avoids the implausible and indiscriminate broadcasting of mental characteristics throughout the world?
——————

My speculative model is sketched in the usenet post:
http://groups.google.com/group.....1dc097e17c

The networks background & references are here:
http://groups.google.com/group.....a8de95db21

where the network harmonization giving rise to Leibniz’s monads
as a limit, the perfect harmonization:
http://groups.google.com/group.....a907f10c22

May I have permission to post Dawkins’ comments on my Pleonast blog? I will give credit as to where I found this information.

Hey, let’s not get sidetracked. At issue here is the fact that in order to hold a position as Dawkins, we have to live with a gross inconsistency–adherence to determinism in order to explain our selfish genes, along with rejection of determinism in order to adhere to a notion of free will. The point is, such an inconsistency is insupportable, unless you base your argument not on logic but on ideology, which is what one invariably does when arguing for Darwinism.

And, at the extreme risk of getting sidetracked, myself: for those of you interested in how quantum physics gives the lie to determinism, allow me to recommend Dr. Amit Goswami’s fascinating treatment of the subject, _The Self-Aware Universe: How Consciousness Creates the Material World_.

#45

“As luck would have it, the present fundamental physics is non-deterministic. Hence, determinism is not only a weak position, but also a scientifically wrong to the best of present knowledge. ”

Some time ago I read with great interest a past interview of Popper concerning his thoughts about determinism dating about 1950. He strongly argued against the reality of determinism and not only for what concerns mind and free will but more essentially for what concerns physical world. He argued that also the classical phisics (typically viewed as deterministic) had not at all deterministic grounds. He also cited a discussion before WWII he had had with many English intellectuals about th reality of determinism. Significantly Bertrand Russell did admit that Popper had argued very well about the fundamental indeterminism of the reality. Sorry not to be able to provide a link in English about this very intersting issue.

@ Designed Jacob - #35

I love Jonathan Edwards and actually have that book and agree whole heartedly with him (Good choice by the way). Since I identify myself so much with his position, was there something I said that made you think I opposed this view - just curious someone would recommend to me a book which very views I try to defend! (I really appreciate it though and I downloaded the pdf you link, really thx alot)

@ Nightlight #47

Thanks for your cordial reply (I think I may have been in a bad mood - please forgive me if I displayed hostility in my response). I will look into this issue. I think I misunderstood what you meant when you said science has no basis for thought. Being in medical school and my understanding of the brain and cognition made my frown at that, but I see now what you are getting at.

I mainly disagreed with your analogy that since things on a quantum level are indeterminant that determinism is now an antiquated question that should have been left in the 19th century.

@ kairos #37

Yes, I agree with you that things on the quantum level can effect macroscopic events (i heard that computer chips have to take quantum effects right?). I was only trying to say that just because things on the quantum level or indeterminant it need not neccessarily be so on the macroscopic level. My main point was that we dont really understand what is going so perfectly that we can conclude that the freewill and determinism debate is over. Good point though (esp. since i agree )

Jpark320, between the Quantum Physics paper and the discussion of The Freedom of the Will, I intended a beat change, so to speak. The free will material was not directed at you specifically, but to the group generally.

I’m glad you enjoy Edwards as much as I do.

The problem of free will is more of a problem dealing with causation than anything else. It seems improbable that something which is caused, like electrons firing in my brain, cause me to raise my arm. However, the question becomes what caused those electrons to fire? Did prior electrons firing cause them or did I, as in myself, cause them to fire?

As for the problem dealing with God and his omiscience, you must understand that classical theism understands God in relation to his will. For example, what people imply is that God, knowing that I will sin tomorrow, is the very necessity of my sinning. However, knowledge does not necessitate any form of cause to my sinning. My choice was the cause that made me sin, not God’s knowledge of such said sinning. Further more, I would contend that this view fails to understand that God’s omscience has two outlets. First is his actual knowledge of what will happen determined by his Sovoreign will and Second is his will of what could happen depending on our choices wich is not determined in any sense other than God has a will for us to live a certain way. The problem then lie in misunderstanding that what God wills cannot be changed and what he does not will can. For example, God has perfect knowledge about who I am and what I will be doing tomorrow at the specific time in which I will sin, time x. However, he also has knowledge of the potential in me to choose not to sin tomorrow at time x. The problem of my choice being determined is only a problem, if in fact God’s knowledge is shown to mean his actual knowledge, Sovoreign will, compared to his general will. In other words the potential for my sin to be determined exists but is not required and thus, I do still infact have free will with regard to the choices I am given.

I was not able to choose where I was born or to whom. I was not able to choose what kind of childhood I would have and such. But, I can control how I reacted to say, having a alcoholic mother when I was young, and say a temptation that is presented to me. Understanding the problem this way reveals our own situation, that what we really do have control over is soley ourselves. Now it does not remove God’s Sovoreign will but nothing could and if you pose naturalism the problem only gets worse because you are then the victim of nothing more than chance. However, in classic theism I can at least truth that God’s goodness is what is helping establish his Sovoreign will with regard to my purpose.

Hope this Helps all of you,

Ricardo

so, Dawkins *might* be a strict determinist? So, he may have no choice but to spend his life fighting strongly for the “common good”, (erasure of religion, etc) essentially because he has no choice in the matter, and despite the fact that the “common good” is a totally meaningless term, since everything’s already predetermined?
Oh?

When materialist physics moved in that direction (with randomness only rescued by Bohr & Schrödinger et al), Darwinism deified chance. Natural Selection may get all the credit, but it’s in no way predictive and hence deterministic. Should the materialists move to a deterministic evolution then they’ll be dumping Darwin in favor of Denton.

Maybe what Dawkins senses is that free will is neither chance nor necessity nor any combination thereof, and so he’d better be careful taking a stand for or against. Argue for it and Darwinism is doomed, argue against it and, well, why argue.

As for Jared L above . . . hmm . . . uh . . . it’s WmAD’s site and though we may disagree with him theologically (I’m sure I do) let’s remember that ID does not insist, as do so many creationists, that the theology is inseparable from the science. It’s a Big Tent really—one that even I (heretic that I am) can fully support. When ID triumphs this will not translate into a return to the Church-State union of Old Europe—providing, of course, that we’re all still on board. So all you Albigensian, Calvinist, Catholic, Pelagian, Protestant, Jewish, Arian, Trinitarian, Binitarian, Unitarian, Mooney, Mormon and moderate Muslim men and women unite! Unite, that is, behind ID, so that when it wins we’ll all have a part in the free-for-all that follows.

Rude,

The only reason I haven’t been